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SYNOPSIS 
 
Researchers have developed investigations into both initial and seasoned equity 
offering (SEO) by obtaining data from developed markets (e.g. Denis, 1994; Kothari 
and Warner, 1997; Corwin, 2003; Eckbo et al., 2006), while the literature in emerging 
markets is relatively neglected. This thesis provides an overview examination of one 
specific emerging region, namely Thailand. Equity financing in Thailand has become 
more widespread in the aftermath of the last economic crisis in 1997. With a more 
recent data set and larger sample size than previous Thai studies, we examine the 
performance of SEO firms between 1999 and 2006. Our thesis findings contribute to 
the existing literature by: (1) examining the SEO samples which focus mainly on 
issuing new shares to existing shareholders, i.e. rights issuing and private placement, 
instead of the general aspect of public offering, (2) applying a different benchmark to 
measure post-issuing performance compared with existing studies and (3) examining 
the relationship between short-term and long-term abnormal returns.  
 
Our evidence reveals that the stock prices react negatively to SEO announcements. 
We also find that there is no relationship between short- and long-term abnormal 
returns. This is a consistent explanation of the characteristics of the Thai capital 
market in practice. In addition, our results from the determinants of SEO underpricing 
are mostly consistent with the previous literature (i.e. Corwin, 2003; Intintoli and 
Kahle, 2009). Lastly, our findings suggest that SEO firms underperform during the 
post-issuing period, particularly one year after issuing new shares. 
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1 
 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background and Motivation 
 
In the studies regarding equity offerings, the evidence of whether an expected 
flotation cost is caused by a security announcement is inconclusive. Nonetheless, it is 
noticed from these studies that equity offerings may be made in two ways. First, an 
expected permanent fall in the issue price is a typical result of the announcement of 
equity offering. Second, the flotation costs could have either a direct or indirect 
impact when the companies raise new capital via equity. Generally, it is possible to 
identify two types of flotation costs: direct and indirect ones. The direct flotation costs 
consist of underwriters‟ fees and out-of-pocket expenses, e.g. fees to law firms, 
accountants, registration fees, etc. The indirect flotation costs, however, contain the 
stock price reaction to both initial public offerings (IPOs, hereafter) and seasoned 
equity offerings (SEOs, hereafter) and to announcements of delay offering or 
cancellation and underpricing. Underpricing is stated to be the most important 
element in the indirect flotation costs, because an underwriter is required to capture 
the association of security offer underpricing (Eckbo et al., 2006).  
 
The survey paper of Eckbo et al. (2006) shows that the majority of existing studies on 
SEOs obtain their data or case study from developed markets. A small amount of SEO 
literature (e.g. La Porta et al., 1999; Salamudin et al., 1999) examines the data from 
2 
 
emerging market(s), leading to a paucity of knowledge in these markets in such a 
particular area as SEOs. Examining an out-of-sample, e.g. an emerging market, 
becomes interesting, not only to fill a gap which is lacking in the literature on these 
markets, but also to highlight differences in institutional characteristics (i.e. high 
volatility, high level of risk and frequent speculations – see Mody, 2004) which are 
other worthwhile reasons. Furthermore, we are able to establish whether the 
consequences from developed markets are carried over to emerging markets. In the 
present study, Thailand has been chosen as the case study of the emerging market. 
This is because the main characteristics of the emerging markets match those revealed 
in the Thai capital market and because Thailand is in transition from a planned 
economy to a free-market one (Mody, 2004). This leads to an increase in foreign 
investment in the Thai capital market; for example, a rise in the number of foreign 
investors in the market, from 19% of total investors in 2001 to 34% of total investors 
in 2006
1
. 
 
In Thailand, financing with equities has become more popular, in particular when the 
country was badly hit by the financial crisis of 1997. To illustrate this, we should 
begin with the downturn of the economy during this crisis. Several banks and 
financial institutions were affected, and some either became bankrupt or had to be 
taken over
2
. Since these institutions were in trouble in the crisis, other companies had 
no confidence in the ability of the banks to provide loans for them, or else the banks 
themselves did not trust these companies to pay back the loans made to them. This 
                                                 
1
 Source: SETSMART as of 31 July 2008. 
2
 In fact, not only were the financial institutions hit by the crisis, but other businesses (non-financial 
companies) were also affected. However, the financial firms appeared to have suffered more from the 
impact. 
3 
 
was because both (the financial and the non-financial firms) were also affected by the 
crisis. As a result, when businesses could not be financed with debt, they turned to 
financing themselves via equities, which would have been the best solution at that 
time. This is because by the time of the financial crisis in 1997, there were no other 
alternative markets, such as bond or derivative ones, in Thailand
3
. Consequently, 
there was an increase in the number of new listed companies on the Stock Exchange 
of Thailand (hereafter, SET) – from 392 firms in 1999 to 518 firms in 2006 and a 
marked rise in number of SEO firms – from 41 firms in 1999 to 116 firms in 20064. 
 
Although the studies of IPOs appear to have been drawn from a wider circle than the 
SEO studies, in the emerging markets in particular, not only in Thailand, the number 
of SEOs in Thailand during the post-crisis period gradually rose (see Figure 3.1 in 
Chapter 3). This is owing to the regulations on equity offerings in Thailand which 
allow SEOs to be made at any time after the IPOs. Therefore, this should make the 
issue of SEOs in Thailand more interesting. Few studies of SEOs have also been 
undertaken in Thailand. One possible reason is that the Thai capital market depends 
normally on technical factors (in term of the external factors such as GDP, the 
exchange rate, inflation, interest rates and money flow-in and –out) rather than 
fundamental factors. This has led to a lack of interest in providing research based on 
theoretical issues and academic styles, which are mostly related fundamental factors. 
As a result, many researchers are likely to be more concerned with technical analyses. 
 
                                                 
3
 The bond market first began trading on the stock exchange in November 2003, while the derivative 
market was established in 2004. 
4
 Source: The SET, as of 31 July 2008. 
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1.2 Main Objectives 
 
The main objective of this thesis is to examine and explore comprehensively the 
performance of SEOs in an emerging market – in the case of Thailand. This will fill 
one of the gaps in this area, as there is a lack of recent SEO studies in the region. In 
addition, this thesis is among the first in Thailand to focus on separating 
considerations on different issuing methods and the offering dilutions (discounting in 
prices in terms of market capitalisation). 
 
We realise from the survey paper of Eckbo et al. (2006) that indirect flotation costs 
seem to be easily and vastly expandable in more detail than direct flotation costs. In 
addition to IPOs, we analyse two categories of indirect flotation costs: stock price 
reaction to SEOs and underpricing, which refer to the study of short-term 
performance. This is because SEO has become more widespread and of interest in 
Thailand. We support this with: (1) a substantial rise in the number of SEOs, from 
106 in 1999 to 403 in 2006 and (2) the fact that SEOs are concerned with issuing new 
equities to existing shareholders rather than to the public. With regard to the stock 
price reaction, the second objective of this thesis concerns the establishment of 
whether the SEO announcement affects the stock price reaction, how the shareholders 
are diluted by the SEO and an examination of the determinant factors which impact 
on the SEO stock price reaction. The study applies the standard event study 
framework with the calculation of abnormal returns via the market model. Instead of 
investigating only the total sample, we intend to make this study more comprehensive 
in order to consider individually the issuing methods available during our study 
5 
 
period. Subsequently, we develop the estimation of factors which affect the SEO 
stock price reaction, based on the characteristics of the Thai capital market. In 
addition, comparisons with the existing literature are brought into the discussion of 
our evidence. Furthermore, the examination of long-term stock price reaction will 
explain the relationship between short- and long-term stock price reactions in 
Thailand, which can be claimed to be new evidence among Thai SEO studies. 
 
We turn our attention to another part of the indirect flotation costs, namely 
underpricing, which is indicated as the most important element. The third objective of 
this thesis is to determine the factors which influence SEO underpricing. This is 
different from our second objective, which concerns precisely the announcement 
effect and market reaction. In this study, we employ a standard OLS (Ordinary Least 
Square) regression to test in three categories related to the previous research and the 
characteristics of the Thai capital market. These categories are information 
asymmetry and uncertainty, price pressure and manipulative trading. Different issuing 
methods are also considered separately in order to have a comprehensive view of this 
area. In our last objective of this thesis, we aim to focus on the way in which SEO 
companies perform in the post-issuing. We consider whether the companies 
underperformed during the post-issuing period by using the Buy-and-Hold Return 
(BHR) approach. Moreover, we bring the issuing methods into consideration, first 
separately and then as a total sample. We believe that each issuing method produces 
some interesting outcomes, and explain how each in turn influences Thai SEO 
companies. In addition, rather than examining the matching firm technique, we 
6 
 
introduce the investigation with the use of benchmarks in the BHR approach. These 
differentiate the present study from all previous ones, in particular those in Thailand. 
 
 
1.3 Contributions 
 
Our study embodies several differences from previous research in this particular area 
of SEOs. First, we provide an out-of-sample examination. Obtaining the data from 
Thailand as an emerging market, we use the existing SEO literature in developed 
markets to develop our hypotheses and to apply the suitable methodologies as 
discussed in those studies to our thesis. Thus, we will examine whether the outcomes 
from developed markets carry over to emerging ones (e.g. Thailand). If this is not the 
case, the research in emerging markets should undergo a specific examination. For 
instance, the data from Thailand (as an emerging market) may need to be examined 
with the basic methodology (i.e. mean-adjusted model, market model and Buy-and-
Hold Return approach) in order to obtain a close reflection of the market in practice. 
This refers to the fact that the market is highly volatile, causing the reactions of the 
stock prices to depend mainly on current situations, announcements and rumours. An 
example of this can be seen when the government announced its intention to return 
the full loan back to the IMF (International Monetary Fund) in February 2003, the 
SET index (the Thai main composite index) reached nearly 800 by the end of the year, 
from around 400 at the beginning of the year. This included a substantial rise in 
7 
 
average daily turnover from THB8,415 million in 2002 to THB20,647 million in 
2004
5
.  
 
In addition to the out-of-sample tests, we fill one of the gaps in the SEO literature by 
expanding the study into the markets which existing research only occasionally 
examines, i.e. the emerging markets. Some examples, which are scrutinised frequently 
in developed markets but rarely in emerging markets, are SEO underpricing and the 
post-issuing performance of SEOs (Chapters 5 and 6 of this thesis). The second 
contribution is that we use a different period of study from previous studies in the 
same area in emerging markets, notably that of Thailand. With a more recent data set, 
the evidence provides some differences in analysis, discussions and conclusions. This 
is because the surrounding situations (e.g. the economy, sample size and regulations) 
tend to change when the time is changed. This leads to changes in the behaviour of 
investors and in company decisions when either investments or decisions have to be 
made. For example, using a period during the post-financial crisis of 1997 (i.e. our 
study period between 1999 and 2006), investors became more interested in the capital 
market. This can be seen by the fact that the combination of the size of the equity 
market (captured via market capitalisation) and the size of the bond market (captured 
via the total unpaid bonds) was twice as large as the bank loans in 2007. This was 
caused by a substantial growth in the equity market since 1996
6
. Applying the post-
                                                 
5
 Source: SETSMART as of 31 July 2008. The exchange rate was briefly at THB33.50: USD1.00. 
6
 Although the proportions of the combination of the capital market (equity and bond) were similar to 
the level of bank loans before 1996, they were slightly different. Unlike the post-financial crisis (i.e. 
after 1997), this proportion reveals a clear improvement in the investment in the capital market, 
particularly in the equity market. Information is taken from The Plan of Developing the Thai Capital 
Market by The Development of the Thai Capital Market Committee on 4 November 2009 (in Thai). 
Available at: http://www.set.or.th/th/about/vision/files/CMP_Master.pdf [Accessed on 5 November 
2010].   
8 
 
financial crisis should also provide a close reflection of the current situation and 
regulations in the capital market. We can point out a specific regulation of 
commission fees, which is at a fixed rate. Thus, the security companies (brokers) will 
benefit from this fixed rate as their main income, leading to high transaction costs for 
investors (SET Research Note, 2009)
7
. This could influence the movement of stock 
prices because it leads to a decision by investors as to whether they will be interested 
in trading in those equities with high transaction costs.    
 
Third, with regard to the SEO sample, our study provides findings which are totally 
different from those of the existing literature in terms of how the SEOs are issued. In 
other words, since new equities in Thailand are usually issued via rights issuing, 
private placement and warrant issuing, there is a small number of firms issuing with 
public offering, which are defined as SEOs in most previous studies. Thus, we do 
sometimes exclude this method from our examinations due to a relatively small 
sample. This elimination should result in differences in the outcomes and other 
aspects compared with the existing literature, where the majority of SEOs refer to 
public offering, unless otherwise stated. Furthermore, our sample provides wider 
sample coverage than the existing literature centred on Thailand. In our empirical 
studies (Chapters 4, 5 and 6), we present the percentage of data coverage compared to 
that in the existing Thai SEO literature. This percentage clearly confirms that our 
sample is much more extensive than previous research in terms of size and the length 
of the period studied. Hence, the larger sample in our study should provide a wider 
                                                 
7
 The Stock Exchange of Thailand (2009) SET Research Note: Deregulation of commission fees – to 
what extent the security companies are ready (in Thai). Vol. 5, pp.1-5, available at: 
http://www.set.or.th/setresearch/files/spotlight/200912_Research_Note_05_2552.pdf [Accessed on 2 
June 2010]. 
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view and more comprehensive investigations.  Fourth, this study considers the 
characteristics of the Thai capital market and the behaviour of Thai investors on the 
part of determinants: both of SEO stock price reaction and SEO underpricing. We 
introduce some factors to be estimated in the regression which are unlikely and not of 
great concern in developed markets or in other emerging markets. For instance, in 
Chapter 4, we employ the price-earning ratio (P/E ratio) into our regression because 
the SET is likely to concern the P/E ratio in the development and improvement of the 
capital market. Ownership is also brought into our estimation in both Chapter 4 and 
Chapter 5, since Thai companies are mostly owned by members of the same family. 
Fifth, we apply a well-known methodology from previous research for measuring 
post-issuing performance since our study is the first study in Thailand based on the 
most recent study period (between 1999 and 2006). In Chapter 6, we examine post-
issuing performance via the Buy-and-Hold Return approach and investigate the firm‟s 
performance with different samples of issuing methods. 
 
Sixth, since no studies in Thailand have separately considered different issuing 
methods at the same time with such a recent data set, considering and comparing the 
issuing methods individually will introduce further evidence into the area of SEOs in 
Thailand. Although some have centred on issuing methods, such as rights issuing and 
private placement, only a few studies have focused on emerging markets. It seemed 
interesting to try to identify how companies perform or how certain factors influence 
SEOs (both stock price reaction and underpricing) in each individual issuing method.  
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Finally, this study is expected to be useful to investors, as well as the managers of 
firms, as it provides more knowledge of SEOs in Thailand. Investors will have a 
better idea of SEOs for their investment decisions based on an analysis of 
fundamental factors; for instance, they will know how the firms are performing during 
the post-issuing period with different sample sizes of issuing methods. The firm 
managers will pay more attention to the factors influencing SEO stock price reaction 
and/or SEO underpricing. They will also notice from our evidence how companies 
perform when different issuing methods are applied. This can be seen, for example, 
from our findings that firms‟ size positively influences the SEO stock prices reaction 
in the total sample and in every issuing method when considered differently. This 
refers to the fact that the larger the company, the more positive is the reaction of stock 
prices. Thus, it makes no difference if issuing methods are used differently. However, 
if we have a difference in outcomes from the different issuing methods, the firm 
managers will be able to choose a specific issuing method (e.g. rights issuing or 
private placement) in order to raise stock prices from the SEO announcements. 
 
 
1.4 Type of Data and the Application of the Methodology 
 
Our study is generally described as a quantitative analysis. We initially collected the 
daily time-series data from the databases (secondary data) during our study period of 
1999 to 2006, and turned to the cross-sectional data when we estimated and analysed 
them. Three main data sources are used throughout this thesis: the SET‟s fact books, 
the SETSMART (SET database: SET Market Analysis and Reporting Tools) and the 
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Thomson One Banker. The first two sources provided the SEO data and the daily 
trading information, e.g. market capitalisation, trading volume and closed prices 
(leading to the calculation of daily returns). The Thomson One Banker supplied the 
financial statements and financial ratios. Initially, our sample shows 1,910 SEOs of 
251 firms listed on the SET. This sample was reduced to 173 companies, following 
the organisation of data in Seiler (2004), together with five different issuing methods: 
rights issuing, private placement, stock dividend, public offering and warrant issuing. 
Among these 173 firms, there are 126 issuing via common stocks (the first four 
methods) and 47 issuing via warrants. We excluded many SEOs due mainly to: (1) the 
sample firms having an “SP” (suspension) sign during our event study period – 115 
days before and after the event and (2) unavailable data, such as no trading and being 
in the rehabilitation group. We also only used the first SEO of each firm in order to 
avoid overlapping in the sample. We applied an event-study framework and a 
standard OLS regression as our main methodology in the study. The abnormal returns 
(hereafter, ARs) were calculated on the basis of the market model. Moreover, a 
specific measurement for post-issuing performance (in terms of long-term 
performance) was obtained, following the suggestions of related studies in these 
areas, i.e. the Buy-and-Hold Return approach. 
 
 
1.5 Organisation of the Study 
 
The rest of our study is organised as follows: Chapter Two reviews the surveys in 
most of the relevant studies of SEOs. We explain in general how the previous studies 
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of SEOs were done, in both developed and emerging markets. We include in this 
chapter the main motivations for our study, together with the summary tables of our 
literature surveys.  
 
In Chapter Three, we begin by discussing why Thailand was chosen as our case study 
to represent the emerging markets. This is followed by a review of the institutional 
background in Thailand, giving general information on the Thai capital market, its 
main characteristics and the national regulations of equity offerings. We present a 
description of the way in which data were collected for the study in the third part of 
this chapter. We close the chapter with the conclusions of the main institutional 
background and our sample size, which will lead to our empirical studies in the 
following chapters. 
 
Chapter Four is the first of our three empirical chapters.  This chapter concerns the 
SEO stock price reaction in Thailand, referred to as one of the indirect flotation costs. 
We introduce the investigation in three main categories: (1) announcement day effect 
and offering dilution, which claim to be the short-term stock price reaction, (2) the 
determinants of SEO stock price reaction and (3) the long-term stock price reaction. A 
standard event study framework and OLS regression are introduced to examine these 
three areas. Furthermore, we provide individual consideration of each issuing method 
available during our study period. The study in sections 1 and 3 focus mainly on how 
stock prices react to the SEO announcement, while section 2 (determinants)  considers 
the fundamental factors influencing SEO stock price reaction, developed from the 
existing literature (mainly in Thailand and emerging markets) and the institutional 
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background in Thailand. In addition, we discuss several possible robustness tests in 
sections 2 and 3 in order to confirm how efficient the evidence is.  
 
Chapter Five presents our second empirical study. The chapter aims to estimate the 
determinants of Thai SEO underpricing, which is another type of indirect flotation 
cost regarding SEOs. We examine the determinants in three areas: asymmetric 
information and uncertainty, price pressure and manipulative trading. Moreover, the 
study takes the different issuing methods into separate consideration. A standard OLS 
regression is chosen to estimate the determinants of SEO underpricing, together with 
a possible robustness test to confirm that our results are robust.  
 
Chapter Six is our last empirical study, with a similar structure to the previous two. 
The chapter concerns the study of the post-issuing performance of Thai SEOs, 
examining whether there is underperformance of SEO firms. We also analyse post-
issuing performance by different issuing methods. This is shown by estimating 
individually different samples of each issuing method under the null hypothesis that 
SEO firms underperformed during the post-issuing period. The Buy-and-Hold Return 
approach is applied in this study as a measurement of post-issuing performance. In 
addition, we examine the different ways of measuring post-issuing performance as 
tests of robustness. 
 
Chapter Seven is the concluding chapter. We summarise the outcomes from the three 
empirical chapters. Moreover, our contributions are compared with the existing 
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research in Thailand. We also make some suggestions, based on the limitations of the 
study, for future research in this area. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE SURVEY 
 
2.1 Introduction  
 
Since equity offering may be seen as an alternative way of financing companies, 
several authors have contributed to the broad range of research in this particular area. 
This chapter surveys various studies relating to both initial public offering (hereafter, 
IPO) and seasoned equity offering (hereafter, SEO). Theoretical studies introduce 
several theories about SEOs, such as agency theory, signalling theory and information 
asymmetry (see Titman and Wessels, 1988; Armitage, 1998; Viswanathan and Wei, 
2005). In addition, the evidence of the empirical studies is mostly consistent with 
those theories in both developed and emerging markets (e.g. Bayless and Chaplinsky, 
1996; Ng and Smith, 1996; Jirasetthakulchai, 2000; Corwin, 2003; Capstaff et al., 
2004; Intintoli and Kahle, 2009). However, there is paucity of SEO research in 
emerging markets compared with that in developed markets. Moreover, the emerging 
market literature focuses mainly on one or two specific areas, such as stock price 
reaction to published events in short-term performance, whereas there is a lack of 
studies on long-term performance. In comparison, the literature on the developed 
market includes wide coverage of the area of SEO. For instance, it considers 
underpricing in relation to regulations (i.e. Rule 10b-21: Corwin, 2003), short-selling 
related to the regulations (i.e. Rule 10b-21: Safieddine and Wilhelm, 1996) and ability 
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to obtain different types of market (i.e. DRs – Depository Receipts in Foerster and 
Korolyi, 2000).  
 
The chapter is organised as follows: section 2.2 will demonstrate the theoretical 
literature of SEOs. Section 2.3 gives several surveys regarding the empirical evidence 
from SEO studies in developed and emerging markets, together with the studies in 
short- and long-term performance. Section 2.4 will present the literature concerning 
the use of methodologies in the examination of SEOs. Section 2.5 is the final part of 
the chapter, containing conclusions about our survey and indicating our motivation. 
 
 
2.2 Theoretical Literature on SEOs  
 
It may be claimed that the studies on SEOs have been developed from capital 
structure theories, such as signalling theory and information asymmetry. We will 
review the studies, which are based on the theories in their examinations and apply to 
both the developed and emerging markets. We summarise the theoretical literature in 
the developed and emerging markets in Tables 2.1 and 2.2, respectively. The main 
details are as follows: 
 
2.2.1 Theoretical Literature on the Developed Markets 
Myers (1983) reveals that an offer of exchange debt for equity is followed on average 
by a rise in stock price and vice versa for the exchange of equity for debt. Titman and 
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Wessels (1988) analyse the explanatory power of some of the optimal capital structure 
theories, namely information asymmetry theory, agency theory and bankruptcy cost 
theory. The suggestion of Grossman and Hart (1982, cited by Titman and Wessels, 
1988, p.3) demonstrates that the higher the threat of bankruptcy costs, the higher the 
debt levels, which reduces the tendency of firm managers to consume more than the 
optimal level of perquisites. Concerning agency theory, short-term debt would lead to 
the mitigation of the agency problem rather than long-term debt. Information 
asymmetry can influence the firms to raise capital from retained earnings, debt and 
issuing new equity, respectively (Titman and Wessels, 1988, p.6). Moreover, these 
theories are claimed by the authors to influence the debt-equity choice of firms in 
different attributes, e.g. asset structure, non-debt tax shields, growth, size, volatility 
and profitability. They also provide a further explanation of capital structure theory by 
conducting empirical studies. For instance, this is done by using a factor-analytic 
technique to measure unobserved variables. This is a direct analogy with the return-
generating process assumed to hold in the Arbitrage Pricing Theory (Titman and 
Wessels, 1988, p.2). This implies that small firms tend to use short-term financing in 
order to avoid the high transaction costs and this could provide some insights into 
possible risk factors (Titman and Wessels, 1988, p.14). 
 
Armitage (1998) reviews previous studies, such as Hertzel and Smith (1993), 
Loughran and Ritter (1995), Armitage and McDiarmid (1997) and Choe et al. (1998), 
of the process whereby further shares are sold to investors by listed firms. He claims 
that when companies are undervalued, purchases of new shares by new investors 
preserve the future gain from being undervalued. Consequently, the existing 
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shareholders are not certain to gain any profit (Armitage, 1998, p.32). In order to 
provide an econometric theory which deals with event studies when events are 
endogenous, Viswanathan and Wei (2005) consider the asymptotic theory for event 
abnormal returns, beginning with an intermediate lemma. In addition, small sample 
theory points out that the determination of the expected bias may be explained by 
sample size and the stationary situation? of the lag number of the events process 
(Viswanathan and Wei, 2005, p.17). 
 
In recent years, Kim and Purnanandam (2006) have examined the importance of the 
theoretical explanations
8
 for the negative investor reaction and to what extent they 
affect and interact in pricing newly issued shares. Their findings conclude that a 
significant cost of issuing new equity in the firm is possibly caused by information 
asymmetry since the firm value is decreasing and the cost of external equity capital is 
increasing (Kim and Purnanandam, 2006, p.32). Additionally, a high degree of 
external monitoring of firms provides no explanatory power from the equity incentive. 
In contrast, if firms have less outside monitoring, there will be a positive and 
significant relationship between investor reaction and equity incentive (Kim and 
Purnanandam, 2006, p.23). 
 
[Insert Table 2.1 here] 
 
 
                                                 
8
 The negative investor reactions, according to the authors, consists of the signalling effect, adverse 
selection problem and agency problems (Kim and Purnanandam, 2006, p.2). 
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2.2.2 Theoretical Literature on the Emerging Markets 
The study of Wiwattanakantang (1999) is perhaps the most relevant paper in this 
section. Her examination applies optimal capital structure theories (e.g. signalling 
theory and agency theory) in Thai companies to estimate the traditional factors 
affecting financing decisions. These factors are stated as profitability, tangibility, 
taxes and growth. Furthermore, firms with different types of controlling shareholders 
seem to have a different capital structure and management ownership has no 
significant effect on debt-equity choice (ibid, p.401). Obtaining the data from the 
questionnaire and applying a multiple regression model, Elashker and 
Wattanasuwannee (2000) provide the same factorial impact on capital structure in 
Thailand as was found in Wiwattanakantang (1999), with the additional factor of 
reputation (associated with the age of firms).  
 
With the review, we realise that information asymmetry, signalling theory and agency 
theory are the capital structure theories which are most often brought into the study of 
SEOs. The main concern is claimed to be the way in which the SEO companies 
perform in the short- and long-term (Titman and Wessels, 1988). Moreover, the value 
of firms and the movement of stock prices are also among the well-known topics 
which can be linked with these theories (Myers, 1983; Armitage, 1998; Kim and 
Purnanandam, 2006). However, it is clear that few studies focus only on theoretical 
issues without some numerical examples. Therefore, we turn next to the empirical 
studies of SEOs. 
 
[Insert Table 2.2 here] 
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2.3 Literature on the Empirical Evidence from SEOs  
 
We provide summaries of the literature on the empirical evidence from SEOs in 
developed and emerging markets in Tables 2.3 and 2.4 respectively, while the main 
explanations are to be found below. 
 
2.3.1 Short-Term Empirical Evidence in Developed Markets 
2.3.1.1 Stock Price Reaction 
Brown and Warner (1985) examine daily stock return properties and the particular 
characteristics of these data with event study methodologies in order to assess the 
share price. After applying a mean-adjusted model and market-adjusted model for 
calculating returns, their results report a highly non-normal for the daily excess 
returns and daily returns in individual securities. Using a sample size three times 
greater than that of Brown and Warner, Mikkelson and Partch (1986) investigate 
further with regard to the nature of information from announcement of offerings. 
They claim that there is a negative movement in stock prices after the SEOs. Thus, 
when managers find their shares are overpriced, equity issuing is preferred. However, 
if the market price is too low, a cancellation action will usually take place. Having 
analysed 531 registered common stocks in the U.S. market, Asquith and Mullins 
(1986) calculate the abnormal returns together with Cumulative Excess Returns 
by employing a two-day excess return to investigate the effect of equity issues 
on security prices. Their study shows a reduction in stock prices when there is an 
)( iCER
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announcement of common equity offerings in over 80% of the sample firms used in 
the study. 
 
Loderer and Mauer (1992), Denis (1994) and Walker and Yost (2007) have produced 
similar studies regarding the relationship between SEOs and market reaction in the 
U.S. They apply standard event study methodologies: i.e. calculation of CARs, 
Tobin‟s Q, and market-book ratio. Then, they consider either the percentage of 
reaction or statistical outcomes from the regression, in which the market model is 
used. All three papers display the same result: that there is no impact between the 
level of leverage or liquidity and the market reaction to the announcement of newly 
issued shares from the firms, even the dividend announcements to some extent 
(Loderer and Mauer, 1992; Walker and Yost, 2007, p.17). Denis (1994), moreover, 
suggests from his cross-sectional regressions that a high level of profitability of 
investment opportunities plays a significant role in the justification of market reaction 
to equity offerings. 
 
Conrad and Kaul (1993) provide an evaluation study concerning the impact of 
information events to the security prices of American companies. Utilising 
Cumulative Raw Returns regression, their evidence indicates nothing referring to 
market overreaction, but the abnormal performance is caused by a measurement of 
January effect and a bias performance. Shivakumar (2000) studies both managerial 
reporting behaviour and investor response around public offerings of common stock 
in the U.S. His results show that there are positive earnings surprises and market 
reaction at earning releases before an offering announcement. Using the calculations 
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based on time-series standard deviation and cross-sectional standard deviation, 
Gajewski and Ginglinger (2002) reveal that there is a negative relationship between 
the stock price performance prior to the offering announcement and the reaction of 
security price. Their results also suggest that when either an investment or an 
acquisition occurs, the market reacts positively, which is consistent with a lower 
adverse selection effect. Masulis and Shivakumar (2002, p.646) suggest that the 
incorporation of new information into market prices can be either accelerated or 
retarded substantially when there are differences in the structure of the market. 
 
After studying the relationship between the sequence of SEOs in the firms making 
multiple offering and the announcement period returns, D‟Mello et al. (2003, p.84) 
find that there is no impact on stock price reaction to the current equity issue 
announcement caused by either expectation of superior performance after the current 
issue or the improvement of firm performance after the previous offer. Furthermore, a 
survey paper by Eckbo et al. (2006) considers an interpretation on the valuation effect 
of security issue announcements under the U.S. sample during the period 1980 – 
2004. They find that “the amount of price dilution depends on the degree to which the 
issuer‟s own shareholders participate in the issue (in a right offer) and the existence of 
strong investment opportunity, as well as on the sequential nature of the issuer‟s 
flotation method choice” (Eckbo et al., 2006, p.114). In addition, Eckbo et al. point 
out that the regulatory changes can lead to an empirical examination of the exogenous 
determinants of issue costs and issuers‟ choice of security and flotation methods. An 
example of the change in regulation is the Security Exchange Commission's (SEC) 
Rule 415 (known as shelf registration), which focuses on lower issue costs. 
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Subsequently, many US firms initially use shelf registration for their SEOs. However, 
in more recent years, only 15% of those firms have employed the shelf registration 
procedure (Eckbo et al., 2006, pp.111 and 141). The problem of adverse selection 
causes the companies to take the benefit of low issuing cost via shelf registration. 
Consequently, the firms appear to apply shelf registration when there is a relatively 
low level of information asymmetry. 
 
2.3.1.2 Determinants of Short-Term Performance 
Many studies of developed markets are concerned with the determinant of factors 
related to SEO. The determinant of SEO stock price reaction and the SEO firm‟s 
operating performance could be claimed to be the most popular areas for discussion. 
Some examples of the factors which are normally considered are firm size, book-to-
market ratio (sometimes employed as market-to-book ratio), leverage and return on 
asset (ROA, hereafter). We have conducted a survey of the literature in these areas 
and summarise its findings as follows. 
 
Hess and Frost (1982) employ an expanded version of the market model
9
, which 
includes the new issue size and stabilisation on stock price 20 days before the new 
issue to 14 days after it. Similar studies have been made in order to apply size as an 
explanatory variable in the regressions; these include the Fama-French model and the 
Buy-and-Hold Return (BHR, hereafter) approach. Some examples of contributors to 
the literature are Teoh et al. (1998b), Spiess and Afflech-Graves (1999), Hertzel et al. 
                                                 
9
 Hess and Frost (1982) apply a model with the additional two variables onto the original market 
model, namely a quantity variable with a time dependent coefficient and a binary variable related also 
to a time dependent coefficient. The reasons for adding these two variables are due to the issue size and 
the overselling of the new issue, respectively. 
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(2002) and Jegadeesh and Karceski (2004). Nevertheless, most of the literature 
relating to SEOs (for instance, Asquith and Muliins, 1986; Eckbo and Masulis, 1995; 
Rangan, 1998; Errunza and Miller, 2003 and Lyandres et al., 2005) considers size as a 
significant part in order to influence the firm‟s valuation and performance. For the 
studies regarding the size of offerings, an early paper by Dimson and Marsh (1986) 
provides the evidence that the misleading longer-term performance is caused by the 
size effect. They also clarify that if there are positive abnormal returns over the pre-
event period, this will lead to the market model‟s alphas having a bias, resulting in 
spurious negative abnormal returns over the post-event period (ibid, p.133). This can 
imply that size, introduced by market model, has an impact upon the firm‟s valuation 
in the U.S. In more recent papers (see Ng and Smith, 1996 and Corwin, 2003), size is 
indicated as the proxy for asymmetric information and uncertainty. It is believed that 
large firms are likely to be associated with lower levels of information asymmetry and 
less uncertainty than small firms (Corwin, 2003, p.2264). 
 
Denis (1994) captures market-to-book ratio (the price-to-book value ratio) for the 
measurement of a company‟s growth opportunity. Price-to-book value is additionally 
applied as an explanatory variable in cross-sectional regressions and tests for 
robustness (see Foerster and Korolyi, 2000 and Kim and Purnanandum, 2006). 
However, this proxy is also utilised as the reverse version ratio as the book-to-market 
ratio, which is normally obtained in the Fama-French model. It is mostly used to 
proxy the firm‟s performance as well as the growth opportunity, especially in the U.S. 
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(see Loughran and Ritter, 1997)
10
.  Some of the related papers are those of Spiess and 
Affleck-Graves (1995), Ng and Smith (1996), Barber and Lyon (1997b), Rangan 
(1998) and Lyandres et al. (2005). These studies believe mainly that there is a 
relationship between this ratio and the security returns. Aside from the reverse 
version, several researchers (e.g. Teoh et al., 1998b; Spiess and Affleck-Graves, 1999; 
Hertzel et al., 2002; Fama and French, 2006) generally apply the book-to-market ratio 
as their independent variable for an examination of the firm‟s performance, 
particularly the Fama-French model. 
 
Two studies concentrate their analysis of the performance of the firm on the leverage 
ratio. Bayless and Chaplinsky (1996) believe that equity is preferable to debt, 
supported by the employment of the target leverage ratio and the leverage ratio itself 
to reach their identification. Since Asquith and Mullins (1986) argue that an 
explanation of negative market reaction is related to an association of changes in 
financial leverage, Lyandres et al. (2005) and Bulter and Wan (2006) apply this ratio 
for their measurement of a firm‟s performance. 
 
It is believed that earnings management could be one of the factors used to identify 
how well the company performs during the time of SEOs. Some authors also analyse 
whether there has been any change in earnings management at the time of SEOs. In 
his paper, Bernard (1992) concludes his findings by stating that the overreaction of 
stock prices might not be a result of the change in the company‟s earning. However, 
                                                 
10
 The paper examines the relation between issuing activity growth and subsequent stock return is 
implied by measuring two types of growth: (1) the change in the rate at the investment and (2) the sales 
growth rate. Therefore, the effect of new issue appears to be independent when high growth seems to 
exist in issuing firms (Loughran and Ritter, 1997, pp.1844-1845). 
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he continues to claim that the possibility still exists that earnings management can 
affect stock price movement. Rangan (1998), who considers all the registered firm-
commitment offerings of stock made by firms in the US market, reports his results 
from discretionary accruals around SEOs, and shows that the earnings in quarters 0 
and 1 are deliberately manipulated by these issuing firms.  In addition, post-offering 
performance showing a fall in earnings in the following year is an outcome from 
earnings management in year 0. Consequently, earnings management over a 1-year 
period around the issuing negatively relates to market-adjusted returns in the 
following year (Rangan, 1998, p.113). 
 
Several works have confirmed that profitability certainly affects the firm‟s capital 
structure choice: e.g. Rajan and Zingales (1995), Wald (1999) and Glen and Singh 
(2004). This is applied by utilising ROA, return on equity (ROE, thereafter), EPS 
(earning-per-share), EBITDA (earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and 
amortisation) and ratio of EBIT (earnings before interest and taxes)-to-total asset, as 
the proxies. For the measurement of operating performance, ROA can be displayed as 
a main proxy. Cooney and Kalay (1993), Rangan (1998), Hertzel et al. (2002) and Fu 
(2006) are among the researchers who have employed ROA in their studies regarding 
equity issuances. Denis (1994) also obtains ROE, instead of ROA, as a proxy linked 
to a firm‟s growth opportunity. 
 
2.3.1.3 Underpricing in Developed Markets 
The underpricing of SEOs is another interesting topic that several studies have 
considered. Although Eckbo et al. (2006) indicate that the literature on SEO 
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underpricing remains lacking, our survey reveals several papers on this particular 
area. In general, we see that underpricing should be equal to the price effect of the 
published information, e.g. SEO announcements, dividend announcements or earnings 
announcements. However, we consider this in a slightly different way in terms of the 
distinction between SEO underpricing and the price effect. The literature on 
underpricing reviewed in this section debates whether the prior SEO price is over or 
under the price after SEOs. In other words, we focus on the way in which the price 
before and after SEOs differs (SEO discounting), while the price effect is mainly 
concerned with the reaction of prices to the SEO announcements, with either a 
positive or negative reaction (focusing more on market reaction). This makes our 
survey of the literature slightly different in its general understanding. 
 
Altinkilic and Hansen (2003) and Corwin (2003) engage in a similar study in order to 
examine the relationship between the offer-day return and unanticipated underpricing, 
and also to analyse the cross-section of seasoned offer pricing and the differences in 
SEO underpricing over time, which are explained by related factors. While Altinkilic 
and Hansen‟s results indicate that the correlation of unanticipated underpricing return 
depends on the information announced, Corwin‟s consequences demonstrate, 
according to the adoption of Rule 10b-21, that SEOs appear to be more underpriced 
when uncertainty over prices is high. Kim and Hyun-Han (2004) explain that the rise 
in SEO underpricing is observed when there is a shift in market conditions, i.e. a 
change in the economy, in the capital market or in the goods markets. These changes 
are caused by a temporary decrease in prices caused by short sales. Moreover, Mola 
and Loughran (2004) show that the SEO discount (underpricing) will not be 
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minimised as long as there is a rise in discounts over time. Nevertheless, the full 
explanation for increased SEO underpricing is still lacking (Eckbo et al., 2006, p.33).  
 
Having employed three model categories (Ordinary Least Square, Probit model and 
Tobit model) in his examination, Shaorong (2005) finds no relationship between 
underpricing and the probability of SEOs, whereas a positive relation to insider 
selling is revealed at the time of the SEO. The latter case is consistent with the 
signalling model. Yongtae and Myung Seok (2005) demonstrate the finding that 
issuers with low information asymmetry are less significant in the negative 
relationship between earning management and SEO underpricing. Eckbo et al. (2006) 
review different literature on the underpricing of SEOs. They also conclude that the 
findings on underpricing are significantly related to three main characteristics: (1) the 
company‟s characteristics, e.g. share ownership structure, firm size and financial 
condition, (2) characteristics of related securities, e.g. security volatility, exchange 
listing, listed stock options and market microstructure properties and (3) the 
characteristics of offering, e.g. capital market condition, offer price, offer size and 
underwriting syndicate (Eckbo et al., 2006, p.36). The study by Intintoli and Kahle 
(2009) reports that high insider ownership can cause not only an increase in price 
pressure and lower level of float at the time of SEOs, but also makes the management 
of the firm  concentrate more on underpricing if their personal wealth is affected. 
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2.3.1.4 Other Related Studies of Short-Term Empirical Evidence in Developed 
Markets 
Some studies use a particular issuing method (e.g. rights issuing and private 
placement) to examine short-term performance in their SEO research. The findings of 
Eckbo and Masulis (1992, p.329) reveal that when the firms adopt a dividend 
reinvestment plan, there is a reduction in rights issues in parallel, allowing common 
stock to be paid as dividend. Burton et al. (1999, p.461) suggest that companies prefer 
to issue new shares via rights issuing when existing shareholders have an opportunity 
to gain ARs by discounting the over-valued shares.  In contrast, Gajewski and 
Ginglinger (2002, p.25) claim that different issuing methods have no impact on a 
positive reaction in the market when the offering is underwritten. Concerning 
Australian public companies, Balachandran et al. (2008b, p.30) demonstrate the 
decrease in the wealth of the rights announcement, together with some degree of 
subsequent recovery around the offer expiry date. In addition, Balchandran et al. 
(2008a, p.39) find that the placement of book-building is chosen by firms with the 
lowest information asymmetry and those with the most widely dispersed ownership, 
while the rights issue has become popular for firms with low-in-information 
asymmetry and with intermediate levels of ownership concentration.  
 
Bayless and Chaplinsky (1996) examine the determinants of market condition (i.e. the 
HOT period) as to whether they are identified by the aggregate volume of equity 
issues among SEO firms in the US. According to t-statistic and the magnitude of the 
coefficients, their results report that the relationship between asymmetric information 
and firm-specific characteristics in hot markets reveals less impact on the errors of 
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announcement date prediction than in cold markets. Safieddine and Wilhelm (1996) 
and Kim and Hyun-Han (2004) made a similar investigation into the magnitude and 
nature of short-selling activity around equity offerings with an adoption of Rule 10b-
21
11
 of companies listed in NYSE and AMEX. Having estimated that there has been a 
temporary decrease in prices caused by short-selling if the result shows there is a 
performance drop, this can indicate that short-selling activities are not manipulative 
and are information based. This leads to the explanation that the rise in SEO 
underpricing is shown when there is a shift in market conditions
12
 rather than a shift 
in offer characteristics (Kim and Hyun-Han, 2004, p.362). Furthermore, Safieddine 
and Wilhelm (1996, p.747) suggest that if a substitution of short-selling becomes the 
listed options
13
, there is less observation of a statistically significant relationship 
between relative short interest for firms with listed option and issue discounts. Thus, 
option open interest and abnormally high levels of short-selling play a significant role 
in characterising seasoned offerings. In addition, since regulatory arbitrage is 
impossible, short-selling activity is curbed and issue discounts will be reduced by the 
adoption of Rule 10b-21. 
 
Chaplisky and Ramchand (2000) discover that domestic issues have a lower offer 
price relative to global equity issues. This lower offer price is suggested by either the 
opposite movement in price during the offering interval, or no global issues to be 
offset with higher costs of direct issue (ibid, p.2787). Regarding the size-matching 
                                                 
11
 Rule 10b-21 imposes restraints on the covering of short-sales using shares from SEOs. This rule also 
prohibits traders from covering short positions established during the waiting period with new shares 
purchased at the offer prices (Kim and Hyun-Hun, 2004, p.344). 
12
 For example, change in the economy, change in capital market, and change in goods markets (Kim 
and Hyun-Han, 2004, p.362). 
13
 Firms with listed options face larger expected issue discounts than firms without listed options 
following the adoption of Rule 10b-21 (Safieddine and Wilhelm, 1996, p.746). 
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portfolios, Huh and Subrahmanyam (2004) study how SEOs characterise order 
imbalance and returns with a sample period of 11 years (1988-1998). Their outcomes 
report a confirmation of correlation coefficient in the two-way sorting, which 
demonstrates that there is delink in the NOIMB
 14
 – return during the post-issue 
period, in which the small-sized SEO firm portfolio is more likely to be bought by 
individual investors. Having explored the relation between short selling and returns 
around SEOs, Henry and Koski (2008) find an increase in the discount of 
manipulative trading with a reduction of the informativeness in secondary market net 
order flow. As a consequence, profit may be gained by the impact of manipulative 
short sellers who are trading in the secondary market at a discount, and there is a 
substantial relation between larger issue discount and short selling closer to the issue 
date (Henry and Koshi, 2008, p.9).  
 
2.3.2 Empirical Evidence on Long-Term Performance in Developed Markets 
There are many studies of long-term performance in developed markets. The paper by 
Healy and Palepu (1990), to start with, examines the nature of information on equity 
offers by analysing post-offer changes in asset and equity betas, financial leverage, 
unsystematic risk, earning levels and analysts‟ earnings forecasts. They reveal that a 
post-offer increase in earning volume is not caused by an industry-wide rise in 
earning volume. When the business risk of firms increases at the same time as a 
probability of financial distress, financial leverage is reduced by firms‟ issuing 
common stock (Healy and Palepu, 1990, p.45). Teoh et al. (1998b) suggest that there 
is a difference in the large long-run return between conservative and aggressive firms 
                                                 
14
 NOIMB stands for a scaled measured of order imbalances in the number of trades. It is more likely to 
pick up the trading behaviour of small traders (Huh and Subrahmanyam, 2004, p.5). 
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in the U.S. Therefore, an explanation of poor post-issue performance is partially 
presented in the pre-issue earnings management of seasoned new issuers, which might 
affect the shareholders‟ wealth. 
 
Apart from surveys of the U.S., Soucik and Allen (1999a) choose the Australian Stock 
Exchange (ASE) to analyse whether the underperformance of SEO firms during the 
long-term period (January 1984 through October 1993) is a fact or an illusion. Their 
findings indicate that there is no aggregate of SEOs underperforming in a real long-
run period owing to the crossing over of SEO companies from an under- to an over-
performance period. In addition, not only are there significant positive initial returns 
in firms issuing seasoned equity, but there is also a relationship between the extent of 
initial returns and subsequent underperformance, conditional on a correct definition of 
the initial gain (Soucik and Allen, 1999a, pp.23-24). Having studied long-run 
performance and insider trading around cancelled and completed SEOs, Clarke et al. 
(2001) demonstrate that a prediction of post-offering returns can depend on pre-filing 
insider trading in completed offerings and vice versa in cancellation offerings. 
Regarding the firms conducting private equity issues, Hertzel et al. (2002) find in 
their results that when investors are willing to overpay the firm‟s equity, the company 
would prefer to issue these new shares via private placement, due to the negative 
nature of post-issue stock-price performance. A similar study by Krishnamurthy et al. 
(2005), which considers the issue of new shares via private placement, shows no 
evidence of underperformance among firms which make private placements to 
affiliated firms, and this is consistent with the view that these investors avoid 
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placement by firms about which the market is overly optimistic (Krishnamurthy et al., 
2005, p.231). 
 
In more recent years, Lyandres et al. (2005) explain why the underperformance 
following SEO is substantially reduced by capital investment with the result that 
matching non-issuers invest less than equity issuers both before and after issuance. 
Moreover, since the measurement of book leverage is applied, their results indicate 
that leverage ratios are negatively related to future returns and cast additional doubt 
on the leverage explanation of SEO underperformance. The survey paper of Eckbo et 
al. (2006) includes extended evidence on the issuing firms‟ performance in the 5-year 
post-issue period after examining the short-term performance. 
 
[Insert Table 2.3 here] 
 
2.3.3 Empirical Evidence in Emerging Markets 
The study of stock price reaction remains popular in accounts of short-term 
performance, which several authors give via the sample size from emerging markets. 
Similar to those of developed markets, the studies of earning management, firm 
performance, dividend announcement and stock splits can also be used in estimating 
how the markets react to these particular events. As usual, event study frameworks are 
normally used, together with other regressions (e.g. cross-sectional regression) in 
order to determine the factors in the SEO stock price reaction. The short-term 
performance of the examples in these studies is described as follows. Aydoğan and 
Muradoğlu (1998) analyse whether the announcement or the implementation of stock 
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dividend and rights offerings convey new information in a thinly traded market. 
Obtaining 109 events (rights offerings and stock dividend announcements) between 
1988 and 1993 from the Istanbul Stock Exchange, they report that stock prices react 
positively during the initial phase of the market (during 1988 to 1990). Nonetheless, 
there are no significant price reactions during the second phase of the market, when 
the market is stated to be more mature (Aydoğan and Muradoğlu, 1998, p.48).   
 
La Porta et al. (1999) studied the top 20 firms ranked by their market capitalisation of 
common equity at the end of 1995 to investigate additional evidence on ownership 
structure in several countries (i.e. Argentina, Korea and Mexico). Their results 
suggest that ownership may depend on how large the firm is. Applying a standard 
event study and cross-sectional regression, Salamudin et al. (1999) examine the 
average abnormal return (AR) around the event dates of rights issues in Malaysia. 
Their findings indicate that differences in economic conditions sometimes drive the 
companies to issue new equity via rights offerings (ibid, p.421).  They also find 
significant positive pre-announcement returns when there is news (announcements) of 
impending rights issues (Salamudin et al., 1999, p.417). 
 
Concerning a sample of stock splits undertaken in the Indian stock market in 1999-
2005, Mishara (2007) considers the market effect of stock splits on stock price, return, 
volatility and trading volume. The empirical outcomes suggest that there is a 
substantial rise in stock volatility and volume, while the reverse is true in stock price 
and return after splitting. This implies that the induction of stock splits allows brokers 
to revise their optimistic valuation about the future performance of firms (Mishara, 
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2007, p.267). In a more recent paper, Dasilas (2009) investigates whether the stock 
price and trading volume respond to dividend announcements in Greece. Having 
obtained the “wave model”, together with a standard event study, his results provide a 
statistically significant market reaction on the announcement of a dividend. In 
addition, the stock price reaction is positively related to the dividend signalling 
hypothesis. 
 
In Thailand, the studies of short-term performance normally focus on the market 
reaction to dividend announcements, operating performance and equity 
announcements (both IPOs and SEOs). For instance, Jirasetthakulchai (2000) 
examines the relationship between the dividend announcement effect and equity 
offerings from 1977 to 1997. Her consequences show a positive reaction in the stock 
price during the post-SEO period and the dividend announcement is referred to as a 
signal to the market. Lertsupongkit (2002) and Vithessonthi (2008) consider similar 
investigations into stock price reaction to SEO announcements in Thailand. Their 
findings report a negative price reaction to the SEO announcements. Moreover, 
Limpaphayom and Ngamwutikul (2004) explain that operating performance changes 
when considered with SEO firms‟ capital structure and their characteristics.  
 
In the above survey of the work on short-term performance in emerging markets, the 
results from this research mostly appear consistent with those of previous works on 
either the emerging markets themselves or on the developed markets.  Nevertheless, 
in comparison with the research in the same area in developed markets, the studies in 
emerging markets of short-term performance need to be expanded. This is possibly 
36 
 
because they are not as widely covered in various areas as they have been in 
developed markets. Some examples of this could be claimed to be firm performance, 
the dilution effect, the determinant of factors in the SEO stock price reaction and 
underpricing. It should also be noted that the studies of emerging markets are still few 
in number. 
 
Research into long-term performance in emerging markets is scarce. Examples of 
such studies of long-term performance (including the Asian-Pacific countries) are as 
follows. Dhatt et al. (1996) study the relationship between market reactions and rights 
issues in Korea during a 15-year period. Employing the BHR approach, their evidence 
indicates that there is a positive relation between market reaction and the rights issues 
in the firms which have a greater decline in level of leverage (ibid, p.41), while the 
firms underperform during the post-issue period. With the sample of SEOs in 
Australia, Soucik and Allen (1999b) control for risk in order to reassess the factors 
affecting post-issue performance. With regard to the performance of SEO firms via 
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs), their consequences confirm that the SEO firms 
continue to underperform when risk is accounted for (ibid, p.1839). Matthew (2002) 
focuses on three Asian markets, Japan, Korea and Hong Kong, in order to examine 
whether the regulatory and organisational structures are related to the long-horizon 
performance. His findings on Japan and Hong Kong provide an explanation of why 
SEO firms underperform in the post-issuing period long-term, while Korean 
companies overperform during the same period. 
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Research on long-term performance in Thailand is rare in terms of SEOs. A recent 
study by Chorruk and Worthington (2009) still considers the IPO sample, which 
appears to be a more popular topic in long-term studies. The earlier studies in 
Thailand, such as Limpaphayom and Ngamwutikul (2004), however, reveal no sign of 
underperformance in Thai SEOs in the post-offering period. However, we can gather 
from our survey of the workings of long-term performance in emerging markets that 
in general companies making SEOs continue to underperform during the post-issuing 
period. 
 
[Insert Table 2.4 here] 
 
Our review shows that the main concern of the empirical studies of emerging markets 
seems to be the market reaction to SEO announcements and published events (i.e. 
dividend announcements and stock splits) in the short term, and the way in which 
companies perform in the longer term. It is clear that SEO research into emerging 
markets is not as wide in some areas as it is in developed markets. Although some 
results in emerging markets provide conclusions consistent with those in developed 
markets, owing to their high volatility and small size we may have different and more 
varied outcomes when we obtain the data from emerging markets in any specific 
period. Consequently, if we believe that the SEO aspect is the same in both markets, 
the effect should carry over to the emerging markets, or at least move in a similar 
direction. Further clarification in the literature on empirical evidence in emerging 
markets is discussed in more specific detail in the empirical chapters. 
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2.3.4 Summaries of SEO Empirical Evidence 
From the review of several studies of the empirical evidence of SEOs in developed 
markets, it has emerged that the most popular areas in short-term performance (which 
many authors are concerned with) appear to be the stock price reaction, determinants 
and underpricing. The papers in these particular areas range from those of Asquith 
and Mullins (1986), to Mikkelson and Partch (1986), Loderer and Maner (1992), 
Denis (1994), Altinkilic and Hansen (2003), Corwin (2003), Eckbo et al. (2006), 
Walker and Yost (2007) and Balachandran et al. (2008a). The outcomes mostly 
indicate that stock prices tend to decline after an SEO. Moreover, the survey 
conducted by Eckbo et al. (2006, p.22) identifies an interesting feature to cover the 
examination of short-term performance: that companies need to consider the flotation 
costs when they are searching for some source of financing beside debt. In the long-
term studies, researchers are mainly concerned with assessing how well the SEO 
companies perform during the post-issuing period. The general outcomes in most 
cases reveal that SEO firms perform poorly during the post-event. 
 
The SEO literature on emerging markets is different to the SEO literature on 
developed markets. This is seen not only in terms of the different amount of SEO 
research between emerging and developed markets, but also implies that SEO 
research in emerging markets frequently focuses on a particular area. For instance, we 
found in section 2.3.3 that the emerging market literature mainly considers stock price 
reaction to published events (i.e. rights issuing, SEO announcements, stock splits and 
stock dividend) in short-term performance (see, for example, Aydoğan and 
Muradoğlu, 1998; Salamudin et al., 1999; Lertsupongkit, 2002). Consequently, the 
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SEO literature on developed markets is concerned with wider areas, such as the 
determinants of short-term performance (i.e. in terms of firms' valuation – Dimson 
and Marsh, 1986; Ng and Smith, 1996; Rangan, 1998; Hertzel et al., 2002), the 
relationship between the regulations (i.e. Rule 10b-21) and underpricing (Corwin, 
2003) or short-selling (Safieddine and Wilhelm, 1996) and offering dilution (Asquith 
and Mullins, 1986). 
 
Nonetheless, we are aware from our literature survey, in particular on emerging 
markets, that some topics are relevant enough in our case to be linked with the study 
of SEOs in Thailand. First, the research on SEOs in this region concentrates mainly 
on applying the event study framework to examine how SEOs are related to: (1) stock 
price reaction, (2) the announcement of dividends, or (3) the operating performance of 
the companies. With samples of different sizes from different emerging markets, most 
of these works provide a statistically significant market reaction and show that the 
operating performance influences the capital structure of SEO companies. However, 
since emerging markets are highly volatile, applying the data from different emerging 
markets can make the outcomes different, possibly reflecting the characteristics of 
each market. Consequently, the evidence may remain inconclusive at some stage. 
Second, the empirical studies of SEOs in emerging markets appear to be less 
comprehensive and varied in some areas than such studies of developed markets. 
These areas include the dilution effect, SEO determinants and the firm performance 
over the long term. Moreover, with so few studies in these areas, we know very little 
about whether the evidence in emerging markets should be interpreted in the same 
way as it is in the developed markets. Third, the SEO empirical literature on emerging 
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markets concentrates less on the different methods of issuing. Although some papers 
consider such methods as rights issuing and private placements, they are still in 
limited areas, e.g. examining the subject with regard to the stock price (market) 
reaction. 
 
 
2.4 Literature on Methodology for SEOs  
 
Summaries of the literature on methodology for SEOs in both developed and 
emerging markets are provided in Tables 2.5 and 2.6, respectively. The details of 
main concern are explained as follows. 
 
2.4.1 The Use of Methodologies in Short-Term Performance in Developed 
Markets 
An early study by Dyckman et al. (1984) compares five return models: (1) Mean-
Adjusted Returns Model, (2) Market-Adjusted Return Model, (3) Market Model, (4) 
Scholes-William Beta Model and (5) Dimson Beta Model, to examine the interaction 
of portfolio size, the magnitude of abnormal performance and event-date uncertainty 
as to whether they have a substantial effect on the researcher‟s ability to detect 
abnormal performance. Their conclusions report that “estimating with the t-test in 
Mean-Adjusted Returns Model, Market-Adjusted Return Model and Market Model, 
the evidence is well specified in rejecting the  existence of abnormal performance 
when it is not presented” (Dyckman et al., 1984, p.10). In addition, their results from 
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the clustering in the power of the test are illustrated by the lower percentage of times 
that the abnormal performance is detected in the test. Moreover, issuing new shares 
can influence the number of shares outstanding and the firm‟s capital structure. 
Information asymmetry is also another interesting area affecting the SEO of 
companies. Krasker (1986) characterises the function relating the change in stock 
price of American companies and the number of new shares issued when there is 
information asymmetry. He reports that a non-increasing function of the issue size is 
able to represent the share price in equilibrium. Furthermore, the author reveals the 
conclusion of Myers and Majluf (1984, cited by Krasker, 1986, p.103) that the 
association of the adverse selection problem is reported by the issuance of risky 
securities, either debt or equity.   
 
The study of Corrado (1989) shows a new nonparametric rank test for abnormal 
security – price performance during the period of July 1962 through December 1986 
in the U.S. His findings, which focus principally on the Rank Test, report that there is 
a slight difference in the rank statistic and the expectation from a standard normal 
population in any size of portfolio. Although the Rank Test seems to be unsuitable for 
the misspecification test, it is more powerful than its parametric counterparts when 
abnormal performance is revealed (Corrado, 1989, p.395). Lucas and McDonald 
(1990) generally display models and other characteristics of U.S. firms for their equity 
issuing and securities prices. Their results (which claim from the study of Korajczyk 
et al., 1990) suggest that CARs rise until the announcement date and drop 
substantially on the issue date (Lucas and McDonald, 1990, p.1030). Moreover, they 
explain the time variation in the aggregate average quality of asset for the issuance of 
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equity and the stock prices. Harris and Raviv (1991) focus on the theory of capital 
structure with reference to asymmetric information. They mention a relation between 
capital structure theory and takeover contests as two points (which may be the closest 
link to SEOs): (1) a rise in level of average debt caused by the targets of takeovers 
and accompanied by a positive stock price reaction and (2) a negative relation on 
average among leverage if the tender offer succeeds. 
 
Fama and French (1992, p.445) describe their findings based on Banz (1981), 
Bhandari (1988) and Basu (1983), that the relation between earning/price and average 
return seems to be absorbed by the combination of size and book-to-market equity. 
Therefore, high book-to-market equity ratio is a consequence when the firm has a 
high earning-to-price ratio. Fama and French (1992) also present the Fama-French 
model by using the time-series regression approach of Black, Jensen and Schole 
(1972, cited by Fama-French, 1992). With this model, a prediction of stock and bond 
returns can be provided in four different ways: (1) dividend yields, (2) default 
spreads, (3) term spreads and (4) short-term interest rates. In order to isolate the firm-
specific components of returns, the Fama-French model suggests using the residual 
from 3-factor regression, including SMB and HML
15
. Moreover, size and average 
return show a negative relationship, while average return and book-to-market equity 
are positively related and more consistent (Fama and French, 1992, pp.449-450). 
 
In order to investigate the effects and nature of stock price manipulation around an 
SEO, Gerard and Nanda (1993) apply a concept of equilibrium in the U.S., known as 
                                                 
15
 SMB is small-minus-big, and HML is high-minus-low. 
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Sequential Nash
16
, under their corollary that the expected terminal value of the 
security conditional on all public information is always higher or equal to the SEO 
issue price. They show that there is no occurrence of manipulation when the informal 
trader‟s information is perfectly disclosed by the second market trading prior to the 
SEOs. Additionally, an announcement of new equity sales is more preferable for firms 
in the following week of a quarterly earnings report than before the release of such 
information (Korajcyk et al., 1991, cited by Gerard and Nanda, 1993, p.236). 
Thompson (1995) interprets the methodology of event studies in corporate finance. 
He reveals that daily security return distribution has fatter tails than normal (Fama, 
1965, cited by Thompson, 1995, p.988) and suggests two methods for confirmation. 
These two methods are based on the assumption of cross-sectional independence and 
normal theory after the elimination of outliers from the sample.  
 
Illustrating the event study framework, which is the study of short-term performance, 
a classic paper by MacKinlay (1997) explains step-by-step the process of applying an 
event study. He suggests four possible models for the calculation of abnormal returns: 
(1) the Constant Mean Return Model – referred to as the simplest model, (2) the 
Market Model, (3) the Statistical Model and (4) the Economic Model, such as CAPM 
(Capital Asset Pricing Model) and APT (Asset Pricing Theory). The Sign Test and 
Rank Test are also identified as non-parametric tests for event studies. Campbell et al. 
(1997) demonstrate event study models in a way similar to that indicated by 
MacKinlay (1997). Nevertheless, they describe the statistical models as factor models 
and another variant of the factor model, the latter being said to be a multi-factor 
                                                 
16
 It can be demonstrated that the complete characterisation of a player‟s actions is stated to be a strategy for 
information set in each period (Gerard and Nanda, 1993, p.219). 
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model. Campbell et al. (1997) also mention some possible biases: for instance, 
calculation of closing price is not done at the same time every day. Seiler (2004) 
provides a process of organising the data set in Excel for event studies. Information 
leakage after the announcement of earning is applied as an example. 
 
Driscoll and Kraay (1998) examine common non-parametric covariance matrix 
estimate techniques. Utilising Monte Carlo experiments, they find that the 
performances of the OLS (Ordinary Least Square) and SUR (Seemingly Unrelated 
Regressions) estimators have an opposite relationship to the size of the cross-sectional 
dimension. Referring to the previous literature in order to examine reasonable 
alternative to market efficiency, Fama (1998) suggests that the use of firm-specific 
models for expected returns (i.e. market model and comparison period approach) 
would possibly limit bad-model problems, instead of the formal asset pricing model.  
 
Referring to the U.S. and Canadian data, Graham and Harvey (2001) find that there is 
no relation between stock valuation on equity issuance and information asymmetry 
indicated by non-dividend paying status and small size. They also note a clarification 
of small firms that should have an incidence of paying dividends and a proportion of 
foreign revenue, being lower in credit rating and higher in proportion of management 
ownership and the chance of being privately owned. Bancel and Mittoo (2002) 
explore the link between the theory and practice of capital structure, also based on 
U.S. firms. Their findings show that the behaviour of managers seemed to be driven 
by two main points in order to face financial policy decisions; namely, the impact of 
financial statements and the search for financial flexibility. Butler et al. (2005) 
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evaluate the forecasting ability of the equity share in total new issues. Their evidence 
shows that the in-sample relationship between future stock market returns is driven by 
an aggregation of pseudo-market timing.  
 
Cai and Zhang (2006) select the Fama–MacBeth (1973) type cross-sectional 
regressions for the test of firm characteristics such as earnings and growth 
opportunity. Their results from this regression show that the effect of capital structure 
innovation on stock returns is not proxy for the effects of earnings and other firm 
characteristics. In asset-pricing factors, nevertheless, there is no full explanation for 
the negative effect of leverage change. Aktas et al. (2007) apply a two-state market 
model (TSMM) based on Markov Switching regression and developed by Hamilton 
(1989, 1994) to solve the contaminating event problem. They discover that, compared 
to the BETA-1 and GARCH models
17
, the TSMM is the most powerful test, while 
those two are not affected by the contaminating events (Aktas et al., 2007, p.140). 
Dietrich (2007) describes how a requirement of internal funds rises for the investment 
of first – best optimally when there is more diversity in an issue. McLean et al. (2007) 
explain the results from Value-Weighted Fama-MacBeth Regressions of holding 
period returns on share issuance measures thus: if the regression includes the country 
dummies, there will be a slightly stronger effect of the issuance. This implies that the 
issuance effect plays a better role within a country, rather than across countries. In 
addition, a limitation of international buyback effect appears to be in small stocks.  
 
                                                 
17
 GARCH stands for Generalise Auto Regressive Conditionally Heteroscedastic. For further explanation of 
these two tests, as well as the other, see Aktas et al. (2007). 
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Spiegel and Watanabe (2007) describe a model in which firms seek to maximise 
proceeds from net equity issuance. They discover that shares tend to be markedly 
issued by growth stocks and their results are also robust to such correlated shocks, e.g. 
dividend shocks. Since the endogenous equity issuance offsets the exogenous supply 
shocks, higher equity issuance accompanying higher current price is followed by 
lower subsequent returns and vice versa (Spiegel and Watanabe, 2007, p.22). 
Armitage (2008) identifies who the buyers are in rights, placing and open offers by 
concluding that existing holders are a main source of new equity, even in pure 
placing. Since the standard Myers-Majluf theory expects that new shares should be 
bought by new investors, any of the SEO methods used in the UK cannot be applied 
with this theory (Armitage, 2008, p.35). Finally, Hoechle and Zimmermann (2008) 
obtain main data in Switzerland to present a regression-based generalisation of the 
calendar time portfolio approach. There are four approaches mentioned in this paper: 
(1) the calendar time portfolio approach (Jensen-alpha methodology), (2) a panel 
regression based approach, (3) the CrossReg approach and (4) the CalTime approach. 
Their investigations show that “it is important to rely on a technique which explicitly 
accounts for cross-sectional dependence” (Hoechle and Zimmermann, 2008, p.12). 
Furthermore, an explanation of private investors pronounced home bias can be 
claimed when the transaction cost of international stock trades is high (ibid, pp.15-
16). 
 
Having surveyed the use of different methodologies for short-term performance in the 
developed markets, we realise that the event study framework and the econometric 
regressions (i.e. the Fama-French model, the Fama-MacBeth, OLS and the cross-
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sectional model) were among the methodologies being used in much of the SEO 
literature on developed markets regarding short-term performance. In general, we 
noticed that, with short-term performance, the main objective should be the 
relationship between particular events (such as the market reaction) and the SEO 
announcements. Therefore, employing the event study framework would provide a 
better standpoint from which to investigate how the market reacts, for instance, to the 
announcement of an SEO. In addition, regarding several regression models, namely, 
the Fama-French model, the Fama-MacBeth model, the standard OLS and the cross-
sectional model, it is a useful methodology for analysing the determinants of SEO 
stock price reaction or even underpricing. In addition to these two popular 
methodologies, some studies (e.g. Corrado, 1989 and Driscoll and Kraay, 1998) have 
introduced non-parametric examinations, such as the rank test and the covariance 
matrix estimate technique, to examine the explanatory variables in more detail in the 
cross-sectional regressions. 
 
However, using such typical methodologies as the event study framework can 
highlight drawbacks. This is particularly the case when different models are employed 
for measuring abnormal return. For instance, there are as a rule four possible models 
for capturing abnormal return when we consider the event study technique (see 
MacKinlay, 1997). Although the market model is claimed to be the one most 
frequently used, its results may provide a bad model for the estimation (Fama, 1998). 
This could influence the discussion of the evidence, because the final model would 
not be the best fit for the data. Consequently, it is to some extent worth employing 
another model for the robustness check of the results, if possible. 
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2.4.2 The Use of Methodologies in Long-Term Performance in Developed 
Markets 
A basic study by Asquith and Mullins (1986) contains a calculation of cumulative 
excess return (CER) in order to examine a firm‟s performance and that of the market 
as a whole. Their findings reveal that pre-announcement market-adjusted returns 
exceed post-announcement market-adjusted returns and that no timing pattern 
occurred in their data. Dimson and Marsh (1986) present evidence that a distortion of 
long-term performance measures is due to the size effect, applying methodology 
which takes account of the size effect in the UK market. They show that an 
examination of the post-publication period appears to be longer when the abnormal 
returns are larger in absolute magnitude. Moreover, they observe that studies of the 
impact of size on events have four severe problems: (1) a long measurement interval, 
(2) the systematic difference in size of event securities, or in the weighting of the 
index constituents, (3) a large and/or volatile element in the size effect and (4) the use 
of CAPM-type methodologies.  
 
Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1995) explore the U.S. in investigating long-run stock 
prices and returns compared with the ability of managers to exploit over-valuation 
opportunities. Their evidence reports that an association of smaller firms appears to 
underperform more severely since there is the least Wealth Relative in the firms 
which are in the smallest-size quintile. Moreover, there is a scattering of long-term 
underperformance for issuing firms in most industries, which does not affect 
particular industries (Spiess and Affleck-Graves, 1995. p.262). Barber et al. (1996) 
suggest alternative methods for the testing of long-run abnormal returns. These 
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methods are, for instance, the long horizon of Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns 
(BHARs, hereafter), skewness-adjusted t-statistic and the simulation method. 
Furthermore, the methods should control for three sources of bias: new listing or 
survivor bias, rebalancing bias and skewness bias (Barber et al., 1996, pp.1-2).  
 
With a comparison of using CAR and BHAR approaches, Barber and Lyon (1997a, 
p.346) find that CARs are biased predictors of long-run BHARs; this is known as 
measurement bias. As a result, the BHARs approach may become a suitable test for 
detecting long-run abnormal stock returns. Referring to the study of Loungran and 
Ritter (1997), Betker and Alderson (1997) conclude that attempts are made to sell 
overvalued shares to a market where there is a sufficient non-reaction to the 
implication of the action. Kothari and Warner (1997, 2006) study a simulation of 
random event dates and discuss the use of event study methodology in the longer 
horizon. Their results demonstrate a positive abnormal performance after three years 
by employing four models: (1) a market-adjusted model, (2) a market model, (3) 
CAPM and (4) Fama-French‟s 3-factor model. The CAR and BHAR approaches are 
also brought into the examination of event study in the long horizon, in which it is 
implied that the minimum event window is a 1-year period (Kothari and Warner, 
2006, p.7). Furthermore, high book-to-market samples show a systematic positive 
sign in average abnormal performance when non-random samples are estimated 
(Kothari and Warner, 1997, p.329). However, Fama (1998, p.291) points out that 
these long-term BHARs can cause a bad-model problem and Mitchell and Stafford 
(1997; cited by Fama, 1998, p.294) also suggest that long-term BHARs may give a 
false impression of the speed of price adjustment to an event. 
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Employing reference portfolios by size and book-to-market, together with the 
calculation of CARs, Lyon et al. (1999) reveal that sampling biases cause CARs to 
impact in an analogous fashion to BHARs. Additionally, a purge of sampling 
observations of overlapping returns is stated to be the only solution to overlapping as 
a source of bias in event studies of long-run BHARs (ibid, p.190). Although the main 
concern is debt offering, Spiess and Afflech-Graves (1999) suggest three models for 
the measurement of long-term performance. These are: (1) rolling portfolios of 
average monthly returns, (2) the Fama-French 3-factor regression and (3) alternative 
benchmarks of BHRs. In debt offering, the performance of firms remains negative 
after the issuing, which is inconsistent with the overreaction of pre-event returns 
(Spiess and Afflech-Graves, 1999, p.71). 
 
Mitchell and Stafford (2000) claim that the calendar-time approach in conjunction 
with the bootstrap approach has more substantial efficiency than mean BHARs in 
measuring the long-term performance of companies. They suggest that the latter 
approach is not an adequate methodology to detect abnormal performance over an 
economically important range and after accounting for the cross-sectional dependence 
of individual-firm abnormal returns. Eckbo et al. (2000) discuss the reflection 
between the new issue puzzle and a failure of the matched-firm technique in the U.S. 
market. This technique, according to the authors, makes abnormal performance equal 
to the difference in holding-period returns of issuing firms and their non-issuing 
matches by selection based on their size and book-to-market-ranked portfolio. Their 
results report that during the post-issue period stocks of matched firms are on average 
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more risky than issuer stocks, while stocks of non-issuing matched firms have much 
lower liquidity, both absolutely and in relation to industrial SEO issuers. 
 
According to Eberhart and Siddique (2002, p.1396), the examination of long-term 
performance in firms‟ bonds and stocks after their SEOs with the event-time approach 
shows that abnormal bond returns almost completely reflect abnormal stock returns, 
while the calendar-time approach reveals a significant negative of abnormal stock 
returns in every model for estimating, for example, the Fama-French model and the 
market-adjusted model.  Byun and Rozeff (2003) take a 12-month period of BHAR 
and mean BHAR to examine post-splits long-run performance. Their results reveal 
that there is an appearance of significant abnormal returns which is sensitive to the 
time period, method of examination and sampling. Jegadeesh and Karceski (2004), 
using data from the U.S., propose a new test of long-run performance which uses the 
average long-run abnormal returns for each monthly cohort of event firms. Applying 
two types of benchmark: (1) Buy-and-Hold size / book-to-market (BM)-match 
portfolio and (2) Size / BM matched individual control firm in each test statistic
18
, the 
authors‟ results indicate that there is a high level of size from HSC_t-tests19 when 
tabulating the distribution of the test statistic used in these tests. Additionally, in 
industry clustering, the theoretical levels appear to be closer to the actual sizes of both 
the SC_t-test
20
 and HSC_t-test than to the conventional t-test. 
 
                                                 
18
 Three statistical tests are used in this paper: (1) t-statistic, (2) Serial Correlation Consistent SC t-
statistic, (3) Heteroskedasticity and Serial Correlation Consistent HSC t-statistic. For further 
information on this point, see Jegadeesh and Karceski (2004). 
19
 HSC stands for Heteroskedasticity Serial Correlation. 
20
 SC is a reference to Serial Correlation. 
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Eckbo et al. (2006, p.116) also suggest the BHR approach for measuring the SEO‟s 
long-term performance. Their evidence is claimed to match the predictions of asset 
pricing theory, that a fall in risk profile (leading to a decline in issuers‟ expected 
returns) should be affected by the conversion of investment options to assets in place. 
Consequently, this is too risky for initial matching firms in the post-issue period (ibid, 
p.116). Fu (2006), finally, set up an experiment to find whether the investment of 
SEO firms still appears heavier than that of non-SEO firms, on the basis of CRSP‟s 
file trading on the NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ by estimating the change in 
operating performance according to two methods: the Straight Forward Method and 
the Alternative Method. Suggesting the use of Fama-MacBeth regression to avoid the 
problem of cross correlations in regression residuals, he discovers that the offer is 
followed by a significant decline in the operating performance, as identified by these 
two methods. In addition, the Fama-MacBeth regression shows that there is still 
overinvestment in some SEO firms whose operating performance seems to have a 
substantial negative effect. 
 
As revealed in our survey of the use of methodologies for long-term performance in 
developed markets, most studies frequently employ two popular approaches: CAR 
and BHR. These methodologies appear to be the basic measurements for several 
studies in the area of long-term performance (see Barber and Lyon, 1997a; Kothari 
and Warner, 1997, 2006; Lyon et al., 1999). Moreover, the methodologies, such as 
bootstrap and matching firms‟ technique, are also applied in the literature on long-
term performance. Nevertheless, it is not easy to identify which methodologies are the 
most suitable for measuring long-term performance. For instance, while the CAR 
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approach is stated to be the simplest way to capture the long-term horizon on a 
monthly basis (Ritter, 1991 in Barber and Lyon, 1997a), CARs tend to evince a 
measurement bias (bias predictor of the long-term BHAR). Subsequently, the BHR 
(as well as the BHAR approach) was found to be inadequate as a methodology for 
detecting long-run abnormal performance (see Mitchell and Stafford, 2000). It was 
replaced by the bootstrap and calendar-time approaches. Some drawbacks of 
methodology in long-term performance were also found in the matching-firms 
technique – that of not identifying any difference among the holding-period returns of 
issuing firms, non-issuing matched firms and abnormal performance (Eckbo et al., 
2000). 
 
As a result, there is no particular methodology suitable for measuring long-term 
performance, according to our survey of a body of literature on the developed 
markets. We assume, on the basis of these surveys, that the BHR (BHAR) approach 
remains the most reliable and widely used methodology for defining long-term 
performance. However, in selecting the methodologies, the data obtained and the 
characteristics of each market should also be considered. 
 
[Insert Table 2.5 here] 
 
2.4.3 The Use of Methodologies in Emerging Markets 
After these surveys of the literature on emerging markets, it becomes clear that similar 
methodologies are normally applied in examining SEOs in developed markets. 
Moreover, we notice from our surveys that no particular methodologies are reserved 
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for emerging markets. In other words, methodologies used in developed markets can 
be used in emerging markets' both short- and long-term performance, according to our 
surveys in previous sections. 
 
Bartholdy et al. (2005) suggest further evidence of the use of event study 
methodology in a small stock exchange (Copenhagen Stock Exchange in this case, as 
an emerging market) to be more efficient. Sample return, uniform return, parametric 
and non-parametric tests are among those suggested methodologies. Their results 
show that the meaningful performance of firms on a small exchange, such as the 
Danish one, occurs when obtaining daily data on event study methodology (Bartholdy 
et al., 2005, p.19).  Based on the Athens Stock Exchange (ATSE), Diacogiannis and 
Makri (2008) describe the calculation of beta (β) in the regression, which can apply in 
an event study methodology. Since we know from the previous section that the OLS 
and multiple regressions are also utilised as methodologies to examine the studies of 
SEO in developed markets, using the same calculation as made in those markets may 
cause a change in the outcomes. However, their results suggest that “there are no 
statistically significant differences between the mean betas estimated using the OLS 
method and the mean beta obtained employing the model of Scholes and Williams 
(1977; cited by Diacogiannis and Makri, 2008, p.120). 
 
Among the research on the use of methodologies in emerging markets, we note that 
many writers employ the same methodologies as were used in studies of short-term 
performance in developed markets. These methodologies are the event study 
framework, non-parametric tests and econometric regressions (see Salamudin et al., 
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1999; Bartholdy et al., 2005; Diacogiannis and Makri, 2008). The literature in 
Thailand also follows the same methodologies as the others (e.g. Jirasetthakulchai, 
2000; Lertsupongkit, 2002; Vithessonthi, 2008). Studies on long-term performance in 
emerging markets (including those in the Asian-Pacific region) are rare and the 
studies in our survey reveal that they continue to apply the same methodologies, e.g. 
the BHR and CAR approach, in their examinations (see Dhatt et al., 1996; Cai and 
Loughran, 1998 and Brown et al., 2006). Therefore, we found no difference in the 
kind of methodology used in emerging markets and in developed markets. 
 
[Insert Table 2.6 here] 
 
 
2.5 Conclusions and Motivation  
 
To summarise, this chapter surveys various issues relating to the SEO studies in both 
developed and emerging markets and in short- and long-term performance. The 
literature confirms that companies issue new equities when the security price of firms 
is overvalued (e.g. Hess and Frost, 1982; Burton et al., 1999). Signalling theory, 
agency theory and information asymmetry appear to be most relevant and important 
to the SEOs. This is because, for instance, information asymmetry would influence 
the movement of stock prices caused by the announcement of SEOs (such as Titman 
and Wessels, 1988; Armitage, 1998; Kim and Purnanandam, 2006). In short-term 
empirical studies, the standard event study framework is usually brought into the 
examination of the market reaction to SEO announcement, which could indicate that 
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it is the most popular issue. Several researchers have covered this area, including 
Brown and Warner (1985), Denis (1994), D‟Mello et al. (2003) and Bartholdy et al. 
(2005). Besides the market reaction, underpricing, dilution, earning management and 
determinants are also frequently focused upon by many researchers, such as Rangan 
(1998), Corwin (2003) and Balachandran et al. (2008a). Moreover, in long-term 
empirical works, the investigations are concerned mostly with the performance of 
companies in the long term, as well as how methodologies are used for measuring 
long-term performance (i.e. Barber and Lyon, 1997a; Kothari and Warner, 1997, 
2006; Mola and Loughran, 2004).  
 
According to our survey, SEO research is considered in several different areas when 
obtaining the data from developed markets. Thus, we can conclude from the SEO 
literature on developed markets that it covers wider areas (i.e. stock price reaction, 
determinants, underpricing and long-term performance) than the SEO literature on 
emerging markets. As a consequence, there is a lack of SEO research in emerging 
markets and studies concerned with a specific area, such as the stock price reaction (in 
terms of short-term performance). Obtaining the out-of-sample (e.g. the data from the 
emerging markets), we close one gap by expanding research in the wider SEO areas, 
similar to developed markets. Furthermore, with the data from the emerging markets, 
it is interesting to consider SEO underpricing. Kim and Hyun-Han (2004) indicate 
that SEO underpricing increases when the market condition is shifting (e.g. a change 
in the economy). This should be the case in Thailand (as an emerging market), as the 
Thai economy was recovering well between 2002 and 2007 after the financial crisis in 
1997. There was a substantial rise in the SET index (the main composite index) from 
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around 350 in early 2002 to approximately 800 by the end of 2003, and then a 
continued increase to around 950 in 2007. The supporting figures are also shown in 
the percentage of GDP growth, which increased markedly from -11% in 1998 to 6.1% 
in 2000, with a slight rise to 6.7% in 2006
21
.  
 
With our survey, we can notice several interesting issues, which make studies of 
emerging markets (e.g. Thailand) worth considering. In Thailand, the different 
characteristics and institutional backgrounds would be the most interesting issues. 
These are , for instance: (1) that emerging markets are smaller in terms of market 
capitalisation than developed markets
22
, (2) that Thai listed companies have preferred 
to issue new shares to existing shareholders than issue to the public during the last 
decade and/or (3) emerging markets, e.g. Thailand, have a small number of financial 
products on the capital market, implying that the cross-border listings or the 
depository receipts (DRs) are just at an initial phase, while in developed markets they 
are growing substantially (see Table 2.7)
23
. In addition, since the majority of 
corporate finance theories have been developed by the studies of data from developed 
markets, it is interesting to examine with the out-of-sample data (e.g. an emerging 
market, Thailand in our case) whether the results carry over to Thailand. 
 
                                                 
21
 Source: Office of The National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB), GDP [online]. 
Available from: http://www.nesdb.go.th/Portals/0/eco_datas/account/hqgdp/data2_09/Alltable 
Q2_2009.xls [Accessed on 20 August 2009]. 
22
 See section 3.2.2.4: market capitalisation, for further details regarding the comparison of market 
capitalisation between Thailand (as an emerging market) and developed markets, such as the US and 
UK. 
23
 Worldwide capital via depository receipts (DRs) increased significantly from USD8.4 billion in 2001 
to USD 29.1 billion in 2005. Source: NYSE, NASDAQ and Bloomberg; cited by The Stock Exchange 
of Thailand (2007) In the Spotlight: Liquidity Thieved in Motion (in Thai), available at 
http://www.set.or.th.setresearch/setresearch.html, [Accessed on 2 June 2010]. 
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[Insert Table 2.7 here] 
 
Moreover, some specific regulations in Thailand could be an additional interesting 
issue on which to focus the investigations on Thailand. For example, in Thailand there 
is no minimum period of follow-on offerings, allowing firms to issue new equity 
whenever they require. This leads to a high volume of SEOs in each company and the 
possibility of issuing new shares to existing shareholders with, for instance, rights 
issues at the same proportion to which shareholders hold shares in the firm (relating to 
the regulation KorChor.12/2543 – see section 3.2.4.1). This is because with this 
issuing method it is not necessary to submit any permission forms to the SEC, 
implying that it takes a shorter period for the new shares to be listed and traded on the 
market, rather than using the normal public offering method. As a result, rights 
issuing became one of the three popular issuing methods in Thailand during our study 
period of 1999 to 2006
24
. In addition, the commission fee regulations have yet to be 
deregulated
25
. This refers to the fact that the commission fee remains at a fixed rate, 
leading to high transaction costs for investors. Consequently, these specific 
regulations in Thailand should be an important and a different case compared with the 
previous SEO studies we have surveyed in developed markets.  
 
In stock price reaction, several studies demonstrate that companies will see their 
prices decline after the announcement of equity offering. We have found in the 
                                                 
24
 The other two issuing methods are private placement and warrants. We will discuss these in further 
detail in the following chapter (Chapter 3: Institutional Background and Data Selection). 
25
 Commission fees will be fully deregulated in 2012 as per the announcement of the SET, allowing the 
security companies (the brokers) to set their own commission rates. This will be a re-enforcement after 
their suspension since 2002 (which was the first year of deregulation of commission fees). 
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literature that there may be a number of studies which consider issuing methods 
separately. Even though some issuing methods, such as rights issuing and private 
placement, have been considered in some papers (e.g. Balachandran et al., 2008b), 
they are examined individually, not viewed together with the total sample or with 
other issuing methods. Moreover, there remain some inconclusive outcomes in the 
area of market reaction in the literature on emerging markets. The dilution effect 
could also be another interesting area which is rarely considered in our review. The 
lack of studies of emerging markets, Asian markets in particular, also makes it 
intriguing to investigate whether similar aspects are carried over from those found in 
developed markets. Therefore, we provide an out-of-sample examination (e.g. 
Thailand)
26
 of stock price reaction to SEO announcements. 
 
Regarding underpricing, our review shows that few papers (e.g. Altinkilic and 
Hansen, 2003; Corwin, 2003) examine this type of indirect flotation cost. Eckbo et al. 
(2006, p.33) have already made the point that the literature on underpricing is scant, 
in particular on SEOs. Consequently, it is difficult to see whether the features of 
previous studies are conclusive or inconclusive. For this reason, we will expand this 
area by adding a sample from Thailand as an emerging market, since the data in 
recent studies of underpricing are mostly obtained from developed markets. In 
addition, it would be original for our study to examine the issuing methods in such an 
area separately. 
                                                 
26
 We give further reasons why Thailand was chosen in our study in the following chapter: Institutional 
Background and Data Selection. In brief, the Thai capital market contains the main characteristics of all 
the emerging markets (i.e. high volatility) and SEOs became more popular during the post-1997 
financial crisis period , particularly between 1999 and 2006, our study period (i.e. a substantial rise in 
number of SEOs). 
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Since previous researchers consider the performance of firms in both the short- and 
the long-term, it would be interesting to include a post-issuing study (in terms of a 
long-term study) in our examination after completing a survey of the short-term 
performance in two areas (stock price reaction and underpricing). Certainly, there are 
no writers, or perhaps only a few, who focus separately on issuing methods. In 
addition, the lack of literature on the emerging markets brings us to the difficulty of 
comparing the papers to see whether we have any conclusive evidence on the area of 
long-term performance. Moreover, if we obtain an out-of-sample, such as the data 
from emerging markets, the results should carry over if they perform in the same way 
as those in the study of developed markets. Given these reasons, estimating the long-
term performance in an emerging market is as interesting as doing so in the short-
term. 
 
As a result, in three of the ensuing chapters we empirically examine both the short- 
and long-term performance of SEOs in Thailand: Stock Price Reaction, Underpricing 
and Post-Issuing (long-term) Performance. Each chapter will classify the related 
studies in more detail, including their motivations and hypotheses. In the following 
chapter, we turn our attention to the institutional background in Thailand and the 
collection of data. 
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Table 2.1: Summary of the theoretical literature on SEOs in developed markets 
 
Authors Market Sample Source Firm type Data Period Sample Size Methodology Results 
Myer (1983) U.S. N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Explanation of the 
theories related to 
capital structure 
Financing behaviour: (1) 
internal-external equity, (2) 
timing of security issue, (3) 
borrowing against 
intangibles & growth opp, 
(4) exchange offer and (5) 
issue or repurchase of 
shares 
Titman & Wessels 
(1988) 
U.S. COMPUSTAT All 1974 – 1982 469 
Testing of 8 factors 
which could influence 
the capital structure 
which is elaborated in 
the long term. 
Small firms have less of an 
effect on larger firms that 
are less leveraged and use 
longer term financing. 
Armitage (1998) N/A Previous literature N/A N/A N/A 
Review of previous 
papers 
When firms are 
undervalued, purchases of 
new shares by new 
investors prevent the future 
gain from being 
undervalued. 
Viswanathan & Wei 
(2005) 
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Theory of asymptotic 
for event ARs 
The data can be described 
by a stationary process with 
regime shifts, though it is 
hard to distinguish this 
from a non-stationary 
process on the basis of unit 
root tests alone. 
Kim & Purnanandum 
(2006) 
U.S. 
Thompson Financials 
SDC database 
Non-financial  1994 – 2003 597 
The univariate test, 
Heckman (1979) 2-
step selection model 
A very high degree of 
external monitoring of 
firms does not appear to be 
driven by explanatory 
power from the equity 
monitoring. 
 
 
62 
 
Table 2.2: Summary of the theoretical literature on SEOs in emerging markets 
 
Authors Market Sample Source Firm type Data Period Sample Size Methodology Results 
Wiwattanakantang 
(1999) 
Thailand SET database 
Non-financial listed 
companies in the SET 
1 Jan – 31 Dec 
1996 
270 
Method a: aggregate 
as an entity of all 
firms in the same 
group.Method b: use 
a group of non-
individual 
shareholders. 
No difference in capital 
structure between firms that 
have conglomerate groups, 
the government and foreign 
investors as their major 
shareholders, and the firms 
that do not have these 
investors as their major 
shareholders 
Elashker & 
Wattanasuwannee 
(2000) 
Thailand Questionnaires  
Selected listed firms in 
SET Index 
N/A 98 
Multiple regression 
model and a mail 
survey 
The top five factors which 
are in relation to capital 
structure are: profitability, 
business risk, growth opp, 
firm size and reputation 
(age) /.The results from the 
regression were not 
satisfactory. 
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Table 2.3: Summary of the empirical literature on SEOs in developed markets 
 
Authors Market Sample Source Firm type Data Period Sample Size Methodology Results 
Hess & Frost (1982) U.S. NYSE Utility firms 
1 Jan. 1975 – 1 
Mar. 1977 
152 
An expansion of the 
market model 
Expect to have a slight 
decline in demand for 
outstanding shares if large 
investors buy the SEOs. 
Brown & Warner 
(1985) 
U.S. CRSP All 
2 Jul. 1962 – 31 
Dec. 1979 
250 
Mean-adjusted model 
and market-adjusted 
model 
Highly non-normal for the 
daily excess returns and 
daily returns. 
Asquith & Mullins 
(1986) 
U.S. 
Moody‟s Industrial 
Manual,  
Moody‟s Public Utility 
Manual 
Industrial firms 
Jan. 1963 – Dec. 
1981 
531 
Cumulative Excess 
Return 
SEOs reduce the stock 
prices. 
Dimson & Marsh 
(1986) 
U.K. The National Press All 1975 – 1982 862 
One-factor market 
model 
Statistically significant 
over-performance by 
recommended stock relative 
to the FTA, but 
underperformance relative 
to the Equally-Weighted 
Index. 
Mikkelson & Partch 
(1986) 
U.S. WSJ Index All 1972 - 1982 360 
Cross-section 
regressions 
Equity issuing is preferable 
when shares are overpriced. 
Healy & Palepu 
(1990) 
U.S. ASE, NYSE Industrial firms 1963 – 1981 128 
Student t-test, 
Wilcoxon Signed 
Rank test 
When business risk of firms 
increases, a probability of 
financial distress seems to 
move together; then, 
financial leverage is 
reduced when firms issue 
common stock. 
Bernard (1992) U.S. Previous literatures N/A More than 20 yrs N/A 
Survey papers on mkt 
efficiency with regard 
to accounting 
earnings 
Overreaction of stock prices 
might not be the result of 
the change in company 
earning. 
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Authors Market Sample Source Firm type Data Period Sample Size Methodology Results 
Eckbo & Masulis 
(1992) 
U.S. WSJI 
All; excluding 
combination of 
primary/secondary stock 
offers 
1963 – 1981 450 
Cross-sectional 
regression, and run 
regression under post-
offer-dominated 
estimation period 
Average direct flotation 
costs of uninsured rights are 
significantly lower than the 
costs of rights with standby 
underwriting. 
Loderer & Mauer 
(1992) 
U.S. NYSE, AMEX 
Non-financial with no 
right issues 
1973 - 1984 450 
Matching of firm 
technique and 
calculation of 
informativeness  
No relation between market 
price reaction, dividend and 
stock offering 
announcements. 
Conrad & Kaul 
(1993) 
U.S. 
Losers and Winners 
firms from DeBondt & 
Thaler (1985) – NYSE 
All 1929 – 1988  
35 Losers 
35 Winners 
Regression of 
Cumulative Raw 
Returns 
Nothing referring to market 
overreaction. 
Cooney & Kalay 
(1993) 
U.S. 
Myers and Majluf‟s 
sample 
All common stock 
offerings 
N/A N/A 
Re-examination of the 
Myer & Majluf model 
It appears that the firm‟s 
prospects for growth and 
the size and/or age of the 
firm are important factors 
in explaining the 
announcement return 
Denis (1994) U.S. NYSE, AMEX All  
Jan. 1977 – Dec. 
1990 
435 
Tobin‟s Q and 
Pearson & Spearman 
correlation 
A high level of profitability 
of investment opportunities 
relates to equity offerings. 
Eckbo & Masulis 
(1995) 
N/A Previous literatures N/A N/A N/A 
Survey of the 
previous literatures 
regarding SEOs 
(empirical 
observations) 
The timing of equity issues 
is affected by business 
cycle downturns. 
Rajan & Zingales 
(1995) 
U.S. Global Vantage All 1987 – 1991  8,000 
Use of four financial 
ratios: tangibility of 
asset, mkt-to-book, 
firm size and 
profitability ratio 
If in the short run dividend 
and investments are fixed, 
and if concerning with debt 
financing, then changes in 
profitability will be 
negatively correlated with 
changes in leverage 
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Authors Market Sample Source Firm type Data Period Sample Size Methodology Results 
Spiess & Affleck-
Graves (1995) 
U.S. CRSP 
All, with common stock 
offerings 
1975 – 1989 
1,247 offerings 
on 974 firms 
Aftermarket return 
from purchasing the 
shares at the closing 
price on the day of 
the offering. 
Long-term 
underperformance scatters 
for issuing firms in most 
industries. 
Bayless & 
Chaplinsky (1996) 
U.S. SDC Industrial firms 1974 – 1990 1,881 Regression: WLS 
Asymmetric information 
and specific characteristics 
have less impact on a 
prediction of announcement 
date. 
Ng & Smith (1996) U.S. 
Registered Offering 
Statistic (ROS) 
All negotiated firm 
commitment SEOs 
Jan. 1981 – Dec. 
1988 
220 – warrants 
1,771 – cash 
compensation 
Two – stage 
procedure of mkt 
segmentation 
vs.maximum of net 
issue proceeds 
The use of warrants causes 
net proceeds to be higher 
than when they are not 
utilised. 
Safieddine & 
Wilhelm (1996) 
U.S. 
Investment Dealers 
Digest, NYSE, AMEX 
Firm commitment 1980 – 1991 2,647 
Issue Discount 
Equation 
Short-selling activity has 
been curbed, and issue 
discounts will be reduced 
by adoption of Rule 10b-21. 
Barber & Lyon 
(1997b) 
U.S. 
CRSP, NASDAQ, 
NYSE, AMEX 
All 
Jul. 1973 – Dec. 
1994 
1,067 
Wilcoxon Signed-
rank test and student 
t-statistic 
High book-to-market firms 
outperform low book-to-
market firms 
Loughran & Ritter 
(1997) 
U.S. 
NYSE, AMEX, 
NASDAQ 
All with cash offer of 
common stocks 
1979-1989 1,338 
Wilcoxon matched-
pairs signed-rank tests 
The effect of new issue 
appears to be independent 
when high growth seems to 
be in issuing firms. 
Rangan (1998) U.S. SEC 
Non-financial with no 
shelf offerings; warrants; 
and debt & equity 
offerings on the same day 
1987 – 1990 230 Event study 
A fall in earnings in the 
following year is affected 
from earnings management 
in yr 0. 
Teoh et al. (1998b) U.S. SDC Non-financial 
Jan. 1970 – Sept. 
1989 
1,248 
Spearman rank 
correlation 
Poor post-issue 
performance is partially 
explained in the pre-issue 
earnings management of 
seasoned new issuers. 
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Authors Market Sample Source Firm type Data Period Sample Size Methodology Results 
Burton et al. (1999) U.S., U.K. LSE, EXTEL cards All 1989 – 1991 110 
Market model, 
Clawback‟s method 
Right issues are highly 
significant and associated in 
mean returns; and vice 
versa in non-right issues. 
Soucik & Allen 
(1999a) 
Australia 
Australian Stock 
Exchange, DataStream 
All with only common 
stock offerings 
Jan. 1984 – Oct. 
1993 
137 CARs  
Significant positive initial 
returns in SEO firms, and a 
relationship between the 
extent of initial returns and 
subsequent 
underperformance. 
Spiess & Affleck-
Graves (1999) 
U.S. CRSP 
All with non-warrant 
offerings, and non-
negative book-to-market 
ratios 
1975-1989 2,229 
Rolling portfolios of 
average monthly 
returns, Fama-French 
3-factor model, and 
Alternative 
benchmarks of BHRs 
Showing relatively 
insensitive negative 
performance following debt 
offering in performance of 
companies in long term 
prior to the issue. 
Wald (1999) 
France 
Germany 
Japan 
U.K. 
U.S. 
Worldscope All 1993 4,404 
Probits model 
Debt-asset ratio 
The factors affecting capital 
structure are: (1) Cost of 
financial distress, (2) Moral 
Hazard, (3) Non-debt tax 
shield >> this factor 
presents the negative 
coefficient, (4) Profitability 
>>this also has a negative 
relation with leverage, (5) 
Growth, and (6) Size >> 
larger firms may be able to 
reduce the transaction costs 
associated with long-term 
debt issuance 
Chaplinsky & 
Ramchand (2000) 
U.S. and 
global mkts 
SDC, PCPlus 
COMPUSTAT, CRSP 
All 1986 – 1995 
349 global 
459 domestic 
Heckman‟s (1979) 2-
stage procedure 
Global issues receive a 
higher offer price relative to 
domestic issues 
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Authors Market Sample Source Firm type Data Period Sample Size Methodology Results 
Foerster & Korolyi 
(2000) 
International 
Bank of New York, 
DataStream 
International 
Non-U.S.‟ firms 1982 – 1996 333 
Cross-sectional 
analysis and BHAR  
approach 
Both DRs (depositary 
receipts) mkt liquidity & 
local mkt liquidity are 
significantly positively 
related to long-term returns 
performance 
Shivakumar (2000) U.S. SDC Non-financial 
Jan. 1983 – Dec. 
1992 
2,995 
A pool regression, a 
control-firm 
approach, a calendar-
time portfolio 
approach, a Fama-
MacBeth panel 
procedure. 
Showing positive earning 
surprises and market 
reaction to earning releases 
before an offering 
announcement. 
Clarke et al. (2001) U.S. SDC 
Cancelled & completed 
common stock SEOs 
1984 – 1996  
174 cancelled, 
3092 completed 
Application of logit 
regression in order to 
examine the 
determinants of SEO 
cancellation. Also, 
computation of the 
long-term ARs by 
Ikenberry et al. 
(1995) 
The logit regression shows 
that the ARs at 
announcement and the ARs 
from filing to cancellation / 
offering have a negative 
effect on the probability of 
cancellation. 
Gajewski & 
Ginglinger (2002) 
France 
The annual report of the 
Commission des 
Opérations de Bourse 
All, excluding unit offers, 
warrants, stock reductions 
or restructuring plan 
1986 – 1996 219 
Two parametrics 
tests: (1) based on 
time-series S.D.; (2) 
based on cross-
sectional S.D. 
The price reaction is 
negatively related to the 
stock price performance 
prior to the offering 
announcements 
Hertzel et al. (2002) U.S. 
Dow Jones News 
Retrieval Service 
All, with private 
placement 
1980 – 1996 619 
BHARs approach and 
the calendar-time 
portfolio approach 
Private placements of 
equity, like public equity 
issues, take place when 
investors appear willing to 
overpay for the firm‟s 
equity. 
Masulis & 
Shivakumar (2002) 
U.S. 
NYSE, AMEX, 
NASDAQ 
All 
Jan. 1990 – Dec. 
1992 
458 NASDAQ 
408 
NYSE/AMEX 
Multivariate 
framework 
Differences in market 
structure can significantly 
accelerate or retard the 
incorporation of news into 
market prices. 
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Authors Market Sample Source Firm type Data Period Sample Size Methodology Results 
Altinkilic & Hansen 
(2003) 
U.S. SDC Utility firms April 1998 1,703  OLS model 
A relationship between 
expected discounting and 
the ratio of new shares to be 
average trading volume 
over the month before the 
offer-day is insignificant. 
Corwin (2003) U.S. SDC 
All U.S. common stock 
offerings 
1 Jan. 1980 – 31 
Dec.1998 
6,637 
Cross-sectional 
analysis 
SEO underpricing relates to 
the previous closing prices, 
and SEOs seem to be more 
underpriced with high price 
uncertainty since the 
adoption of Rule 10b-21 
D‟Mello et al. (2003) U.S. SDC 
Firms that conduct at least 
two primary SEOs. 
1979 – 1996  
2,286 SEOs of 
863 firms 
Multivariate analysis 
BHR 
F-F 3-factor model 
Cross-sectional 
correlation 
No evidence of improved 
firm performance after the 
previous offer or 
expectation of supervisor 
performance after the 
current issue affects stock 
price reaction to the current 
equity issue announcement. 
Errunza & Miller 
(2003) 
International 
Bank of New York, 
SDC, DataStream 
All firms domiciled 
outside the U.S. 
1981 – 1996 78 
Event study 
framework with a 
simple test 
Raising capital globally 
rather than locally mitigates 
the negative stock price 
reaction of SEOs. 
Glen & Singh (2004) 
Developed 
and 
emerging 
mkts (44 
countries) 
The CD of Osiris / BVD 
(May 2002) 
All 1994 – 2000 N/A 
Size distribution of 
firms using median 
assets in the sample 
Firm Leverage >> 
developed market firms 
have higher levels of 
leverage than emerging 
market firms, and there  has 
recently been a decline in 
leverage in emerging 
markets // current liabilities 
are equally utilised in both 
groups of countries 
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Authors Market Sample Source Firm type Data Period Sample Size Methodology Results 
Huh & 
Subrahmanyam 
(2004) 
U.S. NYSE All 1988 – 1998 521 
Time-series 
regressions 
There is delink in the scaled 
measured of order 
imbalances in the number 
of trades. 
Jegadeesh & Karceski 
(2004) 
U.S. 
CRSP 
COMPUSTAT 
All 
Jul. 1973 – Dec. 
1994 
70 
t-statistic, Serial 
Correlation 
Consistent SC t-stat, 
and Hetero and Serial 
Correlation 
Consistent HSC t-stat 
High level of size from 
HSC_t-tests when tabulated 
distribution of the test 
statistic is used in these 
tests. 
Kim & Hyun-Han 
(2004) 
U.S. SDC All 1983 – 1998 3,304 Regression analysis 
Shift of market conditions 
causes SEOs to be 
underpriced. 
Mola & Loughran 
(2004) 
U.S. SDC 
All with common stock 
SEOs 
Jan. 1986 – Dec. 
1999 
4,814 
The average SEO 
discount method 
SEO discount will not be 
minimised as long as there 
is a rise in discounts over 
time. 
Krishnamurthy et al. 
(2005) 
U.S. SDC Global Financing  
All listed on the NYSE, 
AMEX and NASDAQ 
Jan. 1983 – Dec. 
1992 
2351 public 
equity issues 
and 397 PPs 
Different benchmarks 
and tests to control 
the stat.-problems. 
Use the F-F calendar 
time regression. Also, 
the BHR and BHAR 
calculations.  
Both firms placing their 
equity and those issuing 
equity publicly exhibit 
significant positive ARs in 
the year prior to the equity 
issue. / The firms engaging 
in PPs of unregistered 
shares are required to 
indicate explicitly the 
restricted nature of the 
shares at the time of the 
placement. 
Lyandres et al. (2005) U.S. 
Thomson Finance‟s 
SDC, CRSP 
All; following Brav et al. 
(2000) and Eckbo et al. 
(2000) 
1970 – 2003 8,126 
CAPM, FF 3-factor 
model, Carhart (1997) 
4-factor model 
Equity issuers invest much 
more than matching non-
issuers both before and 
after issuance. 
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Authors Market Sample Source Firm type Data Period Sample Size Methodology Results 
Shaorong (2005) U.S. 
Thomson Financial 
SDC Platinum New 
Issues database 
IPOs and SEOs 1990 – 1997 
IPOs = 2,793 
SEOs = 3,857 
First SEOs by 
IPO firms 
within 3 yrs = 
918 
Market-adjusted 
returns, OLS, Probit 
model, Tobit model 
A significant negative on 
the announcement day and 
the next day for and after 
lockup. Probit results do not 
relate to the prob of SEO. 
Underpricing from Tobit is 
positive. 
Yongtae & Myung 
Seok (2005) 
U.S. SDC 
All with common stock 
offerings 
1989-2000 1,040 
Employed the 
variable PreCAR to 
control for the effect  
of the pre-offer price 
move 
The higher the information 
asymmetries, the more the 
SEOs are underpriced. 
Eckbo et al. (2006) U.S. SDC 
All with separate 
financial firms 
1980 – 2004 83,282 
Floatation method 
choice, Matching firm 
technique 
The long term performance 
of issuer is biased 
downward owing to high 
expected returns in 
benchmark 
Fu (2006) U.S. SDC 
All with common stock 
offerings 
1980 – 1999 2,873 
Straightforward 
Method, Alternative 
Method 
Offer is followed by a 
significant decrease in the 
operating performance. 
Bulter & Wan (2006) U.S. 
SDC New Issue 
database 
Firms with debt offerings 1975 – 1999 
3,661 straight 
debt offerings 
632 convert debt 
offerings 
BHR approach 
FF 3-factor model 
Sample firms have 
significantly higher 
liquidity than size & book-
to-mkt matching peers >> 
should have low required 
returns 
Fama & French 
(2006) 
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Three-factor model of 
F-F (1993), and 
separate value & 
growth by E/P ratio & 
B/M ratio 
CAPM is a perfect model to 
capture the value premium 
when value stocks have 
larger market βs than 
growth stocks 
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Authors Market Sample Source Firm type Data Period Sample Size Methodology Results 
Walker & Yost 
(2007) 
U.S. COMPUSTAT All 1997 and 2000 438 Event study 
No impact between the 
level of leverage or 
liquidity and the market‟s 
reaction to the 
announcement of SEOs. 
Balachandran et al. 
(2008a) 
U.K. LSE All 1996 – 2005 1,001 
Event study, market 
model 
Suitable methods for SEOs 
depend on level of 
information asymmetry, 
ownership concentration, 
price discount, and 
idiosyncratic risk 
Balachandran et al. 
(2008b) 
Australia 
Bloomberg, 
DatAnalysis 
All with no warrants, 
convertible, unit trusts, 
M&A 
1995-2005 636 
Event study 
framework (market 
model), cross-
sectional analysis 
Revealing the decrease in 
the wealth on the rights 
announcement, together 
with some degree of 
subsequent recovery around 
the offer expiry date. 
Henry & Koski 
(2008) 
U.S. SDC, SROs 
Short sales and SEOs 
with common stock 
offerings 
1 Jan. 2005 to 6 
Aug. 2007 
456 SEOs of 
402 unique 
firms 
Test for abnormal 
short-sale 
Found an increasing in the 
discount of manipulative 
trading with a reduction in 
the informativeness in 
secondary market net order 
flow. 
Intintoli & Kahle 
(2009) 
U.S. SDC and CRSP 
SEO firms with 
ownership data 
1980 – 2004 
Ownership data = 
1996 – 2004  
7,720 
Binominal logit 
model with year fixed 
effects, the 
calculation of SEO 
underpricing 
The negative market-
adjusted returns leading up 
to the offer date are the 
result of temporary price 
pressures as a consequence 
of the SEO. 
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Table 2.4: Summary of the empirical literature on SEOs in emerging markets and the Asian – Pacific countries 
 
Authors Market Sample Source Firm type Data Period Sample Size Methodology Results 
Dhatt et al. (1996) Korea PACAP - Korea All rights issues firms 1977 – 1991  791 BHR approach 
Negative ARs in the post-
issuing months.  Market 
reaction to Korean rights 
issues is more positive for 
firms with a greater fall in 
leverage. 
Aydoğan & 
Muradoğlu (1998) 
Turkey 
Istanbul Stock 
Exchange 
All rights offerings and 
stock dividend 
1988-1993 109 
Event study 
framework and non-
parametric 
Positive reaction in the 
initial phase (1988-1990), 
while no significant 
reaction during the second 
phase of the market. 
La Porta et al. (1999) 
Emerging 
mkts 
Worldscope and 
Bloomberg Financial 
System 
All 
Collected until end 
of 1995 
All firms 
available in 27 
countries 
Set up the rules and 
classified the sample 
into six types: widely 
held, family-
controlled, state 
controlled, controlled 
by widely held 
financial institutions, 
controlled by a 
widely held 
corporation, or 
miscellaneous 
The largest firms in the 
world: ownership is about 
as common as family 
control. // Financial 
institutions do not typically 
appear as controlling 
shareholders 
Salamudin et al. 
(1999) 
Malaysia SCAN All rights issuing firms 1980-1995 72 
Event study 
Cross-sectional tests 
The positive response 
attributed to issues made 
during favourable economic 
conditions being 
characterised by periods of 
falling term premiums is 
indicative of (1) lower issue 
costs, (2) lower dilution of 
shareholding and (3) higher 
funds being raised 
73 
 
Authors Market Sample Source Firm type Data Period Sample Size Methodology Results 
Soucik & Allen 
(1999b) 
Australia DataStream and SDC All SEOs 
Jan. 1984 – Oct. 
1993  
94 firms 
Event study with 
CAR approach 
SEO firms do underperform 
more than non-issuers over 
the extended long-term 
period 
Jurasetthakulchai 
(2000) 
Thailand ISIM (SET database) 
Non-financial with 
common stock offerings 
1977 – 1997 92 
CAPM, Chi-square 
test 
New shares are issued when 
prices are overvalued. 
Lertsupongkit (2002) Thailand SETSMART All SEOs 1994 – 2001  59 Event study 
Negative stock price 
reaction after the SEO 
announcements. 
Mathew (2002) 
Japan 
Korea 
Hong Kong 
PACAP 
All, except rights, stock 
distributions and stock 
splits 
1977 – 1992  
Japan = 744 
SEOs of 631 
firms, Korea = 
415 SEOs with 
344 firms and 
Hong Kong = 
313 SEOs of 
209 firms 
Mkt model, Equal-
weights mkt index 
and BHAR approach 
Korea: the insignificant 
ARs associated with 
seasoned equity issues is a 
result of two opposing 
motives/ Japan: firms take 
advantage of periods in 
which investors are overly 
optimistic about the value 
of the stock / the older 
firms perform better than 
the younger firms/ Hong 
Kong: Hong Kong firms 
use asym info to issue 
equity when market prices 
overvalue the firms 
Limpaphayom & 
Ngamwutikul (2004) 
Thailand SET Index Non-financial 1991 – 1994 62 
Regression analysis 
by using the proxies 
of operating 
performance; i.e. 
ROA, Tobin‟s Q 
More shares are offered 
when the expectation of 
operation performance 
worsens. 
Mishara (2007) India 
CMIE 
BSE 
The stock splits firm 1999 – 2005  180 
Non-parametric 
statistical test 
proposed by Ohlson 
& Penman (1985) 
A negative effect on price 
and return of stock splits. 
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Vithessonthi (2008) Thailand SETSMART 
All PIAC announcement 
firms 
1997 – 2006  156 
Event study 
framework and 
Standardised ARs 
PIAC, on average, convey 
information to the market / 
The larger the firm that 
announces a PIAC, the 
lower the CAR around the 
announcement. 
Chorruk 
&Worthington (2009) 
Thailand 
SETSMART 
Form 69-1 from SEC 
All IPOs 
Feb 1997 – Oct 
2008 
136 and 142 of 
145  
CARs, BHRs and 
wealth relatives 
Thai IPOs at first 
outperform the market 
benchmark, but their longer 
run performance is 
generally poor. 
Dasilas (2009) Greece 
Dissemination 
Information Department 
of ASE 
All dividend 
announcement firms 
2000 – 2004  216 
Standard event study 
with the naïve model 
A statistically significant 
market reaction on the 
dividend announcement 
day. 
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Table 2.5: Summary of the methodology literature from the SEOs in developed markets 
 
Authors Market Sample Source Firm type Data Period Sample Size Methodology Results 
Dyckman et al. 
(1984) 
U.S. CRSP All 
1 May 1974 – 31 
Aug. 1979 
2,069 
(1) Mean-adjusted 
returns model; (2) 
Market adjusted 
return model; (3) 
Market model; (4) 
Scholes-William 
beta model; (5) 
Dimson beta model. 
Showing a reduction of 
time clustering in the power 
of the test, as illustrated by 
the lower percentage of 
times the test detects 
abnormal performance. 
Krasker (1986) N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Characterisation of 
the function relating 
to the number of 
new shares issued 
An increasing function of 
the issue size does not 
include the share price. 
Corrado (1989) U.S. CRSP All 
Jul. 1962 – Dec. 
1986 
600 
Simulation method, 
Rank test 
Reporting a slight 
difference in the rank 
statistic and those expected 
from a standard normal 
population in any size of 
portfolio. 
Lucas & McDonald 
(1990) 
U.S. 
NYSE, AMEX, OTC 
stocks 
Industrial firms 1974-1983 549 Simulation method 
CARs rise until the 
announcement date, and 
substantially drop on the 
issue date. 
Harris & Raviv 
(1991) 
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Descriptive analysis 
with regard to info 
asym and SEOs 
(1) a rise in level of debt on 
avr caused by targets of 
takeovers; (2) negative 
relation on avr among 
leverage whether the tender 
offer succeeds. 
Fama & French 
(1992) 
U.S. CRSP, COMPUSTAT Non-financial 1962-1989 N/A 
Fama-MacBeth 
regression 
High book-to-market equity 
ratio is a result when firm 
has high earning-to-price 
ratio. 
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Authors Market Sample Source Firm type Data Period Sample Size Methodology Results 
Gerard & Nanda 
(1993) 
U.S.  N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Concept of 
Equilibrium known 
as Sequential Nash 
The expected terminal 
value of the security 
conditional on all public 
information is always 
higher than or equal to the 
SEO issue price. 
Spiess & Affleck-
Graves (1995) 
U.S. CRSP 
All, with common stock 
offerings 
1975 – 1989 
1,247 offerings 
on 974 firms 
Aftermarket return 
from purchasing the 
shares at the closing 
price on the day of 
the offering. 
Long-term 
underperformance is 
scattered for issuing firms 
in most industries. 
Thompson (1995) U.S. 
COMPUSTAT, CRSP, 
WSJ 
N/A Since 1962 N/A 
The conditional 
return generating 
process: non-event 
and event 
Showing the evidence that 
daily security return 
distributions have fatter 
tails than normal.  
Barber et al. (1996) U.S. 
NYSE, AMEX, 
NASDAQ 
All 
Jul. 1973 – Dec. 
1994 
N/A 
Simulation method, 
Bootstrap 
Misspecification is reduced 
in test statistics, and a 
negative sign is shown in 
bias test statistic based on 
BH ref. portfolio. 
Barber & Lyon 
(1997a) 
U.S. 
CRSP, NASDAQ, 
NYSE, AMEX 
All 
Jul. 1963 – Dec. 
1993 
10,000 
Fama-French 3-
factor model 
A positive bias of CARs 
calculated using reference 
portfolio yield test statistics 
Betker & Alderson 
(1997) 
U.S. WSJ Index 
All, but no unit offerings, 
preferred stocks. 
1983 – 1990 102 
Following the 
methods for the 
calculation of 
abnormal operating 
performance 
Firms attempt to sell 
overvalued shares to a 
market that does not react 
sufficiently to the 
implication of the action. 
Campbell et al. 
(1997) 
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Provision of event 
study model 
Lists of models for event 
study: Constant-mean-
return model, Mkt model, 
Factor model, CAPM, APT, 
Signed tests 
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Kothari & Warner 
(1997) 
U.S. NYSE, AMEX All 1980 – 1989  250 
Application of four 
models as (1) 
market-adjusted; (2) 
Market model; (3) 
CAPM; and (4) 
Fama-French 3 
factor model 
The estimated average 
abnormal performance is 
systematically negative for 
the low book-to-market 
samples, and it is positive 
for the high book-to-market 
samples 
MacKinlay (1997) N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Description of the 
methodology on 
event study 
Calculation of ARs: (1) 
Constant mean return 
model; (2) Mkt model; (3) 
CAPM or APT 
Driscoll & Kraay 
(1998) 
More than 
100 
countries 
N/A Annual observation N/A 20 or 30 
Monte Carlo 
experiments, 
together with non-
parametric 
covariance matrix 
estimate technique 
Performances of the OLS 
and SUR estimators have a 
relationship opposite to the 
size of the cross-sectional 
dimension. 
Fama (1998) U.S. N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Review of the 
studies of long-term 
returns 
The utilisation of firm-
specific model for expected 
returns, i.e. mkt model and 
comparison period 
approach, is possibly done 
to limit bad-model 
problems, instead of the 
formal asset pricing 
models. 
Lyon et al. (1999) U.S. 
NYSE, AMEX, 
NASDAQ 
All with no ADRs, 
closed-end funds, foreign 
domiciled, Prime&Scores 
and REITs 
July 1973 – Dec. 
1994 
14 size reference 
port and 10 BM 
reference port. 
Size and book-to-
mkt reference port, 
CARs 
The only ready solution to 
overlapping source of bias 
in event studies of long-
term BHAR is to purge the 
sample of observation of 
overlapping returns. 
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Authors Market Sample Source Firm type Data Period Sample Size Methodology Results 
Mitchell & Stafford 
(2000) 
U.S. CRSP 
Long-term stock returns 
in mergers, SEOs and 
share repurchases‟ firms 
1958 – 1993  
4911 
underwritten 
primary; 2421 
open market and 
tender-offer 
share 
repurchases; and 
2193 acquisitions 
of CRSP firms 
Employment of F-F 
3 factors model, 
together with the 
calculation of BHR 
and BHAR. 
The popular approach of 
measuring long-term 
abnormal performance with 
mean BHARs in 
conjunction with 
bootstrapping is not an 
adequate methodology. // 
Calendar-time approach has 
sufficient power to detect 
abnormal performance over 
economically important 
ranges.  
Eckbo et al. (2000) U.S. WSJ Index, SDC All 1963 – 1979 4,860 
Matched-Firm 
Technique 
Stocks of matched firms are 
on average more risky than 
issuer stocks during the 
post-issue period. 
Graham & Harvey 
(2001) 
U.S., 
Canada 
FEI N/A N/A 8,000 
Questionnaires, 
Trade-off model  
Finding no relation of stock 
valuation  to equity 
issuance and information 
asymmetry indicated by 
non-dividend paying status 
and small size. 
Bancel & Mittoo 
(2002) 
EU; plus 
Switzerland 
Survey data 
17 EU countries; plus 
Switzerland 
N/A 737 
The survey 
questionnaire 
Managers‟ behaviour seems 
to be driven by impact of 
financial statement and 
search for financial 
flexibility in order to face 
financial policy decision. 
Eberhart & Siddique 
(2002) 
U.S. SDC All 
1 Jan. 1980 – 31 
Dec. 1992 
1368 SEOs of 
1083 firms 
Cross-sectional 
regression; together 
with the event-time 
and calendar-time 
approach 
Abnormal bond returns 
almost mirror abnormal 
stock returns, such that 
abnormal firm returns are 
closer to the horizontal axis 
than abnormal stock 
returns. 
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Authors Market Sample Source Firm type Data Period Sample Size Methodology Results 
Byun & Rozeff 
(2003) 
U.S. CRSP 
All stock splits and 
dividends 
1927 – 1996  
12,474 splits 
with 247 
observations 
Application of the 
calculation of 
BHAR and mean of 
BHAR for 12-
month period, 
together with the 
technique of 
calendar-time ARs 
to test post split 
long-run 
performance 
The authors claim that 
comparison of the long-
term ARs produced by the 
BHR and CAR methods 
reveals that they are not 
very different, nor is one 
systematically larger than 
the other. 
Jegadeesh & Karceski 
(2004) 
U.S. 
CRSP 
COMPUSTAT 
All 
Jul. 1973 – Dec. 
1994 
70 
t-statistic, Serial 
Correlation 
Consistent SC t-stat, 
and Hetero and 
Serial Correlation 
Consistent HSC t-
stat 
High level of size from 
HSC_t-tests when tabulated 
distribution of the test 
statistics used in these tests. 
Seiler (2004) U.S. Yahoo website Non-financial N/A N/A 
Risk-adjusted return 
method with 
explanation step by 
step in Excel 
spreadsheets 
No leakage of information 
during the study period 
Bulter et al. (2005) N/A 
Jeffrey Wurgler‟s web 
page, Federal Reserve 
Bulletin 
All with equity and debt 
issues 
1927 – 2001 N/A 
Out-of-sample 
methods: 
conditional and 
unconditional 
model 
Aggregate pseudo-market 
timing drives the in-sample 
relationship between equity 
issues & future stock 
market returns 
Cai & Zhang (2006) U.S. CRSP, COMPUSTAT 
Non-financial 
Non-utilities 
1975-2002 N/A Fama-French model 
The effect of capital 
structure innovation on 
stock returns is not proxy 
for the effects of earnings 
and other firm 
characteristics 
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Authors Market Sample Source Firm type Data Period Sample Size Methodology Results 
Kothari & Warner 
(2006) 
U.S. Previous literature All N/A N/A 
CAR approach, 
cross-sectional 
distribution and 
BHAR approach 
All event-studies, 
regardless of horizon 
length, must deal with 
several basic issues: (1) risk 
adjustment and 
expected/abnormal return 
modelling; (2) the 
aggregation of security-
specific abnormal returns; 
and (3) the calibration of 
the statistical significance 
of abnormal returns 
Aktas et al. (2007) U.S. CRSP All 
1 Jan. 1973 – 31 
Dec. 2004 
1,000 
Two-stage market 
model, based on 
Markov Switching 
regression 
In comparison with BETA-
1 and GARCH models, the 
TSMM is the most 
powerful test; while those 
two are saved from the 
contaminating events. 
Dietrich (2007) U.S. 
Theories and some 
formulas 
N/A N/A N/A 
Contracting model 
with long-term 
investments 
Rise in internal funds for 
the investment of first-best 
optimally when there is 
more diversity in an issue. 
McLean et al. (2007) U.S. DataStream 
Monthly stock price 
indices 
Jul. 1981 – June 
2006 
41 non-U.S. 
countries indices 
Fama-MacBeth 
regressions, Cross-
sectional 
regressions, the 
procedure of Pontiff 
(1996) 
The issuance effect plays a 
better role within a country 
rather than across countries. 
Spiegal & Watanabe 
(2007) 
U.S. 
NYSE, AMEX, 
NASDAQ 
Stock dividends and stock 
splits 
Jan. 1963 – Dec. 
2004 
N/A 
Calculation of the 
excess returns of 
each portfolio 
Shares tend to be markedly 
issued by growth stocks, 
and also robust to 
correlated shocks such as 
dividend shocks. 
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Authors Market Sample Source Firm type Data Period Sample Size Methodology Results 
Armitage (2008) U.K. 
The prospectus and lists 
compiled by Argus 
Vickers 
SEOs: rights issue, open 
offer and placing 
2003 – 2006  
275 SEOs: 49 
right issues, 142 
open offers and 
84 placing 
The formulas for 
“New Buyers” 
New equities mainly come 
from the existing 
shareholders, implying that 
the standard theory of 
Myers-Majluf does not 
apply to any of the SEO 
methods. 
Hoechle & 
Zimmermann (2008) 
Switzerland 
European wholesale 
banks 
N/A 
Mar. 2000 – June 
2005 
41,719 
(1) Calendar time 
portfolio approach; 
(2) panel regression 
based approach; (3) 
CrossReg approach; 
(4) CalTime 
approach. 
An explanation of private 
investors pronounced home 
bias can be claimed when 
the transaction cost of 
international stock trades is 
high. 
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Table 2.6: Summary of the methodology literature from the SEOs in emerging markets 
 
Authors Market Sample Source Firm type Data Period Sample Size Methodology Results 
Cai & Loughran 
(1998) 
Japan PACAP 
All SEOs, excluding the 
banking section 
1971 – 1992  1389 
BHR and 
measurement of 
ARs with six 
different 
benchmarks 
The post-issue operating 
performance of the SEO 
sample is poor. 
Bartholdy et al. 
(2005) 
Denmark 
Copenhagen Stock 
Exchange 
All N/A N/A Market model 
The probability of trading 
during the event window is 
higher than the other period 
for stocks influenced by the 
event. 
Brown et al. (2006) Australia SDC Platinum All SEOs with XR and PP 1993 – 2001  
3650: 664 XR 
and 2986 PP 
BHAR and Mann-
Whitney U-Test 
XR firms are more 
profitable and are less 
levered. The converse is 
true in PP firms. 
Diacogiannis & 
Makri (2008) 
Greece ATSE All 
Jan. 2001 – Dec. 
2004 
187 
Hawawini (1983) 
model 
Showing a better 
performance in the low-
capital portfolio than in the 
high-capital portfolio when 
the direction of change in 
beta is predicted. 
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Table 2.7: The varieties of financial products in the Thai capital market and the other markets 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Bloomberg, cited by The Plan of Developing the Thai Capital Market by The Development of the Thai Capital Market Committee on 4 November 2009 (in 
Thai). Available at: http://www.set.or.th/th/about/vision/files/CMP_Master.pdf [Accessed on 5 November 2010] 
 
Notes: REITs refer to real estate investment trusts. ETF refers to exchange-traded fund. 
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CHAPTER 3 
INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND AND DATA SELECTION 
 
3.1 Introduction  
 
In recent years (up to the first quarter of 2009)
27
, the financial outlook for emerging 
markets in Asia appeared in better condition than that for other regions after the 
economic recession of 2008, due to the positive expectation of net private capital 
inflow to the region‟s capital markets. The money markets in the emerging economies 
of Asia are all smaller in scope than those in developed economies, as they require 
further development in many areas. These areas may include hedging in short-term 
risk, the effective allocation of capital and effective distributive liquidity in their 
financial institutions. Moreover, the analysis from The Asia Capital Markets Monitor 
reveals that “the global banking system remains the weakest link in the chain of 
global financial and economic crises”. However, there have been temporary signs that 
the emerging Asian equity markets are now stabilising after being hit by global 
financial crises (both in 1997 – 1998 and 2007 – 2008)28. Since the performance of 
the emerging Asian markets appears to be different from that of developed markets, 
examining the data from the emerging markets may not show up the same results. 
However, it may be interesting to survey the data from the emerging markets in order 
                                                 
27
 All the information and overview of the emerging Asian capital markets in this chapter is based 
mainly on The Asia Capital Markets Monitor, April 2009, by the Asian Development Bank (ADB)‟s 
Office of Regional Economic Integration. Available via: http://asianbondsonline.adb.org/features/ 
asian_capital_markets_monitor/ACMM-highlights.pdf  [Accessed on 30 December 2009]. 
28
 According to the analysis from The Asia Capital Markets Monitor, these signs of temporary 
stabilisation refer to an improvement in the valuation indicators. However, it might be a long time 
before the recovery is complete. 
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to have different evidence and views from those of the previous research. This is 
because in practice investors should diversify their investments into different markets, 
where they can gain the most suitable returns. Introducing the studies in emerging 
markets could be useful for these investors since we still lack evidence in this area. 
 
Mody (2004) refers the definition of emerging markets to online searches,
29
 as 
markets with high growth expectation, high levels of risk, extreme volatility and a 
short history of substantial foreign investment. Thailand is selected for our study of 
emerging markets due to two main reasons. First, since the country was badly hit by 
the financial crisis in 1997, many listed companies were confronted with the difficulty 
of obtaining debt financing, because the financial institutions also suffered in the 
crisis. Since then, financing with equity has become more popular. This is confirmed 
by the gradual rise in SEOs during the period 1999 - 2006 (see Figure 3.1). Second, 
Thailand contains the main characteristics of emerging markets. For instance, there 
are few institutional investors, leading to high volatility in the Thai capital market. 
This is because the value of equities, from the foreign investors‟ point of view, 
appears to be low. In addition, the Thai market has a high level of risk, caused by the 
high volatility
30
, and the economic and political conditions in Thailand have been 
highly volatile in recent years
31
, which may be another characteristic of emerging 
markets (Mody, 2004)
32
. Moreover, there has been a great development of the Thai 
capital market, particularly after the financial crisis in 1997, showed by an increase in 
                                                 
29
 Some examples of these can be found by making a Google search with the words “Emerging + 
market” (Mody, 2004). 
30
 According to the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET)‟s statistics based on the end of 2004, the ratio of 
return-risk in the SET index was 2.33. 
31
 The political chaos originally began in 2005. 
32
 Mody (2004, p.1) bases this type of characteristic on the online searches at 
www.schwab.com/SchwabNOW/ReDir/1.5348.%7C64%7c.00.html.  
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market capitalisation (see section 3.2.2.4) and daily trading volume
33
. This leads to 
the interesting aspect of the Thai capital market, that it is growing within its small size 
and there are a small number of listed firms. 
 
Figure 3.1: Number of SEO firms and incidences of SEOs on the Stock Exchange of Thailand 
(SET) 
The graph show the number of SEO firms and incidences of SEOs on the Stock Exchange of Thailand 
(SET) between 1999 and 2006 
 
 
 
As a consequence, we feel it is suitable to take Thailand as a case study to represent 
emerging markets in our examination. Therefore in this chapter we provide a brief 
description of its institutional background, including general information on the Stock 
Exchange of Thailand (SET, hereafter). Some regulations relating to equity offerings 
in Thailand are also discussed, together with the selection of data for this paper. The 
organisation of this chapter is as follows: section 3.2 explains the institutional 
                                                 
33
 See Appendix 1 for a clarification by graph. 
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background, while section 3.3 describes the data selection for the paper. We 
summarise the chapter in section 3.4. 
 
 
3.2 Institutional Background in Thailand  
 
3.2.1 Institutions and Market Structure 
The SET began trading on 30 April 1975 under the Open Auction method. In April 
1991, about 16 years after its establishment, the SET began full operations with 
computerised trading, known as the “Automated System for the Stock Exchange of 
Thailand”, or ASSET. This enabled trading to be more efficient, fluid and equitable34. 
SET‟s subsidiaries are basically of four kinds: the equity market, the bond market, the 
derivatives market and the Thailand securities depository company limited (TSD). 
Apart from the four subsidiaries of the SET (see Figure 3.2 for an overview diagram), 
there is securities trading elsewhere on the SET, mainly in the equity market. There 
are currently 11 mutual funds (unit trusts) and another 26 property funds listed in the 
SET
35
. Furthermore, the SET has Exchange-Traded Funds (ETF), preferred stocks, 
depository receipts and warrants as various alternative investment channels for 
investors. 
 
 
 
                                                 
34
 Further information regarding the history of the SET can be found on its website: 
http://www.set.or.th/en/about/overview/history [Accessed on 25 September 2008]. 
35
 The information is up to the end of the first quarter of 2010. 
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Figure 3.2: Structure of the Thai capital market 
 
 
3.2.2 Characteristics of the Thai Capital Market 
3.2.2.1 Trading Methods 
Based on ASSET, investors are able to trade in securities by two principal methods: 
(1) Automatic Order Matching (AOM): the submission of buy and sell orders 
is placed by traders in ASSET and the system automatically performs the order 
matching process
36
 according first to price and then to time priority, without human 
intervention; 
                                                 
36
 In terms of the matching process, two methods are involved: (i) continuous order matching – 
matching trading orders in the queue and confirming of each executed transaction via the broker‟s 
terminal and (ii) call market matching –  utilised as a calculation of opening and closing prices of a 
security at the opening and closing of trading hours 
Ministry of Finance 
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(2) Put Through (PT) Trading: traders may deal directly with each other after 
the brokers‟ announcement of bid or offer prices37. The results of negotiations must be 
submitted to ASSET for recording purposes. 
 
3.2.2.2 Types of Order 
A “Limit-Price” order is the main type of trading order on the SET. This order allows 
traders alternative types of order
38
: (1) Market Price Order (MP), (2) At the Open 
(ATO) / At the Close (ATC), (3) Immediate or Cancel (IOC), (4) Fill or Kill (FOK), 
(5) Publish Volume and (6) Basket Order. 
 
3.2.2.3 Taxation 
By law, investors who are trading in the Stock Exchange need to pay tax to the 
government. The SET has summarised guidelines of taxation for investors as follows: 
first, capital gains are exempt from tax for both Thai and foreign investors who carry 
out their business in Thailand but individual investors and juristic investors need to 
pay corporate income tax (no withholding tax). For other foreign investors, capital 
gains are also tax-free for individuals but juristic investors are required to pay 15% 
withholding tax. Second, dividends for domestic and foreign investors are taxed if 
they are received from a listed, limited company. Another 10% withholding tax has to 
be paid if the taxpayer receives income from a mutual fund and decides not to 
calculate such income with other income at the end of the year. However, these 
                                                 
37
 Nittayagasetwat and Withisuphakorn (1997, p.15) claim that in the Thai stock market, BROKERS are 
defined as stock exchange members who execute orders and buy or sell securities for their customers, who 
include individual investors, sub-brokers and institutional investors. This structure is different from other 
exchanges, e.g. the U.S. 
38
 Note that under these six optional types of order, investors are allowed to trade their securities only 
on the main board and foreign board. 
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individual investors are exempted from tax if dividends are paid by any firms 
supported by BOI
39
. Juristic investors are generally required to pay 10% withholding 
tax, whereas dividends are tax free if the taxpayer is a listed firm and if those 
dividends are paid by Thai companies or mutual funds. The taxes on dividends are 
also exempted if the taxpayer is a company holding at least 25% of all the shares in 
the paying company and if such a company does not hold any share in the taxpayer‟s 
company, and also if any dividend payments come from companies supported by 
BOI. 
 
Finally, interest incomes for individual and juristic investors are liable to 15% 
withholding tax, except for juristic investors who run businesses in Thailand. These 
investors pay only 1% withholding tax and pay nothing if the financial business, 
securities business or credit foncier business receives interest from a commercial 
bank. In addition, Thailand has double tax agreements with 52 countries
40
, including 
the UK, U.S.A., and the EU. Only in 28 of the countries have institutional investors 
received exemption from capital gains taxes.  Investors must also pay 7% VAT to a 
security company as a service fee and must buy stamps (1 Thai baht for every 1,000 
Thai baht) for any transfer of share certificates and debenture certificates. 
Nevertheless, more than 60% of investors who run their businesses in Thailand
41
 
                                                 
39
 BOI, or the Board of Investment, is working to be a one-stop service for investors regarding their 
investments in Thailand. The BOI helps investors in three key categories: (1) a reduction of risks 
associated with investment, (2) a reduction of initial investment costs and the improvement of the 
overall rate of return on investment and (3) providing incentives for business-related investment at all 
times. Information obtained from the BOI website: http://www.boi.go.th; [Accessed on 9 August 
2008]. 
40
 Last update was on 24 February 2009, according to the SET regulations website: 
http://www.set.or.th/en/regulations, [Accessed on 15 May 2009].  
41
 This figure is based on the survey of the National Economic and Social Development Board (2006). 
  91 
complain that these taxation regulations are confused and not flexible, and also very 
slow in actions. This is a drawback when competing in the business‟ sector. 
 
3.2.2.4 Other Characteristics 
There are several characteristics which are likely to be the main features in the Thai 
capital market. 
 (1) Types of Investor 
The main types of investor on the SET are: (1) individual investors, (2) local 
institutions and (3) foreign investors. Figure 3.3 shows that individual (local) 
investors have formed the largest group of investors on the SET since 2000
42
 and it is 
clear from the figure that there is a lack of institutional investors. This causes high 
volatility in the market. The fact that the Thai capital market is highly volatile can 
also be explained by the behaviour of the individual investors. Since these investors 
have a lack of investment knowledge, they usually trade following rumours, leading 
to high volatility in the market. In addition, the market itself tends to be based on 
technical factors (refer as the external factors) rather than fundamental factors, which 
could be another interpretation of high volatility. These technical factors include 
GDP, interest rate, inflation, exchange rate and money in- and out-flow (foreign net 
buy). Furthermore, since the SET has marginal variety in its financial innovations, e.g. 
securitisation and structured products, which do not motivate investors to invest in the 
market, and since there is a low standard of financial literacy, the number of investors 
(institutional investors, in particular) in the market remains low. However, Figure 3.3 
                                                 
42
 According to SET‟s statistics (by the end of the second quarter 2009), individual investors accounted 
for more than 60% of the total number, while only 10% were institutional investors. The remaining 
30% were foreign investors. 
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suggests that the number of institutional investors seems to have risen in the last 3 to 4 
years. 
 
Figure 3.3: Transactions by investor type 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Source: SETMART as of 30 November 2009. 
Note: The three columns from the top are foreign investors, local institutions and local investors, respectively. 
 
(2) Market Capitalisation 
The SET‟s market value increased by approximately 203% from 1999 to 200743.  By 
the end of 2007, the market capitalisation of the SET was up to about THB 6,636,069 
million (or $198,092 million), the highest since 1995. However, the SET is relatively 
small in comparison with major developed markets, such as the S&P500 ($12,867,850 
million by 31 December 2007) and the FTSE100 ($3,047,506 million by 31 
December 2007)
44
. Although the market value of the SET is lower than that of 
neighbouring countries, such as Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia and Taiwan, a 
                                                 
43
 The number was obtained on 31 December 1999 from SET‟s website: http://www.set.or.th [Accessed 
on 10 August 2008]. The market capitalisation in 1999 on average was THB 1,782,718 million or 
$53,215.43 million. 
44
  Information on both the S&P500 and the FTSE100 is taken from DataStream. 
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substantial increase in Thai market value becomes an interesting feature, in that the 
capital market is growing when the size is smaller than the other markets. 
 (3) Short Selling 
According to the regulation of the SET (Bor.Sor./Khor.01-00)
45
, a member may 
conduct a short sale only with securities specified by the Exchange. This applies 
except in the case of a short sale by a market maker. However, if the short sale of any 
security is more than the prescribed volume, it is prohibited by the Exchange on the 
business day after the day when the short sale exceeds the prescribed volume, until 
such volumes are reduced. 
 (4) Insider Trading 
When insider trading occurs in Thailand, after the buy transaction, it appears that the 
stock earns abnormal returns for about 4 or 5 days, while stocks seem to level off after 
the sale transactions. It is managers and directors of firms who possibly influence 
people and have the ability to time the market. Nevertheless, there are currently no 
strict regulations regarding insider trading on the SET. 
 (5) Institutional Intermediaries 
The structure of income in institutional intermediaries in the Thai capital market 
depends mainly on the commission fee for more than 84% of the overall income of 
those intermediaries
46
. This commission fee is based on the fundamental rate, 
undermining the institutional intermediaries‟ motivation to find other sources of 
income. As a result of this limitation, it is difficult to develop their ability to compete 
                                                 
45
 Bor.Sor./Khor.01-00 mentioned here focus on the section “Short Selling in the Exchange 2001” on 
pp.107 - 113. 
46
 Information is taken from The Master Plan of Developing the Thai Capital Market # 2 (between 2006 
and 2010) by The Federation of Thai Capital Market Organisations; released on 10 May 2006 (in Thai) 
available at http://www.fetco.or.th [Accessed on 22 May 2009]. 
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with foreigners. Moreover, there is a lack of joint venture businesses which can lead 
naturally to international expansion, because the institutional intermediaries are 
normally individual companies. 
(6) Ownership Structure
47
 
In recent years, most companies listed on the SET are controlled and owned by 
families or large companies. These family-owned firms are small in size, leading to 
limitations in competing with foreign companies and difficulty in investing in 
sufficiently varied businesses. 
 (7) Regulations 
Although the standard of the investment regulations has improved and has been 
continuously developed, they are not fully accepted as they still have drawbacks. This 
applies not only to taxation, as noted earlier in this section, but also to the protection 
of minority shareholders when there is an ineffective board of directors, another major 
weak point in the regulations. The judgements of illegal securities trading also appear 
to have many processes and to take a long period of time, leading to a slow reaction 
when someone breaks the regulations. We will discuss the regulations with regard to 
equity offerings later in this section 3.2. 
 
3.2.3 The SET Index and Other SET Indices  
According to the SET, it currently has 561 listed firms in the entire equity market
48
. 
These can be divided into three parts: (1) the main market, listed in the SET Index, 
                                                 
47
 Information in this section is based on Alba et al. (1998), Wiwattanakantang (1999) and The Master 
Plan of Developing the Thai Capital Market # 2 (between 2006 and 2010) by The Federation of Thai 
Capital Market Organisations; released on 10 May 2006 (in Thai). 
48
 This figure is based on the number of listed companies on the SET available from its website: 
http://www.set.or.th/en/company.  This information was updated on 21 February 2010. 
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which consists of 475 companies, (2) the MAI (Market for Alternative Investment) 
Index, which contains 60 companies and (3) another 26 property funds which are 
listed and traded in the SET Index
49
. Further details of the MAI Index will be briefly 
mentioned later in this section. 
 
3.2.3.1 The Calculation 
The SET has been calculated by composite index, known as the SET Index, by: (1) 
market capitalisation weight, (2) all the common stocks listed in the SET, including 
the unit trust of mutual funds, (3) none of those exceeding a 1-year suspension of 
stock
50
, (4) the base index as 100 and (5) using the base date on 30 April 1975 (the 
establishment date). 
 
3.2.3.2 Industries and Sectors in the SET 
There are 25 sectors listed under 8 industries in the SET at present, set out in Table 
3.1 below: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
49
 This is based on information from the SET, updated on 21 February 2010. 
50
 This is due to there being no reflection of stock current fundamental factors and a constant in share 
prices. The movement of the index does not consequently fully reflect the market‟s condition, as the 
calculation is still weighted by these securities (The SET website: http://www.set.or.th, accessed on 3 
March 2008). 
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Table 3.1: Industries and sectors on the SET up to February 2010 
 
INDUSTRY GROUP CODE NUMBER OF FIRMS
51
 
1. Agro and Food Industry 
 Agribusiness 
 Food and Beverages 
AGRO 41 
AGRI 18 
FOOD 23 
2. Consumer Products 
 Fashion 
 Home and Office Products 
 Personal Products and Pharmaceuticals 
CONSUMP 41 
FASHION 24 
HOME 11 
PERSON 6 
3. Financials 
 Banking 
 Finance and Securities 
 Insurance 
FINCIAL 61 
BANK 12 
FIN 32 
INSUR 17 
4. Industrials 
 Automotive 
 Industrial Materials and Machinery 
 Paper and Printing Materials 
 Petrochemicals and Chemicals 
 Packaging 
INDUS 70 
AUTO 20 
IMM 23 
PAPER 2 
PETRO 12 
PKG 13 
5. Property and Construction 
 Construction Materials 
 Property Development 
PROPCON 92 
CONMAT 31 
PROP 61 
6. Resources 
 Energy and Utilities 
 Mining 
RESOURC 27 
ENERG 25 
MINE 2 
7. Services 
 Commerce 
 Health Care Services 
 Media and Publishing 
 Professional Services 
 Tourism and Leisure 
 Transportation and Logistics 
SERVICE 83 
COMM 14 
HEALTH 13 
MEDIA 24 
PROF 3 
TOURISM 14 
TRANS 15 
8. Technology 
 Electronic Components 
 Information and Communication Technology 
TECH 38 
ETRON 11 
ICT 27 
9. Non-Performing Group NPG 22 
 
Note: The Non-Performing group is a special one which is not brought into the calculation of either the SET Index or the 
Industry Indices. This is because these companies are subject to plans for restructuring in order to reduce their level of debt when 
facing financial distress.  
 
 
 
Having re-organised all the industrial groups on the SET which was established in 
1991, the calculation of these Industrial Indices began on the first trading day in 2004. 
                                                 
51
 Information was updated on 21 February 2010 and obtained from the SET website: 
http://www.set.or.th/en/company/companylists  [Accessed on 22 February 2010]. 
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According to the SET, these Industrial Indices reflect the movement of security prices 
in that industry and are computed by: (1) taking the last trading day in December 2003 
as a base date for the calculation, with the base index at 100, (2) reckoning no 
historical calculation of Industrial Indices, (3) calculating the base on the same 
structure as the SET Index, i.e. using market capitalisation weight and (4) reckoning 
no calculations for the Non-Performing (rehabilitation) group. However, any 
movement of prices in rehabilitation firms is still included in the calculation of the 
SET Index, if they are still trading. 
 
3.2.3.3 Other Indices in the SET 
On the side of the equity market, not only is the SET Index traded in the Stock 
Exchange, but the SET has also established another four indices in three categories in 
order to perform the measurement of returns, risk and performance of firms more 
easily and to have greater international scope. 
(1) The SET 50 Index and SET 100 Index 
With the SET Index is our Market Indicator Index; it established the SET 50 Index in 
August 1995 and the SET 100 Index in April 2005. The SET 50 Index consists of 50 
of the largest listed companies by their market capitalisation; the SET 100 Index is, 
correspondingly, the 100 largest listed firms. The SET 50 Index can be stated as the 
Performance Benchmark for the portfolio management of mutual funds. Moreover, 
the SET 50 Index is used as the underlying index for derivatives. The SET 100 Index, 
which contains medium-sized firms, scatters the investment in the companies on the 
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SET 50 Index more widely and increases their liquidity. In addition, the calculation of 
these two indices is strictly by the market capitalisation weight method
52
. 
(2) The Market for Alternative Investment (MAI) Index  
The MAI was established on 21 June 1999 as an alternative market for long-term 
allocation. Companies listed on the MAI must have authorised capital of less than 200 
million baht (around USD 5.97 million). The MAI Index is calculated in a similar way 
to the SET Index
53
. 
(3) The FTSE SET Index Series54 
This is the newest Index series with a partnership between the SET and the FTSE 
Group Investors, providing a comprehensive new suite of indices; it enables the 
performance of the major capital segments in Thai markets to be measured more 
easily. In these series, there are six separate indices segmented by market 
capitalisation: (1) the FTSE SET Large Cap Index, (2) the FTSE SET Mid Cap Index, 
(3) the FTSE SET Small Cap Index, (4) the FTSE SET All-Share Index, (5) the FTSE 
SET Mid Small Cap Index and (6) the FTSE SET Fledging Index. 
 
With a representative of the top 30 listed companies by market capitalisation on the 
SET main board, the FTSE SET Large Cap Index is the main headline index of the 
FTSE SET Index Series. Furthermore, stocks under the FTSE SET Index Series are 
free-float weighted to ensure that only the investable opportunity set is included 
                                                 
52
 For further information regarding the characteristics of the firms selected for the SET 50 Index and 
SET 100 Index, together with some relevant statistics, see the SET website: 
http://www.set.or.th/en/products/index [Accessed on 24 September 2008]. 
53
 The calculations of the MAI Index are (1) using market capitalisation weight and bringing all the 
listed firms into the calculation, (2) adjusting the index when firms transfer to SET, (3) taking the base 
Index as 100 and (4) taking the base date as 2 September 2002. 
54
 Information in this section is derived from the SET website: http://www.set.or.th/en/products/index, 
[Accessed on 28 September 2008]. 
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within the index. This free-float must be greater than 15% for eligible stocks. Other 
key features of the FTSE SET Index are briefly summarised in Table 3.2: 
 
Table 3.2: Summary of the FTSE SET Index Series 
 
Liquidity Criteria 
Turnover of at least 0.05% of their shares in an issue based on their median daily trade per 
month. 
Base Date  29 February 2008 
Base Value 1,000 with 2 decimal points 
Index Currency Thai Baht 
Index Review Period 
Twice yearly: 
1. In June (for use during the period July – December) and 
2. In December (for use during the period January – June) 
 
 
3.2.4 Equity Offerings in Thailand 
Since the capital market in Thailand generally has four categories of SET subsidiaries 
(equities, bonds, derivatives and TSD), the equity market seems to be the most 
important of these subsidiaries in financing the companies‟ capital, apart from debt 
financing. Due to a lack of financial innovation in the SET, companies may prefer to 
finance their capital via the equity market, although the SET has another three 
optional markets, which are not popular. As can be seen, the bond market and also the 
derivative market have been firmly established for the past decade, but many investors 
(together with the firms themselves) are still unfamiliar with them and know very 
little about them.  
 
Companies issuing bonds and derivatives offer these mostly to their directors and 
employees. In other words, even though these two types of security are being traded, 
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the transactions are limited to a particular group of people inside the firms. This is 
possibly one of the reasons why the companies issuing warrants and convertible 
bonds offer them to either their management section or their employees, rather than to 
the general public. Additionally, there is no evidence of a minimum period for the 
follow-on offering (SEOs) after the initial public offering (IPO) of each firm. 
Consequently, it can sometimes be observed that the firm makes an SEO within a 
month of its first trading as a public company. 
 
3.2.4.1 Regulations: Common Stock Offerings 
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) of Thailand announced the 
Notification of the Application for and Approval of Offer for Sale of Newly Issue 
Shares (KorChor.12/2543), which is a modification of the notification in 1992, that 
listed companies need to request the permission of the SEC and must fulfil the SEC‟s 
requirements in either the case of an SEO, or an IPO. The main objective of the 
notification, KorChor.12/2543, is to protect or reduce the risk of investors who 
purchase securities in this offering. However, SEO firms do not need to have their 
financial statements examined, as they are required to clearly publish their figures 
under the SEC regulations. The main conditions for the SEC to give permission to 
listed companies to offer their equities to the public are as follows. 
 
First, the SEC has the right to revoke its permission before the securities are offered if 
the SEC seems that licensees (SEO listed firms) do not have the right qualities and are 
unable to reach the requirement in the given period. Second, the licensee cannot 
arrange any shareholder meetings with regard to the effect of investors‟ rights before 
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issuing equities. Third, listed companies which plan to issue new shares, known in 
this case as “applicants”, have to submit two specific forms issued by the SEC (called 
Form 35-1 and Form 69-1, which can be called the filing forms) together with a draft 
of their prospectus and other supporting documents; namely, a copy of the 
memorandum, a copy of the certificate issued by the Ministry of Commerce, a copy of 
the company‟s regulations and the certificate of investment bank (I.B) and a list of 
independent directors or audit committees. Having received the acceptance letter from 
the SEC regarding the submission of these forms, the information on securities 
offerings can be published to investors. The minimum period for this is 15 working 
days after the SEC receives the forms and the draft of the prospectus. In addition, 
according to the SEC‟s notification KorChor.12/2543, the licensee has to complete the 
selling of its securities (or shares or other equities) within six months from the date 
when the filing form came into force. If it cannot do this and requires an extension 
period, the request needs to reach the SEC at least 30 days before the end of the 
period, together with a justification. As a consequence, it is possible for companies to 
issue equities more than once per year. Finally, concerning the previous regulation, 
the information on Form 69-1 and the draft of the prospectus must state that a 30-day 
waiting period is allowed for investors to study the prospectus before they invest. 
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Figure 3.4: Time line of the steps in obtaining permission to make an equity offering 
 
 
Figure 3.5: Time line of disclosure of information for equity offerings 
 
 
 
Waiting period 
Date of submission of filing + 
draft of prospectus 
Filing is in 
force 
Post-effective 
period 
Pre-filing 
period 
Offering 
date 
Listing 
date 
Receive the request and filing forms (forms 35-1and  
69-1, and supporting documents); plus fee. 
Information correction 
Within 15 working days 
Information edited by I.B. 
Within 30 days 
7 days 
 
Letter certifying the request 
15 working days 
Letter certifying the request (result) 
1. Forms 35-1 and 69-1 and supporting 
document submission. 
2. Examine document; 
3. Require further information or documents 
from I.B. and company representative; 
4. Auditor examination 
5. Company visit 
 
Note: Topics 4 and 5 are applied when the issuing 
is the IPO. 
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Notes from Figures 3.4 and 3.5:  
 The pre-filing period is the period in which there is no information available nor is any advertising published 
regarding the amount and prices of securities which include any persuasion to offer and buy securities. 
 The waiting period is the period in which most of the information is allowed to be published, except information with 
regard to prices, offerings, reservation, allocation and underwriting. 
 The post-effective period is the period in which companies are allowed to give their prospectus or publish 
advertisements to the investors to buy their securities (under the Act of regulating securities). 
 In a real transaction, there are generally 3-5 days before the SET allows the offered securities to be traded in the 
market. Therefore, most brokers in Thailand assume the offering date and listing date to be the same. 
 
 
According to Figures 3.4 and 3.5 above, it is theoretically assumed that the 
announcement date is at least 45 working days before the listing date. Nevertheless, in 
practice, these announcement dates are sometimes not published, vary widely and 
conflict with the time-lines shown in the above figures. For instance, the company 
may develop a plan to increase capital by equity offering to the public, existing 
shareholders or institutional investors, either as a short-term or a long-term plan. 
Since the SET and SEC in Thailand do not have a specific period of time between the 
announcement of a company‟s SEOs and the listing of the newly issued shares, it is 
possible that the company may announce this plan and then be unable to complete the 
process of offering for any one of three possible reasons: a market reason, a financial 
reason or a strategic reason (a change in the strategy of the investment)
55
. Therefore, 
the most approved official date to ensure that firms have successfully issued their 
equities is said to be either the offering dates, payment dates or listing dates. 
 
                                                 
55
 These three reasons can be briefly explained in turn. First, the situation of the market may not be as 
first expected. Thus, in order to avoid the company‟s responsibility to buy those shares, it is worth their 
while to cancel them. Second, the SEOs of the firm are based on finding other sources of financing to 
complete them, i.e. on the debt side. If the loan is not given, the project cannot be run and the SEOs 
need to be cancelled. This may also be due to some conflict between the issuer and the investment bank 
(I.B.) regarding the set up for the offering prices. Lastly, the project is immediately cancelled. 
Therefore, there is no need for further financing from the SEOs. 
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As a result, in November 2006, the SEC finally issued another notification concerning 
the application for and approval of offers for sale of newly issued shares 
(KorChor.32/2549). This notification revised the previous one, KorChor.12/2543, 
specifying that the waiting period was exactly 15 days (no minimum requirement) in 
the case of securities issued by listed companies. This implied that the announcement 
could be made to the public on the fifteenth day after the filing form and draft of the 
prospectus are submitted to the SEC. Combined with the 30 days for investors to 
study the information about securities offerings before the offer date, in total 45 days 
are allocated between the announcement date and the offering date (listing date). This 
regulation came into force on 1 January 2007.  
 
Nevertheless, this notification (KorChor.12/2543) gives rise to some interesting 
considerations. The followings brief illustrations give some idea of these. 
(1) Limitation 
There are several limitations in the SEC notification; first, concerning the rights issue 
of listed companies. According to Act no. 33 of the Securities and Stock Exchange 
1992, such an issue can be offered for sale without the permission of the SEC. 
However, this rights issue refers to the issuance to the existing shareholders according 
to their proportion of shares held. Second, if security offerings are issued by limited 
companies, they are not allowed to sell any securities to the public (according to Thai 
civil and commercial law). Third, this also applies to security offerings issued by 
existing shareholders and the offerings by a juristic person set up under a specific law, 
i.e. The Industrial Finance Corporation of Thailand (IFCT) and the Government 
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Housing Bank. Finally, it applies to security offerings of listed companies, in cases 
which have a specific notification. 
(2) Type of Permission 
There are generally two categories of approval of offers for the sale of newly issued 
shares. First, private placement (PP) is the general approval and acceptance of the 
decision not to publish the information required in the regulation. This is because of 
(1) a low valuation of the offer or a small number of investors, which should not 
affect to the vast majority of other investors and (2) the fact that it is an offering to 
investors who might have a good deal of knowledge regarding the investment in the 
capital market and might also be powerful negotiators in requesting as much 
information as they require from the companies. Second, a public offering (PO) is a 
general offering and must receive the permission of the SEC, as stated in this 
notification. All the information with regard to security offering and the prospectus 
needs to be published before that security is offered. According to notification 
KorChor.12/2543, the PO is divided into two cases: (1) an IPO must be approved by 
the SEC as usual and (2) newly issue shares (SEOs) require the submission of an 
application and approval of any offer for sale of newly issued shares, as in the case of 
an IPO. Although these were not previously a demand, the SEC requires the firms to 
be approved in order to indirectly ensure the issuing companies pay close attention to 
their corporate governance. In both cases, there is no obligation for the companies to 
finance with equities after their IPOs. In other words, no minimum period is required 
for issuing new shares after the IPO period. 
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3.2.4.2 Regulations: Warrant Offerings 
Besides the common stock offering, there is a non-common stock offering, namely 
warrants, which have become popular with the Thai listed companies for their equity 
financing in the last decade. Not only are the warrants used as sweeteners attached to 
the common stock offering, they are also issued as dividends in Thailand. These types 
of warrants will be listed and traded in the market for general speculations. Any 
profits from selling the warrants are stated to be the income from the capital gain, 
which is tax free. In other words, issuing warrants in Thailand can be referred to as 
one of the issuing methods that the companies choose to delay the dilution which 
occurs when issuing new equities (delay earning dilution). We will discuss whether 
there are any warrants attached to SEOs as sweeteners in our sample (unit warrants) 
later in section 3.3: Data Selection.  
 
Since the warrant holders will exercise their rights when the exercise price is lower 
than the market prices, issuing warrants is an obligation of the issuing firms. This is 
because they will lose the opportunity to issue other securities (i.e. common stocks) 
with higher prices than the exercise prices. In Thailand, warrants are mainly issued: 
(1) to persuade the firm‟s employees, (2) as dividends, so shareholders can sell these 
warrants (right warrants) to receive capital gain and (3) for restructuring their 
leverage. The SEC of Thailand amended its rules and procedures concerning 
applications for and approval of offering warrants to buy newly issued shares and 
newly issued shares for warrants. This is known as the SEC notification 
KorChor.13/2547
56
, the previous one being originally on 30 October 1992. The main 
                                                 
56
 This notification came into force on 16 March 2004. 
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explanations of the rule of warrant issuance and offering (edited) are briefly as 
follows. 
 
For public offerings (POs), the approval of the regulation will be announced to 
applicants within 45 days. These applicants must be a public company limited under 
Thai law and have fulfilled all the conditions stated in the SEC notification 
concerning the issue of new shares. The applicants must have a financial advisor (who 
needs to be reported to the SEC) alongside the process of warrant issuing and need to 
have clear explanations and information on the warrants to be issued, e.g. exercise 
price, exercise period and dilution effect. In addition, the warrants to be issued must 
have a certain period of maturity (normally up to 10 years) and contain a number of 
shares up to 50% of the total sold shares (firms with financial problems are excluded 
for this 50% number of shares). Table 3.3 below summarises the conditions for the 
publication of information. 
 
Table 3.3: The publication of information on public offerings on warrants 
 
 Filing form 
Period for information to be 
available 
1. PO Form 69-1 with I.B in corporation 
 30 days for non-listed firms 
 15 days for listed firms 
2. Right warrant 
 No-restriction for a particular form and the 
corporation of the I.B. 
 Required suitable information which can confirm 
the general characteristics and risk of warrants. 
3 days after the submission of filing 
form. 
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For private placements (PP), institutional investors
57
 have to be offered the sale of 
warrant offerings or up to 35 warrant holders in any period of time. The approval of 
regulations in PP cases will be announced to the applicant within 7 days. The other 
requirements regarding the applicants are similar to those in the PO case and they also 
have to set up the limitation of transfer for the warrants which will be offered. The 
warrants to be issued must have a definite maturity period and up to 50% of all the 
sold shares and certain exercise prices. Furthermore, there are no restrictions on 
publishing information. 
 
3.2.4.3 Regulations: Comparison with the other Asian-Pacific markets 
The regulations concerning equity offering (SEOs for our case) in Thailand provide 
differences in comparison with those used in another four Asian-Pacific markets, 
namely Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia and Taiwan. These differences are in 
particular the period and number of days in which the SEOs become listed in the 
market, the consideration for the approval of issuing firm by the SEC and when the 
next follow-on offering can be issued. We interpret some categories as follows and 
the summaries of these comparisons are shown in Table 3.4. Firstly, since we claim 
that there is no minimum period between the SEO and IPO of each company in 
Thailand, we notice from our survey (in Table 3.4) that the Malaysian and Taiwanese 
markets also use this rule. This would give the motivation to the companies to apply 
equity financing whenever they require, with no need to wait for a specific time 
period after the IPOs. Interestingly, the developed markets, namely Hong Kong and 
                                                 
57
 According to the notification, there are 17 different types of institutional investors. For further 
details, see the Appendix 2. 
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Singapore
58
, do have a restriction on this. For example, a period of six months is 
required to issue other new shares after the IPOs in Hong Kong and Singapore.  
 
Secondly, we realise that the process of consideration for approval of issuing firms by 
the SEC in Thailand appears to be longer (slower) than other markets. This is clearly 
seen in that the issuing firms need to wait 45 days for the SEC to approve their 
requirements of issuing new shares in Thailand, while other markets demand 
markedly less than 45 days. For instance, it is only 25 business days in Hong Kong 
and 24 days in Taiwan for this approval by the SEC, while a maximum of 30 (on 
average) is applied in the regulations of equity offering in the rest of the markets. 
Furthermore, the SEC in Thailand allows the issuing firms to issue new shares via 
rights issuing without any permission (KorChor.12/2543) if they issue to the existing 
shareholders in the same proportion to their current holding of shares. In Hong Kong, 
rights issuing also no longer requires the permission of the SEC, while it is 
compulsory to be approved by the SEC in Singapore, Malaysia and Taiwan. 
 
In addition, the other regulations in Thailand, such as the regulation on commission 
fees, are different when compared with other Asian-Pacific markets – and are still 
subject to fixed rates (up to December 2011). Consequently, since the SEO 
regulations in Thailand (particularly in term of the periods, the condition of the 
issuing method and the commission fee) are different from the other Asian-Pacific 
markets, these are some of the reasons which lead to the differences in institutional 
                                                 
58
 We claim the fact that Hong Kong and Singapore are developed markets following the statement of 
MSCI Barra as of May 2010. Available at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Developed_market [Accessed 
on 23 May 2011].  
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background in Thailand. The process of the SEC to approve the issuing of new shares 
(public offering) appears to be slow compared with the other markets, while the SEC 
has relaxed the restrictions on some issuing methods (namely rights issuing). As a 
result, the issuing firms prefer to use this relaxation to shorter the waiting period from 
the SEC in order to issue new shares. 
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Table 3.4 The regulation of equity offering between Thailand and Asian-Pacific countries 
The table shows the regulation on equity offering in comparison between Thailand and another four Asian-Pacific markets, namely Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia 
and Taiwan.  SEC refers to the Securities Exchange Commission. THB refers to the local currency in Thailand (Thai Baht, THB33.50: USD1.00). HK$ refers to the 
local currency in Hong Kong (Hong Kong dollar, HK$7.77: USD1.00). SGD refers to the local currency in Singapore (Singapore dollar, SGD1.24: USD1.00). RM 
refers to the local currency in Malaysia (Ringgit Malaysia, RM3.03: USD1.00). TWD refers to the local currency in Taiwan (Taiwan dollar, TWD28.927: USD1.00). 
USD refers to US dollar. All exchange rates are taken from: http://www.fxstreet.com/rates-carts/currency-rates [Accessed on 19 May 2011].  
 
Categories Thailand  Hong Kong  Singapore  Malaysia  Taiwan 
Minimum period between the SEOs and IPOs N/A  6 months  Not clearly mentioned, 
but assumed at 6 months 
 N/A  N/A 
The period between the announcement dates and 
listed dates, e.g. is there any minimum or fixed 
number of days? 
45 days  35 days  Maximum 28 days  Within 45 working days  45 days 
Period for the new shares to be listed on the 
market 
3-5 days  4 days  2-3 days  Maximum 2 days  3 days 
How long the SEC needs to consider the 
approval of issuing firms 
45 days  25 clear business days  Maximum 28 days  No longer than 30 days  24 days 
Issuing with rights issuing, do they need to have 
any permission from the SEC?  
No, if issued at the same 
proportion to the 
currently held shares of 
each existing shareholder 
 No, in all cases.  Yes, in all cases.  Yes, compulsory for all 
cases 
 Yes, compulsory for all 
cases 
Is there any fixed rate or no regulations on 
commission fees? 
At 0.25% fixed rate, after 
2012, depending on the 
negotiations between the 
brokers and the issuers.  
 In terms of listing fee 
(minimum at 
HK$100,000). 
Commission fee at a 
non-fixed rate. 
 From SGD15,000 to 
SGD50,000, plus the 
administration fee of 
SGD1,000 
 Varies, but maximum of 
0.7% of contract value 
 In terms of listing fee (for 
common stock offerings) 
with maximum of 
TWD450,000. No rule for 
commission fee. 
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Categories Thailand  Hong Kong  Singapore  Malaysia  Taiwan 
Other main criteria for listing in the market Minimum total 
shareholder equity is 
THB300 million. If 
issuing via PP, minimum 
value of issue of new 
shares is THB20 million. 
 Minimum cash flow = 
HK$20 million. Mkt 
cap. is required of at 
least HK$30 million 
 No maximum value of 
listing. Mkt cap is 
required of at least 
SGD80 million. 
 At least 25% of total 
number of shares for 
which listing is sought 
(not less than RM20 
million) 
 Amount of capital stock 
required is minimum of 
TWD600 million (except 
state-owned or privatised 
public enterprises).  
 
 
Sources: 
Hong Kong Stock Exchange [Accessed on 17 May 2011]:  http://www.hkex.com.hk/eng/listing/listreq_pro/listreq/equities.htm 
 http://www.hkex.com.hk/eng/listing/listreq_pro  
 http://www.hkex.com.hk/eng/rulesreg/regulatory.htm 
 
Singapore Stock Exchange [Accessed on 17 May 2011]:  http://www.singaporesetup.com/singapore-company-registration/ 
 http://www.sgxcatalist.com/listing/Admission_Criteria.shtml 
 http://www.sgxcatalist.com/listing/Listing_Fees.shtml 
 
Malaysia Stock Exchange [Accessed on 15 May 2011]: http://www.bursamalaysia.com/website/bm/regulation/rules/listing_requirements  
 http://www.bursamalaysia.com/website/bm/bursa_basics/investing_basics/types_stocks.html  
 
Taiwan Stock Exchange [Accessed on 22 May 2011]: http://eng.selaw.com.tw/FnLaw.asp?a1=org&a2=0302000000&a3=TSE Rules &a4=Listing Regulation &a5=&a6= 
 http://www.twse.com.tw/en/products/market_rules.php 
 http://eng.selaw.com.tw/FLAWDAT0202.asp 
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3.2.4.4 Method of Issuing 
According to our data obtained from the SET‟s fact books, we find that there are 
generally five issuing methods: (1) rights issuing: XR – the right is normally given to 
the existing shareholders and the group of directors and employees, (2) private 
placement: PP – normally for a particular group of investors, i.e. management teams 
or institutional investors
59
, (3) stock dividend: SD, (4) public offering: PO and (5) 
warrant issuing: W – mostly issued to directors and employees of the issuing firm. 
 
3.2.4.5 Other Characteristics of Equity Offerings in Thailand 
In Thai SEO companies, several of them show at least two instances of SEOs during 
the last decade. One possible explanation which may clarify why these firms have, for 
instance, 10 SEOs over 7 years is that it depends on whether the subscribers exercise 
the rights when companies issue either warrants or rights offerings. In other words, 
supposing the company develops a plan of equity issuing by warrants with 5 years' 
maturity, which can be exercised by the end of every quarter each year, when the right 
is exercised it needs to be reported to the SET and SEC and the securities are listed in 
the market
60
. If the subscribers decide to exercise the rights every quarter in the first 
year, there will be four SEOs during the first year of this company. However, as 
previously mentioned, the plan of issuing equity may not be followed after the 
announcement for certain reasons (see section 3.2.4.1) and those equities are not listed 
and traded in the market. 
                                                 
59
 The SEC of Thailand divides institutional investors into 17 categories, as stated in the notification 
KorChor.12/2543 (discussion), p.4. Some examples are commercial banks, financing companies, 
insurance companies, Bank of Thailand, mutual funds, pension funds and partnership limited. 
60
 This plan is normally known as Employees Stock Option Plan (ESOP). It mainly gives the rights to 
exercise the securities to the directors and employees of companies. 
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In addition, another possible reason for firms appearing to have frequent SEOs is 
based on the regulations for the SEC in Thailand. Concerning the SEC‟s notification 
KorChor.12/2543 (for common stock offerings), the licensee (the company issuing 
new shares) must complete its selling of the shares within 6 months after obtaining the 
permission of the SEC. This period can be extended by another 6 months, but the total 
period must not exceed 12 months. As a consequence of this regulation, a company 
might consider submitting a second request to the SEC in order to issue the remaining 
shares as another SEO if it cannot complete the equity offering the first time (being 
unable to complete within 12 months). It is possible that the company may repeat this 
process more than once until their shares are totally sold out. This also implies that the 
announcement should occur every time the company submits the filing form to the 
SEC. 
 
As with the notification of warrant issuing (KorChor.13/2547) the licensees (firms 
issuing warrants) are allowed to extend the period of exercise and change the exercise 
price after the warrants are first sold. Therefore, if there is nobody to exercise the 
right, because the exercise price is lower than the market price, the companies are not 
allowed to extend the exercise period or change the exercise price. Instead, they need 
to issue another new set of warrants in order to adjust the prices or the time period, 
leading to frequent SEOs for the same firm. This regulation, according to the SEC, is 
better than allowing the companies to edit the existing conditions of the warrant, as 
this can reduce the risk to the investors of unequal rights. Moreover, the SEO 
companies sometimes use the offering of equities in order to return the loan to the 
creditors (conversion of debt to equities). Such companies usually fall into the 
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rehabilitation group, which are allowed by either the Bank of Thailand or the 
bankruptcy court to implement a restructuring plan. Nevertheless, since only the first 
SEO during our study period is employed, so as to avoid any overlapping caused by 
frequent SEOs for each company, there are no firms issuing new equities to creditors 
(companies in the rehabilitation group). Consequently, no exclusion is applied
61
. 
 
In the following section, we will discuss the collection of data, including data sources, 
sample size and limitations. 
 
 
3.3 Data Selection  
 
3.3.1 Data Sources 
The data obtained come from three main sources: (1) the fact books of the SET, (2) 
SETSMART
62
 and (3) Thomson One Banker. A summary of data sources is shown in 
Table 3.5 below: 
 
                                                 
61
 In the calculation of the SET index (the main composite index), suspension securities exceeding 1 
year are also excluded when stocks are undergoing a capital restructuring process either on the orders 
of the Bank of Thailand or through bankruptcy court filings, until their restructuring is completed. 
Source: SET website: http://www.set.or.th/en/products/index/setindex [Accessed on 12 May 2009]. 
62
 SETSMART stands for SET Market Analysis and Reporting Tools. It is mainly the SET‟s database 
from which the data from the stock exchange is provided online for general investors and other 
interested persons. SETSMART covers the five fundamental areas which are usually considered by 
analysts and investors: (1) Company Information, (2) Historical Trading Prices, (3) Company News, 
(4) Key Statistical Data and (5) Key Financial Data and Financial Ratios. However, SETSMART (the 
principal version) is limited to a maximum of only 5 years‟ historical data, based on a rolling period of 
the first access into the system. The data for the year when the SET was established (in 1975) is 
obtained via SETSMART in its intranet version for brokers, available in the SET‟s library and from 
any broker. 
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Table 3.5: Summary of the data sources  
 
Sources Areas obtained 
Fact books of the SET SEO information (on the SEOs which take place each year) 
SETSMART 
Daily trading information, e.g. closed prices, market capitalisation, turnover ratios 
and other events 
Thomson One Banker Financial ratios and financial statements 
 
 
In the SETSMART, we calculate the daily return from closed prices using the 
equation below: 
  (3.1) 
where  
Compound returns of each company i at day t 
Closed price of company i at day t 
Closed price of company i at day t-1 (or the previous day) 
 
3.3.2 Sample Size 
Having established the study period around the last financial crisis, we chose the years 
between 1999 and 2006. This period may be identified as the most suitable period to 
examine after the crisis of 1997. The reason is that in 1999 the Thai economy passed 
its weakest point and has remained steady ever since, making a slow recovery. After 
2006, however, Thailand experienced political chaos and violence in the country, 
leading to uncertainty and a slowdown of the economy. 
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Among the data of SEOs from the SET‟s fact books, our initial sample reveals 251 
non-financial companies listed on the SET index, with 1,910 SEOs at different times. 
Although another three composite indices (SET50, SET100 and FTSE SET), which 
could be benchmarks, have recently made their appearance, we chose the SET index, 
not only because it is the main composite index, but for other reasons too. First, 
SET50 and SET100 contain the largest companies (measured by market 
capitalisation): 50 and 100 companies, respectively. Most of the companies on these 
two indices are commercial banks and financial institutions, which we at first 
excluded from our sample, due to the difference in their asset structures. As a result, 
when the sample is organised we may have a relatively small sample size after 
dropping the financial firms. The second reason is that SET50 and SET100 are both 
identified and represented in the SET Index. According to the SET‟s information, the 
SET50 and SET100 Indices can stand as representatives at around 72% and 81% 
respectively of the SET‟s market capitalisation. In addition, the correlations with the 
SET Index show at 0.9856 for the SET50 index and 0.9965 for the SET100 index
63
, 
implying that these three indices are closely correlated. No matter which indices are 
used, they can all represent each other. 
 
Another reason concerns the FTSE SET index. This index is a new composite index, 
coming into use only two years ago (in 2008). There was no FTSE SET in the year 
when our examination begins. Consequently, we took the SET index as a benchmark 
in our study of SEOs in Thailand. 
                                                 
63
 The figures are based on the main statistics of SET50 and SET100, provided by the SET on 9 March 
2005. Information is cited via http://www.set.or.th/en/products/index/files/documentSET100 
_SET50.pdf., [Accessed on 17 February 2010]. 
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Among these 251 firms, there are many companies which made SEOs more than once 
(repeating SEOs)
64
. In order to avoid any overlapping, we use only the first SEO of 
each firm. Moreover, we follow the same data organisation as Seiler (2004), who set 
the event window as 15 days before and after the event
65
. For the estimation period, 
Seiler (2004) considers 100 days before the event. Since our study also considers the 
post-issuing period, we therefore include in our estimation period 100 days after the 
event. Consequently, the event study period in our case is 115 days before and 115 
days after the event. Having set up the event study period, any SEO firms meeting the 
following conditions will be excluded from the sample: (1) if they contain SP or 
suspension signs and (2) if their data of trading information are unavailable (i.e. if 
they have no closed prices or are in the rehabilitation group). 
 
The final sample contains 173 SEO companies. Between them they have five different 
methods for issuing their SEOs: (1) rights issuing (XR) with 53 firms, (2) private 
placement (PP) with 52 firms, (3) stock dividend (SD) with 22 firms, (4) public 
offering (PO) with two companies and (5) warrant issuing (W) with 47 companies. 
The first four issuing methods are taken to involve the issuing of new shares via 
common stocks (126 firms in total)
66
. In addition, there are other events than the SEO 
announcement, including the announcements of financial statements and company 
performance, dividend payment dates and the submission of any document required 
by either the SET or the SEC. These events could influence the stock price reaction 
                                                 
64
 In section 3.2.4.5, above, we explain why some companies had several SEOs during our study 
period. 
65
 In our case, we refer to the event as the announcement of SEOs, defined as day 0. 
66
 There are three companies, ITD, KTP and SORKON (for their names in full, see Appendix 3), which 
use two different issuing methods at the same time. ITD and KTP use XR and PP, while SORKON 
applies PP and SD. For this reason, the total numbers of firms with common stock offerings for each 
issuing method does not equal exactly 126 firms. 
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and performance of firms during our study period. We finalise these events and have 
70 companies with events around SEOs and 103 without such events. The descriptive 
statistics of our sample are presented in Tables 3.6 and 3.7. 
 
Regarding our sample size, although the sample of 173 companies is far smaller than 
the samples in the literature on developed countries (by such writers as Altinkilic and 
Hansen, 2005 (3,782 samples), Lyandres et al., 2005 (8,126 samples) and Walker and 
Yost, 2007 (438 samples), it is a reasonable sample to have obtained when we 
compare it with other studies on Thailand and on other emerging markets. For 
instance, Jirasetthakulchai (2000) draws on 92 firms in Thailand, Limpaphayom and 
Ngamwutikul (2004) on 62 firms in Thailand, Vithessonthi (2008) on 156 Thai firms 
and Lin and Tsai (2010) on 93 firms in Taiwan. Nonetheless, our sample size remains 
different from that of other studies (based mainly outside Thailand). We notice from 
SEO authors in general that they tend to assume that public offering (PO) is the form 
of issuing, unless otherwise stated.  
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Table 3.6: Summary of sample size and five different issuing methods  
The table below presents the following information: Panel A shows the summary of sample size and 
five different issuing methods available during our study period of 1999 to 2006. The total sample 
refers to the final sample size of 173 SEO firms. XR is defined as firms using rights issuing as their 
issuing method. PP denotes firms issuing new shares via private placement. SD is defined as firms 
issuing by stock dividend. PO refers to the firms using public offering as the issuing method. W is 
firms issuing new shares via warrants. The average size is measured by average market capitalisation in 
millions of Thai Baht (THB33.50: USD1.00) during the study period 1999 to 2006. The companies 
represented in each category are shown in parentheses, with their full names shown in Appendix 3. The 
age of each firm is calculated as the number of months since the company first traded in the market 
until the offering month. The average daily returns are the average of daily returns during the study 
period (1999 – 2006) obtained from the SETSMART. The average ownership is measured by the 
average top five major shareholders in the offering year. The average turnover ratio is taken directly 
from the SETSMART during the study period. Panel B shows the results from the mean difference of 
size (measured by market capitalisation) estimation in the total sample and each issuing method by 
using the two-sample t-test. The null hypothesis under this estimation indicates that there is no 
difference in the mean between the two samples. The degree of freedom is shown in parentheses and 
calculated by: ; where are the variance of sample 1 and 2, and refer to 
the sample size of samples 1 and 2. 
 
 
PANEL A 
 
Statistics Total Sample XR PP SD PO W 
Average Size 10,447.82 7,608.75 10,627.94 2,227.51 32,880.78 16,113.51 
Maximum Size 
396,590.47 
(PTT) 
93,552.06 
(PTTCH) 
176,237.72 
(ADVANC) 
23,488.28 
(CPF) 
64,416.73 
(THAI) 
396,590.47 
(PTT) 
Minimum Size 
71.07 
(NEW) 
71.07 
(NEW) 
122.35 
(SORKON) 
122.35 
(SORKON) 
1,344.84 
(S&P) 
182.88 
(SUN) 
Average Age 
(months) 
95 101 94 109 146 81 
Average Daily 
Returns 
0.00423 -0.00030 -0.00018 -0.00082 0.00033 0.01644 
Average 
Ownership 
10.95858 10.86675 10.46116 12.42480 11.82200 11.01354 
Average 
Turnover Ratio 
0.00590 0.00462 0.00742 0.00427 0.00080 0.00655 
TOTAL 173 53 52 22 2 47 
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PANEL B 
 
 Total XR PP SD PO W 
Total 1.0000      
XR 
-0.7788 
(187) 
1.0000     
PP 
0.0389 
(114) 
0.6867 
(87) 
1.0000    
SD 
-2.7785*** 
(193) 
-2.0839** 
(68) 
-2.1842** 
(59) 
1.0000   
PO 
0.7086 
(2) 
0.7991 
(2) 
0.7008 
(2) 
0.9715 
(1) 
1.0000  
W 
0.6094 
(56) 
0.9259 
(53) 
0.5704 
(62) 
1.5542 
(48) 
0.5118 
(2) 
1.0000 
 
* Significant at 10% level, ** Significant at 5% level, *** Significant at 1% level 
 
 
Note: Three firms (namely, ITD, KTP and SORKON) use two different issuing methods at the same time. ITD and KTP use XR 
and PP; SORKON applies PP and SD for its issuing method. Therefore, the total sample will not equal 173 firms if we combine 
all the issuing methods. The full names of the companies are shown in Appendix 3. The market capitalisations were in the local 
currency (Thai baht: THB) and the appropriate exchange rate to US dollars is THB33.50: USD1.00 (which will be used for any 
cases referring to US dollars). We excluded the sample of PO in the two-sample t-test since there are only two firms. 
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Table 3.7: Number of SEO firms in the sample for each year 
The table below presents the number of SEO firms in the final sample (173 SEO firms) for each year, including the industrial groups whose firms are in the SET and 
issuing methods. The five issuing methods comprise: rights issuing (XR), private placement (PP), stock dividend (SD), public offering (PO) and warrant issuing (W). 
Their industrial groups are the groups shown in the SET Index and contain (apart from financial ones) the Agro and Food Industry (AGRO), Consumer Products 
(CONSUMP), Industrials (INDUS), Property and Construction (PROPCON), Resources (RESOURC), Services (SERVICE) and Technology (TECH). 
 
Year Total 
 Industrial Groups  Issuing Methods 
 
AGRO CONSUMP INDUS PROPCON RESOURC SERVICE TECH  XR PP SD PO W 
1999 37  7 1 5 7 1 6 10  9 16 1 - 11 
2000 23  6 - 3 6 2 4 2  14 8 1 - 1 
2001 14  1 5 1 1 2 2 2  4 6 - - 4 
2002 22  7 3 2 7 - 2 1  7 3 6 1 6 
2003 26  1 - 5 4 2 10 3  2 8 5 1 10 
2004 13  - 2 1 3 2 3 2  4 2 3 - 4 
2005 22  1 3 4 5 2 3 4  7 4 4 - 7 
2006 16  3 1 6 2 1 3 -  6 5 2 - 4 
TOTAL 173  26 15 27 35 12 33 24  53 52 22 2 47 
   
Note: There are three companies: ITD, KTP and SORKON, using two different issuing methods at the same time (rights issuing and private placement for the first two, and private placement and stock 
dividend for SORKON). Therefore, the total sample will not equal 173 firms if: (1) we combine all the firms in each issuing method and (2) we combine all the firms in Industrial Groups because there is one 
firm (USC, see the full name in Appendix 3) whose industrial group information is unavailable. 
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Our sample clearly demonstrates that it contains only two companies which issued via 
PO between 1999 and 2006
67
. The reason in this case can be one of two things. First, 
issuing via PO entails higher costs than the other methods, such as XR or PP. 
Companies themselves would prefer to save their costs for issuing because they were 
either recovering from the financial crisis or they wanted to maintain their cash flow. 
Second, several companies in the SET (as well as in our sample of 173) are likely to 
issue new shares to the existing shareholders and/or their directors and employees 
according to their plan. This is known as the employees‟ stock option plan (ESOP), as 
earlier mentioned. Using ESOP could motivate the employees to work hard for the 
company. In other words, issuing new shares to existing shareholders (e.g. via XR or 
PP) should be easy to do because they are issued to the people who already own the 
companies (another reason could be the desire to retain talented employees). The 
companies will be more certain to receive the incomes for financing, while issuing via 
PO gives a chance that the equities will not be exercised by outside investors. 
 
Another interesting point to address regarding sample size arises when a company 
issues new shares via SD in Thailand. Although issuing with SD is reported, as there 
is equity financing in the firm, the main reason appears to be concerned with dividend 
payment (the indirect issue of new equities). This is because when a firm issues via 
SD, it brings no incoming cash flow to the company, whereas the number of shares 
outstanding increases. The small firms, or the firms which have less capital and would 
prefer to retain capital in the company, are likely to issue new shares using this 
method. When SD is applied, it is similar to the case where a company announces the 
                                                 
67
 Initially, three firms issued via PO. However, organising the data along the same lines as Seiler 
(2004) called for one firm to be dropped. 
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payment of a dividend, a good sign to the market which shows the company is still 
performing well. In addition, according to Thai law, the investors and/or the existing 
shareholders can sell the stocks (from the dividend) to get their capital gain, from 
which no tax is deducted due to the income from the dividend. However, as 
previously stated, we still report this method as our SEO sample since the companies 
at least do the financing, thus increasing their capital
68
. 
 
According to Table 3.6 – panel B, our results show additionally that small firms in 
Thailand are likely to issue via SD because of the lowest average size. Although this 
leads to the endogenetic problem, it would not be a case to which more attention 
should be paid. The reason is that the maximum size of SD firms is the smallest 
within our sample, at THB23,488.28 million (see Table 3.6 – panel A). If the above 
assumption was true (small firms tend to issue new shares via SD), the minimum size 
of the entire sample would be THB122.35 million for SORKON, instead of 
THB71.07 million for NEW
69
. Issuing new shares in Thailand does not depend on the 
firm size, according to the evidence in Table 3.6 – panel B. It depends mostly on how 
well the companies perform during the period they require equity financing. This is 
because in Thailand SD appears to be the issuing method which is mostly applied by 
the firms that would prefer to maintain the level of cash flow. Hence, these firms use 
the dividend announcements to signal to the market that they are able to pay dividend 
to shareholders, but in the form of common stocks. If the small firms perform well, 
issuing new shares via SD should not be the case because there is no incoming cash 
flow. They will move to the other issuing methods, which can raise their number of 
                                                 
68
 This is also reported in SETSMART when we collect the data.  
69
 See Appendix 3 for the names in full. 
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shares outstanding, together with having the incoming cash flow to their companies 
(see the cases of SORKON and NEW, as previously mentioned). With the above 
explanations and the results in Table 3.6 – panel B, we can claim that it is unnecessary 
for small firms to issue new equities via SD.  
 
Although large firms appear to issue new equities with warrants in our statistical 
evidence (see Table 3.6 – panel A: case of PTT), it is not always the case in Thailand. 
This confirms our results from the two-sample t-test, that there are no differences 
between warrants and other issuing methods (e.g. XR and PP). Furthermore, it was 
previously claimed that issuing warrants in Thailand was unfair and risky for 
investors. These means the shareholders (who might have the benefit in those 
warrants) can extend the maturity period or reduce the exercise prices in order to 
increase the value of the warrants. These shareholders could utilise their inside 
information to trade in these warrants before the other investors. Thus, investors could 
be at risk of greater information asymmetry. However, with the SEC‟s notification 
KorChor.13/2547, the issuers are not allowed to extend the maturity period or amend 
the exercise prices after the warrants have been issued. Instead, they can re-issue new 
warrants to match the market prices if nobody exercises them. This leads to the fact 
that the warrant issuing companies in our sample (47 firms) can have multiple SEOs 
because they re-issue the warrants (which are referred to as the SEOs in Thailand; see 
Appendix 3 for examples of firms in this case). 
 
In our study, we will focus on the companies issuing new shares with the common 
stocks. This is because although the warrant issuing companies are likely to be a large 
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sample (with 47 companies), they should be considered separately due to having a 
different aspect from the other issuing methods. For instance, warrants are issued as 
sweeteners to other securities in order to motivate the investors, even though they are 
one of the issuing methods in Thailand. In addition, warrants have slightly different 
regulations compared to the common stock offerings (see section 3.2.4.2): e.g. the 
extension of exercise period and offering period – common stock offerings are 
allowed within 6 months, while warrants offerings are not allowed.  
 
Examining warrants would have many points of comparison with the existing 
literature in this area (i.e. convertible bonds and underpricing with warrants). Some 
examples of these studies are Ng and Smith (1996), Lewis et al. (1998), Ederington 
and Goh (2001) and Korkeamaki and Moore (2004). This should be done separately 
to the common stock offering case because we could have the evidence in more detail. 
The sample size of warrant firms (47 companies) is also less than the sample of 
common stock offering firms in total (126 firms), although it is larger than some 
issuing methods (i.e. SD). However, there are no unit warrants (those attached to the 
SEOs) among our 47 warrant offerings (first SEOs of each company). This could be 
the case in the second or third SEOs of those firms, which we do not cover in 
collecting our data. Thus, we leave warrants to be a subject for future research in 
Thailand (see section 7.3 in Chapter 7). 
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3.3.3 Limitations 
In collecting data, we also considered another database, not the SETSMART alone. 
The Thomson One Banker: Deal Equity (TOBDE, hereafter)
70
 was considered. 
Interestingly, we initially found 147 SEO companies (non-financial) with only 266 
observations of SEOs during the same study period, 1999 to 2006 (see Table 3.8). 
These figures are much lower than those taken from the SET database (1,910 times 
with 251 firms). In addition, some firms appear to have SEOs during the study period 
according to the TOBDE, whereas they are displayed as non-SEO firms by the 
SETSMART
71
. Moreover, only two issuing methods are provided in the TOBDE and 
these are only for common stock offerings: XR and PP. No warrant issuing firms are 
shown or available in this database. This is because the TOBDE considers warrants as 
non-SEOs, whereas warrants are one type of SEOs in Thailand. Thus, the availability 
of these warrant firms in the TOBDE can be pointed out as a limitation to obtaining 
the data from this database. Nonetheless, even though there are other issuing methods 
(i.e. Third Party Allotment, Auction, Block Trade, Negotiated Sale, Offer for Sale and 
Open Offer)
72
, they are less related to issuing methods in Thailand during our study 
period than the case of XR and PP.  
 
In Table 3.8, we notice that the figures do not appear to correspond with those 
reported under the total sample. The main reason is that there are some companies 
which apply for more than one issuing method at the same time. Furthermore, the 
                                                 
70
 The Thomson One Banker: Deal Equity obtained in our data collection is the trial version. We are 
grateful to our supervisor, Professor Ranko Jelic, who received this trial version and allowed us to 
share his account in order to check our data. 
71
 This includes some firms which were placed in the wrong sector as presented in the data from the 
SET (real-time trading), e.g. they are in the financial sector, instead of Tourism and Leisure. 
72
 All definitions refer to the Thomson One Banker: Deal Equity. See Appendix 4 for the full 
definitions. 
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figures reveal no correspondence among them, even though they have been directly 
obtained from the TOBDE. This can be claimed to be one of the limitations to 
employing the TOBDE. Although the TOBDE provides much information (such as 
transaction details, after market performance and financial data), no filing forms are 
available from any SEO companies. Therefore, this shows that the data obtained from 
the TOBDE do not fully reflect the real time trading published by the SET. This is 
particularly with regard to the unavailability of warrant issuing for SEOs in Thailand 
and lack of correspondence with the sample (see Table 3.8). As a consequence, the 
TOBDE may be consulted to obtain data for estimating the most relevant outcomes 
reflecting Thai SEOs. 
 
 
 
Table 3.8: Descriptive statistics for SEOs in Thailand via Thomson One Banker (Deal Equity) 
The table shows descriptive statistics for SEOs in Thailand obtained via the Thomson One Banker 
(Deal Equity). Rights mean rights issuing, while Placement refers to private placement. Other issuing 
methods refer to the remaining issuing methods available in the Thomson One Banker (Deal Equity), 
aside from rights issuing and private placement. 
 
Issue Date 
Total Sample 
 
Rights 
 
Placement 
 Other Issuing 
Methods 
No.of 
SEOs 
No. of 
Firms 
 
No. of 
SEOs 
No. of 
Firms 
 
No. of 
SEOs 
No. of 
Firms 
 
No. of 
SEOs 
No. of 
Firms 
01.05.1975 
To 
31.12.2008 
447 250  193 158  281 178 
 
107 82 
01.01.1999 
To 
31.12.2006 
(study period) 
266 147  102 85  171 102 
 
53 37 
 
Note: The SEOs in each category include the firms which use more than one issuing method at the same time. No figures seem to 
correspond with each other as we obtained them directly from the Thomson One Banker (Deal Equity). Also, the number of firms 
require close consideration if they are going to be obtained in the study because some firms are reported under different names. 
However, all figures have excluded the financial companies and the firms which are not listed in the main composite index (SET 
index). 
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Furthermore, the MSCI World Index
73
 can be another alternative benchmark to 
consider when examining post-issuing performance. However, in order to obtain this 
index for use in our study we had to accept some limitations. A fuller account of these 
will be given in more detail later in the chapter on post-issuing performance (Chapter 
6). Therefore, it would be better if the SET‟s database were used for collecting all the 
data on SEOs in Thailand. This would be reflected better in the findings from our 
study. In addition, we can provide comparisons for each issuing method according to 
the real-time trading in the market. 
 
 
3.4 Conclusions  
 
With several similarities between the main characteristics of emerging markets, such 
as high level of risk and volatility, Thailand was chosen in this thesis to be the case 
study of an emerging market. Not only these characteristics, but also the fact that 
there was a substantial recovery of the economy (from the Asian financial crisis in 
1997) and some differences in the institutional background, are among the reasons for 
making Thailand the typical emerging market to study in the period following the 
financial crisis. These reasons are supported by the information published by the SET. 
For instance, the Thai capital market is small compared with the markets in the 
surrounding countries (e.g. Singapore, Hong Kong and Malaysia), it has a low number 
of institutional investors, which causes the market to be highly volatile, and many 
                                                 
73
 The MSCI refers to The Morgan Stanley Capital Investment Index, also known as the World Index. 
Further information is to be found in Chapter 6. 
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Thai firms are owned by one group of people or members of the same family – all 
these factors influence the company‟s investment decisions and lack of institutional 
intermediaries. 
 
The regulations on equity offering in Thailand can be relatively slow to enact (in 
terms of the period that it takes for the submitted document to be approved by the 
SEC, i.e. it takes too long) and uncertain (i.e. using the term of the minimum period of 
15 days, so it can take 20 days or more) when issuing via public offering. This leads 
to a lack of using public offering in SEO firms in Thailand. Alternatively, we could 
identify that some notification (KorChor.12/2549) was recently enforced (in 2007) to 
specify a waiting period of 15 days. This implies that before such enforcement (during 
our study period 1999 to 2006), the process of equity offering in Thailand appears to 
have depended on individual companies and the analysis period of the SEC on 
documents submitted. This refers to the fact that there is no particular time period 
exactly specified. Thus, it increases the time for new equity to be listed and traded in 
the market, helping the issuers receive their financing faster. Furthermore, some 
specific regulations in Thailand lead to the differences in characteristics of the Thai 
capital market, compared with the developed and other emerging markets. These 
regulations include no minimum period of SEOs after the IPOs of each firm, the 
preference of issuing new shares to existing shareholders rather than via public 
offerings (beside the reasons mentioned above) and the commission fee regulations. 
  
With these characteristics of the Thai capital market and such regulations as were 
pointed out earlier, we can claim two main contributions based on the institutional 
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background from our study of the data from Thailand. The first institutional 
contribution concerns the characteristics of the Thai capital market. With the high 
number of individual investors causing high volatility in the market, the market itself 
seems to be relatively sensitive to technical (external) factors from the listed 
companies. Moreover, these individual investors are generally short of investment 
knowledge. They normally follow those rumours which they believe in order to gain 
maximum profit from them. Examining these features of Thailand‟s investment 
behaviour could provide newer evidence than in previous studies, which survey less 
volatile markets than Thailand‟s. In particular, we focus on the post-financial crisis 
period on which few studies in Thailand have given more details (based on our survey 
of the literature on SEOs in Thailand in Chapter 2). The second institutional 
contribution concerns the size of our sample. The number of firms issuing via public 
offering is relatively small, while the general studies of SEO tend to assume public 
offering as the method unless otherwise stated. This leads to the view that we most 
need to consider rights issuing and private placement. Furthermore, methods such as 
stock dividend could give us a new issue in the SEO area since it contains a specific 
reason in Thailand. 
 
To examine such issues, we investigated 173 Thai SEO firms between 1999 and 2006. 
This final sample can be divided into 126 companies with common stock offerings 
and 47 firms with warrant offerings. In addition to these 47 warrant offerings, they are 
free from the case of SEO attachment (unit warrants) when only the first SEOs of 
each company are obtained. Even though warrants are one of the SEO issuing 
methods in Thailand, we choose to focus on the non-warrant sample in our empirical 
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study. This is due to: (1) the difference in aspects compared with the common stock 
offering, such as the convertible bond and (2) a slight difference in regulations in 
Thailand (i.e. the extension of exercise period and offering period), as previously 
explained. The 126 firms issuing via common stocks used four different issuing 
methods, namely rights issuing, private placement, stock dividend and public offering. 
Although our sample size appears to be small compared with those in the SEO 
literature on developed markets, they are consistent with the research in Thailand and 
some Asian-Pacific countries (e.g. Soucik and Allen, 1999b; Jirasetthakulchai, 2000; 
Anderson and Rose, 2006; Vithessonthi, 2008). 
 
In the following chapters, we begin our empirical study of our three aspects. The next 
chapter examines the stock price reaction to SEOs in Thailand. 
 
  133 
CHAPTER 4 
STOCK PRICE REACTION TO SEOs  
 
Abstract  
 
This chapter examines the stock price reaction to Seasoned Equity Offering (SEO) 
announcements in Thailand. A standard event study framework is brought into our 
examination in three main categories: (1) stock price reaction to SEO and offering 
dilution, (2) the determinants of SEO stock price reaction and (3) the long-term stock 
price reaction. The evidence shows a negative price reaction to SEO announcements 
in both the short and long term. The issuing methods can reduce the offering dilution 
caused by the SEO announcement. In addition, our findings report significance in 
size, market-to-book and ownership, including when issuing methods are individually 
considered. Moreover, there are no relationships between the short- and long-term 
stock price reactions, supporting the aspect that long-term stock prices react to the 
current situations at that time. However, our robustness evidence suggests that 
EBITDA would be the suitable proxy of operating performance since the entire 
regression fits the data better when it is applied. 
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4.1 Introduction  
 
Companies generally conduct SEOs for three main potential reasons, according to 
Barclay et al. (2009, p.16): (1) raising investment capital, (2) reducing firms‟ leverage 
and (3) the need to take the advantage from the temporary overvaluation. Eckbo et al. 
(2006) point out that there are several flotation costs associated with SEOs with which 
companies should be concerned. These are issue announcement effect, underpricing, 
underwriters‟ spread and any short-term incremental costs or benefits of moving away 
or towards a firm‟s target leverage ratio (Eckbo et al., 2006, p. 22). The underwriter 
fee is the direct flotation cost, while indirect flotation costs are concerned with issue 
underpricing and stock price reaction to the announcement of SEOs, offering delay or 
cancellations (Eckbo et al., 2006, pp.23-24)
74
. 
 
Eckbo et al. (2006, p.22) suggest that security is announced with reference to 
expected flotation costs. Some accept this idea because it causes direct and indirect 
effects when raising new equity capital, while others disagree and believe that it does 
not represent an issue cost, due to the existence of insider trading. Consequently, the 
evidence that a security announcement is an expected flotation cost remains 
inconclusive, referring to the survey of Eckbo et al. (2006). The survey also indicates 
that although there is no resolution on this issue, a decline in the issue price may be 
the outcome of a typical negative announcement effect. As a result, it would be 
possible to find a similar consequence regarding the inconclusive discussion of 
                                                 
74
 According to Eckbo et al. (2006), there is another type of indirect flotation cost: stock price reaction 
to Initial Public Offering (IPO). 
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expected flotation costs when we examine different markets. Since indirect flotation 
costs (represented mainly by stock price reaction and underpricing) play an important 
part in the arguments of several researchers (e.g. Asquith and Mullins, 1986; Denis, 
1994; Corwin, 2003; Walker and Yost, 2007), we propose to investigate whether the 
suggestion in Eckbo et al. (2006) of expected flotation costs carries over to different 
markets, i.e. Asian ones. There also appears to be a paucity of literature on SEOs in 
these markets. Some examples of these studies include those of Salamudin et al. 
(1999), Jirasetthakulchai (2000) and Vithessonthi (2008). Their findings report both 
positive (Salamudin et al., 1999) and negative (Vithessonthi, 2008) stock price 
reaction to SEO announcements, and also present the relationship between SEO and 
dividend announcements (Jirasetthakulchai, 2000). 
 
The main purpose of this empirical examination is to expand the examination of 
indirect flotation cost in emerging markets by using Thailand as the case study. To be 
more specific, we aim to examine how SEO companies perform when there is the 
announcement of SEO in both the short term and long term (481 day event window) 
with different issuing methods. This clarifies how issuing methods individually 
influence the stock price reaction caused by SEOs in both the short and long term, 
including a reduction of the offering dilution (discounting prices). Having reviewed 
several studies in emerging markets, Thailand in particular, we rarely find the 
research on SEOs obtained from recent data, e.g. the data after the financial crisis in 
1997. This is because both debt and equity financing could remain influenced by the 
crisis. Thus, there would be less interest, e.g. a small number of firms doing SEOs, or 
companies having to restructure their financing plans and wait until the economy 
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recovers. Although the economy of Thailand has been slowly recovering since 1999, 
the market itself appears to be more volatile (due to the high number of individual 
investors) and depends mostly on technical (external) factors, rather than focusing on 
fundamental factors
75
. Since we have noticed that Thai investors have a lack of 
investment knowledge, this means that they invest following the rumours and the 
situations at the time, instead of considering their options in more detail. For 
illustration, the study will consider firm performance and which factors impact on the 
stock price reactions with the link between fundamental and technical (external) 
factors. Expanding the research of SEOs with a more recent data set will equip 
investors with the necessary evidence and the knowledge of SEOs in order to 
understand the aspect of stock price reaction to a specific event, such as SEOs. 
 
In addition, we earlier found in previous literature (e.g. Nittayagasetwat and 
Withisuphakorn, 1997 and Mody, 2004) that the capital market in Thailand (stated as 
one of the emerging markets) exhibits a difference in characteristics to those of the 
U.S.; for instance, high volatility, small size and fewer listed companies. Therefore, if 
the existing evidence carries over to the Thai market, we should still have the same 
outcomes and aspects. We also attempt to determine the factors which impact upon 
the SEO announcement. These factors (i.e. size, leverage and firm annual sales)
76
 are 
claimed to be an important issue which should be considered regarding the securities 
risk and control variables.  
                                                 
75
 See for example, Kasikorn Research Centre (2002). SET Index and the Risk of Recession (in 
Thai). Vol. 8 Issue 1345, available from the CD-Rom of Kasikorn Research Centre or its summary via: 
http://www.kasikornresearch.com/TH/K-Econ%20Analysis/Pages/ViewSummary.aspx?docid=3663 
[Accessed 15 March 2011]. 
76
 These examples of factors are described by Eckbo et al. (2006). 
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Within this chapter, we identify 126 SEO companies issued with common stock in the 
Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET, hereafter) from 1999 – 2006, including four of the 
different issuing methods available, namely rights issuing, private placement, stock 
dividend and public offering. We found among our three categories that the stock 
prices react negatively to the SEO announcement in the short term (around SEOs) in 
every case. Although the findings show the existence of shareholder dilution from the 
SEO (defined in all cases as the discounting of stock prices after being issued, 
measured by market capitalisation)
77
, different issuing methods in our case, 
interestingly, reduce this offering dilution. In the determinant investigation, the results 
are significant in the same variables (namely size, market-to-book and ownership), 
including when issuing methods are individually concerned. This leads to the 
interpretation that the SEO stock price reaction is influenced by these three factors. 
Furthermore, the evidence in the long-term stock price reaction suggests that there is 
no relationship to the short-term stock price reaction. Consequently, any reactions in 
the long-term depend on the current situations at that time, rather than being caused 
by events in the short-term (i.e. SEO announcements). 
 
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows: section 4.2 will present the relevant 
literature, relating in particular to developing countries and Thailand, together with 
motivations and the hypotheses. Section 4.3 will outline the data and methodology. 
We display the empirical results in section 4.4 and provide a conclusion in section 
4.5. 
 
                                                 
77
 For more details, see section 4.3.2.1. 
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4.2 Literature Review and Hypotheses  
 
4.2.1 Literature on Stock Price Reaction in Developed Markets 
Among several studies concerning SEO stock price reaction, we find that the most 
basic and frequent estimate is to apply the event study framework to examine the 
market reaction to announcements of SEOs. In addition, dilution could be claimed as 
another area which many authors consider in parallel with the SEO stock price 
reaction. The papers in this particular area are widespread, ranging from Brown and 
Warner (1985), to Asquith and Mullins (1986), Mikkelson and Partch (1986), Loderer 
and Mauer (1992), Conrad and Kaul (1993), Denis (1994), D‟Mello et al. (2003), 
Eckbo et al. (2006) and Walker and Yost (2007), including such developed Asian 
markets as Japan and Singapore in Ong et al. (2008). Most of the outcomes indicate 
that stock prices tend to decline after an SEO. However, we find some different 
evidence of the factor effect on the SEO market reaction. For example, Asquith and 
Mullins (1986) report that a firm‟s leverage should be an important aspect of the 
market reaction to SEO announcements, while some studies, i.e. Denis (1994) and 
Walker and Yost (2007), report no impact between the level of leverage (as well as 
the liquidity) and market reaction to the announcement of SEOs. Moreover, based on 
the above studies, most evidence has no particular identification of the direction of the 
relationship between SEO market reaction and the effect factors (e.g. positive or 
negative). 
 
Therefore, even though the same market and types of data are obtained, the findings 
are different. As a result, we cannot indicate exactly whether the factor (such as 
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leverage) will influence an SEO announcement. Nonetheless, the differences would 
explain that there could be a difference in the period of study, in which the change in 
regulations and sample size could be the points of focus. Thus, we should have 
inconclusive results of which factor(s) impact exactly upon SEO stock price reaction 
in developed markets. In other words, sometimes we cannot point out that these 
factors have a positive or negative influence on SEO announcements. Moreover, some 
of the research is concerned with the dilution of shareholders caused by equity 
offerings (discounting in stock prices after their issue). This is because we know that 
shareholders are diluted when new equities are issued. Consequently, no one appears 
to have concentrated on this particular area. This also makes it possible to introduce a 
further examination of different markets, e.g. emerging markets, for a comparison 
with the previous studies of dilutions in developed markets. 
 
4.2.2 Literature on Stock Price Reaction in Emerging Markets 
4.2.2.1 Stock Price Reaction  
An early study in Korea by Kang (1990) was based on 89 firms with rights issuing 
between 1983 and 1987. His findings reveal that an increase in stock price with rights 
issues announcements is higher than the average change of the market portfolio. With 
109 events of rights offerings and stock dividend announcements in Turkish 
companies between 1988 and 1993, Aydoğan and Muradoğlu (1998) find a positive 
stock price reaction during the initial phase of the market (between 1988 and 1990). 
When the market becomes more mature (referring to the period of 1991 to 1993), 
their results reveal no significant price reactions caused by board meetings and the 
actual implementation of stock dividend-right offering announcements (Aydoğan and 
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Muradoğlu, 1998, p.48). In a study of 72 Malaysian firms from 1980-1995, 
Salamudin et al. (1999) find a positive stock price reaction to SEO announcements. 
Nevertheless, this positive response depends on economic conditions characterised by 
periods of falling term premiums, namely lower issue costs, lower dilution of 
shareholding and higher funds being raised (Salamudin et al., 1999, p.425). Another 
recent paper on rights issuing, by Marisetty et al. (2008), examines 67 Indian rights 
issues between 1997 and 2005. Their findings confirm a positive price reaction to the 
rights issue announcements in retail share ownership, while a negative reaction is 
reported in family owned firms. Recently, in India, Mishra (2007) and Dhar and 
Chhaochharia (2008) show a contrasting consequence in the relationship between 
stock splits and market reaction. While Mishra (2007, p.251) finds a negative effect 
on price and return of stock splits, driving down the wealth of the shareholders, Dhar 
and Chhapchharia (2008) report a positive relation of stock splits announcement and 
security return. From an examination of the Greek Stock Market, Dasilas (2009) finds 
a similar outcome, that market reaction is statistically significant on the day of 
dividend announcement.  
 
With the review of studies in the emerging markets listed above, it is possible to 
suggest that the results from the stock price reaction provide different conclusions. 
This supports the two papers which obtained the Indian data and reveal the opposite 
outcomes from the stock splits, although the sample size was collected from the same 
market and databases. This leads to an uncertain result when the announcements of 
stock splits are concerned, whether they cause the stock prices to be changed. 
Although this event (stock splits) is not directly related to our concern with SEO 
  141 
announcements, it would be important for companies when deciding whether any 
further financings, especially in equities, are required. We will describe some 
additional and specific reasons later in more detail. Consequently, the evidence from 
the stock price reaction to particular events (such as stock splits) could remain 
inconclusive. Our study aims to investigate whether a different event, i.e. SEO 
announcements, provided similar consequences in the earlier events in emerging 
markets. In other words, it would be useful to consider whether announcements such 
as SEOs could convey some information to the market which would lead to the 
reaction of stock prices (Vithessonthi, 2008). 
 
4.2.2.2 Determinants of SEO Stock Price Reaction 
In emerging markets, previous studies have applied various factors (explanatory 
variables), such as size, market-to-book ratio and operating performance, relating to 
the stock returns and firm performance. With reference first to the paper by 
Demirgüc-Kunt (1992), his empirical analysis during the period 1983 – 1987 
discloses an incorporation of the impacts on stock market development in emerging 
markets, including Korea, Malaysia and Thailand. These refer to the relationship 
between many factors, such as size, growth, profitability, change in profitability and 
stock market valuation of firms (Demirgüc-Kunt, 1992, p.19). The findings of 
Claessens et al. (1995) on 20 emerging markets, including Indonesia, Korea, 
Malaysia, Taiwan and Thailand, show that there is no relationship between beta (β) 
and returns when size, earning-price ratio and book-to-market value of equity ratio are 
included as explanatory variables in the regression. Fama and French (1998) examine 
whether there is a value premium in the markets outside the U.S. and confirm a risk 
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model. Their results reveal that the higher the book-to-market equity, earning-to-price 
and cash flow-to-price, the higher the average returns. In addition, the evidence 
suggests that size effect possibly impacts upon emerging market returns. 
 
La Porta et al. (1999) indicate that ownership structure plays an important role in 
corporate finance for emerging market countries in their lists (i.e. Argentina, Korea 
and Mexico), and these firms are controlled by the controlling shareholders, who 
usually come from the same family. With an investigation of the sources of return 
variation in emerging markets (e.g. Indonesia, India, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Taiwan and Thailand), Rouwenhost (1999) suggests that size (by market 
capitalisation) and book-to-market ratio interpret the change in expected returns. 
However, there is no evidence of a relation between expected returns and turnover in 
emerging markets, implying that a compensation for illiquidity is not reflected by the 
return premium (Rouwenhost, 1999, p.1462). 
 
Claessens et al. (2000) show that the majority of inside shareholders have a huge 
influence on more than two-thirds of firms in East Asian countries
78
, and are able to 
exert a powerful right in order to control those companies. Applying the cross-
sectional regression to examine the robustness of size and book-to-market effects, 
Barry et al. (2002, p.27) disclose evidence from 35 emerging markets (e.g. Taiwan, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand) that the motivation for using 
relative size is made by considering whether the emerging markets are fully integrated 
with global capital markets. In China, Chen (2004) suggests that there are six 
                                                 
78
 East Asian consists of nine capital markets: (1) Hong Kong, (2) Indonesia, (3) Japan, (4) South 
Korea, (5) Malaysia, (6) the Philippines, (7) Singapore, (8) Taiwan and (9) Thailand. 
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determinants of capital structure: (1) profitability, (2) size, (3) growth opportunity, (4) 
asset structure, (5) cost of financial distress, and (6) tax shield effects. His evidence 
also shows that the profitability of Chinese listed companies is negatively related to 
debt (ibid, p.1346). Brown et al. (2008) employ book-to-price, earning-to-price, cash 
flow-to-price and dividend-to-price as the independent variables in order to analyse 
the impact of the returns to value and momentum in four Asian markets: Hong Kong, 
Korea, Singapore and Taiwan. 
 
To summarise the literature on SEO stock price reaction in emerging markets, we 
provide the main findings of these studies in Table 4.1. We found that the existing 
studies regarding the stock price reaction reveal different outcomes in the same area 
of specific events. The examples of these can be identified by the difference in the 
relationship between stock price reaction and stock splits announcements in India. 
Although these two specific events have no direct relation to SEO announcements, we 
may learn from them how the evidence of stock price reaction in emerging markets 
will be reported when considering each particular event. Therefore, we aim to re-
examine the study of stock price reaction to specific events. For the events, our 
surveys of the literature found no studies applying SEO announcements to the recent 
data (during the 2000s) from emerging markets in Asia, as far as we are aware. Since 
equity financing has been becoming more popular in Asian markets (particularly in 
Thailand, supported by a marked rise in the number of SEOs between 1999 and 2006 
– see Figure 3.1) during the last decade, SEOs should be an interesting issue to focus 
on. Regarding the stock price reaction as short-term performance, existing studies on 
both developed and emerging markets (e.g. Brown and Warner, 1985; Denis, 1994; 
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Salamudin et al., 1999; D‟Mello et al., 2003; Mishra, 2007) demonstrate that SEO is 
more appropriate than the case of IPO. In other words, the sample of SEOs is applied 
in the literature on stock price reaction, in comparison to the IPO sample (focusing 
mostly on underpricing and the long-term performance, e.g. Rock, 1986; Loughran 
and Ritter, 1995, 2004; Eckbo and Norli, 2005). Moreover, the evidence of Chen 
(2004) assumes that firms in China should avoid debt financing due to a decline in 
profitability. Consequently, SEOs are starting to focus on the study of short-term 
performance in terms of the stock price reaction. Moving to the determinants of SEO 
stock price reaction, the previous literature reports that factors (such as size, 
profitability, leverage and growth rate) are possibly the main factors which affect a 
company‟s capital structure (e.g. Demirgüc-Kunt, 1992; Claessens et al., 1995; La 
Porta et al., 1999; Barry et al., 2002). This includes the valuation, performance and 
financing of the firm. These factors reveal similar outcomes as estimated in developed 
markets; for example, there is a relationship between market-to-book ratio and 
security returns
79
. Thus, we can assume, according to the literature that the evidence 
from developed markets carries over to emerging markets. We will describe the Thai 
literature in more detail in the following section. 
 
[Insert Table 4.1 here] 
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 See Rangan (1998) and Fama and French (1998) for the comparison of this relationship between 
developed markets and emerging markets. 
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4.2.3 Literature on Stock Price Reaction in Thailand 
4.2.3.1 Stock Price Reaction  
Jirasetthakulchai (2000) examines the effect of dividend announcements on public 
offerings of equity for listed companies in Thailand between 1977 and 1997. As 
pointed out earlier, although dividend announcements show no direct relationship to 
SEO announcements, they are likely to be important for SEOs. She also claims from 
previous works (such as Cooney and Kalay, 1993: cited by Jirasetthakulchai, 2000, 
pp.13-14) that issuing dividends could be an interesting effect caused by SEOs. This 
is because the issuing companies can avoid a decline in the value of a firm after the 
SEOs by using financial innovations, e.g. dividend announcements, earning 
announcements and the investment announcements of the company, in order to allow 
the release of internal information reports to the public. This leads to a reduction in 
information asymmetry between the company and the market. As a result, the stock 
prices after SEOs could react positively. Consequently, the firm‟s managers may use 
dividend announcements as a signal to both market and investors that the companies 
are performing well and are likely to acquire finance to expand their businesses. 
Applying the concept of the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) for calculating 
expected returns, her results indicate that Thai firms issue new shares when there is an 
over-value in prices. This leads to a decline in stock prices after the SEOs and the 
suggestion that the companies should issue new equities (do SEOs) immediately after 
the announcement of dividends. 
 
In addition, Jirasetthakuchai suggests that the abnormal returns would not be the 
results from the issuing of new equities via public offering. This is because issuing via 
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public offering in Thailand is very rare and most cases also include other issuing 
methods, such as rights issuing or private placement. As a result, separate 
considerations among issuing methods available during the study period should make 
it possible to obtain better explanations in this particular area. Lertsupongkit (2002) 
investigates the stock price reaction during the post-SEO announcement between 
1994 and 2001 in Thailand. His results pursue the aspects of previous studies, that 
there is a negative stock price reaction after the announcement of SEOs. Although this 
study is similar to the literature relating to developed markets (such as Brown and 
Warner, 1985; Conrad and Kaul, 1993; Denis, 1994), his evidence shows no factors 
which impacted on the SEO stock price reaction in Thailand during his study period. 
This is possibly because his sample size is relatively small (59 firms).  
 
Another relevant study of SEO stock price reaction in Thailand is provided by 
Vithessonthi (2008), who examines the impact of public announcements of the 
proposal to increase authorised common stocks (PIAC) on the stock return behaviour 
of publicly listed firms. With a similar study period to ours of between 1997 and 
2006, he finds that stock prices decrease around the announcement of the PIAC, 
implying no leakage of information before the announcement (ibid, p.31). 
Nonetheless, the differences between our study and the study of Vithessonthi are that 
his paper is concerned with the PIAC, while our focus is on the announcement of 
SEOs in general. In other words, the PIAC is the announcement of the number of 
shares which are going to be issued over the number of shares outstanding, while the 
SEO announcements in our case (also the meaning in general of issuing new shares on 
which previous research focuses) are those issuances within the number of shares 
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outstanding
80
. Thus, the PIAC is a different aspect to our case.  He also applies both 
financial and non-financial companies as his total sample (although the sub-sample of 
non-financial firms is separately estimated), whereas we obtain only the non-financial 
ones. However, consideration of the financial crisis period (between 1997 and 1998) 
should cause some bias. This is because the debt-to-asset ratios for the sample firms 
could reveal a somewhat high level (shown as 68.1%, according to Vithessonthi). 
This leads to one of our reasons to exclude this period from our study and to focus our 
examinations on the period from 1999 to 2006. In addition, during the period 1997 to 
1998, many companies were still in the rehabilitation and/or reorganisation process. 
Hence, it would be difficult for the estimations to reflect the real valuation of firms. 
 
4.2.3.2 Determinants of SEO Stock Price Reaction 
With regard to the transaction costs in Thailand, Nittayagasetwat and Withisuphakorn 
(1997, p.5) point out that these costs lead to investment transactions being 
discouraged. A discussion of the characteristics of the Thai capital market by the 
Stability-Structure-Challenge (SSC) model suggests that market liquidity deteriorates 
as a measure of turnover ratio. Alba et al. (1998, p.26), who obtain the quarterly data 
of financial statements for all firms listed in the SET from 1994 – 1997, report that 
ownership may influence firm performance in Thailand. Their findings confirm that 
the more profitable the firms, the higher the concentration of ownership. 
Wiwattanakantang (1999) suggests that there are six factors (explanatory variables) 
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 For illustration in Thailand, there are 1 million authorised shares and 100,000 outstanding shares. A 
firm is required to issue new shares up to a maximum of 900,000 (i.e. from 1 share to 900,000 shares), 
which refers to the announcement of equity offering in general (as in previous studies and our case). 
However, if the firm is required to issue more than 900,000 new shares (which exceed 1 million shares 
in combination), it is the case of the PIAC. 
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which possibly impact upon Thai firms‟ capital structure under 270 non-financial 
samples: (1) non-debt tax shields, (2) tangibility, (3) profitability, (4) business risk, 
(5) size of firms and (6) agency variables. With reference to the results in Thailand, 
De Groot and Verschoor (2002) find that there is no size effect when controlling 
market-to-book equity in their cross-sectional models between 1984 and 2000, while 
the outcomes are reversed when size is under control. Concerning the examination of 
post-issue operating performance of SEO companies in Thailand from 1991 to 1994, 
Limpaphayom and Ngamwutikul (2004) confirm the change in operating performance 
between the issuers and non-issuers by comparing characteristics of SEO firms among 
total asset, total liabilities, age (years), market capitalisation and ownership (in 
percentage). The consequences from this comparison lead to the interpretation that a 
reaction of investors in Thailand is negative against the announcement of SEO 
information
81
. 
 
The studies related to SEOs in Thailand having been considered, the main drawback, 
which is easily claimed, is the lack of literature in this area with Thai data. As with 
the other emerging markets, we have been unable to identify the areas from which we 
do have conclusive or inconclusive results, i.e. in the area of market reaction and 
dilution. For the determinants‟ part, size, profitability and market-to-book ratio (proxy 
for growth opportunity or tangibility
82
) remain the main factors, as indicated, similar 
to those in other emerging markets and developed markets. In Thailand, turnover ratio 
is brought to attention to proxy the liquidity. Many studies (e.g Alba et al., 1998 and 
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 This result is consistent with that of several studies on developed markets: Loughran and Ritter 
(1997), Rangan (1998) and Teoh et al. (1998b): cited by Limpaphayom and Ngamwutikul (2004). 
82
 For tangibility, market-to-book ratio is used to proxy this factor (Wiwatthanakantang, 1999). 
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Limpaphayom and Ngamwutikul, 2004) also consider company ownership structure, 
since this factor is believed to impact on firm performance. Another interesting point 
from the evidence of SEOs in Thailand suggests that the study periods of previous 
literature do not appear to be up to date and the sample size is small. In other words, 
they mostly apply the period either before or during the financial crisis in 1997, when 
debt financing was still the first choice of financing in most companies in Thailand. 
We question in this case whether the outcomes will be the same if the recent data (e.g. 
post-crisis) are obtained. To confirm this, we calculated the percentage of sample 
coverage compared with the existing Thai SEO literature, given in Table 4.2. 
Furthermore, we realise that we have no evidence of determinants of SEO stock price 
reaction in Thailand, in particular. Most studies we reviewed are based on the 
application of each variable (factors) in areas such as valuations and leverage with the 
data from Thailand. 
 
[Insert Table 4.2 here] 
 
Therefore, we expect to fill these gaps in the SEO literature in Thailand by providing 
a study of Thai SEOs in order to increase the amount of research in this area. Our 
study also obtains more updated data and will cover more ground than previous Thai 
studies did, relating to the current regulations in the market and investors‟ behaviour. 
Furthermore, considering the determinants of SEO stock price reaction in particular, 
offering dilution and individually focusing on different issuing methods provide new 
evidence from the relevant SEO literature in Thailand. 
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4.2.4 Motivations and Hypotheses 
We have been motivated to examine the SEO stock price reactions and their 
determinants for three interesting reasons. First, a lack of studies on SEOs in 
emerging markets is the main gap from our literature review. The existing Thai 
research mostly focuses on dividend announcements. Secondly, the results of the 
literature on emerging markets are inconclusive (e.g. the evidence of Mishra, 2007 
and Dhar and Chhapchharia, 2008). Finally, we employ a different database, leading 
to the difference in institutional background. We also expand our study into an area 
which we believe has not been examined in the case of Thailand with the recent data 
between 1999 and 2006, namely the relationship between short- and long-term stock 
price reactions. 
 
4.2.4.1 SEO Stock Price Reaction 
According to our literature review, the studies of SEOs in Thailand remain lacking. 
These are supported by the existing studies we earlier mentioned that are not 
specifically focused on the SEO announcement (i.e. Jirasetthakulchai, 2000). In 
addition, when the SEO literature is available in Thailand, it does not cover the recent 
dataset (i.e. Lertsupongkit, 2002) and does not refer to the same aspect as our case 
(i.e. Vithessonthi, 2008). Since the number of SEOs rose markedly between 1999 and 
2006 (which is our study period), it is interesting to examine the SEO stock price 
reaction in order to establish whether the outcome remains conclusive in Thailand 
with the recent dataset (reacting negatively to the announcements). Moreover, since 
our sample of SEOs mostly refers to the issuing of new shares to the existing 
shareholders, we would have a different SEO sample compared to the previous 
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studies (e.g. Denis, 1994; D‟Mello, 2003; Walker and Yost, 2007). This is because 
SEOs in other studies normally issue new shares via public offering, unless 
particularly stated, such as rights issuing or private placement.  
 
In Thailand, we find no research concerned with the offering dilution in the country, 
which is one of the important issues to be considered when new equities are issued. 
Our examination of the separate consideration of different issuing methods in the 
offering dilution would confirm the Securities Exchange Commission‟s (SEC) 
regulation whether it helps to reduce the dilution for the companies issuing via rights 
issuing (XR). This implies that the notification KorChor.12/2543 of the SEC would be 
exempted for the firms issuing new shares via XR if they issue new shares to the 
existing shareholders in the same proportion of holding shares. In other words, there 
is no need to receive any permission from the SEC to issue new shares, giving a more 
flexible process to those companies. Thus, issuing new shares to particular 
shareholders will be considered and examined by the SEC in order to have as little 
dilution as possible before allowing companies to issue XR. 
 
Furthermore, considering individually different issuing methods available in our 
sample would extend the evidence further from the study by Jirasetthakulchai (2000). 
Since the issuing via public offering in Thailand may combine with other issuing 
methods, the evidence should not reflect the real abnormal returns which have 
occurred. Consequently, investigating all available issuing methods would have been 
a new issue in Thailand in recent years (e.g. our study period of 1999 to 2006). 
Meanwhile, the larger sample size in our study and the consideration of SEO 
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announcements (in general cases) are additional to the study of Lertsupongkit (2002) 
and Vithessonthi (2008). 
 
In order to develop the hypotheses, our study will be based on the existing literature 
review which we discussed earlier (see section 4.2). Although Thailand contains 
different institutional backgrounds compared with other markets (e.g. small size, 
dependent on technical (external) factors and with a high number of retail investors), 
its differences should not lead to an expectation of any specific outcomes in the area 
of SEO stock price reaction and the offering dilution. For instance, stock prices react 
positively or there is no reaction of stock price to the announcement of SEOs. 
Therefore, we will estimate our study in the section of SEO stock price reaction using 
the following hypotheses: 
There is a negative impact of security price on the SEO announcement. 
There is a negative sign of the percentage of average offering dilution
83
. 
 
4.2.4.2 Determinants of SEO Stock Price Reaction 
According to the review of literature in Thailand, we find that in previous studies (e.g. 
De Groot and Verschoor, 2002 and Limpaphayom and Ngamwutikul, 2004) the 
factors, i.e. size, market-to-book, leverage and operating performance, influence the 
performance of companies. These factors (variables) have also been applied in the 
research to both the developed and emerging markets. Some examples of these are 
considered in the early works of researchers such as Hess and Frost (1982) and 
                                                 
83
 This hypothesis was originally developed based on the study of Asquith and Mullins (1986). 
:1,0H
:2,0H
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Asquith and Mullins (1986), as well as Denis (1994), Eckbo and Masulis (1995), Ng 
and Smith (1996), Jindra (2000), Hertzel et al. (2002) and Brown et al. (2008). Not 
only have these factors been obtained to estimate the firm performance by prior 
researches, but we also discover that they are interesting and appear to be relevant to 
the case of Thailand. Moreover, we propose to make a thorough study of the 
determinants of SEO stock price reaction in Thailand, since the existing works have 
concentrated only on the capital structure, performance, earning management and 
dividend announcements of the firms. 
 
We begin by choosing size and operating performance as the first two factors which 
affect SEO stock price reaction. Although they have been previously examined in 
Thailand by Wiwattanakantang (1999), De Groot and Verschoor (2002) and 
Limpaphayom and Ngamwutikul (2004), our study may provide different evidence. 
This is because those studies applied the data before and during the financial crisis in 
1997, while our test covers more recent data, e.g. the post-financial crisis. We have 
currently more companies in the market, with a variety of size. This confirms our 
comparison with those existing studies: for instance, the 363 non-financial companies 
in the market in 1996 in Wiwattanakantang (1999) compared with the 414 non-
financial companies in our study during 1999 to 2006, around 700 listed firms 
between 1984 and 2000 in De Groot and Verchoor (2002) and around 475 listed firms 
in the market in the first quarter of 2010 and 62 SEO firms in Limpaphayom and 
Ngamwutikul (2004) between 1991 and 1994, compared with 126 SEO firms (with 
common stock offering) in our study from 1999 to 2006.  
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The operating performance is also chosen as a subsequent factor which affects SEO 
stock price reaction. This is because it should be different if we compare our 
examination (having obtained the recent data, i.e. the period of 1999 to 2006) with the 
existing Thai studies that focus on the data before and during the financial crisis in 
1997 (i.e. Jirasetthakulchai, 2000; Lersupongkit, 2002; Pranthawat, 2002). We realise 
that companies could have performed better after the crisis since the economy was 
gradually recovering. This is supported by a substantial rise in the SET Index between 
2002 and 2007
84
. During this period, the index rose from around 350 to approximately 
800 by the end of 2003, and then continued to rise to around 950 in 2007 (one year 
after our study period). Furthermore, the average earnings
85
 of listed companies 
increased markedly from around THB80 billion in the third quarter of 1999 to 
approximately THB600 billion by the end of 2007
86
. Consequently, the operating 
performance of Thai listed firms confirms the difference between our study period 
(1999 to 2006) and the period obtained in the previous Thai literature, including the 
improvement of this operating performance in recent years. 
 
In parallel, good operating performance could also refer to a better growth in the 
firm‟s business. Our statement is confirmed by the percentage of GDP growth that 
                                                 
84
 The movement of the security index (SET Index in this case) is the leading indicator of the economic 
situation. The information was taken from Kasikorn Research Centre (2002). The Thai stock index 
and the risk of the economic recession (in Thai). Vol. 8 Issue 1345, available from the CD-Rom of 
Kasikorn Research Centre or its summary via: http://www.kasikornresearch.com/TH/KEcon%20 
Analysis/Pages/ViewSummary.aspx?docid=3663 [Access on 16 March 2011]. 
85
 Earnings are calculated by 12 months' accumulated EBIT (earning before interest and tax) shown in 
billions of Thai Baht (THB): THB33.50: USD1.00. 
86
 Source: SETSMART as of 31 March 2008. 
  155 
increased significantly from -11% in 1998 to 6.1% in 2006
87
. In addition, choosing 
growth as one of the factors impacting stock price reaction is not only due to a marked 
rise in the percentage of GDP growth, but is also indicated by the reason that growth 
is examined in the Fama-French 3-factor model. Hence, since the factor of growth has 
been previously tested in existing research with the data from Thailand (i.e. Claessens 
et al., 1995; De Groot and Verchoor, 2002)
88
 and is included in well-known models 
(such as Fama-French 3-factor), it could be argued that growth relatively influences 
the expected returns. Thus, with a more recent dataset in Thailand, we will include 
growth (proxy with the market-to-book ratio) as one of our factors which influences 
the SEO stock price reaction.  
 
We focus on leverage, liquidity and ownership in our impact factors, owing mainly to 
the characteristics and institutional background of the Thai capital market. To 
illustrate this in more detail, we begin with leverage. Not only new listed firms that 
finance with debt in parallel with equity, but several existing listed companies also 
apply debt to finance their businesses. According to the statistics provided by the 
Bank of Thailand (BOT) and the SET, bank loans remain the highest percentage of 
financing sources for companies in Thailand. This figure is 77%, followed by equities 
at 67% and bonds at 46%, in 2005. As a result of these percentages, the Federation of 
Thai Capital Market Organisations (hereafter, FETCO, which provides the Master 
Plan of Developing the Thai Capital Market) aims to develop and improve the 
stability of the capital market in order to have better availability of economic 
                                                 
87
 Source: Office of The National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB), GDP [online]. 
Available from: http://www.nesdb.go.th/Portals/0/eco_datas/account/hqgdp/data2_09/Alltable 
Q2_2009.xls [Accessed on 20 August 2009]. 
88
 Their results show significant signs in market-to-book ratio, which is the proxy for growth. 
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competition. Furthermore, leverage has been included as one of the factors related to 
expected returns in the Fama-MacBeth model
89
. Since this model is widely applied in 
existing research (e.g. Shivakumar, 2000; McLean et al., 2007), it is possible to 
follow those works, which suggest that leverage should have an important role in 
average expected returns. We also suspect that leverage should affect the SEO stock 
price reaction in Thailand, as the model was applied in previous studies of emerging 
markets (i.e. Barry et al., 2002). 
 
A subsequent factor to be illustrated is liquidity, which can be defined in terms of 
trading and the ability to pay the debt of firms. With regard to the definition in terms 
of trading, the Thai capital market does not appear to be fully liquid. The main reason 
could be that there are a small number of local institutional investors in the market. In 
2006, the statistics show around 10% of local institutional investors in the Thai capital 
market, which could be a low level in comparison with other markets (e.g. Hong 
Kong, Singapore or Malaysia)
90
. This percentage is claimed by the FETCO to be an 
unbalanced level of liquidity and stability valuation. It also refers to the fact that the 
individual investors are the majority of the investors in the market and are mostly 
short-term investors, who are likely to trade following rumours from speculators
91
. 
Although the total average daily turnover (which is a representative of liquidity in the 
                                                 
89
 According to Fama and French (1992), leverage is one of the factors included in the Fama-MacBeth 
model. The remaining factors are size, P/E ratio, book-to-market ratio and the beta (β). 
90
 The information was obtained from the Master Plan of Developing the Thai Capital Market # 2 
(year: 2006 – 2010; Thai version) by the Federation of Thai Capital Market Organisations, published 
via its website: http://www.fetco.or.th [Accessed on 22 May 2009]. 
91
 This supports a recent example of a significant fall in the SET Index on 14 October 2009 of 8.28%. 
According to the regulations, if there is a decline in the index of more than 10% within one trading day, 
known as the Serkit Breaker. The SET claims that the main reason for this fall was a rumour from 
Bloomberg news regarding the health of King Bhummitpol. Source: The article of ASTV Manager 
Newspaper on 15 October 2009 [online] at http://www.manager.co.th/StockMarket/ 
ViewNews.aspx?NewsID=9520000122562 [Accessed on 17 March 2011]. 
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Thai market) has increased substantially since 2003 (i.e. from THB3,740 million in 
2000 to THB19,030 million in 2003, followed by THB20,647 million in 2004)
92
, the  
average daily turnover of foreign investors remains low. This supports our prior 
claims that the Thai market is only partly liquid. In addition, liquidity would become 
more important since the SET issued the new regulations on turnover risk in June 
2008
93
. However, liquidity in terms of the ability to return the loans of the companies 
would also be brought to the attention, since in this meaning liquidity could influence 
the decision of SEOs. In this case, it relates to leverage, which we have previously 
considered as one factor which impacts on SEO stock price reaction.  
 
Lastly, concerning ownership structure, many listed companies in the SET are family- 
owned, whose investment decisions could possibly depend on only one person and 
lead to some extent of bias. A good example of a family-owned company during our 
study period is the “Shin Corporation Group”, which is owned mainly by the 
Shinnawatra family. Under this group, there are several companies which are mainly 
in the industrial sector, called “Information and Communication Technology (ICT, as 
the local code)”, e.g. SHIN, ADVANC, ITV and THCOM (see Appendix 3 for the 
name in full). For instance, a member of the Shinnawatra family held at 36.88% of the 
total shares in SHIN in 1999 and around 38% of the total shares in 2003
94
. 
                                                 
92
 Source: SETSMART as of 31 March 2008. 
93
 This regulation concerns whether there is an increase in turnover ratio (as a proxy of liquidity) of 
over 50% on each trading day; it could be stated as a possibility of turnover risk. The investors will be 
required to trade by using only cash balance (trade with cash only); implying that trading with a loan 
will be refused. When this regulation was enforced, the investors had to be careful about what they 
traded. This would influence the stock price reaction in other ways. 
94
 In 2006, there was a significant change in the major shareholders, since the Shinnawatra family were 
no longer the major shareholders. Dr Thaksin Shinnawatra, as a major shareholder during the period 
and also the prime minister of Thailand, sold the shares to local and foreign juristic persons. This was 
one of the reasons that led to political chaos in Thailand. 
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Furthermore, SHIN was also the major shareholder of ADVANC (a mobile phone 
business), at more than 40% between 1999 and 2004. This may led to a huge network 
of communication and monopolies in this business in Thailand. As a result, it should 
have provided a substantial impact when the company‟s decisions were made and 
would be have been when Dr Thaksin Shinnawatra was the prime minister of 
Thailand between 2001 and 2006. . Consequently, consideration of these three factors 
(leverage, liquidity and ownership) should provide the evidence with a close relation 
to Thai SEO firms. 
 
In addition, since the SET considers price-earning (P/E) ratio in the daily statistic 
values report, P/E ratio could become important for investment decisions. The 
evidence from Claessens et al. (1995) reveals that P/E ratio was an insignificant factor 
when the authors focused on the data from Thailand. In recent years (i.e. during the 
2000s), to our knowledge, the studies of Thailand included the P/E ratio in 
determinants of SEO stock price reaction. To illustrate this in further detail
95
, we 
claim from the SET research that P/E ratio becomes another factor (aside from market 
capitalisation) in order to expand the size of the capital market in Thailand. This is 
confirmed by the fact that a more than 45% increase in market capitalisation between 
2002 and 2005 was caused by an increase in P/E ratio. Since the market capitalisation 
of Thailand's capital market is lower than the neighbouring markets (such as 
Singapore, Malaysia and Taiwan), expanding the size of the capital market by 
increasing market capitalisation is one of the missions for developing the Thai capital 
                                                 
95
 The information provided here is based on the article by the SET (SET Note): “How Market 
Capitalisation and P/E Ratio Increase (Thai version)”, issue 3/2006: available from 
http://www.set.or.th/th/products_services/research/setnote_p1.html  [Accessed on 2 June 2010] 
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market
96
. Due to a small number of large listed companies (which have a high level of 
market capitalisation), the SET considers improving the P/E ratio in the existing 
companies. Although the P/E ratio provides no direct influence on SEO stock price 
reaction, it is likely to be a motivation factor for the investors. For instance, a low P/E 
ratio during the time of SEO would motivate the investors or the existing shareholders 
(if issued via rights issuing or private placement) to buy or exercise the new shares, 
leading to the reaction of stock prices. Therefore, we will estimate P/E ratio as a 
control variable in the regression as we have found it could indirectly influence the 
SEO stock price reaction in Thailand. 
 
Moreover, when considering different issuing methods separately, the evidence 
should provide more comprehensive and new findings in this area
97
. In order to 
concentrate on SEO announcements only, we will assume that the other events (i.e. 
dividend announcements, earning announcements and policies announcements from 
the government or related institutions) have a small impact on stock price reaction. 
 
We are aiming to provide an empirical investigation into the determinants of SEO 
stock price reaction, similar to what has been done in previous studies (i.e. Asquith 
and Mullins, 1986; Lertsupongkit, 2002; Walker and Yost, 2007). However, our study 
                                                 
96
 This information was obtained from the Master Plan of Developing the Thai Capital Market#2 (year: 
2006 – 2010: Thai version) by the Federation of Thai Capital Market Organisations (FETCO), 
published via its website: http://www.fetco.or.th [Accessed on 22 May 2009]. 
97
 Due to the availability of the data and information regarding the issue types of SEOs in Thailand, we 
are unable to specify exactly which issue types are used in each issuing (i.e. book building, fixed prices 
or floating prices). In the secondary data sources (such as SETSMART and the prospectuses) we 
obtained, they state the fixed prices. If we need to know the obvious type, primary data need to be 
collected. However, it is generally assumed in Thailand that companies need to survey and inform the 
SEC and the SET regarding the purpose of the issuing, implying that they have to know the demand of 
new financing via equities. 
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will be conducted by obtaining the data from emerging markets, since they are rarely 
found in the existing literature. We capture the SEO stock price reaction with a two-
day announcement abnormal return. This is because when the board of directors of 
companies agree to issue new equities, they are required to submit the report to the 
market (the SET). The market will normally accept and respond on the following day, 
despite the late agreement from the meeting boards. As a result, if there is any 
reaction, it should be on the next day that the stock goes public (day +1). Furthermore, 
we introduce some new factors, e.g. P/E ratio, ownership and issuing methods, which 
could be more related to the characteristics of Thai companies and the Thai capital 
market. We summarise the findings regarding this area in Table 4.3, together with our 
initial expectations. Finally, the hypotheses to be estimated are given as follows: 
 Size affects the two-day announcement abnormal return. 
Market-to-book impacts on the two-day announcement abnormal return 
 There is an impact between leverage and the two-day announcement 
abnormal return 
There is an effect between operating performance and the two-day 
announcement abnormal return 
Liquidity affects the two-day announcement abnormal return 
Insider ownership influences the two-day announcement abnormal 
return. 
 
[Insert Table 4.3 here] 
:3,0H
:4,0H
:5,0H
:6,0H
:7,0H
:8,0H
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4.2.4.3 Long-Term SEO Stock Price Reaction 
Having examined the SEO stock price reaction in the short-term, we briefly extend 
our investigation to cover the overview of how stock prices move in a longer event 
window, e.g. 240 days before and after the event
98
. The evidence from this longer 
event window could lead to the discussion on whether there is a timing of equity sales 
during the post-issuing period (Asquith and Mullins, 1986). We would expect to have 
a negative movement of stock prices during a longer event window (240 days before 
and after the event). This is because in Thailand investors (mostly individual 
investors, who are the largest proportion in the market, see Figure 3.3) normally trade 
in the short-term. The Thai market is also highly volatile and varies according to 
situations. Examples of these are the dramatic fall in stock prices after the 
announcement of the Bank of Thailand (BOT) on capital reserve in 2006, or political 
chaos and violence
99
. As a consequence, investors would sell the stocks and move to 
invest in other equities or securities. We consider the hypothesis as below: 
 Stock prices respond with negative movement in a longer event 
window after an SEO announcement. 
 
Furthermore, it would be useful to pay a little more attention to the relationship 
between the short-term and the long-term stock price reaction. When we have a short-
term reaction, we are not totally sure whether it will be an over or under reaction, or 
whether this reaction is correct as it is. In other words, since we expect (and know 
from the existing literature, e.g. Conrad and Kaul, 1993; Lertsupongkit, 2002; Walker 
                                                 
98
 The reasons are given in more detail in section 4.3.2.3. 
99
 Source: The Thai news station on 17 May 2010, MCOT Public Company Limited, available at 
http://www.mcot.co.th [Accessed on 17 March 2011]. 
:9,0H
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and Yost, 2007) stock prices to react negatively to SEO announcements, these SEO 
announcements are specifically made in order to adjust the stock prices back to the 
level that they should be (correcting of misprice). This is described by Daniel et al. 
(1998, cited by Balachandran et al., 2010) as selective events
100
. If there is a 
relationship between short- and long-term stock price reactions, it implies that we will 
find the degree of mispricing that corrects the stock prices in the long-term. 
Consequently, issuing new shares (i.e. via rights issuing, private placement or stock 
dividend) could be referred to as selective events in order to adjust the stock prices to 
the level that they should be at. In Thailand, we expect to have no relationship 
between short- and long-term stock price reactions. This is because the stock prices in 
practice should depend on current situations and events (i.e. external factors – GDP, 
interest rate and inflation) rather than related to events in the short-term (SEO 
announcement in our case). Therefore, the hypothesis to be estimated regarding the 
relationship between short-and long-term stock price reaction is: 
 The long-term stock price reaction has no correlation to the two-day 
announcement abnormal returns 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
100
 In their paper, they explain with the case of rights issuing that “if rights issues occur in response to 
an overvaluation of the stock, then clearly such issues constitute selective public events with a negative 
announcement effect and a negative post-announcement drift (Balachandran et al., 2010, p.7).” 
:1 0,0H
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4.3 Data and Methodology  
 
4.3.1 Data and Definition of Variables 
We have obtained our SEOs data mainly from the SET fact books and SET database 
(SETSMART) during the period 1999 to 2006. The financial statements and financial 
ratios were obtained via Thomson One Banker. The initial sample from these sources 
displays 251 non-financial firms with 1,910 SEOs. We take the exclusion of financial 
companies (including banks and insurance firms) because of the difference in their 
asset structures. Among these 251 firms, we follow the data organisation in Seiler 
(2004), who utilised the event window to 15 days before and after the event – the 
SEO announcement date referred to day 0. For the estimation period, Seiler (2004) 
employs 100 days before the event window. In order to arrange our initial data to 
cover more around the event date, we extend the 100 days of the estimation period 
after the event window. Consequently, we have 115 days regarding our focused event 
study period. 
 
Any firms that contain the SP or suspension signs and unavailable data for trading 
information (i.e. closed prices) are also excluded from our sample. To avoid any 
overlapping among our sample, we used the first SEO of each company. As a result, 
we have a final sample consisting of 173 companies. In this paper, we utilised the 
sample of common stock offering companies of 126 firms during our study period 
1999 to 2006. Among these, four issuing methods (rights issuing: XR; private 
placement: PP; stock dividend; SD and public offering: PO) have been applied and 
the number of firms using each method is displayed in Table 4.4. 
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[Insert Table 4.4 here] 
 
Regarding our sample of 126 common stock offering firms, it is absolutely less than 
the sample obtained in developed markets. Some examples of this are shown as 531 
samples in Asquith and Mullins (1986), 435 samples in Denis (1994), 863 firms in 
D‟Mello et al. (2003) and 438 samples in Walker and Yost (2007). However, our 
sample is consistent with those applied in Thailand
101
 and other emerging markets. To 
illustrate some examples from the emerging markets, we notice some studies, i.e. 89 
firms in Korea by Kang (1990), 109 firms in Turkey by Aydoğan and Muradoğlu 
(1998), 72 firms in Malaysia by Salamudin et al. (1999) and 67 firms in India by 
Marisetty et al. (2008). Having identified seven explanatory variables in the previous 
section, we define those variables, together with sources of data in Table 4.5. The 
definitions in Table 4.5 are mostly concerned with the change of those variables 
between their value on the issuing year and the average 3 years prior to the issuing. 
This is because we focus on the difference of those variables in the issuing year and 
prior to the issuing. The average 3 years before the offering year is chosen in order to 
increase number of firms into our estimation. Further explanations in more detail are 
given in section 4.3.2.2. 
 
[Insert Table 4.5 here] 
 
                                                 
101
 For Thailand, see the examples of the existing studies in section 4.2.4.2 and Table 4.2. 
  165 
In addition, we tested the differences between the three subsamples of different 
issuing methods
102
. Our results indicate that small firms in Thailand are likely to issue 
new shares via SD (reported with the significant t-statistics in the two-sample t-test) 
because the average size under this method is revealed as the lowest among the other 
samples (see Table 4.7 – panel A). This leads to similar interpretations in our previous 
chapter (section 3.3.2 in Chapter 3), so it could be assumed that there is no difference 
between the sample of SD and other subsamples, even though the results should refer 
to the endogenetic problem. This is because if all small firms in Thailand tend to issue 
new shares via SD, the minimum size for the total sample should be SORKON (at 
THB122.35 million – see the full name in Appendix 3); instead of NEW at THB71.07 
million (which is the smallest size in our sample). In addition, although issuing via SD 
is likely to be used by the firms which need to maintain their cash flow, it is not 
always the case for a small company which has a good performance and no need to 
retain capital in the company. Consequently, we can point out that there are no 
significant differences between the total sample and the three subsamples of different 
issuing methods in our estimation. 
 
[Insert Table 4.7 – panel A here] 
 
4.3.2 Methodology 
The review of the literature has led to the realisation that the calculation of abnormal 
return by market model and event study concept remains the key methodology for 
                                                 
102
 The significant differences between the total sample and the three subsamples can also be seen in 
the same statistic table (see Table 4.7 – panel A). 
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much of the literature in more recent years. This is demonstrated in, for instance, 
Errunza and Miller (2003), Aktas et al. (2007), Balachandran et al. (2008a), and 
Yermack and Chenyang (2009). Not only are the market model and standard event 
study frequently applied to SEO studies, but other methodologies: e.g. a normal 
student t-test, ordinary least square (OLS), multiple regression, as well as cross-
sectional analysis, Tobin-Q technique and even the CAPM, are also employed in the 
literature. Some examples of the studies which used these types of methodologies, 
including the examination of long-term performance, are Teoh et al. (1998b), 
Gajewski and Ginglinger (2002), Fu (2006), Balachandran et al. (2008b) and Brown 
et al. (2009).  
 
In emerging markets and in Thailand, we find some studies of SEOs obtaining the 
event-study framework and market model, such as Bartholdy et al. (2005), 
Vithessonthi (2007) and Diacogiannis and Makri (2008). Consequently, it is noted 
that the studies apply key methodologies, e.g. event-study, the market model, the 
standard OLS or a cross-sectional approach, in emerging markets (including 
Thailand) where there are different characteristics from the developed markets. 
Moreover, these methodologies appear to be easily understood. As a result, we 
decided to follow the wide use of these methodologies in our investigation. 
 
The methodology to be employed in this chapter is concerned with three areas: (1) the 
stock price reaction to SEO announcements and offering dilution, (2) the determinants 
of SEO stock price reaction and (3) the long-term stock price reaction. We consider 
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first applying abnormal returns (ARs, hereafter) because the ARs are adjusted with 
beta of each security. Therefore, the calculation of ARs for any securities is given by: 
   (4.1) 
where t = day measured relative to the event, 
 = abnormal return to security i for day t, 
 = return on security i during day t and 
 = expected rate of return on security i for day t 
 
 is estimated by the market model as suggested by MacKinlay (1997). As a 
consequence, equation 4.1 can be re-written as: 
   (4.2) 
 where  = market return on day t (in our case defined as return on the SET 
index, which is the main composite index in the SET), 
 = intercept and 
 = the OLS estimators of the market model parameters, calculated in the 
estimation period. 
 
Since equation 4.1 is defined, it leads to the measurement of cumulative abnormal 
return (CAR, hereafter), displayed as: 
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   (4.3)
103
 
where and are the days between the event window. 
 
In addition, another possible explanation for employing ARs (as well as CARs) is that 
since excess returns are only different by one type of benchmark, i.e. risk free rate      
( ) or average returns from the portfolios, there might be other risk factors which 
have an influenced. Much of the basic literature regarding the event-studies (for 
instance, Cambell et al., 1997; MacKinlay, 1997; and Kothari and Warner, 2006) also 
suggest CAR in order to capture the impact from the event (our case refers to SEOs), 
as well as some studies of event study in emerging markets (e.g. Aydoğan and 
Muradoğlu, 1998; Jirasetthakulchai, 2000; Lertsupongkit, 2002; Prangthawat, 2002; 
Diacogiannis et al., 2005). Since the number of firms in each methodology of issuing 
is below 30 and when every variable is available in all the firms in each issuing 
method, these could be a small sample, since all of the companies have been chosen. 
We need to employ a further method of increasing the available quantities of data, by 
utilising a pooled sample, or the panel data concept (Brooks, 2008, p.174). 
Furthermore, we will bring the other events - apart from SEOs - to our attention as the 
control variable, although we assume that there are no other events. 
 
4.3.2.1 Stock Price Reaction to the SEO Announcement and Offering Dilution 
We used the event window to 15 days before and after the event, employing day 0 as 
an event date. Seiler (2004) suggests that, with extremely certain events with little 
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 The calculation of CAR is referred to by MacKinlay (1997, p.21). 
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possibility of leakage information, as little as a plus and minus event window, e.g. 
days, can be used. Since there are many speculators and the characteristics of the 
market in Thailand are helpful for insider trading, a leakage of information might 
occur. Consequently, it could be worth covering this leakage. In order to pursue this, 
we extended the event window up to 15 days, as indicated. Furthermore, our evidence 
from Table 4.7 – panel C suggests that there are no significant differences between 
the average two-day announcement abnormal returns and the complete subsamples 
(including the total sample) in our study. This is confirmed by the two sample t-tests 
(see Table 4.7 – panel C), which are insignificant. 
 
[Insert Table 4.7 – panel C here] 
 
We define the offering dilution as the discounting of stock prices after the issuing, in 
terms of market capitalisation, calculated on the basis of a suggestion by Asquith and 
Mullins (1986): 
                             (4.4) 
Where = Market capitalisation on the announcement date. 
 = Market capitalisation on day after the announcement date. 
 
In our review of the literature, we have encountered no studies, in emerging markets 
and Thailand in particular, which examine offering dilution. Nevertheless, the 
previous studies normally focus on the discounting of stock prices in terms of offer 
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and closed prices (i.e. Mola and Loughran, 2004; Intintoli and Kahle, 2009). As 
pointed out above, our study is one of the first in Thailand to investigation offering 
dilution and it should be reliable so long as we use the same definition as the existing 
literature (Asquith and Mullins, 1986). This could allow us to compare whether our 
evidence from Thailand provides the same aspects as reported on the basis of the 
developed markets. 
 
4.3.2.2 The Determinants of SEO Stock Price Reaction 
The consideration of ARs in the event study‟s methodology with regard to the 
examination of event and the movement of share prices or the performance of the 
market is widely obtained in much of the literature (i.e. MacKinlay, 1997; Burton et 
al., 1999, Kothari and Warner, 2006; Walker and Yost, 2007). Using ARs could be 
better than using excess returns, as the returns are adjusted with the beta of each 
security under, for example, either market model or CAPM. There is also some 
evidence that excess returns are applied in the calculation and measurement of short-
sale activities (Kim and Hyun-Han, 2004) and insiders‟ aggregate activities (SET 
research paper, 2004), even though the procedure is similar to the methodology of the 
event study. Therefore, our dependent variable, “two-day announcement abnormal 
return”, is defined thus: 
   (4.5) 
Where,  is two-day announcement abnormal return for firm i,  
  is abnormal return to security i on day after a published 
announcement and 
1,0,1,0, iii ARARCAR 
1,0,iCAR
1,iAR
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  is abnormal return to security i on day of announcement. 
 
We clarify the seven explanatory variables pointed out in the previous section. These 
variables will be considered as the change in values before the SEOs and when the 
SEO is announced. This should let us know how the difference between those 
explanatory variables is impacted upon by the SEO announcement. Moreover, we 
employed methods of issuing into our consideration, because we noticed that the 
outcomes may be different from the previous studies made of the Thai market. This is 
supported by the findings of Burton et al. (1999), as firms would prefer rights issuing 
when there is an opportunity to gain ARs. In addition, as mentioned earlier 
concerning the characteristics of Thai SEOs, companies rarely issue via public 
offering without combining other issuing methods with it (see Jirasetthakulchai, 
2000). Consequently, considering each issuing method separately could lead to proper 
results for Thai SEOs. 
 
Regarding our explanatory variables, we provide the proxies for variables based 
mainly on the existing literature in that area as follows. Beginning with the firm size, 
we will capture this via market capitalisation. This is preferable as our examination is 
based on the market (where its size is captured by market value), while other proxies 
(such as sales and total asset do not appear to be linked to the market (i.e. stock price 
reaction). This proxy is used and supported in several studies, e.g. Asquith and 
Mullins (1986), Barber and Lyon (1997b), De Groot and Verchoor (2002) and 
Limpaphayom and Ngamwutikul (2004). We capture the growth of the firm following 
how it was measured in the Fama-French model via market-to-book ratio, as 
0,iAR
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previously mentioned (see section 4.2.4.2)
104
. For leverage, debt-equity ratio is chosen 
as the proxy suggested in Eckbo and Masulis (1995). The operating performance is 
proxy with the return on asset (ROA, hereafter). This proxy is widely used to capture 
the operating performance in much of the literature (e.g. Cooney and Kalay, 1993; 
Rangan, 1998; Hertzel et al., 2002; Fu, 2006). Nonetheless, there are various other 
proxies for operating performance. These proxies are, for instance, return on equity 
(ROE), earning per share (EPS), EBITDA (earnings before interest, tax, depreciation 
and amortisation) and ratio of EBIT (earnings before interest and tax)-to-total asset 
(e.g. Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Wald, 1999; Elashker and Wattanasuwanne, 2000; 
Glen and Singh, 2004). 
 
We capture liquidity by the turnover ratio, because it has been applied in some of the 
existing literature, such as Nittayagasetwat and Withisuphakorn (1997) and Fama and 
French (1998). Liquidity will also be our control variable since it is partly related to 
the leverage, as discussed earlier (see section 4.2.4.2). Lastly, insider ownership is 
proxy following the study of operating performance of Thai SEOs by Limpaphayom 
and Ngamwutikul (2004). Concerning the other events and the issuing methods, they 
are estimated as the dummy variables in the regression (see Table 4.5 for all 
definitions of variables). 
 
In order to measure the determinants of SEO stock price reaction, we employed a 
standard OLS regression in our consideration. Many previous authors (see Rajan and 
Zingales, 1995; Krishnan and Moyer, 1997; Frank and Goyal, 2004; Vaaler et al., 
                                                 
104
 We employ the reverse ratio from the Fama-French 3-factor model to follow the statistical values 
reported by the SET. 
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2006) applied this basic model to some extent (sometimes based on adverse selection 
and pecking order theory) to determine the level of leverage in the firm‟s capital 
structure,. In our case, we intend to measure which factors could influence two-day 
announcement abnormal return, and a standard OLS regression should be worth 
studying to begin with. For other events apart from SEOs, we will consider this as a 
dummy variable in our regression (also a control variable). In order to have more 
samples in our estimation, we select the average three years prior to the issuing year 
in our explanatory variables. This is because if we obtain the five-year average (i.e. 
similar to the study by Asquith and Mullins, 1986), several companies have not even 
been listed in the market, such as those making their SEOs in 1999. Thus, we have no 
data available during that period in order to estimate explanatory variables with the 
balanced panel (all variables need to be available to every firm). As a result, we 
choose the period of three years to define our explanatory variables. The regression is 
revealed as follows: 
 
 (4.6) 
, where DXR, DPP, DSD and DPO are represented as dummy variables equal to 1 
when the company issues are by rights issuing (XR), private placement (PP), stock 
dividend (SD) and public offering (PO), respectively, and equal to zero otherwise. We 
define the other variables with reference to Table 4.5. 
 
Concerning sample size, we use the concept of balanced panel to obtain our 
explanatory variables under our final sample of 126 companies. This means that the 
)()()()(Re 4321 ROALeverageMBsizeturnrmalTwoDayAbno  
)()()()()()()/( 111098765 DSDDPPDXREVENTSOWNTURNEP  
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companies need to have the entire data for every explanatory variable (see Table 4.6 
for number of firms to be estimated and those available in each explanatory variable). 
For instance, since we have seven independent variables in our regression, a company 
may have its data available for five variables, because there is unavailability of data 
for the remaining variables (balanced panel). This unavailability can indicate, for 
example, that the firm has not been listed in the market during the previous three 
years from the issuing year when we obtained the data for the market-to-book ratio or 
the ownership, as earlier mentioned. The firm would also be under rehabilitation or 
have had the SP (suspension) sign during the three years prior to the issuing year. This 
leads to no trading information (i.e. closed prices, market capitalisation and turnover 
ratio) during that period. Subsequently, there is no data available for turnover ratio in 
this case. Therefore, we have to exclude these firms from our final sample of 126 
companies, following the concept of balanced panel. As a result, our sample size for 
estimation in the OLS regression (equation 4.6) is reduced to 68 companies (see Table 
4.6 – panel B). This sample size is consistent and reasonable in relation to other 
studies in Thailand, as previously discussed (see section 4.3.1). Furthermore, since 
our sample appears to be small for each issuing method when examined separately, 
we need to pool the data for the sample of companies issuing new shares by common 
stock via each issuing method (see Table 4.6 – panel A) in order to increase our 
sample. 
 
[Insert Table 4.6 here] 
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In Table 4.6 – panel A, only three issuing methods will be considered in our analysis: 
rights issuing, private placement and stock dividend. This is because the fourth 
issuing method, public offering, refers to two companies, which are excluded from 
our 68 estimated firms, due to unavailable data of ownership. Our estimation would 
be different from the existing literature, apart from Thailand. The explanation is that 
public offering is normally examined in most studies regarding equity offerings, while 
public offering is not a popular method in Thailand. Issuing new equities to the 
existing shareholders, e.g. via rights issuing, private placement or even stock 
dividends, can guarantee them the possibility to exercise their rights rather than 
issuing to the public, according to the trading aspect in the Thai capital market. One 
reason is that the process of issuing via rights is faster than issuing via public offering 
because it is unnecessary to receive the permission of the SEC as long as the company 
issues new shares in the same proportion to all existing shareholders in the firm (see 
notification KorChor.12/2543, section 3.2.4.1). In addition, since we have a limited 
amount of literature relating to SEO stock price reaction in Thailand (as well as in 
other emerging markets) and less variety compared with the studies in developed 
markets, we sometimes need to depend to some extent on the research in developed 
markets, which is mostly relevant to SEO stock price reaction rather than the 
emerging markets. 
 
Moreover, we provide the two-sample t-test of whether there are any significant 
differences between the three subsamples in the regression sample (68 firms in total, 
Table 4.7 – panel B). The results show again that there are significant differences 
between the XR sample and the SD sample. The similar explanations remain true here 
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(see section 4.3.1), that if small firms tend to issue new shares via SD, the smallest 
firm size should be reported as SORKON (at THB122.35 million), instead of NEW at 
THB71.07 million (see Appendix 3 for their names in full). Based on our prior 
interpretations (see section 3.3.2 in Chapter 3 and section 4.3.1), it is identified that 
there are no significant differences among our sample size for estimating the 
regression of determinants of SEO stock price reaction. 
 
[Insert Table 4.7 – panel B here] 
 
4.3.2.3 The Long-Term Stock Price Reaction 
In order to capture the movement of security prices over a longer period, we expanded 
our event window to 240 days before and after the announcement date. Although it 
can be claimed that the period of 240 days may not be enough to analyse the 
announcement effect as a long-term event, there are two main reasons in this case.  
First, during the 240 day period, the companies which have unavailable data and SP 
(suspension) signs are smaller in number than those in the longer period, i.e. 480 days. 
Additionally, the SET is not as old as exchanges in developed markets
105
. 
Consequently, if we use a longer period, our sample will be substantially reduced, as 
those companies do not cover the entire period. Lastly, having re-arranged the sample, 
we obtained 49 rights issuing firms, 47 firms with private placement, 20 firms for 
stock dividend and 2 firms remained for public offering
106
. The sample size is reduced 
because the companies: (1) are delisted or not listed yet, (2) are showing the SP sign 
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 The SET was originally established in April 1975. 
106
 Three firms of public offering are excluded from our investigation for the determinant of stock price 
reaction section. Therefore, we would rather apply the same category in our overall examination. 
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and (3) have no trading information during the period of 481 days around the event. 
The calculation of ARs remains the same as in the previous section, via the market 
model (equation 4.2). We also compare this movement with the cumulative average 
market return (CARs Mkt), where market returns are measured by the SET composite 
index returns (SET Index returns). 
 
If we recall the explanatory variables estimated in equation 4.6, we will consider 
those variables in terms of the control variables to examine the correlation between 
the long-term stock return (as the short-term price reaction). We then define the 
relationship of this examination thus: 
 (4.7) 
where   LR_AR refers to CAR [+16, +240]. 
 
To illustrate this in more detail, we point out the reason for using CARs from day 
+16, which is the post-issuing period outside our event window which we have 
already examined in an earlier section. This range (from day +16 to day +240) will 
cover us up to 240 days after the announcement of SEOs. Furthermore, we consider 
the factors we previously estimated as the control variables, since we need to focus 
only on the relationship of short- and long-term stock price reaction. Alternatively, we 
could indicate that we are going to make estimations similar to equation 4.6, with 
different dependent variables (LR_AR) and an extra explanatory variable (two-day 
announcement abnormal return). The sample size is reduced to 67 companies, since 
one firm (LL) had to be dropped owing to unavailable data up to 240 days after the 
event date. To be more specific, this firm contains the SP sign and no trading data 
  t urnrmalTwoDayAbnoi abl esCont rol V rfARLR Re_ 
  178 
within our post-issuing period of 240 days after the event. Hence, we excluded it 
following our sample conditions (see section 4.3.1). 
 
 
4.4 Empirical Results  
 
4.4.1 CARs by Total Sample 
CARs during the event period (15 days prior and after the event date) decline 
gradually. There is also a substantial drop of CARs around the announcement date 
(day 0), as demonstrated in Figure 4.1 – panel A. 
 
[Insert Figure 4.1 – panel A here] 
 
The two-day announcement abnormal returns are statistically significant with t-
statistic at -2.97211 on day 0 and -2.76114 on day +1 (see Table 4.8). These imply 
that the change in stock prices is caused by the announcement of SEOs, which are 
consistent with our hypothesis (Hypothesis 1) that there is a negative impact of 
security price on SEO announcements (see Figure 4.1 – panel A). In addition, our 
evidence shows aspects similar to those of previous studies in both developed and 
emerging markets, including Thailand. These are revealed in, for instance, Denis 
(1994), Jirasetthakulchai (2000), Lertsupongkit (2002), Mishra (2007) and Walker 
and Yost (2007). Although some of these studies (e.g. Jirasetthakulchai, 2000 and 
Mishra, 2007) have not been made in the area of SEOs, they examine the other 
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published events (namely, dividend announcements and stock splits) and reveal 
similar outcomes of stock price reactions to the published information. This should 
imply that our finding has the same result as shown in the research into emerging and 
Thai markets because we still have a negative effect of stock price, similar to 
published information (SEO in our case and dividend and stock splits in the others). 
Therefore, in terms of stock price reaction to SEOs, we can claim that our results in 
Thailand are consistent with those of previous studies.  
 
[Insert Table 4.8 and 4.9 here] 
 
Concerning the offering dilution, all of the common stock offering firms show 
approximately 0.36% of change in the value of the firm on announcement day (see 
Table 4.9). This means that we have an increase of 0.36% in the equity value of firms 
on this day. Moreover, it can clearly be seen from Table 4.9 that more than one third 
of our total sample firms have not suffered from the loss of firm value, indicated with 
a positive percentage of dilution. As a consequence, our result is inconsistent and 
shows a contrasting explanation to our hypothesis (Hypothesis 2) that there is a 
negative offering dilution. In comparison with the previous research in this area, we 
can only refer to a work on the developed market, Asquith and Mullins (1986), where 
the offering dilution was especially focused on. Our evidence from Thailand displays 
a contrasting finding in offering dilution compared with their findings. The possible 
reasons could first be the difference in study period and database. Based on the 
results, this indicates that an emerging market would be better able to protect the 
shareholders from dilution than developed markets. This also implies that our SEO 
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sample is mainly concerned with the issue of new shares to the existing shareholders 
(i.e. rights issuing and private placement), while their SEO sample refers to public 
offering. Furthermore, with the regulations of issuing via rights issuing in Thailand, 
the issuers need to issue the same proportion of new shares that each shareholder 
currently holds in the firm, otherwise they may be refused permission by the SEC to 
have new shares listed and traded (see KorChor.12/2543, section 3.2.4.1). Second, it 
can also be assumed from our results that the emerging markets‟ performance at 
present would be equivalent to the developed markets‟ performance in the past.  
 
In parallel with the stock price reaction, our evidence in Table 4.8 can imply that there 
is a leakage of information before the SEO announcement (i.e. on day -12) due to a 
significant t-stat at -1.80345 (see Table 4.8). As a result, investors can use this leakage 
information to gain their ARs (insider trading). Trading on this leakage information is 
expected to start earlier, which may consequently reduce ARs during the event 
window.  This is also supported by a gradual decrease in CARs from the beginning of 
our event window (day -15). In addition, we notice that our results are partly 
consistent with the previous research in Thailand by Lertsupongkit (2002) and 
Vithessonthi (2008), that there is no evidence of leakage information during the event 
window of SEO announcements. For illustration, our findings are consistent with the 
study of Lertsupongkit (2002) regarding the negative stock price reaction to SEO 
announcements, while we report no leakage of information up to 10 days before the 
event date (day 0), which is consistent with the study of Vithessonthi (2008). This is 
because we have different study periods (Lertsupongkit, 2002) and a different 
definition of SEOs (issuing new shares for raising capital) and the proposal to 
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increase the authorised common stock (PIAC, Vithessonthi, 2008 – see section 
4.2.3.1). Thus, the concept of Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) would not be 
applied to SEO announcements in Thailand (no ARs before the announcement). 
 
4.4.2 CARs by Issuing Methods 
4.4.2.1 Rights Issuing (XR) 
CARs of the XR firms during an event period fall gradually from the beginning of our 
event window (see Figure 4.1 – panel B). The value of t-statistic for the two-day 
announcement abnormal return is 1.80224 on announcement day (day 0) and -1.85543 
on the following day (day +1) (see Table 4.10 – panel A), which are significant at a 
10% level of confidence. Consequently, the stock prices react negatively to the SEO 
announcements when the companies issue new shares via XR. This is again consistent 
with our hypothesis (Hypothesis 1) and provides the same outcome as the total sample 
case. Our negative reaction in XR firms can be supported by a sharp fall in ARs 
between day -1 and day +1 (see Figure 4.1 – panel B). Furthermore, our evidence 
from XR firms contrasts to the research of Kang (1990), Dhatt et al. (1996) and 
Salamudin et al. (1999), where stock prices react positively to rights issuing 
announcements. Nonetheless, our findings on negative stock price reaction in XR 
firms are consistent with the study of Marisetty et al. (2008) on Indian firms. In 
addition, our results are also consistent with the studies in developed markets, such as 
Armitage (1998) and Balachandran et al. (2008b). 
 
[Insert Figure 4.1 – panel B here] 
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[Insert Table 4.10 – panel A here] 
 
Concerning the offering dilution, there is around 0.90% of change in the value of the 
firm on announcement day, with the minimum percentage of offering dilution at         
-13.60% (see Table 4.11 – panel A). This means that the shareholders of XR 
companies could lose a maximum of 13.60% in current market value. Thus, we have 
to reject our hypothesis of negative average offering dilution (Hypothesis 2). Since 
our results show a positive average offering dilution, it implies that the post-
announcement equity value is greater than the equity value when the issue is 
announced. This is consistent with the study of Dhatt et al. (1996), who reported no 
effect from rights issues in Korean shareholder‟s wealth. In addition, the SEC‟s 
regulation (KorChor.12/2543), as previously mentioned, can be a confirmation that it 
helps the shareholders to have less dilution when companies issue new shares via XR. 
Consequently, we can claim that XR can protect the shareholders from dilution. 
 
[Insert Table 4.11 – panel A here] 
 
4.4.2.2 Private Placement (PP) 
The movement of CARs during the event period for the companies issuing new shares 
by PP is similar to what was mentioned in the total sample. Although there is a 
substantial rise of CARs around 5 days before the announcement date, CARs 
continued to drop markedly until the end of the period (see Figure 4.1 – panel C). This 
suggests that the average two-day announcement abnormal return is negatively 
affected by the announcement of equity offering and is consistent with our assumption 
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(Hypothesis 1). This is confirmed by the significant t-statistics at -5.14867 at 1% on 
the announcement day and -1.69341 on the following day (see Table 4.10 – panel B). 
Previous studies supporting our findings on PP are rare, although some research has 
focused on long-term performance (i.e. Herizel et al., 2002; Krishnamurthy et al., 
2005)
107
. Furthermore, in Figure 4.1 – panel C, a sharp fall in ARs around 3 days 
before the announcement could mean that investors can gain ARs by trading with 
inside information. Hence, the leakage of information remains in the PP firms. This is 
confirmed by a significant t-statistic at 10% on day -3 (see Table 4.10 – panel B). 
 
[Insert Figure 4.1 – panel C here] 
[Insert Table 4.10 – panel B here] 
 
With regard to offering dilution, the 0.064% on average is shown as the loss in equity 
value of PP firms after the issue. This indicates that the value of firms falls by around 
0.06% of the funds raised in the issuing of new shares via PP
108
. Issuing with this 
method (PP), the shareholders would be confronted by a maximum loss of 22.83% in 
current market value, which is also the maximum loss of equity value of firms in our 
study (among 126 firms). Moreover, issuing via PP, the post-announcement equity 
value of firms is the lowest among our sample size compared with the equity value on 
the announcement day. Consequently, with a negative average offering dilution, we 
are unable to claim that issuing via PP can protect the shareholders from dilutions. In 
addition, the regulation (KorChor.12/2543) only considers the XR case for dilution. 
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 These two studies will be explained in further detail in the “Post-Issuing Performance” chapter 
(Chapter 6) later in this thesis. 
108
 This explanation is based on Asquith and Mullins (1986). 
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Issuing with PP is similar to having new investors who become new shareholders, 
generally causing dilution for the existing shareholders. Therefore, our hypothesis 
(Hypothesis 2) is consistent with our findings in this section. 
 
 [Insert Table 4.11 – panel B here] 
 
4.4.2.3 Stock Dividend (SD) 
The results from the effect of the category announcement show that the trend of CARs 
during the event period is similar to that shown in the total sample and XR, with a 
substantial decline from the beginning until the end of the period (see Figure 4.1 – 
panel D). Statistically, the two-day announcement abnormal returns (revealed at          
-0.02759) are significant with the t-statistic at -2.33303 on the announcement day and 
-2.46389 on the following day (see Table 4.10 – panel C). These suggest that the 
stock prices of the firms issuing via SD are negatively affected by the announcement. 
This is consistent with our hypothesis, as a negative effect of the stock price on the 
SEO announcement (Hypothesis 1). Moreover, if we closely consider the graph in 
Figure 4.1 – panel D, it is clearly seen that the average ARs in SD firms appear to 
have the lowest value within the event window in comparison with those shown in the 
total sample of XR and PP companies. The AR graph also highly fluctuates prior to 
the announcement, including a sharp drop in ARs around day +1. However, our 
findings are slightly different to the study of Aydoğan and Muradoğlu (1998), which 
reports no significant price reactions to the implementation of stock dividend and 
rights offering when the market is mature (i.e. in the more recent period of 1991 to 
1993).  
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[Insert Figure 4.1 – panel D here] 
[Insert Table 4.10 – panel C here] 
 
Regarding the offering dilution, the companies issuing new shares with SD reveal 
0.06% of change in the equity value of the firm on announcement day. The maximum 
offering dilution that impact on the shareholders is 8.69%, meaning that they will lose 
THB8.69 if the firm raises THB100 in new equities (Asquith and Mullins, 1986). 
According to the results provided in Table 4.11 – panel C, issuing with SD provides a 
greater equity value in the post-announcement than the announcement value. This is 
shown by a positive average offering dilution, which is inconsistent with our 
hypothesis (Hypothesis 2). Consequently, issuing via SD can help the shareholders to 
have less dilution. Nevertheless, with 0.06% of average offering dilution, there 
appears to be a marginal change in the equity value after the SEO announcements in 
the SD firms. 
 
[Insert Table 4.11 – panel C here] 
 
4.4.2.4 Public Offering (PO) 
Issuing new shares via PO is applied less in Thailand, especially during our study 
period of 1999 to 2006. We have only two companies in our sample size (126 firms) 
and therefore we will omit these in our statistic tables (Table 4.10 and 4.11). CARs 
fall gradually during our event window, while there is a small reaction of ARs 
between day -1 and day +1 (see Figure 4.1 – panel E). The t-statistic is 0.90186, 
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which is insignificant on the day of announcement
109
. Thus, according to this finding, 
we claim that there is no abnormal return on the announcement day of SEO, which is 
inconsistent with our hypothesis (Hypothesis 1). In addition, our results from PO 
firms are different to our previous issuing methods (namely, XR, PP and SD), 
including the existing literature (e.g. Denis, 1994; D‟Mello et al., 2003). Nonetheless, 
our results provided here may not be reflected in practice for the PO firms in 
Thailand, since we have only two companies. Therefore, the PO firms in our case are 
mainly for comparison with the other issuing methods in our sample size. Depending 
only on the performance of these two companies, around 0.45% is shown to be the 
average offering dilution for PO firms. This means the shareholders can lose, on 
average, 0.45% of current market value. As a result, it is consistent with our 
hypothesis (Hypothesis 2 – no rejection). 
 
[Insert Figure 4.1 – panel E here] 
 
4.4.3 Robustness of CARs  
Omitting the case of PO, we noticed from the evidence provided in sections 4.4.1 and 
4.4.2 that there were some information leaks before the SEO announcements. These 
are confirmed by the significant t-statistics at all cases (namely, total sample, XR, PP 
and SD – see Tables 4.10 and 4.11). In order to consider this leakage more, Elton et 
al. (2003) and Seiler (2004) suggest expanding the event window to cover this leakage 
period in the event study framework. Hence, we consider extending our event window 
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 The two-day announcement abnormal return is 0.00585 and the t-statistic on the day following 
announcement is -0.03022. 
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for another 15 days in order to cover the leakage period in our study. As a 
consequence, we have a new event window for the robustness of CARs of 30 days 
before and after the event date (61-day event window).  
 
[Insert Figure 4.2 here] 
[Insert Table 4.12 here] 
 
The evidence on the announcement day reveals that when the total sample and three 
subsamples are considered separately, we have significant t-statistics at 1% (for the 
total sample and PP) and 10% (for the XR and SD) – see Table 4.12. These imply that 
the leakage of information remains in these three subsamples, leading to the 
consistency of Hypothesis 1. In other words, the ARs are not equal to zero in the two-
day announcement period, allowing the investors to gain the ARs. The graphs of 
CARs decline gradually in the total sample case, while showing a marked fall in all 
cases for our 61-day event window (see Figure 4.2 – panel A to D). Thus, our 
evidence from the 61-day event window is consistent with our earlier examination, 
since investors were able to use insider information to invest when the companies 
issued new shares between 1999 and 2006 in Thailand.  
 
In addition, the results in our robustness 61-day event window confirm our prior 
findings (with the 31-day event window), that there is leakage of information when 
we consider a larger event window (i.e. ±30 days). These cause t-statistics around day 
-20 to be highly significant (see Table 4.12). Since the investors can gain abnormal 
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returns before the SEO announcements (i.e. between day -22 and day -19 in most 
cases of our study), we could give two reasons: (1) information is leaked prior to the 
announcement and (2) there are other external factors which impact on stock prices. 
These external factors are, for instance: the current situation at that time (i.e. the 
political situation), interest rate, exchange rates, the economic figures (i.e. GDP and 
growth rate announced by the Bank of Thailand) and the global situation. Supporting 
this, the Kasikorn Research Centre (2002)
110
 indicates that although the correlation 
between the SET Index and the Dow Jones Index (DJIA) is lower than 1.00 and lower 
than other markets in the region (except the Korean and the Japanese), the movements 
of DJIA cause an impact on the Thai stock market. This is because if the DJIA 
increases, the SET Index can increase slightly in comparison with the markets with 
which they have a close correlation to the DJIA. In contrast, if the DJIA decreases, the 
investors can transfer their investments to the Thai stock market in order to diversify 
them. This is because the SET Index may not decline as much as the DJIA. As a 
consequence, in order to have considered more closely the SEO announcements and 
the examination of information leakage in Thailand, a small event window is 
preferable, i.e. ±15 days and ±10 days. 
 
4.4.4 Determinants of CARs 
4.4.4.1 Total Sample 
In order to consider whether those three issuing methods have any influence on the 
two-day announcement abnormal return, we include dummy variables of the three 
                                                 
110
 Kasikorn Research Centre (2002). SET Index and the Risk of Recession (in Thai). Vol. 8 Issue 
1345, available from the CD-Rom of Kasikorn Research Centre or its summary via: 
http://www.kasikornresearch.com/TH/K-Econ%20Analysis/Pages/ViewSummary.aspx?docid=3663 
[Accessed 15 March 2011].  
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issuing methods in the regression of total sample. The outcomes are displayed in 
Table 4.13. 
 
[Insert Table 4.13 here] 
 
According to the statistical results, size, market-to-book and ownership are those 
variables that are significant. This means that they influence the SEO stock price 
reaction, confirming that our Hypotheses 3, 4 and 8 remain unchanged (no rejection). 
These findings are also consistent with the previous studies of emerging markets, that 
size and market-to-book (as a growth of firms) and ownership can interpret the 
expected returns (e.g. Demirgüc-Kunt, 1992; Claessens et al., 1995; La Porta et al., 
1999; Barry et al., 2002). In addition, our evidence in Table 4.13 shows that issuing 
methods, such as rights issuing (XR) and stock dividend (SD), affect the SEO stock 
price reaction. This is confirmed by the significant coefficients in both XR and SD 
and they are negatively related to the two-day announcement abnormal returns. 
Subsequently, the regression as a whole appears to fit well with our data (reported 
with R-square )(
2R at 0.336364 and adjusted at 0.206006). Although the standard 
error of TURNOVER is slightly higher than the other variables (at 1.424725), it 
should not be a major concern based on the suggestion of multicollinearity in Brooks 
(2008)
111
. One reason is that our explanatory variables are still significant. 
 
                                                 
111
 Brooks (2008) claims that the multicollinearity in the regression can remain but we ignore it for two 
reasons: (1) regression looks good as a whole but individual variables are insignificant and there is a 
high standard error and (2) the regression becomes very sensitive to a small change. 
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Concerning the variance-covariance matrix for the total sample, most of the variables 
are not closely correlated. We make the assumption that if any variables are correlated 
greater than 0.5 (or 50%), they could have a problem of near multicollinearity in the 
regression. However, the percentage of correlation between LEVERAGE and ROA 
(as a proxy of operating performance) has fallen into our assumption of 
multicollinearity at approximately -54.60% (see Table 4.13 – panel A). According to 
Brooks (2008, pp.173-174), several suggestions have been offered in order to cope 
with this multicollinearity problem: e.g. drop one variable which closely correlates or 
increase the sample size. The latter solution is impossible in our case, because we 
have already collected all of the data relating to SEOs with common stock issuing 
companies from 1999 to 2006. Turning to the suggestion of dropping one variable, the 
question arises as to whether it is possible to follow this. If one of these two variables 
is excluded from our regression, we will lose our intention to estimate the 
determinants of SEO stock price reaction. This is because we have realised from our 
literature survey (e.g. Glen and Singh, 2004; Lyandres et al., 2005; Bulter and Wan, 
2006) that both leverage and operating performance (measured by ROA in this case) 
might impact significantly upon security prices. Some studies in Thailand (i.e. 
Limpaphayom and Ngamwutikul, 2004) have also made the analysis with regard to 
the operating performance of SEO firms.  
 
[Insert Table 4.14 – panel A here] 
 
As already noted, operating performance refers not only to proxies by ROA, but also 
to other proxies used to capture the operating performance, such as return on equity 
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(ROE), earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation (EBITDA) and the 
ratio of earnings before interest and tax (EBIT) to total asset
112
. Some existing works 
which applied ROE, EBITDA or EBIT as a proxy of operating performance have 
been discussed in our earlier literature survey chapter, such as Rajan and Zingales 
(1995), Wald (1999), Elashker and Wattanasuwannee (2000) and Glen and Singh 
(2004). Thus, in order to keep these two explanatory variables in our estimation, we 
consider changing the proxy of operating performance. The main reason is to avoid a 
high correlation between ROA and LEVERAGE. Since the other variables (i.e. size, 
market-to-book and turnover ratio) are not highly correlated (the percentages are 
lower than 50%), there is no need to change the proxy for other variables. 
Nevertheless, we will consider the case of changing the proxy of operating 
performance as the robustness. This is because the percentage of correlation between 
ROA and LEVERAGE only exceeds the assumption by 5%. Hence, there should not 
be much difference in the outcomes, compared with the case where the percentage is, 
say, 80%. As a result, we found that ROE has similar correlations to other variables 
when ROA is employed. When EBITDA is applied, all percentages of correlations are 
below 50%, meaning that there is no multicollinearity in our regression.  
 
Moreover, we will make a further examination of whether the market is sensitive to a 
small change, e.g. by changing the proxy of operating performance. If the results are 
the same, we can state that they are robust, even if the proxy is changed. We can also 
suggest that EBITDA would be a better proxy for operating performance in Thailand. 
                                                 
112
 EBITDA is stated to be an indicator of a company‟s financial performance. It is also a good metric 
to evaluate profitability but not cash flow. ROE is useful for comparing the profitability of one 
company with that of other firms in the same industry. This information refers to: 
http://www.investpedia.com/terms, [Accessed on 18 November 2009]. 
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This is because it is clearly free from multicollinearity and provides our regression 
best fit with the data. 
 
4.4.4.2 Rights Issuing (XR) 
Having excluded some companies in pursuing the concept of a balanced panel, there 
are 28 firms left that use XR as their issuing method. With the variance-covariance 
matrix of all our variables under 28 sample sizes, we realise that high correlation 
remains in leverage ratio and ROA at -0.56752 (see Table 4.14 – panel B). As a 
consequence, there is a possibility of multicollinearity in the regression. However, we 
will examine this with the different proxy for operating performance (instead of ROA) 
in our robustness section. We claim the same reason as indicated in the total sample 
case (see section 4.4.4.1); roughly, it is not as high as 80%. Following the suggestion 
of Brooks (2008), we use the concept of simple pooling data in order to expand the 
sample size
113
. Moreover, pooled data were obtained not only to eliminate the 
multicollinearity problem; we need to increase our sample size as 28 firms can be 
seen as a small sample according to statistical theory (sample size is less than 30). 
Having pooled the data, the variance-covariance matrix with DXR as the only dummy 
variable is reported in Table 4.14 – panel A. The outcomes, which were controlled for 
the heteroscedasticity problem by using White Heteroscedasticity-Consistent Standard 
Errors and Covariance, are shown in Table 4.15 – panel A. 
 
[Insert Table 4.14 – panel B and Table 4.15 – panel A here] 
                                                 
113
 The complete sample of companies issuing with XR cannot be expanded as this is the only sample 
size available. 
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The evidence in Table 4.15 – panel A reveals that size, market-to-book and ownership 
have significant coefficients. This implies that these three factors affect the SEO stock 
price reaction, the same factors as we found in the total sample. Our Hypotheses 3, 4 
and 8 are also consistent. Alternatively, we can confirm that our preliminary 
expectations (see Table 4.3) were correct for these three factors in the case of SEO in 
Thailand. Nonetheless, we could have a contrasting explanation of those variables, 
which shows no impact on SEO stock price reaction, compared with the characteristic 
of the Thai capital market in practice. For instance, in the case of liquidity (proxy by 
TURNOVER), issuing via XR, it should be more certain that their new issued shares 
would be exercised. This is because they issue to existing shareholders, who are part 
of the firms. Consequently, rights should be easily exercised and the incomes used to 
finance the companies. In other words, XR should have high liquidity. As a result, 
liquidity would be a major part of issuing new shares with XR. 
 
4.4.4.3 Private Placement (PP) 
Pursuing the concept of balance panel, we need to exclude some firms, leaving only 
26 companies issuing new shares with PP. The outcomes are displayed in Table 4.15 
– panel B with a control of the heteroscedasticity problem. We pooled the entire 
sample of 68 companies into the regression and included the dummy variable of the 
PP method because of a small sample of PP after collecting the data of independent 
variables, based on a basic statistical theory
114
. The correlation between leverage ratio 
and ROA seems to be free from multicollinearity at approximately -0.4823, lower 
than 0.50 as per our assumption (see panel C of Table 4.14), while the correlations 
                                                 
114
 It is assumed that if the number of sample (n) is less than 30, it is said to be a small sample. 
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after pooled data are shown in Table 4.14 – panel A, with DPP as the only dummy 
variable. The consequences reveal that size; market-to-book and ownership are again 
significant, implying that they do affect two-day announcement abnormal return. In 
other words, Hypotheses 3, 4 and 8 remain. The and adjusted  are slightly 
higher than in the case of XR at 0.3294 and 0.2254, respectively. 
 
[Insert Table 4.14 – panel C and Table 4.15 – panel B here] 
 
Nevertheless, the remaining insignificant factors (e.g. LEVERAGE, ROA and 
TURNOVER) should also influence SEO stock price reaction when issuing new 
shares via PP in practice. For the PP method, there is more than the certainty of newly 
issued equities to be exercised in comparison with XR. Some institutional investors 
who have been given the rights to exercise the securities via PP would be eligible for 
“co-equal benefit”. This means that they may have some deals or agreements with the 
firm‟s management team in order to be a part of the company. Companies themselves 
also need those institutional investors to help in driving their businesses and 
performance
115
. Thus, the factors which relate to the firm performance (i.e. 
LEVERAGE, ROA, TURNOVER and P/E) should also impact on the SEO stock 
price reaction.  As a result, when those institutional investors are willing to exercise 
                                                 
115
 This can also link to political reasons. For example, the institutional investors may have connections 
with the political parties who are in the coalition government. Subsequently, any projects which need to 
be approved by the government could be easier and faster. 
2R 2R
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and the companies are willing to have them, newly issued equities easily turn to 
income for financing the firms
116
. 
 
4.4.4.4 Stock Dividend (SD) 
The sample size of 16 firms is admittedly a small sample. We use the concept of 
pooled sample with a dummy variable of SD issuing method. Having pooled the 
sample, we also reduce the possibility of multicollinearity in the regression (see Table 
4.14 – panel A, with only DSD as dummy variable) since there are high correlations 
among LEVERAGE, ROA and P/E (see Table 4.14 – panel D). We include the White 
Heteroscedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors and Covariance estimation to control 
the heteroscedasticity problem (see Table 4.15 – panel C). 
 
[Insert Table 4.14 – panel D and Table 4.15 – panel C here] 
 
Our findings show that the same factors (namely size, market-to-book and ownership) 
are significant at 1% (for size) and 5% (for the last two). This implies that these three 
factors influence the SEO stock price reaction, causing our Hypotheses 3, 4 and 8 to 
remain unchanged (no rejection). Moreover, our outcomes are consistent with all the 
cases examined earlier (total sample, XR and PP) and the existing literature on 
emerging markets, as previously pointed out in section 4.4.4.1 (e.g. Claessens et al., 
1995; La Porta et al., 1999; Rouwenhost, 1999; Claessens et al., 2000). Nevertheless, 
although there are some variables that are insignificant (i.e. TURNOVER and P/E), 
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 In practice, with real trading in the SET, there are some interesting features regarding the PP in 
Thailand. The study in this particular area (in depth) is beyond our scope and will be specified in 
Chapter 7 as a subject for future research. 
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this evidence is also consistent with previous studies; for instance, no relationship 
between expected returns and turnover (Rouwenhost, 1999) and a positive 
relationship between average return and P/E ratio (Fama and French, 1998). 
 
4.4.4.5 Robustness 
We chose to conduct the robustness tests in several ways in order to support our 
evidence in a previous section on the determinants. We investigate two tests of 
robustness: (1) using different proxies to measure the operating performance and (2) 
applying the logarithm to transform some explanatory variables. First, having realised 
that operating performance can be captured by other proxies rather than ROA, we 
expanded our study to make it slightly more comprehensive by attempting to obtain 
those other proxies as our robustness. With the different proxies, we could have a 
lower percentage of correlation between LEVERAGE and ROA (as a proxy of 
operating performance). This leads to a 100% free multicollinearity in the regression. 
Therefore, when we considered using ROE and EBITDA instead of ROA, the sample 
size for the estimation in the regression fell from 68 to 63 and 62 companies, 
respectively, according to the concept of balanced panel. The results in which ROE 
and EBITDA were used separately are shown in Table 4.16. 
 
[Insert Table 4.16 here] 
 
For ROE, the correlations between variables are similar to those presented in the case 
of ROA. The percentage of correlations between LEVERAGE and ROE (as a proxy 
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of operating performance) remains greater than 0.5, referring to a high correlation, 
identical to our previous case of ROA. With only 4% of the percentage of correlations 
that exceed the limitation (at 0.5), instead of a very high percentage (say 80%) as 
previously explained
117
, our results report with more significant variables. Besides 
size, market-to-book and ownership, LEVERAGE and ROE are another two factors 
which are significant in the total sample (see Table 4.16 – panel A). These refer to the 
fact that our Hypotheses 5 and 7 are correct. Furthermore, the significance results 
vary slightly when issuing methods are individually considered. LEVERAGE will 
influence SEO stock price reaction when the firms issue new shares via PP and SD, 
while it shows no impact on the two-day announcement abnormal return (the 
dependent variable) when issuing via XR (see Table 4.16 – panel B, C and D). 
Although P/E is our control variable, it starts to have an effect on SEO stock price 
reaction in the PP firms (see Table 4.16 – panel C). The significance of ROE in our 
case is also consistent with the study of Denis (1994), who reports on ROE influence 
on the SEO stock price reaction. Although the evidence of using ROE as the proxy of 
operating performance provides many significant results (particularly in PP firms, 
similar to our initial expectation – see Table 4.3), the regression is not 100% free from 
multicollinearity.  
 
For EBITDA, the variance-covariance matrix demonstrates the correlations among the 
variables without a sign of multicollinearity. In other words, all the percentages of 
correlations among the variables are lower than 50% (at 0.5), as mentioned. 
According to our findings with EBITDA, there are three significant variables in all 
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 The actual figure of variance-covariance matrix in the case of ROE is -0.532883. 
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cases, regardless of the intercept. These are size; market-to-book and ownership (see 
Table 4.16). Thus, our Hypotheses 3, 4 and 8 are on hold (no rejection). In 
comparison with the results when ROA is obtained as the proxy of operating 
performance, we notice that the same variables influence the SEO stock price 
reaction. Moreover, the values of 2R are higher than those reported in the case of 
ROA (e.g. see Tables 4.10 and 4.11) in all cases. Consequently, using EBITDA as a 
proxy of operating performance could lead to better results in our examination of the 
determinants of SEO stock price reaction.  
 
Nevertheless, we notice one interesting finding by changing the proxy of operating 
performance in our regression. This can be seen when we apply ROE, instead of 
ROA, as a proxy of operating performance. Our results become significant in several 
variables (namely size, market-to-book, leverage, ROE, P/E and ownership) although 
the correlation between ROE and LEVERAGE is high (greater than 0.5), identical to 
the case of ROA. In other words, since either ROA or ROE is highly correlated to 
LEVERAGE (which will lead to multicollinearity), the results are differently 
reported, in terms of the number of variables that are significant. Subsequently, when 
EBITDA is applied, the results are the same as when ROA is used. As a result, we 
suggest that the Thai capital market appears to be sensitive to small changes. 
 
Our second robustness test transforms the explanatory variables by adding a logarithm 
to them. We claim the reason for transferring these variables is to adjust some 
variables to have elasticity in their coefficients. The variables to be examined are: size 
(ln(size): LSIZE), turnover ratio (ln(TURN): LTURN) and ownership (ln(1+OWN): 
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LOWN). The definitions before their transformation still refer to those in Table 4.5. 
Transforming these explanatory variables (namely size, turnover and ownership) by 
applying the logarithm is similarly used in the research of others, such as Eckbo and 
Masulis (1992), Wiwattanakantang (1999), De Groot and Verschoor (2002), Chen 
(2004) and Limpaphayom and Ngamwutikul (2004). These studies obtain the 
logarithm function at the beginning, when they estimate the variables in their 
regression, while we initially consider the variables without any transformation. Since 
our explanatory variables are measured with the change in their values from before 
the SEO to when the SEO is announced, some variables contain negative values. 
Regarding the concept of balanced panel, we need to reduce our sample size of the 
determinants section from 68 firms to 50 firms for our estimation. 
 
The outcomes in Table 4.17 reveal that market-to-book (MB) is the only variable to 
be significant in the total sample and other issuing methods (when individually 
examined). This implies that only Hypothesis 4 requires no rejection. In PP firms, P/E 
is also significant, at 10%. The values of  and adjusted  are reduced 
substantially, compared with the non-transformation case (showing approximately 
0.0963 for and -0.1001 for adjusted , on average). Although in the variance-
covariance matrix the figures report no signal of multicollinearity (confirmed by all 
correlations being lower than 0.5), the regression as a whole appears to have poorer 
outcomes than when we obtain variables without transformation. These can be 
supported by the lower numbers of significant variables and very low values of  
and adjusted . Therefore, transforming the variables to have more elasticity in their 
coefficients does not provide any improvements in the outcomes of our study. In 
2R 2R
2R 2R
2R
2R
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contrast, it causes our findings as a whole to fit less well with the data. As a result, our 
evidence of transforming the variables is not robust with our previous examination 
(no transformation). Estimating without transformation of variables is also more 
preferable. 
 
[Insert Table 4.17 here] 
 
Aside from the above two robustness tests, there are some robustness estimations 
which could be applied in our study. These are: (1) controlling for the market 
condition around the SEO announcements and (2) taking account of inflation and the 
exchange rate to measure the issuing size, i.e. using a different currency – the US 
dollar – instead of the local currency. According to the first case, by adding another 
control variable in the regression, we roughly find no difference between the results in 
this case and those reported previously in section 4.4.4.1. With the second alternative 
robustness test, our issuing size (SIZE) has been measured as the ratio of market 
capitalisation before and after the SEOs. Therefore, adjusting the market capitalisation 
to the US dollar provides no change in the values we obtained for the estimation. As a 
result, all the outcomes remain unchanged.  
 
4.4.4.6 Summary of the Determinants of CARs 
Having examined all cases in the determinants of CARs, our evidence shows 
significant results in three factors, namely, size, market-to-book and ownership. 
Hence, these three factors demonstrate the impacts on SEO stock price reaction. 
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Furthermore, our findings are partly consistent with the existing literature in emerging 
markets, which examines the relationship between all the factors we tested and stock 
price reaction (see Table 4.3). These studies are, for instance, Demirgüc-Kunt (1992), 
Wiwattanakantang (1999) and Barry et al. (2002) for size and market-to-book, while 
our results on ownership are consistent with Alba et al. (1998) and Wiwattanakantang 
(1999). The remaining factors (i.e. leverage, ROA, P/E and turnover ratio) are 
suggested to have no impact on SEO stock price reactions, according to our outcomes. 
Nevertheless, the evidence of no influence on SEO stock price reactions is consistent 
with some prior studies, such as Claessens et al. (1995) for P/E and Rouwenhost 
(1999) for turnover ratio. Although our findings are supported by several studies (as 
mentioned above), we cannot confirm that our regression is 100% free from the 
problem of multicollinearity. Since the percentage of correlation between leverage 
and ROA is slightly higher than the limited level (greater than 0.5 or 50%), we could 
have multicollinearity in our regression. 
 
However, when we applied some robustness tests, we found some interesting 
evidence. Changing the proxy of operating performance to ROE leads to several 
significant variables in the regression, while the percentage of correlation remains 
slightly higher than the limited level (50%) between ROE and LEVERAGE. This 
implies that multicollinearity still exists. When we change the proxy to EBITDA, we 
found the same results as the previous case (using ROA as the proxy of operating 
performance), including higher values of and adjusted . In addition, there is no 
sign of multicollinearity in the variance-covariance matrix. Therefore, we could claim 
that EBITDA would be the appropriate proxy of operating performance for our 
2R 2R
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sample size. Moreover, the results from the transformation of variables report 
contrasting outcomes compared with the initial cases. Only market-to-book appears to 
be significant, with a very low value of . 
 
4.4.5 The Long-Term Stock Price Reaction 
For the firm and stock market performance in the long term, we examine the period of 
1 year or 240 days before and after the event (for a 481-day event, see the supporting 
reasons in section 4.3.2.3). Figure 4.3 – panel A reveals that CARs fell markedly 
during the 60 days before the announcement date, and then continued to decrease 
gradually. In contrast, the cumulative average market returns performed with positive 
values for most of the period. In other words, firms‟ stock return and stock market 
return as a whole performed totally differently from 60 days before the 
announcement. Our results are consistent with the hypothesis (Hypothesis 9) that 
stock prices responded negatively in the longer period after the SEO announcement. 
Nevertheless, a gradual fall in CARs after the announcement day could be impacted 
by other events in Thailand. Consequently, investors are unlikely to hold their equities 
in the long-term. Instead, they sell the stocks following a period in which the stock 
underperforms the market, implying that they hold the stocks for a short-term 
(Asquith and Mullins, 1986). 
 
[Insert Figure 4.3 here] 
 
2R
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When issuing methods are individually concerned, there is clearly a marked decline in 
CARs during the post-issuing period in the firms issuing via XR and PP (see Figure 
4.3 – panel B and C). This is consistent with our initial hypothesis, that CARs move 
negatively in the longer event window (Hypothesis 9), similar to the total sample. 
Investors are likely to invest, if they wish, in the short-term rather than hold the 
equities for a longer period. Therefore, we have no timing pattern for the investors to 
sell the shares since they are trading within a short period. However, we would have a 
timing pattern for the SD firm. In Figure 4.3 – panel D, we could claim that investors 
may sell their stocks about 45 days before the announcement since CARs of firms 
drop sharply. This implies that the SD firms underperform the market. Investors will 
sell their shares and move to invest in other securities. For the PO firms (see Figure 
4.3 – panel E), the results show a bias because the CARs of firms are based only on 
two companies. Thus, the evidence would not reflect the effect of the SEO 
announcement. 
 
Regarding the examination of the relationship between short- and long-term stock 
price reactions, our findings are shown in Table 4.18 – panels A.1 to D.1. The results 
are insignificant in the total sample and when issuing methods are individually 
considered. This means that there is no relationship between long-term and short-term 
(referred to as the two-day announcement abnormal return) stock price reaction. In 
addition, since we noticed from the previous section that EBITDA would be the 
appropriate proxy of operating performance, we estimate the relationship between 
short-run and long-run reaction with EBITDA, instead of ROA (see Table 4.18 – 
panels A.2 to D.2). The outcomes remain insignificant in all cases (total sample and 
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different issuing methods). Therefore, our evidence is consistent with the 
characteristics of the Thai capital market and implies that the shorter the examination 
period, the better the reflection of real time market trading in Thailand. 
 
[Insert Table 4.18 here] 
 
 
4.5 Conclusions  
 
Our evidence reveals that stock prices react negatively to SEO announcements in 
Thailand. This is reported in all cases of our examinations, total sample and different 
issuing methods. Nonetheless, our evidence demonstrates that the information is 
leaked before the announcement date, especially when the different issuing methods 
are separately examined. In the total sample case, we noticed that this leakage of 
information occurred in the longer period before the announcement. For instance, 
there is no leakage of information around 10 days prior to the announcement, while 
we reported this leakage around day 12 before the announcement. This can confirm 
our robustness findings, which consider an event window of up to ±30 days. The 
results show that investors can gain abnormal returns from day -19 or day -20 prior to 
the announcement. Furthermore, regarding the offering dilution, the firms in our 
sample size do not appear to suffer from the discounting in prices (or loss in equity 
value of firms). This is because the equity value in the post-announcement is greater 
than the announcement one, indicating the positive percentage of offering dilution. 
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Having employed a total of seven explanatory variables suggested in studies of 
emerging markets, together with a two-day announcement abnormal return, our 
findings reveal significance in size, market-to-book and ownership. This implies that 
these three factors affect SEO stock price reaction. The dummy variables of rights 
issuing and stock dividend show the impact on SEO stock price reaction when 
included in the regression of the total sample. With an individual examination of 
different issuing methods, the same variables (size, market-to-book and ownership) 
are significant, meaning that they influence SEO stock price reaction. These results 
are partly consistent with our expectations (see Table 4.3), while they are consistent 
with the existing literature on emerging markets (e.g. Demirgüc-Kunt, 1992; Alba et 
al., 1998; Rouwenhost, 1999; Barry et al., 2002). However, changing the proxy of 
operating performance to EBITDA as our robustness test has better consequences in 
terms of no sign of multicollinearity in the regression. Although we still show the 
significance of size, market-to-book and ownership, none of the variables are closely 
correlated, contrasting to the case between leverage and ROA at the beginning.  
 
The CARs in the longer event window decline after the announcement date. This 
implies that investors rarely hold their equities in the long-term when the stocks 
underperform the market. Nevertheless, this decrease in CARs could be influenced by 
other events during that period. We support this with our evidence that there is no 
relationship between the short- and long-term stock price reactions. With an 
insignificant coefficient of short-term stock price reaction, this indicates that there are 
no degrees of mispricing that correct the stock prices to the level that they should be 
at in the long-run. In other words, the long-run stock price reaction would depend 
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mainly on the current situations or events at that time, rather than influencing the 
event in the short-term (which are SEO announcements in our case). This is stated to 
be consistent with the characteristics of the Thai capital market in practice. 
 
Moreover, this empirical study provides various practical implications from our 
findings to investors and firm managers in Thailand. First, managers will realise from 
our evidence that they should use a suitable issuing method for their next SEOs. Since 
we examined each issuing method separately, the managers could establish which 
issuing methods have the least impact on offering dilution. Second, those investors 
who have access to our results relating to SEO announcements will put the stock 
prices into decline, no matter which issuing methods are applied. This would be 
significant information for the investors when making decisions about investments. 
Furthermore, with the determinant of SEO stock price reaction, the managers could 
use our findings to concentrate closely on those factors which affect the movement of 
security prices during SEO announcements. This could be linked to the performance 
of the management sector; for instance, if leverage or ROA play a substantial part in 
the stock price movement. In addition, financial analysts could also benefit if they use 
our evidence in their analysis when making suggestions to investors.  
 
In the following chapter, we will consider another point of indirect flotation cost, 
known as the “underpricing” of SEOs in Thailand.  
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Table 4.1: Summary of existing literature on stock price reaction in emerging markets 
The table presents summaries of the existing literature on stock price reaction. Panel A shows the previous studies of stock price reaction within the Asian-Pacific 
Region. Panel B shows the previous research into stock price reaction in other emerging markets around the world. 
 
AUTHORS MARKETS PERIOD SAMPLE OBJECTIVE FINDINGS 
Panel A: Literature in Asian-Pacific Region 
Kang (1990) Korea 1983 – 1987 89 To examine the existence of ARs over the 
period of announcing rights issues and to 
analyse possible determinants of ARs if 
they exist.  
An increase of stock price with rights 
issues announcements is higher than the 
average change of the market portfolio. 
Demirgüc-Kunt (1992) Korea 
Malaysia 
Thailand 
1983 – 1987 669 
282 
214 
To investigate the impact of emerging stock 
markets on the financing patterns of 
developing country corporations. 
Stock market development relates to 
many factors, e.g. size, growth, 
profitability and valuation. 
Claessens et al. (1995) 20 emerging mkts, e.g. 
Indonesia 
Korea 
Malaysia 
Taiwan 
Thailand 
1986 – 1993 96 monthly 
observations for 
each country 
To examine the cross-sectional patterns of 
returns and the effect of a number of risk 
factors on asset returns. 
No relationship between beta (β) and 
returns when size, P/E ratio and market-
to-book are included in cross-sectional 
regression. 
Fama & French (1998) Mkts outside the U.S.: 
Japan 
Hong Kong 
Singapore 
1974 – 1994  
325 
39 
50 
To present out-of-sample evidence on the 
value premium. 
The higher the book-to-market equity, 
earning-to-price and cash flow-to-price, 
the higher the average returns. 
Rouwenhost (1999) 20 emerging mkts, e.g. 
Indonesia 
Malaysia 
The Philippines 
Taiwan 
Thailand 
1982 – 1997  
114 
184 
58 
119 
120 
To examine the source of return variation in 
emerging stock markets. 
The explanation of change in expected 
returns could be driven by size and 
book-to-market ratio. 
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AUTHORS MARKETS PERIOD SAMPLE OBJECTIVE FINDINGS 
Salamudin et al. (1999) Malaysia 1980 – 1995 72 To measure average ARs around the event 
dates of rights issues and to investigate 
possible reasons to explain why a positive 
announcement effect is found. 
Economic conditions influence the SEO 
announcement effects with rights 
issues, e.g. lower issue costs, lower 
dilution of shareholding and higher 
funds being raised. 
Barry et al. (2002) 35 emerging mkts, incl. 
Taiwan 
Indonesia 
Malaysia 
The Philippines 
Thailand 
1985 – 2000 N/A To examine the robustness of size and 
book-to-market effect in 35 merging equity 
markets. 
The motivation of using relative size is 
done by considering whether the 
emerging markets are fully integrated 
with global capital markets. 
Claessens et al. (2000) Hong Kong 
Indonesia 
South Korea 
Malaysia 
The Philippines 
Singapore 
Taiwan 
Thailand 
1996 2,980 To examine the separation of ownership and 
control in nine East Asian countries. 
Inside shareholders are able to have a 
powerful right to control the sample 
companies. 
Brown et al. (2008) Hong Kong 
Korea 
Singapore 
Taiwan 
1990 – 2005 N/A (1)To analyse both value strategies and 
momentum strategies in combination and 
(2) to evaluate the respective returns to 
value and momentum investment strategies 
at the regional level.  
There is a possibility to focus on low 
capital, low liquidity, low price stocks 
and retain a sufficiently large number 
of stocks. 
Panel B: Literature in other emerging markets 
Aydoğan & Muradoğlu (1998) Turkey 1988 – 1993  109 To make an empirical analysis of the 
amount and implementation of rights issues 
and stock dividends in Turkey, including 
examining the efficiency of the Turkish 
market with regard to this information set. 
Positive reactions in the initial phase 
(1988-1990), while no significant 
reaction during the second phase of the 
market (1991-1993). 
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AUTHORS MARKETS PERIOD SAMPLE OBJECTIVE FINDINGS 
La Porta et al. (1999) 27 emerging mkts, e.g. 
Argentina 
Greece 
Portugal 
1995 N/A To find more evidence on the ownership 
patterns of large publicly traded firms in 
different countries. 
Ownership structure plays an important 
role in corporate finance and these 
firms are controlled by the controlling 
shareholders, who usually come from 
the same family. 
Chen (2004) China 1995 – 2000 77 To develop some preliminary groundwork 
on which a more detailed evaluation could 
be based. 
The profitability of Chinese listed firms 
is negatively related to the debt 
(leverage). 
Mishra (2007) India 1999 – 2005 180 To examine the market effect of stock splits 
on stock price, return, volatility and trading 
volume around the split ex-dates. 
A negative effect on price and return of 
stock splits drives down the wealth of 
the shareholders. 
Dhar & Chhaochharia (2008) India Apr. 2001 – Mar. 2007 90 splits 
82 bonus issues 
To examine the effects of stock splits and 
bonus issues. 
There is a positive relation of stock 
splits announcement and security 
return. 
Dasilas (2009) Greece 2000 – 2004 216 To investigate the stock price and trading 
volume response to dividend distribution 
announcements. 
Market reaction is statistically 
significant on the dividend 
announcement day. 
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Table 4.2: Summary of the percentage of sample coverage compared to existing Thai SEO literature 
The table presents summaries of existing studies of Thai SEOs and the calculation of sample coverage as a percentage of the relevant sample obtained in previous 
research in Thailand during the same study period (1999 to 2006).  
 
AUTHORS MARKET PERIOD SAMPLE 
SAMPLE 
COVERAGE 
OBJECTIVE FINDINGS 
Jirasetthakulchai (2000) Thailand 1977 – 1997 65 N/A To examine the effect of dividend 
announcements on public offering of 
equity. 
The larger the firm size, the more 
negative ARs from equity offering. 
Prangthawat (2002) Thailand 1996 – 2000 115 Sample comprises 60 firms 
between 1996 and 2000, 
coverage at 52.17%. 
To investigate whether earning 
management and the timing of SEOs 
can explain subsequent poor 
performance 
Negative relationship between 
discretionary accruals and operating 
performance of firms after SEOs. 
Lertsupongkit (2002) Thailand 1994 – 2001 59 Sample comprises 74 firms 
between 1994 and 2001, 
coverage at 100.00%. 
To examine the stock price reaction to 
the announcement of SEOs. 
Negative stock price reaction after the 
SEO announcements. 
Ngamwutikul (2002) Thailand 1991 – 1994 62 N/A To examine operating performance in 
SEO firms during the pre- and post-
offering periods. 
Poor operating performance after the 
SEOs of sample firms, measured by 
three proxies: ROA, ROE and Tobin‟s 
q / The asymmetric information in 
Thailand remains the major impact on 
operating performance.  
Limpaphayom & 
Ngamwutikul (2004) 
Thailand 1991 – 1994 62 N/A To examine the post-issue operating 
performance. 
More shares are offered when the 
expectation of operating performance 
is worse / Future prospects of issuing 
firms are signalled by using issue 
proceeds. 
Vithessonthi (2008) Thailand 1997 – 2006 115 (only non-
financial firms) 
Sample includes 173 firms 
between 1997 and 2006, 
coverage at 100.00%. 
To examine the changes in the 
authorised common stock (PIAC) and 
how it can affect stock prices. 
PIAC, on average, conveys 
information to the market / The larger 
the firm that announces a PIAC, the 
lower the CAR around the 
announcement. 
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AUTHORS MARKET PERIOD SAMPLE 
SAMPLE 
COVERAGE 
OBJECTIVE FINDINGS 
This study Thailand 1999-2006 126 N/A 
To examine the stock price 
reactions to SEOs and the 
determinants of SEO stock price 
reaction. 
Expecting a negative stock price 
reaction to SEO announcement and 
the factors under review to 
influence the SEO stock price 
reaction. 
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Table 4.3: Previous evidence of the relationship between stock price reaction and factor influence in emerging markets 
The table shows previous evidence of the relationship between stock price reaction and factor influence in emerging markets, particularly Thailand, and the 
expectations from the authors of each factor. (0) indicates no relationship between stock price reaction and factors tested. (-) signifies a negative relationship. (*) 
identifies the factors estimated in the study, but refers only to the relationship between stock price reaction and each factor – no specific sign. 
 
Authors 
Factors Estimated in Thailand 
Size Market-to-Book Leverage Operating Performance Price-Earnings Ratio Ownership Liquidity 
Demirgüc-Kunt (1992) * *  *    
Claessens et al. (1995) 0 0   0   
Nittayagasetwat & 
Withisuphakorn (1997) 
      * 
Alba et al. (1998)      *  
Rouwenhost (1999)       0 
Wiwattanakantang (1999) *       
Claessens et al. (2000)      *  
Barry et al. (2002) * *      
De Groot & Verschoor 
(2002) 
0 0      
Limpaphayom & 
Ngamwutikul (2004) 
  - -  -  
Our Expectations * * * * * *  
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Table 4.4: Descriptive statistics for SEOs in Thailand during the study period 1999 to 2006 
The table shows descriptive statistics for SEOs in Thailand in two panels. Panel A shows the summary of the number of firms in each category. „Events‟ concern other 
events of interest besides the SEO announcement, i.e. dividend announcements, announcements of financial statement and the submission of required forms to the 
Stock Exchange or Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) to fulfil the regulations. Panel B shows the descriptive statistics of the companies‟ newly issued shares by 
common stock via each issuing method, namely rights issuing (XR), private placement (PP), stock dividend (SD) and public offering (PO), during the study period. 
The companies represented in each category are shown in parentheses, with their full names shown in Appendix 3. The firm size is defined as the market capitalisation 
in millions of Thai Baht (the exchange rate at THB33.50:USD1.00). The age of each firm is obtained from the number of months since the company first traded in the 
market until the offering month. The average daily returns are the average of daily returns during the study period (1999 – 2006) obtained from the SETSMART. The 
average ownership is measured by the average of the top five major shareholders in the offering year. The average turnover ratio is taken directly from SETSMART 
during the study period (1999 – 2006). Industrial groups are the groups shown in the SET Index, containing (apart from financial ones) the Agro and Food Industry 
(AGRO), Consumer Products (CONSUMP), Industrials (INDUS), Property and Construction (PROPCON), Resources (RESOURC), Services (SERVICE) and 
Technology (TECH). 
 
 
PANEL A 
 
Descriptions 
Common Stock Issuing 
XR PP SD PO TOTAL 
Number of firms to be used for 
estimation 
53 52 22 2 126 
Firms with events around 
SEOs 
20 20 16 1 56 
Firms without events around 
SEOs 
33 32 6 1 70 
 
 Note: The total sample includes the companies which have issued new shares via warrants. 
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PANEL B Total Sample 
 
XR  PP  SD  PO 
Average Size 8,334.42 
 
7,608.75  10,627.94  2,227.51  32,880.78 
Maximum Size 176,237.72 (ADVANC) 
 
93,552.06 (PTTCH)  176,237.72 (ADVANC)  23,488.28 (CPF)  64,416.73 (THAI) 
Minimum Size 71.07 (NEW) 
 
71.07 (NEW)  122.35 (SORKON)  122.35 (SORKON)  1,344.84 (S&P) 
Average Age (months) 100 
 
101  94  109  146 
Average Daily Returns 0.00606 
 
-0.00030  -0.00018  -0.00082  0.00033 
Average Ownership 10.93945 
 
10.86675  10.46116  12.42480  11.82200 
Average Turnover Ratio 0.00523 
 
0.00462  0.00742  0.00427  0.00080 
Number of Firms in each Industrial Group: 
AGRO 20 
 
6  6  8  1 
CONSUMP 13 
 
7  4  2  - 
INDUS 21 
 
9  7  5  - 
PROPCON 26 
 
12  14  1  - 
RESOURC 8 
 
2  5  1  - 
SERVICE 24 
 
11  8  4  1 
TECH 14 
 
6  7  1  - 
TOTAL 126 
 
53  52  22  2 
 
Note: There are three companies, ITD, KTP and SORKON, utilising two different issuing methods at the same time (XR and PP for the first two, and PP and SD for SORKON). Thus, the total sample will not 
equal 126 firms exactly. 
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Table 4.5: Lists of variables, definitions and data sources of each variable 
The table shows the lists of explanatory and control variables with their definitions, as used in our examination. Data sources of each variable are also mentioned. 
SETSMART refers to the SET‟s Market Analysis and Reporting Tool (the database of the SET). 
 
Explanatory Variables Definitions Sources 
Issuing Size (SIZE) The ratio of market capitalisation (million Thai Baht – THB33.50:USD1.00) on day +1 and day 0 SETSMART 
Market-to-Book (MB) 
The change in market-to-book ratio is defined as the difference in the market-to-book ratio in the year of 
issuing and the average 3 years of this ratio before the year of offering 
Thomson One Banker 
Leverage Ratio (LEVERAGE) 
The calculation of this ratio after obtaining total debt (total liability) and total asset from the companies‟ 
financial statements (Eckbo and Masulis, 1995). Change in leverage ratio is defined as the difference 
between leverage ratio in the year of issuing and average leverage ratio 3 years before the issue year.  
Thomson One Banker 
Operating Performance (ROA, ROE or 
EBITDA) 
The difference between ROA, ROE or EBITDA in the offering year and average ROA, ROE or 
EBITDA for 3 years before the year of offering. 
Thomson One Banker 
Price-Earning Ratio (P/E) 
The change in P/E ratio is defined as P/E ratio in the issued year minus average P/E ratio 3 years before 
the issuing year. 
Thomson One Banker 
Turnover Ratio (Liquidity) – (TURN or 
TURNOVER) 
Our turnover ratio is defined as a ratio that measures trading volume in comparison to the number of 
shares outstanding. It is calculated by 11 months, ending one month before the offering month. 
SETSMART 
Inside Ownership (OWN) 
This is measured in percentage, following Limpaphayom and Ngamwutikul (2004). It is also calculated 
as the difference between the top five largest shareholders in the year of offering and the average of the 
top five largest shareholders 3 years before the issuing year. 
SETSMART 
Other events (EVENTS) 
„Events‟ refer to events other than SEOs during the period of 115 days before and after the SEO 
announcement (day 0). These events include dividend announcements, financial statements or financial 
performance announcements, and the submission of forms to either the Stock Exchange or Securities 
Exchange Commission (SEC), according to the regulations.  
SETSMART 
 
Note: SETSMART is basically the SET‟s database which provides the data from the stock exchange online for general investors and other interested parties. SETSMART covers five fundamental areas 
which are usually considered by analysts and investors: (1) Company Information, (2) Historical Trading Prices, (3) Company News, (4) Key Statistical Data and (5) Key Financial Data and Financial 
Ratios. However, SETSMART (principal version) is limited to historical data for a maximum of only 5 years, based on the rolling period of the first access into the system. We had to make a special and 
private request directly to people in the SET and the brokers in order to obtain the data since the establishment of SET in 1975 via their SETSMART (intranet version – for brokers).
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Table 4.6: Summary of number of firms available for the regression 
The summary of the number of firms available for the regression part, together with those which are 
available in each explanatory variable are obtained in the regression. Panel A shows the number of 
firms available for the regression analysis. Panel B shows the number of firms available in each 
explanatory variable and the data sources taken. SIZE refers to the ratio of market capitalisation on the 
day following the announcement (day +1) and the day of the announcement (day 0). Market-to-Book 
(MB) is defined as the change in market-to-book ratio calculated by the difference between market-to-
book ratio in the offering year and the average 3 years before the issuing year of this ratio. Leverage 
ratio (LEVERAGE) is the ratio of total debt and total asset, and change in leverage ratio is leverage 
ratio in the year of issuing minus average leverage ratio for 3 years before the year of offering. Return 
on Asset (ROA) refers to the change in ROA computed by the change between ROA in the offering 
year and average ROA for 3 years ending one year before the issuing year. Return on Equity (ROE) is 
measured as the change in ROE calculated by the change between ROE in the offering year and 
average ROE for 3 years before the year of issuing. EBITDA is earning before interest, tax, 
depreciation and amortisation, and is implied as the change in EBITDA: the difference between 
EBITDA in the issuing year and the average of EBITDA 3 years before the offering year. Price-
Earnings Ratio (P/E or P_E) is defined as the change in this ratio: P/E ratio in offering year minus 
average 3 years P/E ratio before the issuing year. Turnover ratio(TURNOVER) is based on the daily 
trading volume and number of shares outstanding calculated by an average of 11 months ending one 
month before the issuing month. Insider Ownership (OWN) is defined as the difference between the top 
five largest major shareholders in the year of offering and the top five largest major shareholders 3 
years before the issuing year. EVENTS refer to the dummy variable equal to 1 if the SEO firms have 
events other than SEOs during the event period of 115 days before and after the announcement date, 
and equal to zero otherwise. SETSMART refers to the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET)‟s database, 
representing SET‟s Market Analysis and Reporting Tool. 
 
 
PANEL A 
 
Descriptions 
Common Stock Issuing  
XR PP SD PO TOTAL 
Number of firms to be used for 
estimation 
28 26 16 - 68 
Firms with events around SEOs 11 11 11 - 32 
Firms without events around SEOs 17 15 5 - 36 
 
Note: We are concerned with only three methods of issuing: rights issuing, private placement and stock dividend, in the 
regression analysis. However, the fourth issuing method, public offering, refers to two companies which were excluded from our 
68 firms when estimating the regressions, owing to unavailable data of ownership. 
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PANEL B 
 
Explanatory Variables Number of Firms Sources 
Size 126 SETSMART 
Market-to-Book 79 Thomson One Banker 
Leverage Ratio 83 Thomson One Banker 
Return on Asset (ROA) 73 Thomson One Banker 
Price-Earning Ratio (P/E) 79 Thomson One Banker 
Return on Equity (ROE) 68 Thomson One Banker 
EBITDA 72 Thomson One Banker 
Turnover Ratio 115 SETSMART 
Insider Ownership 111 SETSMART 
Events (1) 70 SETSMART 
Events (0) 103 SETSMART 
TOTAL 68  
 
Note: The 68 firms are the total number of firms which had available data during the period mentioned for every explanatory 
variable in our case. In addition, we obtained only ROA as the operating performance and excluded ROE and EBITDA. 
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Table 4.7: The two-sample t-test of sample size and average two-day announcement abnormal returns 
The table shows whether there are: (1) significance differences between the total sample and three 
subsamples and (2) any significant differences between the average two-day announcement abnormal 
returns. Panel A shows the test between the total sample of 126 firms and the different issuing 
methods, namely rights issuing (XR: 53 firms), private placement (PP: 52 firms) and stock dividend 
(SD: 22 firms). Panel B shows the tests between the total sample applied in the estimation of 
determinants between the total sample of 68 firms and three different issuing methods concerning the 
concept of balanced panel (XR: 28 firms, PP: 26 firms and SD: 16 firms). Panel C shows the test 
significant difference between the two-day announcement abnormal returns in total sample (126 firms) 
and in three issuing methods, namely rights issuing (XR: 53 firms), private placement (PP: 52 firms) 
and stock dividend (SD: 22 firms). The two-day announcement abnormal returns are calculated on the 
day of the announcement (day 0) and the following day after the announcement (day +1): 
; where is the two-day return for firm i , is the abnormal 
return to security i on the day of announcement published and  is the abnormal return to 
security i on the following day of the announcement. Using the two-sample t-test, the null hypothesis 
under this estimation indicates that there is no difference in the mean between two samples. The degree 
of freedom is shown in parentheses and calculated by: ; where are the 
variance of sample 1 and 2, and refer to the sample size of sample 1 and 2. 
 
 
 
 
PANEL A 
 
 Total XR PP SD 
Total 1.0000    
XR 
-0.2395 
(120) 
1.0000   
PP 
0.5513 
(79) 
0.6867 
(87) 
1.0000  
SD 
-2.8331*** 
(138) 
-2.0839** 
(68) 
-2.1842** 
(59) 
1.0000 
 
* Significant at 10% level, ** Significant at 5% level, *** Significant at 1% level 
 
Note: There are only two firms issuing via PO (public offering), which are not worth reporting in this table. 
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PANEL B 
 
 Total XR PP SD 
Total 1.0000    
XR 
-0.1472 
(75) 
1.0000   
PP 
0.6184 
(35) 
0.6979 
(35) 
1.0000  
SD 
-1.9407* 
(82) 
-1.7066* 
(37) 
-1.5581 
(28) 
1.0000 
 
* Significant at 10% level, ** Significant at 5% level, *** Significant at 1% level 
 
Note: There are only two firms issuing via PO (public offering), which are excluded from the 68 samples following the concept 
of balanced panel. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PANEL C 
 
 Total XR PP SD 
Total 1.0000    
XR 
-0.2772 
(108) 
1.0000   
PP 
-0.0654 
(81) 
0.1415 
(94) 
1.0000  
SD 
0.0269 
(41) 
0.2495 
(54) 
0.0772 
(68) 
1.0000 
 
* Significant at 10% level, ** Significant at 5% level, *** Significant at 1% level 
 
Note: There are only two firms issuing via PO (public offering), which are not worth reporting in this table. 
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Table 4.8: Mean abnormal return surrounding the SEO announcement for the total sample 
The table shows the mean abnormal returns during the event window 15 days before and after the 
announcement for the total sample of 126 firms. Day 0 refers to the announcement date. The abnormal 
return (AR) is calculated via the market model:  , where is return on 
security i for day t, is intercept, is the OLS estimators of the market model parameter and 
is market return on day t (SET index in our case). The t-statistics (t-ratio) are calculated as: 
, where sample size, and standard deviation of . 
 
 
Event Days ARs t-statistics CARs Sample Size 
-15 -0.01953 -1.34614 -0.01953 126 
-14 -0.01012 -0.97094 -0.02965 126 
-13 -0.00444 -0.77422 -0.03409 126 
-12 -0.03981 -1.80345* -0.07390 126 
-11 -0.00474 -0.75158 -0.07864 126 
-10 -0.00277 -0.71009 -0.08142 126 
-9 -0.02526 -1.31231 -0.10667 126 
-8 0.00092 0.18179 -0.10575 126 
-7 -0.01179 -0.62531 -0.11754 126 
-6 -0.00169 -0.51616 -0.11923 126 
-5 -0.00371 -1.05142 -0.12294 126 
-4 -0.01646 -1.25925 -0.13940 126 
-3 0.00246 0.49876 -0.13694 126 
-2 0.00184 0.42626 -0.13510 126 
-1 0.00341 0.18334 -0.13169 126 
0 -0.01069 -2.97211*** -0.14238 126 
1 -0.01288 -2.76114*** -0.15526 126 
2 -0.02669 -1.38846 -0.18195 126 
3 -0.00398 -0.96014 -0.18593 126 
4 -0.00189 -0.41642 -0.18782 126 
5 -0.00386 -1.35656 -0.19168 126 
6 0.00138 0.43216 -0.19030 126 
7 0.00140 0.57019 -0.18889 126 
8 -0.00787 -1.59762 -0.19676 126 
9 0.00115 0.31925 -0.19562 126 
10 0.00355 1.30915 -0.19207 126 
11 -0.00288 -0.80634 -0.19495 126 
12 -0.00461 -0.76453 -0.19956 126 
13 -0.00193 -0.71663 -0.20149 126 
14 0.00180 0.50430 -0.19968 126 
15 0.00062 0.15294 -0.19906 126 
 
* Significant at 10% level, ** Significant at 5% level, *** Significant at 1% level 
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Table 4.9: Offering dilution of total sample 
The table shows the offering dilution of common stock offering (total sample) during the event 
window. The percentage of the dilution column is defined as the ratio of the change in equity value 
(market capitalisation) on the day the announcement (day 0) to equity value on day +1. The parentheses 
in the maximum and minimum percentage show the common stock offerings, which fall into their 
categories (see Appendix 3 for the names in full). 
 
 
Dilution (%) Number of Firms 
Average Dilution in 
the Range 
Cumulative (%) 
      0 < 54 3.69 3.69 
(-10) < ≤ 0 69 -1.55 2.14 
(-20) <  ≤ (-10) 2 -12.09 -9.95 
(-30) <  ≤ (-20) 1 -22.83 -32.78 
(-40) <  ≤ (-30) 0 0.00 -32.78 
(-50) <  ≤ (-40) 0 0.00 -32.78 
(-60) <  ≤ (-50) 0 0.00 -32.78 
(-70) <  ≤ (-60) 0 0.00 -32.78 
(-80) <  ≤ (-70) 0 0.00 -32.78 
(-90) <  ≤ (-80) 0 0.00 -32.78 
(-100) <  ≤ (-90) 0 0.00 -32.78 
TOTAL 126 
Average Offering Dilution 
0.00359 
(0.35900%) 
Median (%) 0.00 
Maximum (%) 25.00 (IRPC) 
Minimum (%) -22.83 (SF) 
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Table 4.10: Mean abnormal return surrounding the SEO announcements for different issuing methods 
The table shows the mean abnormal returns during the event window 15 days before and after the announcement day for different issuing methods, namely rights 
issuing (XR: 53 firms, Panel A), private placement (PP: 52 firms, Panel B) and stock dividend (SD: 22 firms, Panel C). Day 0 refers to the announcement date. The 
abnormal return (AR) is calculated via the market model:  , where is return on security i for day t, is intercept, is the OLS 
estimators of the market model parameter and is market return on day t (SET index in our case). The t-statistics (t-ratio) are calculated as: , where 
sample size, and standard deviation of . (*) Significant at 10% level, (**) Significant at 5% level, (***) Significant at 1% level 
 
 
Event days 
 Panel A: XR  Panel B: PP  Panel C: SD 
 ARs t-statistics CARs Sample size  ARs t-statistics CARs 
Sample 
size 
 ARs t-statistics CARs 
Sample 
size 
-15  -0.03969 -1.18439 -0.03969 53  -0.00855 -1.05673 -0.00855 52  0.00550 1.15060 0.00550 22 
-14  -0.02359 -1.63939 -0.06328 53  0.00843 1.24400 -0.00012 52  -0.05184 -1.14153 -0.04634 22 
-13  -0.01730 -1.54230 -0.08058 53  0.00006 0.00819 -0.00006 52  0.00289 0.40301 -0.04345 22 
-12  -0.02347 -1.33790 -0.10405 53  -0.00610 -0.78886 -0.00616 52  -0.16971 -1.45922 -0.21316 22 
-11  -0.02004 -1.62336 -0.12409 53  0.01306 1.64942 0.00690 52  -0.00023 -0.03613 -0.21339 22 
-10  -0.00691 -1.14123 -0.13100 53  -0.00057 -0.07989 0.00633 52  0.00494 1.32668 -0.20846 22 
-9  0.01001 1.61158 -0.12099 53  -0.01569 -1.61439 -0.00936 52  -0.12476 -1.17668 -0.33321 22 
-8  -0.00187 -0.43937 -0.12287 53  0.00864 0.99193 -0.00072 52  -0.00942 -0.53071 -0.34263 22 
-7  0.00464 0.81349 -0.11823 53  0.01432 1.52011 0.01360 52  -0.09888 -0.93951 -0.44151 22 
-6  -0.00192 -0.38269 -0.12015 53  -0.00454 -0.84440 0.00906 52  0.00155 0.21707 -0.43996 22 
-5  -0.01011 -1.97017* -0.13026 53  -0.00655 -1.03231 0.00251 52  0.00924 1.04431 -0.43072 22 
-4  -0.00593 -1.22504 -0.13620 53  0.00145 0.28549 0.00396 52  -0.08106 -1.11438 -0.51178 22 
-3  -0.00697 -0.91142 -0.14317 53  0.01449 1.71865* 0.01845 52  0.01341 0.96144 -0.49837 22 
-2  0.00319 0.64681 -0.13998 53  0.00689 0.85934 0.02534 52  -0.00234 -0.19390 -0.50071 22 
-1  0.00043 0.09671 -0.13955 53  -0.02709 -0.60801 -0.00175 52  0.00478 0.66423 -0.49593 22 
0  0.01102 1.80224* -0.12853 53  -0.03021 -5.14867*** -0.03196 52  -0.01196 -2.33303** -0.50789 22 
1  -0.01056 -1.85543* -0.13909 53  -0.01587 -1.69341* -0.04783 52  -0.01563 -2.46389** -0.52352 22 
2  -0.00426 -1.06579 -0.14336 53  -0.00067 -0.10164 -0.04850 52  -0.13742 -1.27851 -0.66094 22 
3  -0.00734 -0.91113 -0.15070 53  -0.00257 -0.48942 -0.05107 52  -0.00470 -0.72159 -0.66563 22 
4  0.00587 0.97374 -0.14483 53  -0.01197 -1.36832 -0.06303 52  -0.00803 -1.56947 -0.67367 22 
5  -0.00082 -0.19674 -0.14565 53  -0.00983 -1.91500 -0.07286 52  0.00029 0.08481 -0.67338 22 
6  0.00628 1.66742 -0.13937 53  -0.00602 -0.93016 -0.07888 52  0.00310 0.90828 -0.67028 22 
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Event days 
 Panel A: XR  Panel B: PP  Panel C: SD 
 ARs t-statistics CARs Sample size  ARs t-statistics CARs 
Sample 
size 
 ARs t-statistics CARs 
Sample 
size 
7  0.00554 1.60518 -0.13383 53  0.00073 0.19174 -0.07815 52  -0.00565 -0.77934 -0.67593 22 
8  -0.00861 -1.07475 -0.14244 53  -0.01358 -1.60512 -0.09173 52  -0.00149 -0.31444 -0.67742 22 
9  0.00567 1.05924 -0.13678 53  -0.00138 -0.19929 -0.09312 52  0.00234 0.42568 -0.67508 22 
10  0.00449 1.23152 -0.13229 53  0.00704 1.43476 -0.08607 52  -0.00437 -0.79324 -0.67945 22 
11  -0.00357 -0.72159 -0.13586 53  -0.00777 -1.45012 -0.09384 52  0.01721 1.70775 -0.66224 22 
12  -0.00607 -1.36011 -0.14192 53  -0.00598 -0.44426 -0.09983 52  0.00464 0.53226 -0.65759 22 
13  -0.00085 -0.20092 -0.14277 53  -0.00064 -0.12213 -0.10046 52  0.00122 0.25560 -0.65638 22 
14  -0.00138 -0.23583 -0.14415 53  0.00608 0.97467 -0.09439 52  -0.00259 -0.70819 -0.65897 22 
15  0.00268 0.56352 -0.14147 53  -0.00348 -0.42074 -0.09787 52  0.00400 0.70146 -0.65497 22 
 
* Significant at 10% level, ** Significant at 5% level, *** Significant at 1% level 
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Table 4.11: Offering dilution of issuing methods 
The table shows offering dilution of common stock offering firms during the event window, with different issuing methods. Panel A shows the offering dilution of 
companies which issued new shares via rights issuing (XR). Panel B shows the offering dilution for the firms using private placement (PP). Panel C shows the 
offering dilution of companies issuing via stock dividend (SD). Panel D shows the offering dilution of firms issuing with public offering (PO). The percentage of 
dilution column is defined as the ratio of the change in equity value (market capitalisation) on the day of the announcement (day 0) to equity value on day +1. The 
parentheses in the maximum and minimum percentage show the common stock offerings which fall into their categories (see Appendix 3 for the names in full). 
 
Dilution (%) 
PANEL A: XR  PANEL B: PP  PANEL C: SD  
Number of 
Firms 
Average in 
the Range 
Cumulative 
(%) 
 
Number of 
Firms 
Average in 
the Range 
Cumulative 
(%) 
 
Number of 
Firms 
Average in 
the Range 
Cumulative 
(%) 
 
      0 < 22 4.06 4.06  22 3.70 3.70  10 2.80 2.80  
(-10) < ≤ 0 30 -0.94 3.12  28 -1.84 1.87  12 -2.23 0.58  
(-20) <  ≤ (-10) 1 -13.60 -10.48  1 -10.58 -8.71  0 0.00 0.58  
(-30) <  ≤ (-20) 0 0.00 -10.48  1 -22.83 -31.54  0 0.00 0.58  
(-40) <  ≤ (-30) 0 0.00 -10.48  0 0.00 -31.54  0 0.00 0.58  
(-50) <  ≤ (-40) 0 0.00 -10.48  0 0.00 -31.54  0 0.00 0.58  
(-60) <  ≤ (-50) 0 0.00 -10.48  0 0.00 -31.54  0 0.00 0.58  
(-70) <  ≤ (-60) 0 0.00 -10.48  0 0.00 -31.54  0 0.00 0.58  
(-80) <  ≤ (-70) 0 0.00 -10.48  0 0.00 -31.54  0 0.00 0.58  
(-90) <  ≤ (-80) 0 0.00 -10.48  0 0.00 -31.54  0 0.00 0.58  
(-100) <  ≤ (-90) 0 0.00 -10.48  0 0.00 -31.54  0 0.00 0.58  
TOTAL 53 52 22  
Average Offering 
Dilution 
0.00897 
(0.89700%) 
 
-0.00064 
(-0.06400%) 
0.00060 
(0.0600%) 
 
Median (%) 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  
Maximum (%) 16.00 (NEW)  25.00 (IRPC)  5.84 (KWH)  
Minimum (%) -13.60 (LPN)  -22.83 (SF)  -8.69 (VARO)  
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Table 4.12: Robustness results of 61 days event window 
The table shows the mean abnormal returns (mean ARs) during the event window 30 days before and after the announcement (61 days event window) for total sample and 
the issuing methods. Panel A shows the mean ARs in the total sample of 126 firms. Panel B shows the mean ARs in the firms issuing new shares via rights issuing (XR: 53 
firms). Panel C shows the mean ARs in the firms issuing new shares via private placement (PP: 52 firms). Panel D shows the mean ARs in the firms issuing new shares with 
stock dividend (SD: 22 firms). Day 0 refers to the announcement date. The abnormal return (AR) is calculated via the market model:  , where 
is return on security i for day t, is intercept, is the OLS estimators of the market model parameter and is market return on day t (SET index in our case). The 
t-statistics (t-ratio) are calculated as: , where sample size, and standard deviation of . (*) Significant at 10% level, (**) Significant at 5% level, 
(***) Significant at 1% level 
 
Event 
days 
 Panel A: Total sample  Panel B: XR  Panel C: PP  Panel D: SD 
 ARs t-statistics CARs 
Sample 
size 
 ARs t-statistics CARs 
Sample 
size 
 ARs t-statistics CARs 
Sample 
size 
 ARs t-statistics CARs 
Sample 
size 
-30  -0.00567 -0.59356 -0.00567 126  -0.00171 -0.25407 -0.00171 53  0.00844 0.79799 0.00844 52  -0.04733 -1.04040 -0.04733 22 
-29  -0.00803 -1.31093 -0.01370 126  -0.01644 -1.89020* -0.01815 53  0.00539 0.79960 0.01383 52  -0.02301 -0.99825 -0.07034 22 
-28  -0.00286 -0.42649 -0.01656 126  -0.01007 -0.88224 -0.02822 53  0.00715 0.74759 0.02098 52  -0.01037 -0.72560 -0.08071 22 
-27  -0.00140 -0.26648 -0.01796 126  -0.00285 -0.36104 -0.03107 53  0.00043 0.04274 0.02141 52  -0.00091 -0.35742 -0.08162 22 
-26  0.00152 0.32682 -0.01644 126  -0.00460 -0.80754 -0.03567 53  0.00841 0.87607 0.02982 52  0.00027 0.06872 -0.08135 22 
-25  0.00001 0.00126 -0.01643 126  0.00162 0.46643 -0.03405 53  0.01122 1.42808 0.04104 52  -0.03495 -0.94991 -0.11630 22 
-24  0.00088 0.18005 -0.01555 126  -0.00317 -0.63053 -0.03722 53  0.00850 1.01659 0.04954 52  -0.00425 -0.25942 -0.12056 22 
-23  0.00457 1.04115 -0.01098 126  0.00312 0.61487 -0.03410 53  0.00653 0.73166 0.05607 52  0.00767 1.02727 -0.11288 22 
-22  0.01194 2.65337*** 0.00096 126  0.00861 1.10021 -0.02549 53  0.01725 2.38094** 0.07332 52  0.00907 2.01447* -0.10382 22 
-21  -0.00635 -1.60604 -0.00539 126  -0.01170 -2.67049** -0.03719 53  -0.00263 -0.31833 0.07069 52  -0.00041 -0.07616 -0.10422 22 
-20  -0.00633 -1.30223 -0.01171 126  -0.00778 -0.82051 -0.04497 53  -0.01091 -1.76475* 0.05978 52  0.00533 0.86762 -0.09889 22 
-19  -0.01194 -3.46236*** -0.02365 126  -0.01305 -2.61432** -0.05802 53  -0.01005 -1.63594 0.04973 52  -0.00164 -0.26661 -0.10053 22 
-18  -0.00203 -0.28189 -0.02568 126  -0.00159 -0.19343 -0.05960 53  0.00460 0.72818 0.05434 52  -0.02551 -0.75155 -0.12604 22 
-17  0.00572 1.39806 -0.01997 126  0.01016 1.56810 -0.04945 53  0.00657 0.90549 0.06091 52  -0.00275 -0.51642 -0.12879 22 
-16  -0.01632 -1.18723 -0.03628 126  -0.01274 -1.65740 -0.06219 53  0.00634 0.89459 0.06725 52  -0.06693 -0.90004 -0.19573 22 
-15  -0.01944 -1.34100 -0.05572 126  -0.04122 -1.23254 -0.10341 53  -0.00498 -0.72666 0.06227 52  0.00207 0.40978 -0.19366 22 
-14  -0.01692 -1.60990 -0.07264 126  -0.02193 -1.52554 -0.12534 53  0.01132 1.65015 0.07359 52  -0.05747 -1.27269 -0.25113 22 
-13  -0.00459 -0.79253 -0.07723 126  -0.01824 -1.63880 -0.14358 53  0.00222 0.29226 0.07581 52  -0.00083 -0.10897 -0.25196 22 
-12  -0.03910 -1.75537* -0.11633 126  -0.02359 -1.33340 -0.16717 53  -0.00174 -0.21123 0.07408 52  -0.17272 -1.49029 -0.42468 22 
-11  -0.00530 -0.82576 -0.12163 126  -0.02011 -1.64407 -0.18728 53  0.01400 1.67025 0.08808 52  -0.00500 -0.71717 -0.42969 22 
-10  -0.00346 -0.88214 -0.12509 126  -0.00787 -1.31805 -0.19515 53  -0.00157 -0.21857 0.08651 52  0.00547 1.35348 -0.42422 22 
-9  -0.02734 -1.40787 -0.15242 126  0.00997 1.58503 -0.18518 53  -0.01620 -1.66905 0.07031 52  -0.13379 -1.26476 -0.55801 22 
-8  0.00340 0.71689 -0.14902 126  -0.00250 -0.59673 -0.18768 53  0.01170 1.59654 0.08201 52  -0.00866 -0.48114 -0.56667 22 
-7  -0.01477 -0.78144 -0.16379 126  0.00337 0.60070 -0.18431 53  0.00903 0.96599 0.09104 52  -0.09849 -0.93837 -0.66516 22 
-6  -0.00248 -0.77367 -0.16627 126  -0.00281 -0.58532 -0.18711 53  -0.00402 -0.73980 0.08701 52  -0.00292 -0.41915 -0.66807 22 
-5  -0.00403 -1.14055 -0.17030 126  -0.01101 -2.12498** -0.19813 53  -0.00616 -0.94337 0.08085 52  0.00811 0.98580 -0.65996 22 
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Event 
days 
 Panel A: Total sample  Panel B: XR  Panel C: PP  Panel D: SD 
 ARs t-statistics CARs 
Sample 
size 
 ARs t-statistics CARs 
Sample 
size 
 ARs t-statistics CARs 
Sample 
size 
 ARs t-statistics CARs 
Sample 
size 
-4  -0.01803 -1.35887 -0.18833 126  -0.00673 -1.40292 -0.20485 53  0.00194 0.35299 0.08279 52  -0.08800 -1.20681 -0.74796 22 
-3  0.00258 0.51986 -0.18575 126  -0.00754 -0.96474 -0.21239 53  0.01643 1.95445* 0.09923 52  0.01164 0.83240 -0.73633 22 
-2  0.00306 0.66122 -0.18269 126  0.00226 0.45123 -0.21013 53  0.00725 0.89170 0.10647 52  0.00570 0.37911 -0.73063 22 
-1  0.00256 0.09901 -0.18013 126  -0.00045 -0.10097 -0.21058 53  -0.06778 -1.08263 0.03869 52  -0.00056 -0.06757 -0.73119 22 
0  -0.01046 -2.78949*** -0.19059 126  0.01055 1.70178* -0.20003 53  -0.04424 -7.38340*** -0.00555 52  -0.01337 -1.85093* -0.74456 22 
1  -0.01105 -2.59227** -0.20164 126  -0.01159 -2.00079* -0.21162 53  -0.01841 -2.24882** -0.02396 52  -0.01882 -3.09341*** -0.76338 22 
2  -0.03035 -1.57441 -0.23200 126  -0.00501 -1.24715 -0.21664 53  -0.00665 -1.45050 -0.03061 52  -0.14074 -1.30919 -0.90412 22 
3  -0.00335 -0.82196 -0.23534 126  -0.00805 -1.00183 -0.22469 53  -0.00060 -0.12904 -0.03121 52  -0.00383 -0.53283 -0.90795 22 
4  -0.00037 -0.10035 -0.23571 126  0.00485 0.80340 -0.21984 53  -0.00415 -0.75664 -0.03537 52  -0.00397 -0.48872 -0.91192 22 
5  -0.00362 -1.12619 -0.23934 126  -0.00242 -0.55496 -0.22226 53  -0.00685 -1.11713 -0.04221 52  0.00163 0.36229 -0.91029 22 
6  0.00037 0.11605 -0.23897 126  0.00597 1.59104 -0.21629 53  -0.00889 -1.40685 -0.05110 52  0.00361 0.85660 -0.90668 22 
7  0.00182 0.71127 -0.23715 126  0.00469 1.33102 -0.21160 53  0.00375 0.94201 -0.04735 52  -0.00925 -1.26236 -0.91593 22 
8  -0.00812 -1.65877 -0.24527 126  -0.00832 -1.03935 -0.21992 53  -0.01396 -1.66761 -0.06131 52  -0.00349 -0.77975 -0.91942 22 
9  0.00165 0.45937 -0.24362 126  0.00405 0.76885 -0.21587 53  0.00180 0.25495 -0.05951 52  0.00092 0.17024 -0.91850 22 
10  0.00285 1.06608 -0.24077 126  0.00301 0.79580 -0.21285 53  0.00681 1.42262 -0.05270 52  -0.00464 -0.91967 -0.92314 22 
11  -0.00433 -1.23675 -0.24510 126  -0.00465 -0.98302 -0.21750 53  -0.00857 -1.65380 -0.06127 52  0.01675 1.57803 -0.90640 22 
12  -0.00548 -0.93754 -0.25059 126  -0.00597 -1.31314 -0.22347 53  -0.00783 -0.59509 -0.06910 52  0.00290 0.36163 -0.90349 22 
13  -0.00346 -1.42908 -0.25404 126  -0.00175 -0.42302 -0.22522 53  -0.00255 -0.57583 -0.07165 52  -0.00095 -0.18998 -0.90444 22 
14  0.00222 0.55784 -0.25183 126  -0.00206 -0.35199 -0.22728 53  0.00831 1.10696 -0.06334 52  -0.00371 -0.97535 -0.90815 22 
15  0.00333 0.95579 -0.24849 126  0.00203 0.42901 -0.22526 53  0.00378 0.57383 -0.05956 52  0.00350 0.58891 -0.90465 22 
16  -0.00138 -0.35421 -0.24987 126  -0.00677 -1.28955 -0.23202 53  0.00240 0.31558 -0.05716 52  -0.00225 -0.40131 -0.90690 22 
17  0.00248 0.51388 -0.24739 126  0.00264 0.30353 -0.22939 53  0.00235 0.31325 -0.05482 52  0.00802 1.43837 -0.89888 22 
18  -0.00080 -0.21212 -0.24818 126  0.00238 0.32295 -0.22700 53  -0.00295 -0.60031 -0.05777 52  -0.00295 -0.58004 -0.90182 22 
19  -0.00428 -1.40790 -0.25246 126  -0.00272 -0.68686 -0.22973 53  -0.00507 -0.82301 -0.06283 52  -0.00197 -0.52285 -0.90379 22 
20  -0.00142 -0.50597 -0.25388 126  -0.00002 -0.00454 -0.22975 53  -0.00571 -1.28533 -0.06854 52  0.00849 1.36835 -0.89530 22 
21  -0.00982 -1.64847 -0.26370 126  -0.01379 -1.03832 -0.24353 53  -0.00498 -1.23127 -0.07352 52  0.00066 0.11217 -0.89464 22 
22  -0.00242 -0.62829 -0.26611 126  -0.00855 -1.50317 -0.25208 53  0.00359 0.54022 -0.06994 52  -0.00330 -0.45311 -0.89794 22 
23  -0.00253 -0.81622 -0.26865 126  0.00282 0.66404 -0.24926 53  -0.00863 -1.52525 -0.07857 52  -0.00051 -0.09869 -0.89845 22 
24  -0.00361 -1.63193 -0.27225 126  -0.00442 -1.33888 -0.25368 53  -0.00359 -0.87679 -0.08216 52  -0.00631 -1.48625 -0.90476 22 
25  -0.00438 -1.25310 -0.27663 126  -0.00838 -1.34467 -0.26206 53  -0.00054 -0.10330 -0.08270 52  -0.00106 -0.23752 -0.90582 22 
26  -0.00020 -0.05499 -0.27683 126  0.00135 0.23972 -0.26071 53  -0.00046 -0.06941 -0.08316 52  0.00051 0.08840 -0.90531 22 
27  0.00231 0.80799 -0.27453 126  0.00682 1.65149 -0.25389 53  0.00000 0.00015 -0.08316 52  0.00107 0.16469 -0.90424 22 
28  -0.00143 -0.34393 -0.27596 126  -0.00620 -0.81161 -0.26009 53  0.00366 0.60115 -0.07950 52  -0.00019 -0.04049 -0.90443 22 
29  -0.00194 -0.69555 -0.27790 126  -0.00593 -1.30953 -0.26602 53  0.00146 0.32574 -0.07804 52  -0.00442 -0.77759 -0.90885 22 
30  0.00039 0.10280 -0.27750 126  0.00690 1.01825 -0.25912 53  -0.00806 -1.44428 -0.08610 52  0.00491 0.62090 -0.90394 22 
 
 
* Significant at 10% level, ** Significant at 5% level, *** Significant at 1% level 
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Table 4.13: Results of the regression in the total sample 
The table gives the results of the regression from the total sample with dummy variables of each 
issuing method in order to examine whether the differences in those issuing methods might impact on 
the explanatory variables. This reveals the results from the regression when controlled for 
Heteroscedasticity using White Heteroscedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors and Covariance. SIZE 
refers to the ratio of market capitalisation on the day following the announcement (day +1) and the day 
of the announcement (day 0). Market-to-Book (MB) is defined as the change in market-to-book ratio 
calculated by the difference between market-to-book ratio in the offering year and the average 3 years 
before the issuing year of this ratio. Leverage ratio (LEVERAGE) is the ratio of total debt and total 
asset, and change in leverage ratio is leverage ratio in the year of issuing minus average leverage ratio 
for 3 years before the year of offering. Return on Asset (ROA) refers to the change in ROA computed 
by the change between ROA in the offering year and average ROA for 3 years ending one year before 
the issuing year. Price-Earnings Ratio (P/E) is defined as the change in this ratio: P/E ratio on offering 
year minus average 3 years P/E ratio before the issuing year. Turnover ratio(TURNOVER) is a control 
variable based on the daily trading volume and number of shares outstanding calculated by an average 
of 11 months ending one month before the issuing month. Insider Ownership (OWN) is defined as the 
difference between the top five largest major shareholders in the year of offering and the top five 
largest major shareholders 3 years before the issuing year. Two-day announcement abnormal return 
(TWO_DAY_AR) refers to the abnormal return to security on the day before the announcement plus the 
abnormal return to security on the day of announcement. EVENTS is a control variable in terms of 
dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm has events other than SEOs during 115 days before and after the 
event date, and zero otherwise. The dummy variables of rights issuing (DXR), private placement (DPP) 
and stock dividend (DSD) are equal to 1 if the firms use each issuing method, and zero otherwise. The 
definition of
2R is referred to as the adjusted 2R .  The regression is estimated as: 
)()()()(Re 4321 ROALeverageMBsizeturnrmalTwoDayAbno  
)()()()()()()/( 111098765 DSDDPPDXREVENTSOWNTURNEP    
 
 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Statistic Values 
Coefficient P-Values Std Error 2R  2R  
SIZE 0.670342*** 0.0001 0.152672 
0.336364 0.206006 
MB -0.002329* 0.0547 0.001187 
LEVERAGE 0.037938 0.1725 0.027454 
ROA 0.072140 0.2009 0.055735 
P/E 2.09E-05 0.2348 1.74E-05 
TURNOVER -0.389383 0.7856 1.424725 
OWN 0.009220** 0.0370 0.004314 
EVENTS 0.011793 0.3552 0.012650 
DXR -0.027992* 0.0668 0.014974 
DPP -0.023705 0.1243 0.015192 
DSD -0.031537** 0.0195 0.013110 
Sample Size 68 
 
* Significant at 10% level, ** Significant at 5% level, *** Significant at 1% level 
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Table 4.14: The variance-covariance matrix by total sample and issuing methods 
The variance-covariance matrix for the dependent variable, two-day announcement abnormal returns (TWO_DAY_AR) and the other explanatory variables are shown 
here. Panel A shows the results regardless of the issuing methods with a sample size of 68 firms. Panel B shows the outcomes from the companies which issued via 
rights issuing (XR) with a sample size of 28 firms. Panel C shows the findings from the companies which issued via private placement (PP) with a sample size of 26 
firms. Panel D shows the consequences from the companies which issued via stock dividend (SD) with a sample size of 16 firms. SIZE refers to the ratio of market 
capitalisation on the day following the announcement (day +1) and day of the announcement (day 0). Market-to-Book (MB) is defined as the change in market-to-book 
ratio calculated by the difference between market-to-book ratio in the offering year and the average 3 years before the issuing year of this ratio. Leverage ratio 
(LEVERAGE) is the ratio of total debt and total asset, and change in leverage ratio is leverage ratio in the year of issuing minus average leverage ratio for 3 years 
before the year of offering. Return on Asset (ROA) refers to the change in ROA computed by the change between ROA in the offering year and average ROA for 3 
years ending one year before the issuing year. Price-Earnings Ratio (P/E) is defined as the change in this ratio: P/E ratio in offering year minus average 3 years P/E 
ratio before the issuing year. Turnover ratio (TURNOVER) is based on the daily trading volume and number of shares outstanding calculated by an average of 11 
months, ending one month before the issuing month. Insider Ownership (OWN) is defined as the difference between the top five largest major shareholders in the year 
of offering and the top five largest major shareholders 3 years before the issuing year. Two-day announcement abnormal return (TWO_DAY_AR) refers to the 
abnormal return to security on the day before the announcement plus the abnormal return to security on the day of announcement. EVENTS is a dummy variable equal 
to 1 if the firm has events other than SEOs during 115 days before and after the event date, and zero otherwise. The dummy variables of rights issuing (DXR), private 
placement (DPP) and stock dividend (DSD) are equal to 1 if the firms use each issuing method, and zero otherwise.  
 
 
PANEL A TWO_DAY_AR TURNOVER SIZE ROA P/E OWN MB LEVERAGE EVENTS DXR DSD DPP 
             
             
TWO_DAY_AR  1.000000            
TURNOVER -0.032845  1.000000           
SIZE  0.425133 -0.088521  1.000000          
ROA  0.055905  0.273157  0.030081  1.000000         
P/E -0.067435 -0.074461 -0.058373 -0.083377  1.000000        
OWN  0.351392 -0.002161  0.151401 -0.046671 -0.146118  1.000000       
MB -0.200328 -0.023912  0.035114  0.014399  0.101215 -0.019281  1.000000      
LEVERAGE  0.073982 -0.027011  0.067797 -0.546019  0.037139  0.057597  0.041042  1.000000     
EVENTS  0.005540 -0.059050 -0.222276  0.020809 -0.080476  0.049929  0.050805  0.010507  1.000000    
DXR -0.062683 -0.047699 -0.134535  0.018379  0.115526 -0.025786 -0.088209 -0.039611 -0.130295  1.000000   
DSD  0.002717 -0.237573  0.124090 -0.299060 -0.021361  0.007779  0.076814  0.199486  0.241059 -0.464095  1.000000  
DPP  0.019679  0.295165  0.022451  0.325623 -0.095319 -0.039117  0.040080 -0.164924 -0.074893 -0.596793 -0.365095  1.000000 
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PANEL B TWO_DAY_AR TURNOVER SIZE ROA P/E OWN MB LEVERAGE EVENTS_XR 
          
          
TWO_DAY_AR  1.000000         
TURNOVER  0.075898  1.000000        
SIZE  0.607305  0.068623  1.000000       
ROA  0.049961  0.201055  0.255596  1.000000      
P/E -0.077474 -0.116143 -0.041556 -0.122830  1.000000     
OWN  0.212500 -0.174328  0.203753 -0.077225 -0.189463  1.000000    
MB -0.515321 -0.004552 -0.046162 -0.011884  0.141766 -0.051786  1.000000   
LEVERAGE  0.079137  0.038460  0.090464 -0.567515  0.020040 -0.069066  0.186348  1.000000  
EVENTS_XR -0.230181 -0.066325 -0.176841  0.045406 -0.156726 -0.022694  0.001790  0.052497  1.000000 
 
 
 
 
 
PANEL C TWO_DAY_AR TURNOVER SIZE ROA P/E OWN MB LEVERAGE EVENTS_PP 
          
          
TWO_DAY_AR  1.000000         
TURNOVER -0.136001  1.000000        
SIZE  0.219194 -0.175109  1.000000       
ROA  0.072887  0.305893  0.083547  1.000000      
P/E -0.307529  0.321128 -0.360113  0.307763  1.000000     
OWN  0.527655  0.116952  0.140682 -0.135076 -0.285676  1.000000    
MB  0.028693 -0.009601  0.138919  0.108907 -0.068933  0.005781  1.000000   
LEVERAGE  0.073116 -0.020202 -0.006208 -0.482310  0.099775  0.223617 -0.194563  1.000000  
EVENTS_PP  0.107651 -0.076434 -0.472658  0.128520  0.247506  0.119113  0.104631 -0.123343  1.000000 
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PANEL D TWO_DAY_AR TURNOVER SIZE ROA P/E OWN MB LEVERAGE EVENTS_SD 
          
          
TWO_DAY_AR  1.000000         
TURNOVER  0.077548  1.000000        
SIZE  0.629551 -0.125534  1.000000       
ROA -0.202689  0.049084 -0.312194  1.000000      
P/E -0.073243  0.101227  0.001817 -0.753990  1.000000     
OWN  0.088554 -0.180011 -0.013822  0.126986 -0.264109  1.000000    
MB  0.129972 -0.137608  0.145291  0.170404  0.073333 -0.206021  1.000000   
LEVERAGE  0.132308 -0.081525 -0.004618 -0.667931  0.579029 -0.085851  0.232785  1.000000  
EVENTS_SD  0.126513  0.314260 -0.179652 -0.183564  0.311130  0.084347 -0.351640  0.110933  1.000000 
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Table 4.15: Results of regression by issuing methods 
The results of the regression when using the concept of pooling sample for the companies issued new 
shares are given here. Panel A shows the method of rights issuing (XR). Panel B shows the case of 
using private placement (PP). Panel C shows when the firms utilise stock dividend (SD) as their 
issuing method. Overall model control for the problem of heteroscedasticity is also achieved by 
applying White's Heteroscedasticity-Consistent Standard Error and Covariance. SIZE refers to the ratio 
of market capitalisation on the day following the announcement (day +1) and the day of the 
announcement (day 0). Market-to-Book (MB) is defined as the change in market-to-book ratio 
calculated by the difference between market-to-book ratio in the offering year and the average 3 years 
before the issuing year of this ratio. Leverage ratio (LEVERAGE) is the ratio of total debt and total 
asset, and change in leverage ratio is leverage ratio in the year of issuing minus average leverage ratio 
for 3 years before the year of offering. Return on Asset (ROA) refers to the change in ROA computed 
by the change between ROA in the offering year and average ROA for 3 years ending one year before 
the issuing year. Price-Earnings Ratio (P/E) is defined as the change in this ratio: P/E ratio in offering 
year minus average 3 years P/E ratio before the issuing year. Turnover ratio (TURNOVER) is a control 
variable based on the daily trading volume and number of shares outstanding calculated by an average 
of 11 months, ending one month before the issuing month. Insider Ownership (OWN) is defined as the 
difference between the top five largest major shareholders in the year of offering and the top five 
largest major shareholders 3 years before the issuing year. Two-day announcement abnormal return 
(TWO_DAY_AR) refers to the abnormal return to security on the day before the announcement plus 
the abnormal return to security on the day of announcement. EVENTS is a control variable in terms of 
dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm has events other than SEOs during 115 days before and after the 
event date, and zero otherwise. C refers to the constant term in the regression. The definition of
2R is 
referred to as the adjusted
2R .   The dummy variables of right issuing (DXR), private placement (DPP) 
and stock dividend (DSD) are equal to 1 if the firms use XR, PP and SD, respectively; and zero 
otherwise. The regression is estimated as:
 
)()()()(Re 4321 ROALeverageMBsizeturnrmalTwoDayAbno  
)()()()/( 8765 EVENTSOWNTURNEP   ),,(9 DSDDPPDXR  
 
 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Statistic Values 
Coefficient P-Values Std Error 2R  2R  
PANEL A: Rights Issuing (XR) 
SIZE 0.659271*** 0.0002 0.168148 
0.328895 0.224758 
MB -0.002374** 0.0403 0.001132 
LEVERAGE 0.035861 0.1988 0.027587 
ROA 0.070099 0.1832 0.052039 
P/E 2.05E-05 0.2561 1.79E-05 
TURNOVER -0.319736 0.8074 1.305636 
OWN 0.009660** 0.0296 0.004331 
EVENTS 0.010263 0.3955 0.011990 
DXR -0.001701 0.8958 0.012924 
PANEL B: Private Placement (PP) 
 
SIZE 0.662386*** 0.0001 0.160001 
0.329441 0.225389 MB -0.002377** 0.0434 0.001151 
LEVERAGE 0.036071 0.1884 0.027103 
ROA 0.065619 0.2220 0.053155 0.329441 0.225389 
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Explanatory 
Variables 
Statistic Values 
Coefficient P-Values Std Error 2R  2R  
P/E 2.09E-05 0.2053 1.63E-05 
TURNOVER -0.381663 0.7844 1.388395 
OWN 0.009683** 0.0306 0.004369 
EVENTS 0.010782 0.3699 0.011931 
DPP 0.003626 0.8327 0.017088 
PANEL C: Stock Dividend (SD) 
SIZE 0.679493*** 0.0000 0.141922 
0.330936 0.227116 
MB -0.002328** 0.0427 0.001124 
LEVERAGE 0.036605 0.1962 0.027994 
ROA 0.062115 0.2331 0.051545 
P/E 1.85E-05 0.2813 1.70E-05 
TURNOVER -0.389249 0.7750 1.355689 
OWN 0.009555** 0.0268 0.004206 
EVENTS 0.012284 0.3293 0.012485 
DSD -0.007462 0.5924 0.013861 
Sample Size 68 
 
 
* Significant at 10% level, ** Significant at 5% level, *** Significant at 1% level 
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Table 4.16: Robustness results of regression by using different proxies 
This table shows the results of the regression when using different proxies for operating performance for the companies which issued new shares. Panel A shows the 
total sample. Panel B shows the method of rights issuing (XR). Panel C shows the case of using private placement (PP). Panel D shows when the firms utilise stock 
dividend (SD) as their issuing method. Overall model control for the problem of heteroscedasticity is also achieved by applying White's Heteroscedasticity-Consistent 
Standard Error and Covariance. SIZE refers to the ratio of market capitalisation on the day following the announcement (day +1) and the day of the announcement (day 
0). Market-to-Book (MB) is defined as the change in market-to-book ratio calculated by the difference between market-to-book ratio in the offering year and the 
average 3 years before the issuing year of this ratio. Leverage ratio (LEVERAGE) is the ratio of total debt and total asset, and change in leverage ratio is leverage ratio 
in the year of issuing minus average leverage ratio for 3 years before the year of offering. Return on Equity (ROE) refers to the change in ROE computed by the change 
between ROE in the offering year and average ROE for 3 years, ending one year before the issuing year. Earnings Before Interest, Tax, Depreciation and Amortisation 
(EBITDA) refer to the change in EBITDA computed by the change between EBITDA in the offering year and average EBITDA for 3 years ending one year before the 
issuing year. Price-Earnings Ratio (P/E) is defined as the change in this ratio: P/E ratio in offering year minus average 3 years P/E ratio before the issuing year. 
Turnover ratio (TURNOVER) is a control variable based on the daily trading volume and number of shares outstanding calculated by an average of 11 months ending 
one month before the issuing month. Insider Ownership (OWN) is defined as the difference between the top five largest major shareholders in the year of offering and 
the top five largest major shareholders 3 years before the issuing year. Two-day announcement abnormal return (TWO_DAY_AR) refers to the abnormal return to 
security on the day before the announcement plus the abnormal return to security on the day of announcement. EVENTS is a control variable in terms of dummy 
variable equal to 1 if the firm has events other than SEOs during 115 days before and after the event date, and zero otherwise. C refers to the constant term in the 
regression. The definition of
2R is referred to as the adjusted 2R .   The dummy variables of right issuing (DXR), private placement (DPP) and stock dividend (DSD) 
are equal to 1 if the firms use XR, PP and SD, respectively; and zero otherwise. The regression is estimated as: 
),()()()(Re 4321 EBITDAROELeverageMBsizeturnrmalTwoDayAbno   )()()()/( 8765 EVENTSOWNTURNEP   ),,(9 DSDDPPDXR  
(*) Significant at 10% level, (**) Significant at 5% level and (***) Significant at 1% level. 
 
 
 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Statistic Values of ROE 
 
Statistic Values of EBITDA 
Coefficient P-Values Std Error 2R  2R  Coefficient P-Values Std Error 2R  2R  
Panel A: Total Sample 
SIZE 0.679188*** 0.0001 0.157818    0.803871*** 0.0000 0.153875 
0.400642 0.268783 
MB -0.003838*** 0.0000 0.000413    -0.005054** 0.0178 0.002063 
LEVERAGE 0.049459* 0.0648 0.026204    0.014415 0.4338 0.018270 
ROE/EBITDA 0.008778** 0.0351 0.004054 0.380815 0.247265  0.000179 0.2216 0.000144 
P/E 2.60E-05 0.1213 1.65E-05    0.000360 0.1304 0.000234 
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Explanatory 
Variables 
Statistic Values of ROE 
 
Statistic Values of EBITDA 
Coefficient P-Values Std Error 2R  2R  Coefficient P-Values Std Error 2R  2R  
TURNOVER -1.254760 0.5327 1.997293    0.732090 0.5602 1.248342 
0.400642 0.268783 
OWN 0.010450** 0.0308 0.004705    0.007469** 0.0213 0.003142 
EVENTS 0.013241 0.3643 0.014465    0.005571 0.6387 0.011793 
DXR -0.028460* 0.0685 0.015291 0.380815 0.247265  -0.014703 0.3737 0.016379 
DPP -0.014676 0.3734 0.016342    -0.012008 0.3322 0.012264 
DSD -0.036575** 0.0328 0.016670    -0.017931 0.1848 0.013335 
Panel B: Rights Issuing (XR) 
SIZE 0.657883*** 0.0003 0.172080 
0.363699 0.255648 
 0.792280*** 0.0000 0.156667 
0.397315 0.293004 
MB -0.003688*** 0.0000 0.000359  -0.005079** 0.0165 0.002050 
LEVERAGE 0.035595 0.1555 0.024704  0.013052 0.4566 0.017400 
ROE/EBITDA 0.006982* 0.0663 0.003723  0.000217 0.1280 0.000140 
P/E 2.33E-05 0.1616 1.64E-05  0.000318 0.2097 0.000251 
TURNOVER -0.661904 0.6822 1.607761  0.819906 0.5083 1.230806 
OWN 0.010656** 0.0272 0.004691  0.007501** 0.0196 0.003114 
EVENTS 0.008579 0.5065 0.012825  0.004680 0.7011 0.012124 
DXR -0.004501 0.7426 0.013633  -0.000658 0.9543 0.011429 
Panel C: Private Placement (PP)   
SIZE 0.662103*** 0.0002 0.164233 
0.371260 0.264492 
 0.790560*** 0.0000 0.160346 
0.397780 0.293550 
MB -0.003900*** 0.0000 0.000418  -0.005081** 0.0136 0.001990 
LEVERAGE 0.041969* 0.0671 0.022447  0.014180 0.4103 0.017082 
ROE/EBITDA 0.007018** 0.0418 0.003365  0.000220 0.1172 0.000138 
P/E 2.74E-05* 0.0775 1.52E-05  0.000323 0.1819 0.000238 
TURNOVER -1.177262 0.5447 1.931130  0.748552 0.5218 1.160777 
OWN 0.010867** 0.0278 0.004803  0.007560** 0.0185 0.003110 
EVENTS 0.010763 0.4236 0.013347  0.005000 0.6546 0.011113 
DPP 0.013903 0.5047 0.020696  0.002623 0.8265 0.011911 
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Explanatory 
Variables 
Statistic Values of ROE 
 
Statistic Values of EBITDA 
Coefficient P-Values Std Error 2R  2R  Coefficient P-Values Std Error 2R  2R  
Panel D: Stock Dividend (SD)  
SIZE 0.692101 0.0000 0.144803 
0.370317 
 
0.263390 
  0.805915*** 0.0000 0.146452 
0.398590 0.294500 
 
MB -0.003576*** 0.0000 0.000378    -0.005023** 0.0141 0.001978  
LEVERAGE 0.046598* 0.0828 0.026354    0.014740 0.4348 0.018728  
ROE/EBITDA 0.008110** 0.0357 0.003764    0.000212 0.1402 0.000141  
P/E 1.92E-05 0.2444 1.63E-05    0.000348 0.1314 0.000227  
TURNOVER -0.913901 0.6064 1.763296    0.723949 0.5792 1.297195  
OWN 0.010670** 0.0255 0.004643    0.007499** 0.0179 0.003067  
EVENTS 0.012640 0.3719 0.014035    0.005760 0.6211 0.011583  
DSD -0.014029 0.3703 0.015527    -0.004842 0.6752 0.011490  
Sample Size 63  62 
 
* Significant at 10% level, ** Significant at 5% level, *** Significant at 1% level 
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Table 4.17: Robustness results of regression by transforming variables 
The results of the regression when transforming variables to the function of logarithm for the 
companies which issued new shares are given here. The concept of a pooled sample is applied here, 
with a total sample of 50 companies. Panel A shows the total sample. Panel B shows the method of 
rights issuing (XR). Panel C shows the case when using private placement (PP). Panel D shows when 
the firms use stock dividend (SD) as their issuing method. The overall model is also controlled for the 
problem of heteroscedasticity by applying White‟s Heteroscedasticity-Consistent Standard Error and 
Covariance. LSIZE refers to the natural logarithm of issuing size measured by the logarithm of ratio of 
market capitalisation on the day following the announcement (day +1) and the day of the 
announcement (day 0). Market-to-Book (MB) is defined as the change in market-to-book ratio 
calculated by the difference between market-to-book ratio in the offering year and the average 3 years 
before the issuing year of this ratio. Leverage ratio (LEVERAGE) is the ratio of total debt and total 
asset, and change in leverage ratio is the leverage ratio in the year of issuing minus the average 
leverage ratio for 3 years before the year of offering. Return on Asset (ROA) refers to the change in 
ROA computed by the change between ROA in the offering year and average ROA for 3 years ending 
one year before the issuing year. Price-Earnings Ratio (P/E) is defined as the change in this ratio: P/E 
ratio in the offering year minus the average of 3 years P/E ratio before the issuing year. Logarithm of 
turnover ratio(LTURN) is a control variable based on the daily trading volume and number of shares 
outstanding calculated by an average of 11 months ending one month before the issuing month. 
Logarithm of insider Ownership (LOWN) is defined as the logarithm function of the difference between 
the top five largest shareholders in the year of offering and the top five largest shareholders 3 years 
before the issuing year. Two-day announcement abnormal return (TWO_DAY_AR) refers to the 
abnormal return to security on the day before the announcement plus the abnormal return to security on 
the day of announcement. EVENTS is a control variable in terms of a dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
firm has events other than SEOs within the 115 days before and after the event date, and zero 
otherwise. C refers to the constant term in the regression. The definition of
2R is referred to as the 
adjusted
2R .   The dummy variables of right issuing (DXR), private placement (DPP) and stock 
dividend (DSD) equal 1 if the firms use XR, PP and SD, respectively; and zero otherwise. The 
regression is estimated: 
)/()()()()(Re 54321 EPROALeverageMBLSIZEturnrmalTwoDayAbno  
)()()( 876 EVENTSLOWNLTURN   ),,(9 DSDDPPDXR  
 
 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Statistic Values 
Coefficient P-Values Std Error 2R  2R  
PANEL A: Total Sample 
LSIZE 0.117356 0.7621 0.385015   
MB -0.003009* 0.0660 0.001593   
LEVERAGE -0.036483 0.4874 0.052054   
ROA -0.019568 0.8599 0.110204   
P/E 0.001141 0.1035 0.000685 0.074070 -0.106599 
LTURN -0.002361 0.7556 0.007535   
LOWN -0.005519 0.7877 0.020356   
EVENTS -0.001508 0.9423 0.020716   
PANEL B: Rights Issuing (XR) 
LSIZE 0.215777 0.6301 0.444586 
0.100463 -0.101933 
MB -0.002923** 0.0459 0.001419 
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Explanatory 
Variables 
Statistic Values 
Coefficient P-Values Std Error 2R  2R  
LEVERAGE -0.036748 0.5279 0.057708 
ROA -0.036871 0.7684 0.124388 
P/E 0.001277 0.1012 0.000761   
LTURN 0.000784 0.9283 0.008659   
LOWN -0.009215 0.6843 0.022501 0.100463 -0.101933 
EVENTS 0.006451 0.7595 0.020932   
DXR 0.029717 0.3341 0.030397   
PANEL C: Private Placement (PP) 
LSIZE 0.112311 0.7578 0.361670   
MB -0.002710** 0.0263 0.001174   
LEVERAGE -0.021849 0.7244 0.061539   
ROA 0.020180 0.8636 0.116713   
P/E 0.001078* 0.0752 0.000590 0.129544 -0.066308 
LTURN 0.002697 0.7768 0.009446   
LOWN -0.003934 0.8369 0.018978   
EVENTS -0.003654 0.8566 0.020089   
DPP -0.043847 0.2215 0.035309   
PANEL D: Stock Dividend (SD) 
LSIZE 0.054194 0.8852 0.372974   
MB -0.002937* 0.0648 0.001547   
LEVERAGE -0.030167 0.5742 0.053250   
ROA 0.007872 0.9457 0.114750   
P/E 0.001030 0.1312 0.000668 0.081020 -0.125751 
LTURN -0.002186 0.7773 0.007676   
LOWN -0.002560 0.9008 0.020411   
EVENTS -0.007347 0.7244 0.020688   
DSD 0.018431 0.3654 0.020130   
Sample Size 50 
 
 
* Significant at 10% level, ** Significant at 5% level, *** Significant at 1% level 
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Table 4.18: Results of the correlation between short- and long-term stock price reactions  
The table presents the results from the regression, in which the long-term abnormal return is defined as the dependent variable and two-day announcement abnormal return 
(TWO_DAY_AR) is the explanatory variable. Control of the problem of heteroscedasticity in the model is also achieved by applying White's Heteroscedasticity-Consistent 
Standard Error and Covariance. The total sample is 67 firms with a pooling sample in each issuing method. Panel A shows the total sample. Panel B shows the method of 
rights issuing (XR). Panel C shows the case of using private placement (PP). Panel D shows when the firms utilise stock dividend (SD) as their issuing method. The control 
variables are the variables previously estimated. SIZE refers to the ratio of market capitalisation on the day following the announcement (day +1) and the day of the 
announcement (day 0). Market-to-Book (MB) is defined as the change in market-to-book ratio calculated by the difference between market-to-book ratio in the offering year 
and the average 3 years before the issuing year of this ratio. Leverage ratio (LEVERAGE) is the ratio of total debt and total asset, and change in leverage ratio is leverage ratio 
in the year of issuing minus average leverage ratio for 3 years before the year of offering. Return on Asset (ROA) refers to the change in ROA computed by the change 
between ROA in the offering year and average ROA for 3 years ending one year before the issuing year. Earnings Before Interest, Tax, Depreciation and Amortisation 
(EBITDA) refer to the change in EBITDA computed by the change between EBITDA in the offering year and average EBITDA for 3 years ending one year before the issuing 
year. Price-Earnings Ratio (P/E) is defined as the change in this ratio: P/E ratio in offering year minus average 3 years P/E ratio before the issuing year. Turnover 
ratio(TURNOVER) is a control variable based on the daily trading volume and number of shares outstanding calculated by an average of 11 months ending one month before 
the issuing month. Insider Ownership (OWN) is defined as the difference between the top five largest major shareholders in the year of offering and the top five largest major 
shareholders 3 years before the issuing year. The definition of
2R is referred to as the adjusted 2R . The regression is estimated via the function: 
  turnrmalTwoDayAbnoiablesControlVarfARLR Re_   (*) Significant at 10% level, (**) Significant at 5% level, (***) Significant at 1% level. The sample size for 
estimation is 67 firms. The sample size for estimation with EBITDA is 61 firms. 
 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Statistic Values  
 
Statistic Values of Estimation with EBITDA 
Coefficient P-Values Std Error 2R  2R  Coefficient P-Values Std Error 2R  2R  
Panel A.1: Total Sample Panel A.2: Total Sample 
SIZE 0.000220 0.9864 0.012850    0.001439 0.9227 0.014752   
MB 3.98E-07 0.9950 6.30E-05    -0.000256 0.1329 0.000168   
LEVERAGE 0.007234* 0.0947 0.004257    0.002771 0.5259 0.004340   
ROA/EBITDA 0.009135 0.1281 0.005916    -1.45E-05 0.1367 9.62E-06   
P/E 4.36E-06*** 0.0016 1.31E-06 0.216649 0.092962  3.04E-05 0.2447 2.58E-05 0.206365 0.066312 
TURNOVER -0.171923* 0.0537 0.087251    -0.103994 0.3389 0.107729   
OWN 0.000748*** 0.0083 0.000274    0.000824** 0.0162 0.000331   
TWO_DAY_AR -0.006867 0.4682 0.009403    0.006029 0.5173 0.009247   
EVENTS 0.000402 0.6766 0.000958    1.39E-05 0.9889 0.000998   
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Explanatory 
Variables 
Statistic Values  
 
Statistic Values of Estimation with EBITDA 
Coefficient P-Values Std Error 2R  2R  Coefficient P-Values Std Error 2R  2R  
Panel B.1: Rights Issuing (XR) Panel B.2: Rights Issuing (XR)  
 
SIZE -0.000852 0.9515 0.013945    0.000592 0.9717 0.016590   
MB -2.75E-06 0.9639 6.03E-05    -0.000259 0.1484 0.000177   
LEVERAGE 0.007158* 0.0964 0.004233    0.002733 0.5307 0.004329   
ROA/EBITDA 0.009261 0.1243 0.005935    -1.46E-05 0.1411 9.77E-06   
P/E 4.60E-06*** 0.0015 1.38E-06 0.219729 0.080395  2.96E-05 0.2802 2.71E-05 0.207235 0.048682 
TURNOVER -0.174956* 0.0557 0.089543    -0.104846 0.3391 0.108619   
OWN 0.000752*** 0.0089 0.000277    0.000829** 0.0187 0.000341   
TWO_DAY_AR -0.006895 0.4783 0.009660    0.006038 0.5235 0.009397   
EVENTS 0.000319 0.7641 0.001057    -2.10E-05 0.9846 0.001084   
DXR -0.000450 0.6617 0.001022    -0.000244 0.8327 0.001150   
Panel C.1: Private Placement (PP) Panel C.2: Private Placement (PP)   
SIZE 0.000305 0.9796 0.011905    0.002533 0.8672 0.015064   
MB 5.79E-06 0.9358 7.16E-05    -0.000251 0.1257 0.000161   
LEVERAGE 0.007171 0.1096 0.004411    0.002391 0.6153 0.004729   
ROA/EBITDA 0.010268* 0.0926 0.006002    -1.56E-05* 0.0806 8.75E-06   
P/E 3.98E-06*** 0.0036 1.31E-06 0.231841 0.094670  2.97E-05 0.2430 2.51E-05 0.216133 0.059360 
TURNOVER -0.150041* 0.0726 0.081992    -0.079898 0.4388 0.102379   
OWN 0.000735** 0.0102 0.000276    0.000799** 0.0234 0.000342   
TWO_DAY_AR -0.006561 0.4486 0.008597    0.006303 0.4781 0.008818   
EVENTS 0.000330 0.7267 0.000940    -6.64E-05 0.9452 0.000960   
DPP -0.001049 0.2954 0.000993    -0.000859 0.4637 0.001163   
Panel D.1: Stock Dividend (SD)  Panel D.2: Stock Dividend (SD)  
SIZE -0.005414 0.6601 0.012247      -0.002956 0.8418 0.014731    
MB -5.00E-06 0.9408 6.71E-05 0.263853  0.132399   -0.000263 0.1437 0.000177 0.230748 0.076898  
LEVERAGE 0.006587 0.1360 0.004355      0.001931 0.6780 0.004623    
ROA/EBITDA 0.011266* 0.0600 0.005868      -1.29E-05 0.1662 9.17E-06    
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Explanatory 
Variables 
Statistic Values  
 
Statistic Values of Estimation with EBITDA 
Coefficient P-Values Std Error 2R  2R  Coefficient P-Values Std Error 2R  2R  
P/E 4.71E-06*** 0.0002 1.18E-06      2.17E-05 0.4218 2.68E-05    
TURNOVER -0.143882 0.1033 0.086886      -0.070920 0.5331 0.112997    
OWN 0.000766*** 0.0044 0.000258 0.263853  0.132399   0.000817** 0.0151 0.000325 0.230748 0.076898  
TWO_DAY_AR -0.005676 0.5129 0.008620      0.006934 0.4304 0.008722    
EVENTS -0.000182 0.8592 0.001019      -0.000351 0.7305 0.001012    
DSD 0.002235** 0.0406 0.001066      0.001586 0.1376 0.001051    
Sample Size 67  61 
 
 
* Significant at 10% level, ** Significant at 5% level, *** Significant at 1% level 
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Figure 4.1: Graphs of abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns in event windows 
The line graphs show abnormal returns (ARs) and Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) for each 
relative day during the event window. Panel A shows the total sample. Panel B shows the method of 
rights issuing (XR). Panel C shows the case of using private placement (PP). Panel D shows when the 
firms utilise stock dividend (SD) as their issuing method. Panel E shows the firms which issued new 
shares via public offering (PO). ARs are calculated via market model:  )( mtitititit RRAR   ; 
where itR is the return on security i for day t, and mtR  is the return on market. The CARs are 
calculated as the equation:
 



L
Kt
itLKi ARCAR ,,
; where 
itAR refers to abnormal return to security i for 
day t, and CAR is for period t = day K until t = day L.  
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Figure 4.2: Graphs of abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns in robustness event 
window by issuing methods and total sample 
The line graphs show abnormal returns (ARs) and Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) for each 
relative day during the event window in each issuing method. The event window is defined as 30 days 
before and after the event date. Panel A shows average CARs in the total sample. Panel B shows average 
CARs in the companies which issued new shares via rights issuing (XR). Panel C lists the firms using 
private placement (PP) as their issuing method. Panel D shows the companies which issued with stock 
dividend (SD). Panel E lists the firms which issued new shares via public offering (PO). ARs are 
calculated via the market model: )( mtitititit RRAR   ; where itR is the return on security i for 
day t, and mtR  is the return on market The CARs are calculated as the equation: 


L
Kt
itLKi ARCAR ,,
; 
where 
itAR refers to abnormal return to security i for day t, and CAR is for period t = day K until t = day 
L.  
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Figure 4.3: Graphs of average cumulative abnormal returns in a longer event window 
The line graphs show the comparison between Average Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) in firms 
which issued new shares via different issuing methods and Cumulative Average Market Returns (CARs 
Mkt). Panel A shows the total sample. Panel B shows the method of rights issuing (XR). Panel C shows 
the case of using private placement (PP). Panel D shows when the firms utilise stock dividend (SD) as 
their issuing method. Panel E shows the firms which issued new shares via public offering (PO). The 
CARs are calculated as the equation: 



L
Kt
itLKi ARCAR ,,
; where 
itAR refers to abnormal return to security 
i for day t, and CAR is for period t = day K until t = day L. Market returns are measured by the Stock 
Exchange of Thailand composite index returns (SET index returns). 
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CHAPTER 5 
THE DETERMINANTS OF THAI SEO UNDERPRICING 
 
Abstract 
 
This chapter examines the determinants of SEO underpricing in Thailand as another 
type of indirect flotation cost. A standard OLS regression is applied in our 
examination, with three categories of determinants: (1) information asymmetry and 
uncertainty, (2) price pressure and (3) manipulative trading. Our results indicate that 
firm size relates negatively to SEO underpricing, following this aspect of asymmetric 
information theory, while shares offering size as a proxy of price pressure show a 
positive relationship to SEO underpricing. Nonetheless, the evidence under the 
category of uncertainty and manipulative trading (as the control variable) show no 
relationship to SEO underpricing in some cases. There could be a contrasting 
explanation to the characteristics of the Thai capital market, where there are 
manipulations and high volatilities. In addition, our robustness tests provide different 
and varied outcomes, implying that the Thai capital market appears to be sensitive to 
changes in the estimations. 
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5.1 Introduction  
 
Eckbo et al. (2006) point out that underpricing is perceived as the most important 
indirect flotation cost of issuing securities. Underwriters use underpricing to allocate 
equity issues to specific customers and their affiliates. Underpricing can be measured 
by relating the offer prices to the bid-ask midpoint or closing price on the day before 
the Seasoned Equity Offerings (SEOs hereafter) or offering date. The main objective 
in this chapter on underpricing is to determine which factors influenced SEO 
underpricing in Thailand during the study period of 1999 to 2006, using the basic 
framework provided in Intintoli and Kahle (2009). Nevertheless, our study in this 
chapter provides several contributions to the existing studies in this area. 
 
First, although we use the general framework of Intintoli and Kahle (2009), our 
hypotheses are developed based on the characteristics of the Thai capital market. For 
example, we indicate the positive relationship between underpricing and size in the 
area of information asymmetry, which is a different aspect to the previous literature 
(such as Bharath et al., 2006). Second, since there are four different issuing methods 
in our SEO sample size (126 firms), we individually examine different issuing 
methods with their sample sizes. This would give us additional evidence of how 
factors influence SEO underpricing in the different sample of issuing methods. Third, 
concerning the SEO underpricing that refers to the relationship between offered prices 
and closed prices (discounting in prices), our study claims to be the first study of 
Thailand, particularly considering the recent data set (i.e. during the post-financial 
crisis of 1997: between 1999 and 2006). This is unlikely to be linked with the 
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previous chapter, which is concerned mainly with market reaction (the movements of 
stock prices). Lastly, we apply two different calculations of underpricing in our study 
(one is as the main estimation, while the other is as robustness). In addition, the firms‟ 
managers will benefit from this study in terms of the information on which factors 
influence SEO underpricing, while investors will be able to use our evidence in their 
investment decisions. 
 
Alternatively, we could point out that underwriters need to consider this underpricing 
when the issue of equity is allocated to the preferred customers (normally, in our case, 
to the existing shareholders). Since Thai firms became substantially financed via 
equities after the financial crisis in 1997, underpricing should be more important to 
consider as part of the flotation costs for the companies. Thus, with a significant 
increase in the number of firms making SEOs in Thailand during our period of 
concern
118
, the question of underpricing is perceived as meriting more attention. 
Underpricing in this chapter focuses considerably more on the issue of discounting in 
prices, while our previous chapter on stock price reaction was mostly concerned with 
the announcement effects of stock prices (in term of market reaction). 
 
For our total estimation, we consider 126 SEO companies on the Stock Exchange of 
Thailand (hereafter, SET), which were the companies issued via common stocks 
during the period 1999 to 2006. Applying a standard OLS (Ordinary Least Square) 
regression, we control for other events besides the SEO by including dummy 
                                                 
118
 We support this with some figures which show that there has been a marked rise in the number of 
times that firms are making SEOs: from approximately 100 times in 1999 to around 400 times in 2005 
(see Figure 3.1 in Chapter 3 for more illustrations of this trend). 
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variables in the regression. Our evidence reveals that there is a difference between the 
theoretical discussions and the findings, from which we developed the hypotheses 
from the characteristics of the Thai capital market. For instance, we found a positive 
relationship between size and underpricing, instead of a negative relationship 
following the concept of information asymmetry (see, for example, Corwin, 2003). In 
addition, issuing methods (i.e. rights issuing and stock dividend) show an impact on 
SEO underpricing. Nonetheless, our robustness findings via a different calculation of 
underpricing and transforming variables into a logarithm function report that there 
may be a possibility of misspecification in the regression due to multicollinearity. 
This is shown by high standard errors in the regression and some insignificant 
variables (e.g. ownership and trading volume).  
 
The organisation of this chapter is as follows: section 5.2 will briefly review some 
studies of underpricing, including possible motivations and hypotheses. In section 5.3, 
we consider the data and methodology. Section 5.4 will report the empirical results 
and discussion of the outcomes. We finally summarise this investigation in section 
5.5. 
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5.2 Literature Review and Hypotheses  
 
5.2.1 Literature on SEO Underpricing in Developed Markets 
Most studies cover the question of whether underpricing exists in new issuing and 
what the movements of underpricing are: for example, Loderer et al. (1991), 
Safieddine and Wilhelm (1996), Altinkilic and Hansen (2003), Corwin (2003), Mola 
and Loughran (2004), Shaorong (2005), Yongtae and Myung Seok (2005) and 
Intintoli and Kahle (2009). Eckbo et al. (2006, pp.33-36) claim that a full explanation 
of increased SEO underpricing is yet to be offered. They indicate that the findings of 
underpricing are significantly related to three main characteristics: (1) the company 
itself, (2) security and (3) the offering. Since the change in the economy or in the 
capital market may cause SEO underpricing to increase (see Kim and Hyun-Han, 
2004), we could claim that the situation in the Thai capital market during our study 
period (1999 – 2006) displays a similarity to these conditions. This is because the 
Thai economy was still recovering from the financial crisis of 1997 and the capital 
market began showing signs of good recovery for the complete period of our concern 
(revealed by a substantial rise in the SET Index, in particular between the years 2002 
and 2004). Therefore, it would be an interesting opportunity to expand the study in 
this area by using an out-of-sample market, e.g. emerging markets (Thailand, in our 
case). Nonetheless, the literature on underpricing in developed markets is also 
concerned with IPOs, focusing more on the related theories (e.g. Rock, 1986; Habib 
and Ljungqvist, 2001; Ljungqvist, 2004; Loughran and Ritter, 2004).  
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5.2.2 Literature on SEO Underpricing in Emerging Markets 
There are no studies available based on data from emerging markets. We could claim 
that studies of underpricing in emerging markets are disproportionately scarce. 
Consequently, more papers on emerging markets would be welcome, so that we could 
compare them with those in developed markets and see how far they resemble one 
another. In Thailand, we have found only one recent essay on the subject; IPOs have 
attracted more attention
119
. Chorruk and Worthington (2009) analyse 145 IPOs listed 
on the SET between February 1997 and November 2007. Their results reveal that 
underpricing is found to be higher in financial service IPOs than in those of industrial 
companies.  
 
With a lack of underpricing literature on emerging markets, we attempt to provide the 
studies covering this area in an emerging market, Thailand. This leads to an 
investigation into whether our results carry over from the studies on developed 
markets. Since equity financing became popular after the financial crisis in 1997, it 
would be interesting to focus on this area. Having found one study on IPO in Thailand 
(Chorruk and Worthington, 2009), we turn over attention to obtaining the sample of 
SEOs. This is because the samples of IPOs are likely to be examined in many markets 
(both developed and emerging, as mentioned in the previous section). We exclude all 
financial companies (unlike Chorruk and Worthington, 2009, who in their paper cited 
companies offering financial services) because they are different in capital structure to 
non-financial ones. Furthermore, we still had some difficulties in finding relevant 
                                                 
119
 More than one study may be focused on underpricing in Thailand in practice, but owing to the 
limited availability and difficulty of access to the related literature, only one piece of work relating to 
underpricing seems to be available. 
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studies on SEO underpricing in other markets. Although we found some papers using 
Australian data (such as that of Balachandran et al., 2008b), they do not particularly 
consider SEO underpricing. Therefore, there is a small amount of literature on SEO 
underpricing in order to compare our evidence with Thailand in particular and other 
emerging markets. In Thailand, there are two possible explanations why studies of 
SEO underpricing are scarce. 
 
First, the number of listed companies is small (even though there has been a gradual 
increase in the number of listed firms every year, according to the SET). Thailand has 
various non-listed companies and most of them are interested in being listed on the 
stock exchange when they are ready. In other words, these non-listed firms have had 
difficulties with debt financing since the financial crisis in 1997. Subsequently, they 
have turned to financing via equities, meaning that they need to be listed on the stock 
market (and become an IPO firm). This can be seen by a marked rise in the number of 
IPO firms in the last decade (between 2000 and 2010), as has been the case with SEO 
firms
120
. In addition, those IPO firms are the companies which are engaged in well-
known businesses (e.g. the state enterprises that were previously non-listed) in 
Thailand and start to influence the stock market (i.e. increasing the SET‟s market 
capitalisation) when they are listed. These are, for instance, energy and utilities 
businesses (PTT in 2001)
121
, media and publishing businesses (MCOT: MCOT Public 
Company Limited in 2004) and transportation and logistics businesses (AOT: 
Airports of Thailand Public Company Limited in 2004). As a result, the existing 
                                                 
120
 This is shown by the more than 150 companies which were listed on the stock exchange during the 
period 2000 to 2010. Source: the SET website: http://www.set.or.th/setresearch/files/20090831_A_ 
graph_SET_statistics.pdf  [Accessed on 22 September 2009]. 
121
 See full name in Appendix 3. 
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studies on Thailand (e.g. Chorruk and Worthington, 2009) turn their attention to the 
samples of IPOs rather than SEOs, although data are available for the examination of 
SEO underpricing in Thailand. 
 
Second, even though the data are available as previously mentioned, another possible 
reason might be that there are limitations to the data to be accessed. The researchers 
may need to have some connections inside the firms in order to obtain more 
information than they provide to the public. We support these limitations of data in 
section 3.3.3., when the Thomson One Banker (Deal Equity: TOBDE) is obtained for 
cross-checking the data. For example, we may use private connections to have the 
historical copies which are not available from older years and the hard copies in the 
Securities Exchange Commission (hereafter, SEC) which are missing. Consequently, 
this leads to difficulties in examining SEO underpricing in more detail. As a result, we 
have discovered very little regarding this area with the sample of SEOs in Thailand. 
 
5.2.3 Literature on the Determinants of SEO Underpricing 
The literature on the determinants of SEO underpricing is sparse. For example, 
Corwin (2003) considers a cross-section analysis for SEO underpricing in the U.S. 
between 1980 and 1998. His evidence indicates that the higher the price uncertainty, 
the greater the increase in possibility that the firms will be underpriced. Kim and 
Hyun-Han (2004) and Shaorong (2005) both examine U.S. firms for the relationship 
between underpricing and some related factors, such as insider selling, short-selling 
and other market activities. Their results explain the positive relationship between 
underpricing and insider selling, including market conditions. In addition, Intintoli 
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and Kahle (2009) investigate the determinants of underpricing in various categories of 
firm in the U.S.: e.g. price pressure, managerial wealth, uncertainty and information 
asymmetry and manipulative trading. As discussed earlier, applying the Thai market 
as the condition of change in the economy (Kim and Hyun-Han, 2004) is perhaps our 
initial concern when choosing Thailand in our study of SEO underpricing. 
Nevertheless, with little evidence of SEO underpricing in the Thai market, we will 
consider examining the determinants of SEO underpricing in three areas, together 
with the motivations which lead to testable hypotheses, as follows. 
 
5.2.3.1 Asymmetric Information and Uncertainty 
Information asymmetry and uncertainty could be important in the decisions on a 
company‟s capital structure. Yongtae and Myung Seok (2005, p.455) point out from 
their discussions of a U.S. sample, that “underpricing is a function of information 
asymmetry. The amount of underpricing reflects investors‟ uncertainty. Therefore, the 
higher the information asymmetry, the more SEOs are underpriced”. Bharath et al. 
(2006), using U.S. data between 1972 and 2002, also demonstrate that the level of a 
firm‟s information asymmetry relates positively to debt financing. With the 
institutional characteristics in Thailand (e.g. highly volatile and small market size), it 
is possible to indicate that the features of asymmetric information and uncertainty 
suggested in previous studies (although they are concerned with developed markets) 
are consistent with those of Thai companies.  
 
As noted, there are several examples of insider trading and speculation in the Thai 
capital market. This is supported by our evidence in the previous chapter on the stock 
 
 
 255 
price reaction that the graphs of cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) display signs of 
information being leaked before the event window of SEO announcements, implying 
that investors may learn the news before its publication. Similarly, on the uncertainty 
of investors (Yongtae and Myung Seok, 2005), the Thai capital market appears to 
have a high number of individual investors. These investors usually follow rumours 
and external factors, causing the high volatility in the market
122
. Since the U.S. and 
other developed markets have been investigated in previous research, we aim to use a 
different market, i.e. Thailand, to examine whether the evidence based on academic 
and theoretical aspects confirms the general characteristics in practice. In this regard, 
information asymmetry and uncertainty of the market and investors seem to be the 
important issues driving stock prices in Thailand.  
 
In general, size is a measurement of information asymmetry because the larger the 
company, the less asymmetric information there will be, as in theory it manages the 
announcement of its information better (see for instance Intintoli and Kahle, 2009). 
However, in the Thai capital market, due to a high level of insider trading, larger 
firms may offer more chances of the information being leaked before the 
announcement. This is because it may be hard in larger firms to control whether, for 
example, the content of the SEO announcement will be spread to other members in 
the company by the people who attend the board meetings. This should be because of 
the high number of shareholders and employees present at the meeting. In contrast, 
                                                 
122
 See for example: Kasikorn Research Centre (2003). The SET Index:  Volatility from Selling to 
Making a Profit (in Thai). Vol. 9 Issue 1438, available from the CD-Rom from the Kasikorn Research 
Centre or the summaries via: http://www.kasikornresearch.com/TH/K-Econ%20Analysis/Pages/ 
ViewSummary.aspx?docid=3972 [Accessed on 5 March 2011] 
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smaller firms might be owned by a small group of people, making it easier to control 
the leakage of new information to outside investors by the inside employees.  
 
Supporting the leakage evidence, our findings on the stock price reaction to SEO 
announcements also report that the information is leaking prior to the announcements 
of SEOs.  In particular, this is when we consider different issuing methods 
individually (see section 4.4 in Chapter 4). Furthermore, although the existing 
literature reports a negative relationship between firm size and SEO underpricing (see 
for example Intintoli and Kahle, 2009), the data were obtained from U.S. companies 
or other developed markets. These markets are larger in size than the Thai market and 
the number of firms listed in those markets would also be larger than Thai firms. We 
provide some examples here: since we measure size via market capitalisation, the 
Thai stock market is listed in 31
st
 position among the world‟s markets. This is 67 
times smaller than the NYSE, and 14 times and 3 times smaller than the Hong Kong 
and Singapore markets respectively (World Federation of Exchange as of 31 July 
2009). Therefore, with the difference of size between developed markets and the Thai 
market, we may not be able to have the same relationship of firm size and SEO 
underpricing when we consider the characteristics of the market closely. Since the 
smaller companies could control the leakage of information better than the larger 
companies in Thailand (as previously pointed out), we subsequently expect a positive 
relationship to the underpricing. If this is correct, we can claim that the evidence 
closely reflects the characteristics of the Thai capital market. This is in contrast with 
the existing literature, such as Yongtae and Myung Seok (2005) and Intintoli and 
Kahle (2009). 
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Regarding the uncertainty, we can justify it by the volatility in the market. With the 
high volatility in the Thai capital market, it may be more difficult than in the lower 
volatility of the developed markets to point out the nature of the relationship between 
underpricing and volatility (whether positive or negative). This refers to the fact that 
the number of individual investors in the Thai markets is high. According to SET 
statistics (see Figure 3.3 in Chapter 3), the number of individual investors in the SET 
between 2000 and 2009 was around 64.4% on average. These individual investors are 
basically short-term investors, who usually come to trade in the stock exchange on the 
basis of rumours and daily events (e.g. the announcement of policies by the SEC, the 
political situation or even natural disasters). Examples of these are supported by an 
instantaneous fall in the SET Index (particularly the energy sector and commercial 
banking sector) of around 3% after the market was opened on 17 May 2010
123
. This 
was due to the political riot in the capital of Thailand. Moreover, more than 8% of the 
SET Index fell gradually, following the rumours from Bloomberg News regarding the 
situation of King Bhumibol Adulyadej‟s health124. Consequently, the volatility easily 
spreads through the entire market, causing the composite index (SET Index) to be 
relatively sensitive to most situations occurring in the country.  
 
However, the area of uncertainty has been considered in research before, for example 
by Altinkilic and Hansen (2003), Corwin (2003) and Intintoli and Kahle (2009). We 
follow this existing literature to examine this area, since the Thai capital market is 
                                                 
123
 Source: The Thai News Station (online) by The MCOT Public Company Limited. Available at: 
http://www.mcot.co.th  [Accessed on 17 March 2011]. 
124
 Source: Manager Online: SET is ready to use the Serkit Breaker for the marked fall in stocks, 
following the rumours from Bloomberg. On 15 October 2009 (in Thai), available at: 
http://www.manager.co.th/StockMkt/ViewNews.aspx?NewsID=9520000122562. [Accessed on 17 
March 2011].  
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highly volatile. Moreover, investing in capital markets always contains risk and 
uncertainty as to whether the investors will make a gain or loss in their trading. Thus, 
this uncertainty in the capital market should be an important factor in the impact on 
underpricing. As a result, we produce two hypotheses for information asymmetry and 
uncertainty: 
:1,0H  Firm size positively affects SEO underpricing. 
:2,0H  Volatility influences SEO underpricing. 
 
5.2.3.2 Price Pressure 
Meidan (2005) obtained 6,768 common stock offerings from the NYSE, AMEX and 
NASDAQ from 1982 to 2002 and found a rise in volume on the day before the offer, 
in response to the price pressure surrounding SEOs. Moreover, an explanation of price 
pressure can reveal a disruption of the offering in the flow of buying and selling. 
Altinkilic and Hansen (2005, pp.1-2) suggest, on the basis of 3,782 offers in the U.S. 
database, that price pressure can be used to interpret only the due portion of the 
decline in price around the equity offering. In addition, the suggestion of Intintoli and 
Kahle (2009, p.13) concerning price pressure on 7,720 SEOs in the U.S. is that 
underpricing is likely to be most pronounced for the largest offers, reflecting the 
market‟s ability to absorb the new shares. Referring to our previous examination of 
SEO stock price reaction in Thailand, the evidence shows that the stock prices 
respond negatively during the event window (offering period). These findings refer to 
the suggestion by Intintoli and Kahle that price pressure can be explained by this 
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decline in stock price at the time of the SEO announcement, although they imply no 
clearer sense of whether this decrease affects a due portion.  
 
Consequently, according to Altinkilic and Hansen (2005), we can consider price 
pressure in our examination. The reason is that we noticed from our previous evidence 
(see section 4.4 of Chapter 4) that there is a decline in stock prices following the SEO 
announcements. Since we have obtained the data from Thailand, we may have 
different explanations compared to the previous literature (e.g. Altinkilic and Hansen, 
2005; Median, 2005; Intintoli and Kahle, 2009), which employs data from developed 
markets, such as the U.S. This also allows our investigations to consider whether the 
results of price pressure carry over to Thailand. At first, we expected the price 
pressure to be an important part of SEO underpricing in Thailand. The current 
situations or events (including the announcements of the related institutions – e.g. the 
Bank of Thailand: BOT) can impact easily on the stock prices either positively or 
negatively. This causes the Thai capital market to be sensitive to events. If they react 
negatively, we can interpret their reactions and underpricing with the price pressure 
(Altinkilic and Hansen, 2005). One example of this suggests that there was a dramatic 
fall (almost 15%) in the SET Index on 19
 
December 2006 after the BOT announced 
its policy to reserve foreign capital investment. On the following day, the BOT 
relaxed its policy on foreign capital due to the effect on direct investment and the 
investment in the SET following this significant fall. This caused the SET Index to 
recover instantaneously, rising around 11.25% by the end of the day. Hence, this 
confirms that the Thai capital market is sensitive to any policies or information 
announced by the government and related institutions (such as the BOT). Besides, 
 
 
 260 
most investors are likely to be irrational and they usually believe in rumours rather 
than relying on their investment knowledge, e.g. considering the fundamental factors 
of the firms. An example can be seen in the prior section (section 5.2.3.1) regarding a 
decline in the SET Index following the rumours of King Bhumibol Adulyadej‟s 
health
125
. 
 
Price pressure was previously a proxy of offer size, share offers to float and trading 
volume (e.g. Corwin, 2003 and Intintoli and Kahle, 2009). Although these proxies 
have been estimated in previous research, they were based on data from developed 
markets, in particular the U.S. If we obtain out-of-sample data (i.e. those of Thailand 
as an example of an emerging market), it would be worth investigating whether the 
outcomes are carried over to a market of a different kind. Furthermore, since the Thai 
capital market is stated to be illiquid, price pressure should be stronger, in order to 
make stock prices more attractive to the investors. Therefore, trading volume as a 
measurement of liquidity is likely to be important for inclusion in our examination. 
However, Intintoli and Kahle (2009) believe that “shares offered to float” could also 
represent insider ownership.  
 
In Thailand, ownership appears as a rule to be fairly important to Thai companies 
because most firms are owned by members of the same family. Supporting this, we 
take an example of a well-known family firm from our sample size
126
: the Charoen 
                                                 
125
 Source: Manager Online: SET is ready to use the Serkit Breaker for the marked fall in stocks, 
following the rumours from Bloomberg. On 15 October 2009 (in Thai), available at: 
http://www.manager.co.th/StockMkt/ViewNews.aspx?NewsID=9520000122562 [Accessed on 17 
March 2011].  
126
 All firms with abbreviated names have the full version of their names shown in Appendix 3. 
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Pokphand (CP) group (e.g. CPF and CPALL). According to the statistics provided by 
SETSMART, the major shareholders are shown as the Chiaravanond family. 
Although they are not the top five shareholders, among all the shareholders in the 
company, such as CPF and CPALL, they combine to form the highest proportion of 
shareholders and the local juristic persons. This represents more than 35% of total 
shareholders
127
. Another example may be demonstrated by the Central group (e.g. 
CENTEL and CPN). The statistics reveal that the Jiratiwat family forms the majority 
of total shareholders, approximately 42%
128
. Moreover, there are many companies, 
both listed and non-listed, including financial companies, which are owned by family 
members and are mostly controlled by them. Some examples of these firms are 
BANPU
129
 – the Wongkusonkit family; the Bangkok Bank Public Company Limited 
(BBL) – the Soponphanich family; the Kasikorn Bank Public Company Limited 
(KBANK) – the Lumsum family; and the Singha Corporation Company Limited – the 
Pirompakdee family (a non-listed firm). These owners may have a powerful influence 
on decisions about any action on the part of the company, although we cannot be sure 
of obvious supporting evidence to show how they use it. As a result, it cannot be 
specified whether the ownership will impact on the underpricing positively or 
negatively. Moreover, our previous findings confirmed that ownership affects the 
SEO stock price reaction (see section 4.4.4 of Chapter 4). Consequently, we should 
include “ownership” as a factor of concern. Nevertheless, since Intintoli and Kahle 
(2009) suggest that either “shares offered to float” or “ownership” should be 
                                                 
127
 This percentage is as at the end of year 2008. If we consider a more distant period, e.g. the year 
1993, when they were listed in the market, this percentage was around 50% of total shareholders. 
128
 This percentage is as at the end of year 2008.  
129
 See Appendix 3 for the name in full. 
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considered, we may follow their suggestion if the result from the variance-covariance 
matrix shows a close correlation between these two proxies.  
 
As pointed out above, it is claimed that price pressure in Thailand can be captured and 
measured via these four factors, on the grounds of the explanations proffered above. 
Nonetheless, although the proxies of price pressure are employed in previous research 
(e.g. Corwin, 2003; Altinkilic and Hansen, 2005; Median, 2005) where the data are 
obtained from developed markets, our study will apply a sample from an emerging 
market (Thailand) where the characteristics and behaviour of investors are totally 
different – the market is inefficient and investors seem to be irrational. We also 
estimate the additional factor, i.e. ownership, in order to make the study more relevant 
to the Thai market. In total, we consider four measurements of price pressure, namely 
the size of shares offered, shares offered to float, ownership structure and trading 
volume. Thus, the four hypotheses are set up as:   
:3,0H  Underpricing increases when there is a larger offer size 
:4,0H  Share offers to float influence SEO underpricing positively 
:5,0H  Insider ownership influences SEO underpricing 
:6,0H  The higher the trading volume, the less the underpricing 
 
5.2.3.3 Manipulative Trading 
Literature regarding manipulative trading can be found. The previous investigation of 
Gerard and Nanda (1993) indicates in its results from the U.S. that no manipulation 
takes place when the informed trader‟s information is perfectly disclosed by the 
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second market trading preceding the SEOs. With three sets of equilibria (pure 
manipulation, partial manipulation and non-manipulative), the relative sizes of the 
secondary market order flow and the issuance of new equity critically influence the 
prevalence of manipulation (Gerard and Nanda, 1993, p.222). Safieddine and 
Wilhelm (1996; cited by Chemmanur et al., 2007, p.8) examine the relationship 
between SEO underpricing and short-selling activity in order to establish any threat of 
manipulative trading around SEOs. Their results report that prior to the adoption of 
Rule 10b-21 SEO underpricing related positively to the short interest. Furthermore, 
Chemmanur et al. (2007) investigate the relationship between pre-offer institutional 
trading, institutional SEO share allocation and the SEO discount. Their findings 
reveal that pre-offer institutional net selling correlates positively to the SEO discount 
under the manipulative trading hypothesis. This can mean that manipulative trading 
could have a positive relationship to the SEO underpricing. Recently, Intintoli and 
Kahle (2009), in order to measure manipulative trading, have examined the US 
market-adjusted return before offers, together with a separation of the proxy into 
positive and negative. With these existing studies, we notice that they were conducted 
with data from developed markets, while our study concerns an emerging market 
(Thailand). A positive relationship between the manipulation and SEO underpricing 
may not be consistent by using the data from Thailand. This is due to the difference in 
characteristics of the capital market. 
 
However, we have a little evidence of how this relates to the SEO underpricing. This 
is because in practice, the rise in stock prices (or the non-normal trading of securities) 
is not a result of manipulation. The daily information or the psychology of investors‟ 
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behaviour can cause this volatility in the stock prices (Sujaritkul, 2007)
130
. In 
addition, the Thai SEC rarely penalises the people and/or the companies (including 
the brokers) because there are difficulties in proving whether they are offenders. The 
research of Meechatt (2010)
131
, who examines the development of manipulative 
investigation, suggests that there are eight main problems regarding the process of 
manipulative trading in Thailand. The key points are that there are relatively small 
penalties for manipulative trading and these penalties are mostly civil ones
132
. 
Alternatively, we could claim that even if there is a law of manipulative trading in 
Thailand, the practical outcomes contrast with the evidence of Safieddine and 
Wilhelm (1996). Their findings support the enforcement of Rule 10b-21, that it is 
successful due to a lack of relationship between SEO discounts and pre-offer short 
selling. Consequently, we will consider manipulative trading as our control variable in 
our examination. We point out the reason that there is no supporting evidence, in 
particular to identify whether SEO underpricing relates to manipulation in Thailand 
(although it remains in practice). 
 
In order to concentrate only on the SEOs, it is possible to make the assumption that 
other events apart from SEOs have a minor impact on underpricing. This is because in 
practice, several kinds of event can influence the movement of stock prices, including 
underpricing. These events are, for instance, dividend announcements, earning 
                                                 
130
 Sujaritkul, R. (2007) “An examination of manipulative trading” in the SEC’s view (Securities 
Exchange Commission’s Article) – in Thai. Available from: http://www.sec.or.th/investor_ 
edu/info_media/article/2550  [Accessed 9 April 2011]. 
131
 Meechart, W. (2010) “The development and strategy of the investigation of the economic 
delinquent in the money market and capital market” Newspaper article (in Thai) on 20 December 
2010, available via: http://www.sec.or.th/investor_edu/info_media/article/2550/Content_0000000831. 
jsp?categoryID=CAT0000316 [Accessed on 9 April 2011]. 
132
 For further details, see The Act of Securities and Stock Exchange 1992, sections 2.4.3 and 2.4.4. 
Available via the SEC website: http://www.sec.or.th/laws_notification [Accessed on 9 April 2011]. 
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announcements and the announcements of financial performance. In addition, we also 
note the issuing methods available in our sample. The firm‟s managers and investors 
may be equipped with necessary evidence on whether or not the issuing methods 
impact upon the SEO underpricing and whether the factors (in the previous three 
categories, see sections 5.2.3.1, 5.2.3.2 and 5.2.3.3) still affect the underpricing in 
each issuing method. Consequently, this should make our study slightly different from 
the others and it would be a new issue in Thailand with more recent data. As a 
consequence, the additional hypotheses can be stated thus: 
:7,0H  Issuing methods, where applicable, influence SEO underpricing. 
In the next section, we describe the data and methodology to be used in this chapter. 
 
 
5.3 Data and Methodology  
 
5.3.1 Data Sources and Definition of Variables 
In this chapter we obtain data from two sources. These are the SET fact books and 
SETSMART. We applied the SEO firms from the SET, who issued common stocks 
during the period 1999 to 2006. Having organised the initial sample of 1,910 SEOs in 
251 companies following Seiler (2004), the final sample consists of 126 companies 
issuing common stocks. From this final sample we have excluded three categories: (1) 
firms with an SP (suspension) sign, according to Seiler (2004), (2) firms with 
unavailable trading data, such as market capitalisation and closed prices and (3) 
financial companies, due to the differences in asset structures between them and non-
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financial firms. The event dates are identified as the first SEO of each firm, in order to 
avoid any overlapping during the study period. We found four different issuing 
methods available among the 126 firms: (1) rights issuing- XR - for 53 firms, (2) 
private placement- PP - for 52 firms, (3) stock dividend- SD - for 22 companies and 
(4) public offering:- PO - for 2 companies
133
. 
 
In comparison with the existing literature in this area, our sample size is relatively 
low; for instance, Median (2005) has 6,768 samples, Altinkilic and Hansen (2005) 
3,782 offers and Intintoli and Kahle (2009) 7,720 SEOs. The main reasons for this 
have perhaps become clear: the Thai capital market is small in size (measured by 
market capitalisation of around $146,000 million)
134
 and small in the number of listed 
companies. Nevertheless, previous studies in Thailand or the neighbouring regions are 
rarely found in the area of SEO underpricing. We have one study of underpricing: the 
IPO sample by Chorruk and Worthington (2009). Their sample size of IPO uses 
around 149 companies between 1997 and 2007. Thus, our sample of SEOs for 126 
firms (for common stock offerings) could be fair as a sample from Thailand, given 
this similarity. Furthermore, if we consider the SEO literature on Thailand, it confirms 
by the percentage of sample coverage for study that we have greater sample coverage 
than previous studies (see Table 5.1). According to the information from the SET 
(obtained from the World Federation of Exchange, WFE, as of 31 July 2009), the 
SET‟s number of listed firms is in 21st position in the rankings of global markets. This 
means that its total of firms is twice as small as that on the Hong Kong Stock 
                                                 
133
 Note that there are three companies, ITD, KTP and SORKON (for full names refer to Appendix 3), 
which use two different issuing methods at the same time.  
134
 This figure is based on the statistic of the SET, taken from the World Federation of Exchange 
(WFE) as of 31 July 2009.  
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Exchange (HKSE) and also smaller than that in other Asian markets, such as the 
Tokyo Stock Exchange, Korea Exchange, Singapore Exchange and Taiwan Stock 
Exchange
135
. In addition, our sample of 126 common stock offering companies is 
approximately 50.20% of the total initial sample of SEOs before the organisation of 
data. We have summarised the lists of variables, including their definitions and 
sources, in Table 5.2. 
 
[Insert Table 5.1 and 5.2 here] 
 
We employ “underpricing” as our dependent variable in the examination, defined as:  
 
 
f eref oreTheOfi ceTheDayB
f eref oreTheOfi ceTheDayBi ceOf f er
ngUnderpri ci
Pr
PrPr
1

   (5.1) 
 
Equation 5.1 is the same as that calculated in Corwin (2003) and Intintoli and Kahle 
(2009, p.12) and also the same procedure as used in the existing literature. For 
instance, Kim and Hyun-Han (2004) call this procedure for calculating SEO 
underpricing “close-to-offer”, while Soucik and Allen (1999b) and Mola and 
Loughran (2004) measure via the “offer-to-close”. It should be noted that Altinkilic 
and Hansen (2003) define underpricing as the relationship between discounting and 
offer-day return, which is slightly different from the definition in Corwin (2003), Kim 
and Hyun-Han (2004) and Intintoli and Kahle (2009). 
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 See the SET website: http://www.set.or.th/setresearch  (accessed on 19 September 2009) for further 
details. 
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However, Eckbo et al. (2006) identify that there are many ways to capture the 
underpricing, including the comparison of offer price to closing price, mid-point, bid-
ask prices, closing price at day -1 or day +1 (taking the SEO day as day 0). Thus, we 
could have various options in defining underpricing. In our case, we follow the 
suggestion of Corwin (2003) and Intintoli and Kahle (2009) because we are concerned 
with paying more attention to the SEO announcement day than the day before it. To 
be more specific, we focus on whether underpricing occurs on the SEO day, 
compared with the preceding day. Alternatively, we measure underpricing in this 
chapter following the concept of “close-to-offer”, suggested in Kim and Hyun-Han 
(2004)
136
.  
 
Moving to the sample size, we still use the concept of balanced panel in our 
regression. This means all variables need to be available in every firm we estimate. 
Thus, with our final sample of 126 firms, there are some explanatory variables 
(presented in Table 5.2) which are unavailable in some firms among the 126 samples. 
These variables are shown as ownership and shared-offer-to float. We can notice from 
Table 5.3 that these two variables are unavailable in some firms. This is because since 
we define ownership as having been measured in the year prior to the offering; some 
companies issued new shares within the year that they were listed in the market. 
Therefore, there was no trading nor other information in the prior year. We can 
indicate additionally that these results are from the SET regulation that allows no 
minimum period of follow-on offerings (see section 3.2.4 in Chapter 3). As a 
consequence of the balanced panel, we have to exclude some companies and end up 
                                                 
136
 We provide the results from the robustness check of underpricing via “offer-to-close” (Soucik and 
Allen, 1999b; Kim and Hyun-Han, 2004; Mola and Loughran, 2004) later in section 5.4.5. 
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with the total sample for estimating the regression at 110 firms issuing via common 
stocks. This can be divided into 48 firms with XR, 44 firms with PP and 20 firms with 
SD
137
. We summarise these samples in Table 5.3. 
 
[Insert Table 5.3 here] 
 
Furthermore, we notice that in our sample size there are no differences between the 
total sample and the three subsamples (the three different issuing methods). The 
evidence of Table 5.4 reveals the same aspects as the previous chapter, that although 
there are significant results in the SD firms, the endogenetic problem should not be 
the case in our study of SEO underpricing. This similarly illustrates what is mentioned 
in Chapter 3 (section 3.3.2) and 4 (section 4.3.1), that small firms in our sample size 
should be SORKON, instead of NEW (see Table 5.3 – panel B and the full names are 
in Appendix 3). This is because it is unnecessary for small companies which have 
good performance to issue new shares with SD, since this method has no incoming 
cash flow. In other words, it depends on the firms whether they issue new shares via 
SD. If they are performing well, there appears to be no reason why they have to still 
issue with SD, since it offers less incentive to their shareholders (e.g. the case of 
NEW and SORKON in our sample size). Therefore, we can assume from these 
reasons that there are no significant differences among the sample size and the three 
subsamples in our study. We will explain in more detail the interesting feature of SD 
later in this section. 
                                                 
137
 Note that those three firms (ITD, KTP and SORKON, see full names in Appendix 3) that use two 
different issuing methods at the same time remain in the total sample. Therefore, our total sample does 
not correspond to the combination of different issuing methods. 
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[Insert Table 5.4 here] 
 
We do not consider the method of “public offering (PO)” separately, as only one firm 
fell into this category. With this exclusion of PO, our study provides a different 
examination from that in previous works on developed markets in general (e.g. Denis, 
1994; Corwin, 2003; Eckbo et al., 2006; Walker and Yost, 2007), or, to some extent, 
even in some emerging markets (e.g. La Porta et al., 1999). This is because those 
studies normally obtain SEOs which they refer to as PO, while our sample from the 
Thai market has only two companies in total issuing via PO and one firm was 
excluded when adjusted with the variables. In our case, we cannot apply any further 
sample for PO, since most SEO companies during our study period issue via other 
methods, such as rights issuing, private placement and stock dividend. Although some 
studies in Thailand (i.e. Prangthawat, 2002) have included “PO” firms in their 
investigation, they obtain the data in a totally different period of study – between 
1996 and 2000. In addition, the sample of PO firms in Prangthawat (2002) comprises 
only 11 firms, which may still be considered a relatively small sample. Nonetheless, 
those 11 companies were studied and their data collected during the financial crisis 
period, while our sample clearly focuses on the post-financial 1997 crisis period. 
Several businesses in Thailand suffered as a result of this crisis and they needed to be 
more certain that their equity offering would be exercised, turning these into income 
to finance their companies. The best way to suggest is to issue new shares to existing 
shareholders (particularly issuing via rights). Since rights issuing can proceed without 
any permission from the SEC (see KorChor.12/2543 in section 3.2.4.1 in Chapter 
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3)
138
, the companies would prefer to reduce the approval period decision (via PO) 
from the SEC in order to secure a shorter period of financing for their companies. 
Therefore, the new shares issued would be easily exercised and used to finance the 
companies. As a result, we assume this PO method to have no impact on the others. 
These data led to the development of a hypothesis to be estimated in this part as the 
determinants of the factors which impact on SEO underpricing. 
 
Issuing new equities via SD also provides us with an interesting detail. With this 
method, the underpricing will equal 1 in any case. This is because, according to 
equation 5.1, the offer price will be 0, since this issuing method is normally applied 
when the companies decide to maintain the level of cash flow. The companies could 
risk either poor operating performance or an unstable cash flow. Thus, a dividend 
announcement (in term of stocks) is used to signal to the market that the firms are in a 
position to pay dividends to their shareholders. In other words, the companies which 
have small capital (normally referring to firms which are small or medium in size) 
would prefer this method, because they can retain at will the cash flow from 
financing, while still being identified as dividend-paying firms. This method will have 
no incoming cash flow, but the number of shares outstanding will increase. 
Consequently, there is no offer price when companies pay this type of dividend. 
However, SD remains one of the issuing methods since the number of shares 
outstanding increases and this method could be claimed as the issuing of indirect 
equity. 
 
                                                 
138
 This exclusion of the SEC permission needs to meet the condition of issuing new shares to the 
existing shareholders at the same proportion to which shareholders already hold shares in the firm. 
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5.3.2 Methodology 
Concerning our hypotheses in the above three categories, there are several possible 
proxies which we could apply in each of these. In the area of information asymmetry, 
the firm size is generally captured by the market capitalisation. For the uncertainty, 
we capture the volatility by the standard deviation of daily return of each SEO firm in 
our sample. As discussed earlier, we attempt to proxy the price pressure via four 
proxies: share offer to size, share offer to float, ownership structure and trading 
volume. All the definitions are presented in Table 5.2. 
 
To proxy manipulative trading, we follow the suggestions of Corwin (2003) and 
Intintoli and Kahle (2009) of employing a market-adjusted return. This is because we 
have no evidence for measuring manipulation in Thailand, as previously pointed out 
(see section 5.2.3.3). Applying the same proxy as the existing literature can lead to the 
investigation of whether the evidence of manipulation carries over to our study on an 
emerging market. In addition, proxy via a market-adjusted return refers to the fact that 
we consider the relationship between the stock return and the market return. This is 
the main concern of when manipulation occurs in the market. Nonetheless, although 
the Thai market is seen to be highly volatile and is normally expected to exhibit 
manipulative trading in the market (due to minor punishments), we will examine 
manipulative trading as our control variable in the regression (see section 5.2.3.3). 
Concerning the variance-covariance matrix (see Table 5.5), we notice that OFFSIZE 
and OFFFLOAT demonstrate a high correlation
139
 in all cases (with total sample and 
different issuing methods). For instance, in the total sample, the correlation between 
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 These high correlations are reported to be higher than 0.5, according to statistical theory. 
 
 
 273 
OFFSIZE and OFFFLOAT is at -0.768423 (see Table 5.5 – panel A and the 
abbreviations refer to Table 5.2). This correlation is likely to lead to multicollinearity 
(Brooks, 2008, pp.70-71). 
 
[Insert Table 5.5 here] 
 
Among our close correlation of explanatory variables, we decided to exclude 
OFFFLOAT in order to prevent the problem of multicollinearity. This is because we 
agree with the suggestion of Intintoli and Kahle (2009) that OFFFLOAT could also 
represent insider ownership (see section 5.2.3.2). Although Intintoli and Kahle 
indicate that OFFFLOAT and “ownership” are similar factors, we check with the 
percentage of correlation between these two variables with the data of Thai SEOs. 
The figures show a good correlation in panel A of Table 5.5 (less than 0.5). Hence, it 
is possible to apply both OFFFLOAT and ownership, as they are free of 
multicollinearity.  However, when OFFFLOAT is closely correlated with OFFSIZE, 
we should drop it because its calculation is already related to ownership (according to 
Intintoli and Kahle, 2009; see section 5.2.3.2) and retain OFFSIZE in the regression, 
since it shows more difference than OFFFLOAT. Once removed, there are no close 
correlations of our explanatory variables and we should not have any problem of 
multicollinearity (see Table 5.6). This also applies when the variance-covariance of 
issuing methods is individually considered. Furthermore, since the sample size of the 
SD method is below 30 (consisting of only 20 firms after obtaining the data for 
estimation), we apply the concept of pooling data to the regression and include a 
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dummy variable of the SD firms. Having pooled the data, we will estimate 110 firms 
in the regression. 
 
[Insert Table 5.6 here] 
 
We consider each of the issuing methods used by Thai SEOs. These issuing methods 
are examined as the dummy variables in the regression. The standard OLS regression 
is introduced here in order to estimate our hypotheses. This is because we note from 
the previous works in this area (e.g. Altinkilic and Hansen, 2003; Corwin, 2003; 
Intintoli and Kahle, 2009) that applying OLS could be the easiest to understand and 
the most reasonable in determining the factors in SEO underpricing. Thus our 
regression is estimated as follows: 
       
         
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
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

 
 (5.2) 
, where DUM_XR, DUM_PP, DUM_SD and DUM_PO are represented as dummy 
variables equal to 1 when the company issues by rights issuing (XR), private 
placement (PP), stock dividend (SD) and public offering (PO), respectively, and equal 
to zero otherwise. For the other variables, please refer to the definitions in Table 5.2. 
 
Equation 5.2 applies to the investigation of whether these different issuing methods 
influence underpricing, since dummy variables are included in the regression. We 
expect to receive an interesting result when the three different issuing methods are 
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considered separately. We will consider the three issuing methods individually, with 
the exception of PO. This is because there is only one company for which we obtained 
all the variables to be estimated in the regression, as earlier mentioned. Each method 
will be examined with the same hypotheses mentioned earlier (Hypotheses 1 to 7 in 
section 5.2.3) with different sample sizes for the different issuing methods. We have 
also adjusted the heteroscedasticity by using the White Heteroscedasticity-Consistent 
Standard Error and Covariance Estimation (White, 1980). Regarding the hypothesis of 
other events, we will not test it because, in practice, there are no way that the other 
events, such as the dividend announcements or earning announcements, could have a 
minor impact on SEO underpricing and so we eliminate them from the estimation. 
Nonetheless, we include this in our regression as a control variable, since we focus 
only on the SEO announcements. 
 
In order to examine a different calculation of underpricing, we next apply the 
definition of “offer-to-close” suggested in Kim and Hyun-Han (2004, p.348) as our 
robustness check. Underpricing will then be defined as: 
1
Pr







iceOffer
P
n gUn d erp rici t           (5.3) 
, where tP = closed price at day t (offer day). Furthermore, this concept of “offer-to-
close” is also defined in the studies of IPO underpricing (e.g. Soucik and Allen, 
1999b; Habib and Ljungqvist, 2001; Chorruk and Worthington, 2009). 
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5.4 Empirical Results  
 
5.4.1 Total Sample 
Regardless of the issuing methods, Table 5.7 – panel A shows that MKTCAP and 
S.D. are significant at 1% and OFFSIZE is significant at 5%. Alternatively, since 
MKTCAP and S.D. are the proxies of information asymmetry and uncertainty, it is 
seen that firm size has a positive relationship with SEO underpricing, while the 
volatility shows an influence on SEO underpricing. Our hypotheses (Hypotheses 1 
and 2) have yet to be rejected. Hence our assumption of less controlling for the 
information in large firms should become valid with our evidence (see section 
5.2.3.1). This leads to a high level of information asymmetry in large firms, although 
they should be well managed and well controlled in general (Intintoli and Kahle, 
2009). For the significance of firm size, our evidence contrasts with some previous 
studies (e.g. Corwin, 2003), where firm size was concluded to have a negative 
relationship with underpricing. Hence, we can identify that the aspect of information 
asymmetry in Thailand could be different from the developed markets. Nonetheless, it 
can be concluded from our findings that since we hold Hypothesis 1, there is a 
positive relationship between asymmetric information and SEO underpricing. This is 
consistent with Yongtae and Myung Seok (2005). For the uncertainty of investors, our 
findings under this variable are consistent with those of previous work, such as 
Corwin (2003), Shaorong (2005) and Yongtae and Myung Seok (2005). They reveal 
the relationship between volatility (indicated with insider selling in Shaorong, 2005) 
and underpricing. However, the significance of S.D. at 1% is also consistent with the 
findings of Intintoli and Kahle (2009), which is shown to be highly significant with 
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the hypothesis of a positive relationship between volatility and underpricing (see 
Table 5.7 – panel A).  
 
Turning to the area of price pressure, only OFFSIZE has an impact on underpricing, 
leading to the non-rejection of the hypothesis that a larger offer size can make 
underpricing in Thailand increase (Hypothesis 3). This is consistent with every model 
estimated in Corwin (2003). The remaining factors are entirely insignificant, leading 
to the rejection of our related hypotheses (Hypotheses 5 and 6) because there was no 
influence on SEO underpricing. It is interesting to note that we find no relationship 
between manipulative trading and SEO underpricing although we expect this impact 
in the Thai market.  
 
[Insert Table 5.7 here] 
 
When issuing methods are considered, their consequences reveal that MKTCAP and 
OFFSIZE remain highly significant at 1% (see Table 5.7 – panel B). DUM_XR and 
DUM_SD are also highly significant. This means that firm size and the relative offer 
size both impact on SEO underpricing. Furthermore, some issuing methods, namely 
rights issuing and stock dividend, play an important part in influencing SEO 
underpricing in Thailand.  Moreover, since we find insignificance in CMAR_51, 
manipulative trading appears to have no relationship with underpricing when the 
issuing methods are considered. It is found to be inconsistent with most of the models 
estimated in Corwin (2003) and Intintoli and Kahle (2009). As a result, we claim that 
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the outcomes from manipulative trading reveal different aspects compared to those in 
the existing literature, although we estimate manipulation as the control variable. 
Another control variable, EVENTS, is also insignificant, leading to no relationship 
between SEO underpricing and other events aside from the SEOs. The results could 
also indicate that PP and PO are the two issuing methods which have no impact on 
underpricing in Thailand, due to the insignificant evidence. The values of 2R and 
adjusted 2R are high when the issuing methods are taken into account. This means 
that the regression currently best fits the data. Consequently, the issuing methods 
should be brought into the estimation of SEO underpricing. 
 
5.4.2 Rights Issuing (XR) 
With the rights issuing method, the results are demonstrated in panel A of Table 5.8.  
 
[Insert Table 5.8 – panel A here] 
 
The evidence shows that MKTCAP, S.D. and CMAR_51 are significant at 1% (for 
the first one) and 10% (for the remaining two). Therefore, information asymmetry and 
uncertainty have an impact on underpricing for the firms issuing via XR, supporting 
the same results in the total sample. Therefore, it is unnecessary to reject Hypotheses 
1 and 2. This also implies that they are consistent with the findings of previous studies 
in the area of the uncertainty (e.g. Shaorong, 2005; Yongtae and Myung, 2005). 
Unlike the results in the total sample, those of OFFSIZE are insignificant in the firms 
issuing via XR, implying that a greater increase in underpricing does not make the 
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offer size larger. This is because there is no relationship between offer size and SEO 
underpricing (rejecting Hypothesis 3). This evidence also contrasts with the existing 
work by Corwin (2003). Chorruk and Worthington (2009), whose paper is the only 
one in this area which uses Thai IPO data, do not provide evidence related to the 
determinants of SEO underpricing. Instead, they suggest that Thai IPO firms, in 
particular the financial institutions, are underpriced. With the significance of the 
control variable (CMAR_51), we indicate that manipulations influence SEO 
underpricing. This supports our prior expectations (see section 5.2.3.3) and appears to 
be partly consistent with the previous literature (e.g. Gerard and Nanda, 1993; 
Chemmanur et al., 2007).  However, although there are regulations for controlling the 
manipulations in Thailand (i.e. The Act of Securities and Stock Exchange 1992, 
sections 243 and 244), we still have the impact of manipulations on SEO 
underpricing. Consequently, the evidence can be contrasted to the existing literature 
because it reports no manipulative trading when such a regulation was enforced.  In 
addition, the model seems to fit the data, because the values of 2R  and adjusted 
2R  
are high. 
 
5.4.3 Private Placement (PP) 
With 44 companies to be estimated, the results are presented in panel B of Table 5.8. 
 
[Insert Table 5.8 – panel B here] 
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The outcomes display that all the variables, except MKTCAP and OFFSIZE, are 
insignificant. This is explained by the fact that when companies issue new equities via 
PP, firm size has a positive impact on underpricing (Hypothesis 1). A rise in 
underpricing also depends on a larger offer size (Hypothesis 3). Consequently, the 
hypotheses of information asymmetry and the number of shares offered are not 
rejected (Hypothesis 1 and 3). As in the two previous cases, our findings from PP 
firms are shown to be inconsistent with those of previous works. For instance, we find 
the contrasting feature in the developed market that there is a relationship between 
volatility and underpricing, as in Altinkilic and Hansen (2003), Corwin (2003) and 
Shaorong (2005), while we find no relationship between these two factors (see Table 
5.8 – panel B). In other words, it is reasonable to suggest that volatility and 
manipulation (as a control variable) could provide the contrasting interpretations to 
the characteristics of the Thai capital market. This is because the market itself is 
highly volatile (supported by the high level of individual investors)
140
 and subject to 
the possibility of manipulation (due to only minor penalties from the regulator)
141
. 
This leads to a rejection of Hypothesis 2. Furthermore, the dummy variable of 
EVENTS is also significant, explaining that other events influence SEO underpricing 
under the PP firms. Although we focus only on SEOs, other events could impact SEO 
                                                 
140
 This was claimed in the Master Plan of Developing the Thai Capital Market#2 (year: 2006-2010, in 
Thai) by The Federation of Thai Capital Market Organisations, published via its website: 
http://www.fetco.or.th [Accessed on 22 May 2009]. 
141
 Meechart, W. (2010) The development and strategy of the investigation of the economic 
delinquent in the money market and capital market Newspaper article (in Thai) on 20 December 
2010. Available via: http://www.sec.or.th/investor_edu/info_media/article/2550/Content_ 
0000000831.jsp?categoryID=CAT0000316 [Accessed on 9 April 2011]. 
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underpricing via the co-equal benefit of the issuing firms (the inside relationship 
between the issuing firms and the institutional investors)
142
. 
 
For the other insignificant factors, insider ownership and the trading volume also 
provide no influence on SEO underpricing (Hypotheses 5 and 6). These insignificant 
results are inconsistent with those of Corwin (2003) and Intintoli and Kahle (2009). 
Although the variance-covariance matrix demonstrates no close correlations among 
all the variables, the regression may be detected by the multicollinearity. This is 
because there is a high standard error in S.D. (as a proxy of volatility, see Table 5.8 – 
panel B), in comparison with other variables in the regression. This is referred to in 
Brooks (2008) as the case of multicollinearity, but we ignore it; regression fits well as 
a whole and individual variables are insignificant, including being sensitive to a small 
change. We will confirm if the regression is sensitive to a small change in the 
robustness test later in this chapter (section 5.4.5) by changing the calculation of 
underpricing and carrying out the transformation of variables. 
 
5.4.4 Stock Dividend (SD) 
With regard to the calculation of underpricing as demonstrated in equation 5.1, all the 
companies under the SD issuing method equal 1 (see section 5.3.1). Therefore, the 
results of estimation with the firms issuing via SD are shown in Table 5.8 – panel C.  
 
                                                 
142
 This is claimed as one of the characteristics of issuing via PP in Thailand (source:  executive 
interview with the management team in TCJ Asia Public Company Limited, undisclosed source, in 
January 2010). Further examples of the inside relationship between the issuing firms and the 
institutional investors will be clarified later in section 5.4.5, where we have similar outcomes. 
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[Insert Table 5.8 – panel C here] 
 
The results reveal that MKTCAP and OFFSIZE are highly significant. This means 
that these two factors have an influence on underpricing, confirming our initial 
hypotheses (Hypotheses 1 and 3). Moreover, our significant factors under SD firms 
are the same pairs as shown in the case of PP. The results regarding uncertainty 
remain inconsistent with those of previous works (e.g. Altinkilic and Hansen, 2003; 
Corwin, 2003; Shaorong, 2005; Intintoli and Kahle, 2009). A larger offer size is 
driven by an increase in underpricing (the rejection of Hypothesis 3), echoing the 
findings of Corwin (2003), but from either Thailand or other emerging markets we 
find no work which concentrates on this issuing method – SD – in particular.  Not 
only these two variables, but the dummy variable SD is also highly significant. This 
implies that issuing new shares via SD does impact on SEOs, making them discount 
their prices. Alternatively, the explanation of high significance in SD can point to the 
fact that underpricing is always constant at the value of 1 when there are no offer 
prices. Regarding the values of 2R and adjusted
2R , both are revealed as relatively 
high, at 0.545999 and 0.510038, respectively. According to these two values, the 
model is stated to fit the data well when companies issue via SD. 
 
5.4.5 Robustness 
We obtained equation 5.3 to calculate underpricing in a different way (using the 
concept of offer-to-close) and to re-estimate with equation 5.2. According to equation 
5.3, we realise that we cannot have the firms issuing via SD in this case. This is 
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because issuing new shares with SD has no offer prices (equal to zero). Thus, 
according to equation 5.3, we are unable to obtain the value of underpricing when the 
closed prices are divided by the offer prices. Based on the concept of balanced panel, 
all variables need to be available in every firm in our sample size of 126. Regarding 
the concept of offer-to-close, there are some PP firms that need to be additionally 
excluded due to the zero offer prices, besides the SD firms (as mentioned earlier). 
Therefore, the total sample for estimation via offer-to-close is reduced to 88 firms, 48 
firms in XR and 41 firms in PP143. The results are shown in Table 5.9.  
 
[Insert Table 5.9 here] 
 
With our evidence, we have the same results and same significant variables when we 
disregard the issuing methods in the total sample (see Table 5.9 – panel A, compared 
with Table 5.7 – panel A)144. More specifically, MKTCAP, OFFSIZE and S.D. are 
significant at 1% (for the first two) and at 5% (for S.D.). This means that our 
hypotheses (Hypotheses 1, 2 and 3) hold entirely, implying that firm size positively 
affects SEO underpricing and volatility has an influence on SEO underpricing. 
Moreover, an increase in underpricing does always refer to the fact that the size of 
share offer needs to be large. In addition, our control variable (CMAR_51) of 
manipulation is insignificant. This means there is no relationship between 
                                                 
143
 Note that two firms (ITD and KTP; see full names in Appendix 3) apply two different issuing 
methods (XR and PP) at the same time. We have also excluded the PO firm, which contains only one 
firm (S&P), see full name in Appendix 3), from our individual estimation. However, S&P remains in 
our total sample. As a result, the total sample does not correspond to the combination of different 
issuing methods.  
144
 In fact, including the dummy variables of each issuing method will provide us with a near singular 
matrix. 
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manipulative trading and SEO underpricing, leading to a slight contrast in the 
explanations of the characteristics of the Thai capital market that expects to have 
manipulations. 
 
With an individual estimation of issuing methods, the results from the XR firms (see 
Table 5.9 – panel B) are different from the evidence calculated via close-to-offer (see 
section 5.4.2). MKTCAP as the proxy of firm size is the only significant factor, 
implying that firm size positively impacts on SEO underpricing. This means that 
Hypothesis 1 holds. Consequently, our evidence reveals contrasting explanations to 
the existing literature (e.g. Corwin, 2003; Intintoli and Kahle, 2009). Additionally, the 
outcomes are inconsistent in the area of uncertainty (proxy with S.D.) and price 
pressure (proxy with offer size – OFFSIZE) compared with the previous literature 
(e.g. Altinkilic and Hansen, 2003; Corwin, 2003; Shaorong, 2005; Yongtae and 
Myung Seok, 2005). In PP firms, VOLUME becomes significant, implying that 
trading volume is positively related to SEO underpricing (see Table 5.9 – panel C). 
Although liquidity (proxy by trading volume) influences SEO underpricing, it shows a 
contrasting relationship to our hypothesis (Hypothesis 6). This means our results show 
a positive relationship, instead of a negative one following the hypothesis. The 
contrast could be interpreted by the specific characteristics of PP firms in Thailand 
that would have some inside relationship between the issuing firms and the 
institutional investors. This is, for instance, the relationship with the political parties, 
who are in the coalition government, leading to more convenience for any 
investments that need to be approved by the government. Furthermore, the values of
2R and adjusted 
2R rise markedly, in comparison with the use of offer-to-close in 
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underpricing calculation (see Table 5.8 – panel C). According to these values, we 
claim that our regression fits the data better for the firms issuing new shares via PP. 
 
Interestingly, we notice from our robustness results that there are higher standard 
errors in the regression than our previous results via the offer-to-close calculation (see 
Table 5.7 and 5.8 for comparisons). These could be evidence that we may have a 
problem of multicollinearity in the regression (Brooks, 2008) although our variance-
covariance matrix presents no close correlations between the explanatory variables. In 
addition, with the differences in results (particularly in the PP firms), they could 
indicate that the Thai capital market appears to be sensitive. This is because of the 
difference in the calculation of underpricing (such as OFFSIZE in XR firms, or 
VOLUME in PP firms). Consequently, multicollinearity could exist to some extent 
when underpricing is defined via the close-to-offer concept (especially in the PP 
firms). Therefore, capturing the underpricing with the concept of “close-to-offer” 
(equation 5.2) may give results which are clearly free from misspecification. 
 
Furthermore, we also intend to extend our robustness test to cover more than the 
difference in the calculation of underpricing. We consider applying different 
explanatory variables by transforming our existing ones by logarithm function. These 
were done in OFFSIZE, OWN and VOLUME, while the underpricing was originally 
defined via the concept of close-to-offer. These three variables are chosen to be 
transformed based on the previous literature (e.g. Eckbo and Masulis, 1992; 
Wiwattanakantang, 1999; De Groot and Verchoor, 2002; Chen, 2004 – see section 
4.4.4.5).  The results are shown in Table 5.10. 
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[Insert Table 5.10 here] 
 
Our evidence reveals that there are no substantial differences from the previous 
outcomes in Tables 5.6, 5.7 and 5.8. This suggests that, no matter how we transform 
the explanatory variables in the regression, the same findings and conclusions remain. 
In Table 5.10 – panel D, we may have a slight difference from our earlier discussion 
as the dummy variable of „EVENTS‟ is insignificant, meaning that there is no 
relationship with the SEO underpricing. Nonetheless, since PP firms could have the 
co-equal benefit (insider relationship between the issuing firms and the institutional 
investors), the outcomes could vary and depend on this insider relationship. 
 
5.4.6 Summary of Empirical Results 
Having examined the determinants of SEO underpricing in the total sample and in 
every issuing method separately, we find that MKTCAP is the only variable which is 
significant in every case. Thus, information asymmetry influences SEO underpricing, 
shown by the positive relationship between firm size (as the proxy of information 
asymmetry) and underpricing. Although this evidence is in contrast with the previous 
literature (e.g. Corwin, 2003; Intintoli and Kahle, 2009), it appears to closely reflect 
the characteristics of the Thai capital market. This is because the information can 
easily leak before the announcements in the larger firms, where they cannot 
completely control the information spread to the attendees of the shareholder 
meetings. S.D. and offer size (OFFSIZE) are the two variables which become 
significant when different samples are examined. For instance, they are significant 
(influence on SEO underpricing) in the total sample and in the first issue of new 
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shares via XR, and vice versa in the PP and SD firms. This can indicate that 
uncertainty (proxy with S.D.) and offer size impact SEO underpricing, depending on 
which issuing methods are applied. 
 
Furthermore, ownership and trading volume are the two insignificant variables in 
every case, causing no relationship with SEO underpricing. This evidence is in 
contrast to the existing research, such as Altinkilic and Hansen (2005) and Median 
(2005). In addition, since Thailand is one of the emerging market countries, 
ownership structure should be an important factor in corporate finance (La Porta et 
al., 1999; Claessens et al., 2000). Hence, ownership should have more impact on SEO 
underpricing in Thailand, instead of showing no relationship to the underpricing, as in 
our evidence. Our control variable of manipulative trading (CMAR_51) reveals the 
impact on SEO underpricing only when firms issue new shares via XR. This finding 
in manipulation refers to the contrasting interpretations to the previous literature (e.g. 
Gerard and Nanda, 1993; Chemmanur et al., 2007) because although regulations on 
manipulation in Thailand (see section 5.2.3.3) have been enforced, manipulative 
trading still influences SEO underpricing. 
 
With the robustness outcomes, we find that all the results are mostly the same when 
we used a different calculation to define the underpricing (close-to-offer) and 
estimated the regression with the transforming variables. In other words, MKTCAP 
remains a significant factor in every case, while the factors such as S.D. and 
OFFSIZE are mostly significant, depending on which samples are estimated (total 
sample or each issuing methods). Moreover, there are slight (but clear) changes in the 
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outcomes in the XR and PP firms. These are revealed by only one significant variable 
(MKTCAP) in XR firms and VOLUME starts to affect SEO underpricing (to be 
significant) in PP firms. In addition, the value of
2R  in PP firms when applying the 
different calculation of underpricing is twice as high as that presented in our initial 
calculation (offer-to-close). Consequently, the Thai capital market would be sensitive 
to the small changes in our regression. Nonetheless, the standard errors in some 
variables (i.e. S.D. and CMAR_51), estimated via close-to-offer, are markedly higher 
than those demonstrated in the offer-to-close estimations. With some insignificant 
variables reported in the outcomes and these high in standard errors, multicollinearity 
may to some extent remain in the robustness regressions. 
 
 
5.5 Conclusions  
 
We have examined the determinants of SEO underpricing in Thailand between 1999 
and 2006. We adjusted 12 explanatory variables (including dummy variables) in three 
different categories with the data from Thailand. The OLS regression is applied after 
the exclusion of the variables which have relatively close correlation, in order to 
prevent multicollinearity. This leaves a sample size of 110 companies for the 
estimation.  Our results suggest that firm size influences SEO underpricing positively 
in every case, while volatility and offer size are related to the underpricing when 
different samples are employed (i.e. when estimating total sample and issuing 
methods individually). Nevertheless, the evidence of firm size (the area of 
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information asymmetry) is inconsistent with the previous literature (e.g. Corwin, 
2003; Yongtae and Myung Seok, 2005; Intintoli and Kahle, 2009), where there is a 
negative relationship between firm size and information asymmetry. Moreover, our 
findings report a contrasting reflection of the Thai market‟s characteristics in practice. 
These are seen by the insignificance of volatility in the total sample (regardless of the 
issuing methods) in PP and SD firms, since volatility is known to be the main 
characteristic of the Thai market and it should affect SEO underpricing. Additionally, 
our control variable of manipulations shows mostly no relationship to SEO 
underpricing, even if the manipulations remain in the Thai market (although the 
regulations on manipulative trading are being enforced). 
 
In our robustness estimations, the findings report slight changes in the factors 
affecting SEO underpricing, particularly in the XR and PP firms, when examined 
separately. These changes in the results are demonstrated when underpricing is 
calculated differently (using the concept of close-to-offer), while the evidence from 
transforming variables reveals similar outcomes to the initial estimations. Therefore, 
the Thai capital market appears to be sensitive to small changes. However, the 
standard errors in some variables (such as volatility and manipulative trading) are 
substantially higher in the estimation via close-to-offer (our robustness tests) than 
those defined via the offer-to-close. This could imply that the regression may to some 
extent be detected by the misspecification problem. 
 
In addition, there are some practical implications of our study for firm managers and 
investors in Thailand. The main implication is that managers will notice and focus 
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more closely on which factors cause an impact on SEO underpricing in Thailand. 
Subsequently, they can use these findings as a pilot study to concentrate on the factors 
which are highly sensitive to underpricing in areas such as uncertainty and price 
pressure. With a separate examination of issuing method, managers will realise 
whether those factors affecting underpricing are different on the basis of different 
issuing methods. This could lead to information on whether the factors influence 
underpricing in a particular issuing method. In addition, investors could include our 
evidence in their investment decisions if they realise that there are some changes in 
the factors influencing SEO underpricing. 
 
In the following chapter, we turn our attention to the post-issuing performance of SEO 
companies issuing common stocks in Thailand. 
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Table 5.1: Summary of the percentage of sample coverage compared to existing Thai SEO literature 
The table presents the summaries of existing studies of Thai SEOs and the calculation of sample coverage as a percentage of the relevant sample obtained in previous 
research in Thailand during the same study period (1999 to 2006).  
 
 
AUTHORS MARKET PERIOD SAMPLE 
SAMPLE 
COVERAGE 
OBJECTIVE FINDINGS 
Jirasettakulchai (2000) Thailand 1977 – 1997 65 N/A To examine the effect of dividend 
announcements on public offering of 
equity. 
The larger the firm size, the more 
negative ARs from equity offering. 
Prangthawat (2002) Thailand 1996 – 2000 115 Sample includes 60 firms 
during 1996-2000, coverage 
at 52.17%. 
To investigate whether earning 
management and the timing of SEOs 
can explain subsequent poor 
performance 
Negative relationship between 
discretionary accruals and operating 
performance of firms after SEOs. 
Lertsupongkit (2002) Thailand 1994 – 2001 59 Sample includes 74 firms 
during 1994-2001, coverage 
at 100.00%. 
To examine the stock price reaction to 
the announcement of SEOs. 
Negative stock price reaction after the 
SEO announcements. 
Ngamwutikul (2002) Thailand 1991 – 1994  62 N/A To examine operating performance in 
SEO firms during the pre- and post-
offering periods. 
Poor operating performance after the 
SEOs of sample firms, measured by 
three proxies: ROA, ROE and Tobin‟s 
q / The asymmetric information in 
Thailand remains the major impact on 
operating performance.  
Limpaphayom & 
Ngamwutikul (2004) 
Thailand 1991 – 1994  62 N/A To examine the post-issue operating 
performance. 
More shares are offered when the 
expectation of operating performance 
is worse / Future prospects of issuing 
firms are signalled by using issue 
proceeds. 
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AUTHORS MARKET PERIOD SAMPLE 
SAMPLE 
COVERAGE 
OBJECTIVE FINDINGS 
Vithessonthi (2008) Thailand 1997 – 2006  115 (only non-
financial firms) 
Sample includes 173 firms 
during 1997-2006, coverage 
at 100.00%. 
To examine the changes in the 
authorised common stock (PIAC) and 
how it can affect stock prices. 
PIAC, on average, convey 
information to the market / The larger 
the firm that announces a PIAC, the 
lower the CAR around the 
announcement. 
This study  Thailand 1999-2006 126 N/A 
To examine the determinants of  
SEO underpricing. 
Expecting the considered factors to 
influence the SEO underpricing. 
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Table 5.2: Table of variables and definitions 
The lists of explanatory and control variables, areas of determinants, definitions and data sources of each variable obtained in this examination are given here. 
SETSMART refers to SET‟s Market Analysis and Reporting Tool (the database of SET) 
 
Areas of Determinants Proxy (-ies) Definitions Sources 
Information Asymmetry 
 
Uncertainty 
Size (MKTCAP) 
 
Volatility (Standard Deviation: S.D.) 
 
The logarithm of market capitalisation on day prior to the offer day (day -1) 
 
The S.D. of the daily return of each SEO firms for 30 days ending 11 days before the 
offer date 
 
SETSMART 
Price Pressure Relative offer size (OFFSIZE) 
The total number of shares offered divided by shares outstanding the day prior to the 
offer date (day -1) 
 Share offer to float (OFFFLOAT) 
  ersh ipIn sid erOwnd in g On Da yS h a reOu ts
Issu edTo ta lS h a re
 11tan
 
 Insider Ownership (OWN) 
The average of the top five major shareholders of each company in the year before the 
issuing (Limpaphayom and Ngamwutikul, 2004) 
 Trading volume (VOLUME) 
The average daily trading volume calculated over the 250 trading days before the offer 
date 
Manipulative Trading 
Cumulative Market-Adjusted Returns 
(day -5 to day -1: CMAR_51) 
The market-adjusted return calculated as the difference between the stock return and the 
return on the market (SET index in our case). This is based on Intintoli and Kahle 
(2009). 
Others Other Events (EVENTS) 
A control and dummy variable equal to 1 if the SEO firms have events other than SEOs 
during the event period of 115 days before and after the announcement date and equal to 
zero otherwise. These events include the dividend announcement, dividend payment, 
financial performance announcement and the submission of documents required by the 
SET and SEC in order to fulfil the regulations. 
 
Note: SETSMART is basically the SET database from which the data from the stock exchange is provided online for general investors and other interested persons. SETSMART covers the five fundamental 
areas which are usually considered by analysts and investors: (1) Company Information, (2) Historical Trading Prices, (3) Company News, (4) Key Statistical Data and (5) Key Financial Data and Financial 
Ratios. However, SETSMART (the principal version) is limited to a maximum of only 5 years‟ historical data, based on a rolling period of the first access into the system. The data for the year when the SET 
was established (in 1975) is obtained via SETSMART in its intranet version for brokers, available in the SET library and from any broker. 
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Table 5.3: Table of number of firms to be estimated in each issuing method and their descriptive statistics during the study period of 1999 to 2006 
Panel A shows the summary of number of firms available in each explanatory variable and the data sources taken; MKTCAP is the logarithm of market capitalisation 
on day prior to the offer day (day -1). S.D. is standard deviation captured by the S.D. of the daily return of each SEO firm for 30 days ending 11 days before the offer 
date. OFFSIZE is the relative offer size which equals the total shares offered divided by shares outstanding on the day prior to the offer date (day -1). CMAR_51 refers 
to cumulative market-adjusted returns over 5 days before the offer date. The market-adjusted return is calculated as the firm‟s return minus market return from the SET 
Index. EVENTS refer to the control and dummy variable equal to 1 if the SEO firms have events other than SEOs during the event period of 115 days before and after 
the announcement date and equal to zero otherwise. OWN is insider ownership obtained from the average of the top five major shareholders of each company in the 
year before the offering year (Limpaphayom and Ngamwutikul, 2004). VOLUME represents the average daily trading volume calculated over the 250 trading days 
before the offer date. OFFFLOAT is share offer to float defined by: Total Share Issued / (Share outstanding on day -1)(1-Insider ownership). The dependent variable, 
UNDERPRICING, is defined based on Intintoli and Kahle (2009, p.12) as: Underpricing = (-1)[(Offer price-Price the day before the offer) / (Price the day before the 
offer)]. SETSMART is the SET database and stands for SET Market Analysis and Reporting Tools. TOTAL represents the number of firms that will be estimated in the 
regression. Panel B shows the descriptive statistics of the companies‟ newly issued shares by common stock via each issuing method, namely rights issuing (XR), 
private placement (PP), stock dividend (SD) and public offering (PO), during the study period. The companies represented in each category are shown in parentheses, 
with their full names shown in Appendix 3. The firm size is defined as the market capitalisation in millions of Thai Baht (the exchange rate at THB33.50:USD1.00). 
The age of each firm is obtained from the number of months since the company first traded in the market until the offering month. The average daily returns are the 
average of daily returns during the study period (1999 – 2006) obtained from the SETSMART. The average ownership is measured by the average of the top five major 
shareholders in the offering year. The average turnover ratio is taken directly from SETSMART during the study period (1999 – 2006), measured by
100
tan







dingOutsberOfShareAverageNum
umeTradingVol
tioTurnoverRa
. Industrial groups are the groups shown in the SET Index, containing (apart from financial ones) the Agro and Food Industry 
(AGRO), Consumer Products (CONSUMP), Industrials (INDUS), Property and Construction (PROPCON), Resources (RESOURC), Services (SERVICE) and 
Technology (TECH). 
 
 
 
PANEL A 
 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Number of Firms 
Sources 
Total Sample Rights Issuing Private Placement Stock Dividends 
MKTCAP 126 53 52 22  
S.D. 126 53 52 22 SETSMART 
OFFSIZE 126 53 52 22  
CMAR_51 126 53 52 22  
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Explanatory 
Variables 
Number of Firms 
Sources 
Total Sample Rights Issuing Private Placement Stock Dividends 
EVENTS 126 53 52 22  
OWN 111 48 45 20  
VOLUME 126 53 52 22 SETSMART 
OFFFLOAT 111 47 43 20  
UNDERPRICING 126 53 52 22  
TOTAL 110 48 44 20  
 
Note: The total number of 110 firms is the number of firms that have available data during the period mentioned for every explanatory variable in our case. When each issuing method is considered separately, 
we exclude the firms using “public offering (PO)” as their issuing methods from our estimation. This is because there is only one company which has all the data for both explanatory variables and dependent 
variables.
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PANEL B Total Sample  XR  PP  SD  
Average Size 6,823.93  7,148.71  8,478.38  2,958.35  
Maximum Size 176,237.72 (ADVANC)  72,289.45 (SHIN)  176,237.72 (ADVANC)  23,488.28 (CPF)  
Minimum Size 71.07 (NEW)  71.07 (NEW)  122.35 (SORKON)  122.35 (SORKON)  
Average Age (months) 110  110  102  121  
Average Daily Returns -0.00027  -0.00027  -0.00013  -0.00060  
Average Ownership 10.95264  10.86675  10.50465  12.36724  
Average Turnover Ratio 0.00516  0.00430  0.00756  0.00235  
Number of Firms in each Industrial Group: 
AGRO 20  6  6  8  
CONSUMP 13  7  4  2  
INDUS 15  6  4  5  
PROPCON 22  11  12  1  
RESOURC 7  2  4  1  
SERVICE 20  10  8  2  
TECH 13  6  6  1  
TOTAL 110  48  44  20  
 
Note: There are three companies, ITD, KTP and SORKON, utilising two different issuing methods at the same time (XR and PP for the first two, and PP and SD for SORKON). In addition, we excluded one 
firm issuing with PO as previously mentioned in panel A. Thus, the total sample will not equal 110 firms exactly. 
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Table 5.4: The two-sample t-test of the estimate sample size and the three subsamples of issuing methods 
The table shows whether there are significance differences between the total sample and three 
subsamples and the test between the total sample of 110 firms and the different issuing methods, 
namely rights issuing (XR: 48 firms), private placement (PP: 44 firms) and stock dividend (SD: 20 
firms). Using the two-sample t-test, the null hypothesis under this estimation indicates that there is no 
difference in the mean between two samples. The degree of freedom is shown in parentheses and 
calculated by:
11 2
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2
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2
1 , SS are the variance of samples 1 and 2, and 21,nn refer to 
the sample size of samples 1 and 2. 
 
 
 
 
 Total XR PP SD 
Total 1.0000    
XR 
-0.2372 
(131) 
1.0000   
PP 
0.6260 
(62) 
0.7629 
(61) 
1.0000  
SD 
-2.0520** 
(115) 
-1.7545* 
(66) 
-1.7026* 
(50) 
1.0000 
 
* Significant at 10% level, ** Significant at 5% level, *** Significant at 1% level 
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Table 5.5: The variance-covariance matrix by total sample and issuing methods 
The variance-covariance matrix of dependent variables (underpricing) and independent variables for the total sample of companies issuing new shares by common 
stock and other issuing methods is given here. Underpricing is defined as negative one times the return from the previous day‟s closing price to the offer price (Intintoli 
and Kahle, 2009). MKTCAP is the logarithm of market capitalisation on day prior to the offer day (day -1). S.D. is standard deviation captured by the S.D. of the daily 
return of each SEO firm for 30 days ending 11 days before the offer date. OFFSIZE is relative offer size which equals the total number of shares offered divided by 
shares outstanding the day prior to the offer date (day -1). CMAR_51 refers to cumulative market-adjusted returns over 5 days before the offer date. The market-
adjusted return is calculated as the firm‟s return minus market return from the SET index. EVENTS refer to the control and dummy variable equal to 1 if the SEO firms 
have events other than SEOs during the event period of 115 days before and after the announcement date and equal to zero otherwise. OWN is insider ownership 
obtained from the average of the top five major shareholders of each company in the year before the offering year (Limpaphayom and Ngamwutikul, 2004). VOLUME 
represents the average daily trading volume calculated over the 250 trading days before the offer date. OFFFLOAT is share offer to float defined by: Total Share 
Issued / (Share outstanding on day -1)(1-Insider ownership). DUM_SD is the dummy variable equal to 1 as the firm issuing via stock dividend and zero otherwise. 
Panel A shows the variance-covariance matrix for the total sample with the sample size 110 firms; Panel B the variance-covariance matrix for companies issuing via 
rights issuing (XR) at 48 firms and Panel C the variance-covariance matrix for companies issuing via private placement (PP) at 44 firms. Panel D show the variance-
covariance matrix for companies issuing via stock dividend (SD) at 110 firms with the pooled sample concept. 
 
PANEL A VOLUME UNDERPRICING S.D. OWN OFFSIZE OFFFLOAT MKTCAP EVENTS CMAR_51 
          
          
VOLUME  1.000000         
UNDERPRICING -0.050076  1.000000        
S.D. -0.055185  0.219055  1.000000       
OWN -0.045753  0.111338  0.118408  1.000000      
OFFSIZE -0.078699  0.079846  0.113976  0.109898  1.000000     
OFFFLOAT  0.023639 -0.099401 -0.061878 -0.038831 -0.768423  1.000000    
MKTCAP  0.184500  0.315102 -0.047526 -0.008050 -0.145582  0.002853  1.000000   
EVENTS -0.120111  0.150468  0.117790  0.212197 -0.094438  0.101539  0.014842  1.000000  
CMAR_51 -0.009800 -0.107422 -0.196252 -0.124077  0.077960 -0.010543 -0.126744 -0.002875  1.000000 
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PANEL B VOLUME UNDERPRICING S.D. OWN OFFSIZE OFFFLOAT MKTCAP EVENTS CMAR_51 
          
          
VOLUME  1.000000         
UNDERPRICING  0.051495  1.000000        
S.D. -0.028226  0.270585  1.000000       
OWN  0.250884 -0.187463  0.077918  1.000000      
OFFSIZE -0.082671 -0.172779 -0.058101  0.200651  1.000000     
OFFFLOAT -0.042864 -0.250665  0.002983  0.349541  0.579634  1.000000    
MKTCAP  0.237555  0.533486  0.121526 -0.013937 -0.156107 -0.266176  1.000000   
EVENTS -0.092556 -0.116546 -0.089648  0.219771 -0.060497  0.122523  0.141006  1.000000  
CMAR_51  0.003212 -0.093564 -0.015727 -0.027115  0.121899  0.150404  0.199186  0.077175  1.000000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PANEL C VOLUME UNDERPRICING S.D. OWN OFFSIZE OFFFLOAT MKTCAP EVENTS CMAR_51 
          
          
VOLUME  1.000000         
UNDERPRICING  0.098903  1.000000        
S.D. -0.051607 -0.151717  1.000000       
OWN -0.115179  0.109175 -0.025060  1.000000      
OFFSIZE -0.113397  0.270742  0.312511  0.098639  1.000000     
OFFFLOAT  0.060629 -0.216883 -0.262285 -0.159966 -0.914597  1.000000    
MKTCAP  0.215107  0.398777 -0.309891  0.029100 -0.137694  0.052647  1.000000   
EVENTS  0.010077  0.178534 -0.055898 -0.210987 -0.065021  0.125640 -0.073190  1.000000   
CMAR_51 -0.075812 -0.006617 -0.072538  0.083331  0.051566 -0.018525 -0.266784  0.270430  1.000000 
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PANEL D VOLUME UNDERPRICING S.D. OWN OFFSIZE OFFFLOAT MKTCAP EVENTS DUM_SD CMAR_51 
           
           
VOLUME  1.000000          
UNDERPRICING -0.050076  1.000000         
S.D. -0.055185  0.219055  1.000000        
OWN -0.045753  0.111338  0.118408  1.000000       
OFFSIZE -0.078699  0.079846  0.113976  0.109898  1.000000      
OFFFLOAT  0.023639 -0.099401 -0.061878 -0.038831 -0.768423  1.000000     
MKTCAP  0.184500  0.315102 -0.047526 -0.008050 -0.145582  0.002853  1.000000    
EVENTS -0.120111  0.150468  0.117790  0.212197 -0.094438  0.101539  0.014842  1.000000   
DUM_SD -0.125791  0.637235  0.287037  0.218122 -0.068469  0.048240 -0.014373  0.298124  1.000000  
CMAR_51 -0.009800 -0.107422 -0.196252 -0.124077  0.077960 -0.010543 -0.126744 -0.002875 -0.113377  1.000000 
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Table 5.6: The variance-covariance matrix by total sample and issuing methods after dropping some variables 
The variance-covariance matrix of dependent variable (underpricing) and independent variables for the total sample of companies issuing new shares by common stock 
and other issuing methods after dropping some variables to avoid the multicollinearity problem in the regression is given here. Underpricing is defined as negative one 
times the return from the previous day‟s closing price to the offer price (Intintoli and Kahle, 2009). MKTCAP is the logarithm of market capitalisation on the day prior 
to the offer day (day -1). S.D. is standard deviation captured by the S.D. of the daily return of each SEO firm for 30 days ending 11 days before the offer date. 
OFFSIZE is relative offer size which equals the total shares offered divided by shares outstanding the day prior to the offer date (day -1). CMAR_51 refers to 
cumulative market-adjusted returns over 5 days before the offer date. The market-adjusted return is calculated as the firm‟s return minus market return from the SET 
index. EVENTS refer to the control and dummy variable equal to 1 if the SEO firms have events other than SEOs during the event period of 115 days before and after 
the announcement date and equal to zero otherwise. OWN is insider ownership, obtained from the average of the top five major shareholders of each company over 1 
year before the offering year (Limpaphayom and Ngamwutikul, 2004). VOLUME represents the average daily trading volume calculated over the 250 trading days 
before the offer date. DUM_SD is the dummy variable equal to 1 as the firm issuing via stock dividend and zero otherwise. Panel A shows the variance-covariance 
matrix for the total sample with the sample size of 110 firms; Panel B the variance-covariance matrix for companies issuing via rights issuing (XR), 48 firms, and 
Panel C the variance-covariance matrix for companies issuing via private placement (PP), 44 firms. Panel D shows the variance-covariance matrix for companies 
issuing via stock dividend (SD), 110 firms, with the pooled sample concept. 
 
 
PANEL A VOLUME UNDERPRICING S.D. OWN OFFSIZE MKTCAP EVENTS CMAR_51 
         
         
VOLUME  1.000000        
UNDERPRICING -0.050076  1.000000       
S.D. -0.055185  0.219055  1.000000      
OWN -0.045753  0.111338  0.118408  1.000000     
OFFSIZE -0.078699  0.079846  0.113976  0.109898  1.000000    
MKTCAP  0.184500  0.315102 -0.047526 -0.008050 -0.145582  1.000000   
EVENTS -0.120111  0.150468  0.117790  0.212197 -0.094438  0.014842  1.000000  
CMAR_51 -0.009800 -0.107422 -0.196252 -0.124077  0.077960 -0.126744 -0.002875  1.000000 
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PANEL B VOLUME UNDERPRICING S.D. OWN OFFSIZE MKTCAP EVENTS CMAR_51 
         
         
VOLUME  1.000000        
UNDERPRICING  0.051495  1.000000       
S.D. -0.028226  0.270585  1.000000      
OWN  0.250884 -0.187463  0.077918  1.000000     
OFFSIZE -0.082671 -0.172779 -0.058101  0.200651  1.000000    
MKTCAP  0.237555  0.533486  0.121526 -0.013937 -0.156107  1.000000   
EVENTS -0.092556 -0.116546 -0.089648  0.219771 -0.060497  0.141006  1.000000  
CMAR_51  0.003212 -0.093564 -0.015727 -0.027115  0.121899  0.199186  0.077175  1.000000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PANEL C VOLUME UNDERPRICING S.D. OWN OFFSIZE MKTCAP EVENTS CMAR_51 
         
         
VOLUME  1.000000        
UNDERPRICING  0.098903  1.000000       
S.D. -0.051607 -0.151717  1.000000      
OWN -0.115179  0.109175 -0.025060  1.000000     
OFFSIZE -0.113397  0.270742  0.312511  0.098639  1.000000    
MKTCAP  0.215107  0.398777 -0.309891  0.029100 -0.137694  1.000000   
EVENTS  0.010077  0.178534 -0.055898 -0.210987 -0.065021 -0.073190  1.000000   
CMAR_51 -0.075812 -0.006617 -0.072538  0.083331  0.051566 -0.266784  0.270430  1.000000 
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PANEL D VOLUME UNDERPRICING S.D. OWN OFFSIZE MKTCAP EVENTS DUM_SD CMAR_51 
          
          
VOLUME  1.000000         
UNDERPRICING -0.050076  1.000000        
S.D. -0.055185  0.219055  1.000000       
OWN -0.045753  0.111338  0.118408  1.000000      
OFFSIZE -0.078699  0.079846  0.113976  0.109898  1.000000     
MKTCAP  0.184500  0.315102 -0.047526 -0.008050 -0.145582  1.000000    
EVENTS -0.120111  0.150468  0.117790  0.212197 -0.094438  0.014842  1.000000   
DUM_SD -0.125791  0.637235  0.287037  0.218122 -0.068469 -0.014373  0.298124  1.000000  
CMAR_51 -0.009800 -0.107422 -0.196252 -0.124077  0.077960 -0.126744 -0.002875 -0.113377  1.000000 
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Table 5.7: Results of regression by total sample regardless of issuing method 
The table shows the results of the regression for the determinant of SEO underpricing for the 
companies in the total sample of common stock offering. The regression is adjusted for 
heteroscedasticity by using White Heteroscedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors and Covariance, 
dropping some explanatory variables causing the form of near multicollinearity. Panel A shows the 
outcomes by total sample regardless of issuing method and Panel B the outcomes by total sample 
considering with the issuing methods (namely rights issuing, private placement, stock dividend and 
public offering). Underpricing is defined as negative one times the return from the previous day‟s 
closing price to the offer price (Intintoli and Kahle, 2009). MKTCAP is the logarithm of market 
capitalisation on the day prior to the offer day (day -1). S.D. is standard deviation captured by the S.D. 
of the daily return of each SEO firm for 30 days ending 11 days before the offer date. OFFSIZE is 
relative offer size, which equals the total number of shares offered divided by shares outstanding the 
day prior to the offer date (day -1). CMAR_51 refers to cumulative market-adjusted returns over 5 days 
before the offer date. The market-adjusted return is calculated as the firm‟s return minus market return 
from the SET index. EVENTS refer to the control variable in terms of the dummy variable equal to 1 if 
the SEO firms have events other than SEOs during the event period of 115 days before and after the 
announcement date and equal to zero otherwise. OWN is insider ownership obtained from the average 
of the top five major shareholders of each company over 1 year before the offering year (Limpaphayom 
and Ngamwutikul, 2004). VOLUME represents the average daily trading volume calculated over the 
250 trading days before the offer date. Regarding the dummy variables of issuing methods: rights 
issuing (DUM_XR) is equal to 1 if firms use right issuing to issue new shares, zero otherwise. Private 
placement (DUM_PP) equals 1 if firms use private placement to issue new shares, zero otherwise. 
Stock dividend (DUM_SD) is equal to 1 if firms use stock dividend to issue new shares, zero otherwise. 
Public Offering (DUM_PO) equals 1 if firms use public offering to issue new shares, zero otherwise. 
2R is implied as the adjusted
2R .   The regression is estimated as below:   
         
)_()_()_()_()()(
51_..
1 11 09876
54321
PODUMSDDUMPPDUMXRDUMEVENTSVOLUME
OWNCMAROFFSIZEDSMKTCAPngUnderpri ci



  
 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Statistical Values 
Coefficient p-values Std Error 2R  2R  
Panel A: Total sample without issuing methods 
MKTCAP 0.122476*** 0.0008 0.035464 
0.191039 0.135522 
S.D. 1.683585*** 0.0031 0.555823 
OFFSIZE 0.034981** 0.0342 0.016298 
CMAR_51 -0.093398 0.6503 0.205389 
OWN 0.008083 0.5877 0.014862 
VOLUME -0.008125 0.1553 0.005676 
EVENTS 0.116120 0.2375 0.097723 
Panel B: Total sample with issuing methods 
MKTCAP 0.130714*** 0.0000 0.028790 
0.626157 0.584195 
S.D. 0.312465 0.3878 0.360188 
OFFSIZE 0.063803*** 0.0015 0.019504 
CMAR_51 0.041498 0.7646 0.138172 
OWN -0.012057 0.3197 0.012056 
VOLUME 0.003704 0.3354 0.003826 
EVENTS -0.012559 0.8559 0.068967 
DUM_XR 0.429321*** 0.0003 0.113904 
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Explanatory 
Variables 
Statistical Values 
Coefficient p-values Std Error 2R  2R  
DUM_PP 0.106185 0.2285 0.087633 
DUM_SD 1.163005*** 0.0000 0.122129 0.626157 0.584195 
DUM_PO 0.096406 0.4410 0.124622   
Sample Size 110 
 
* Significant at 10% level, ** Significant at 5% level, *** Significant at 1% level 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
306 
 
Table 5.8: Results of regression by issuing methods 
The results of the regression for the determinant of SEO underpricing for the companies issuing 
common stock via different issuing methods are shown here. The regression is adjusted for 
heteroscedasticity by using White Heteroscedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors and Covariance, 
dropping some explanatory variables causing the form of near multicollinearity and including the 
dummy variables of issuing methods where applicable. Underpricing is defined as negative one times 
the return from the previous day‟s closing price to the offer price (Intintoli and Kahle, 2009). MKTCAP 
is the logarithm of market capitalisation on the day prior to the offer day (day -1). S.D. is standard 
deviation captured by the S.D. of the daily return of each SEO firm for 30 days ending 11 days before 
the offer date. OFFSIZE is relative offer size, which equals the total number of shares offered divided 
by shares outstanding the day prior to the offer date (day -1). CMAR_51 refers to cumulative market-
adjusted returns over 5 days before the offer date. The market-adjusted return is calculated as the firm‟s 
return minus market return from the SET index. EVENTS refer to a control variable in terms of the 
dummy variable equal to 1 if the SEO firms have events other than SEOs during the event period of 
115 days before and after the announcement date and equal to zero otherwise. OWN is insider 
ownership obtained from the average of the top five major shareholders of each company over one year 
before the offering year (Limpaphayom and Ngamwutikul, 2004). VOLUME represents the average 
daily trading volume calculated over the 250 trading days before the offer date. DUM_SD refers to 
dummy variables equal to 1 if firms use stock dividend to issue new shares, zero otherwise. Panel A 
shows the outcomes from the 48 firms issuing with rights issuing (XR);  Panel B the findings from the 
44 firms issuing with private placement (PP) and Panel C the results from the companies issuing with 
stock dividend (SD), 110 firms using the pooled data concept. 
2R is implied as the adjusted
2R .   The 
regression is estimated as below where the dummy variables are applied when applicable:  
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Explanatory 
Variables 
Statistic Values 
Coefficient p-values Std Error 2R  2R  
PANEL A: Rights Issuing (XR) 48 Firms 
MKTCAP 0.119164*** 0.0001 0.028191 
0.423854 0.323028 
S.D. 1.296193* 0.0693 0.694471 
OFFSIZE -0.009547 0.6962 0.024278 
CMAR_51 -0.935279* 0.0860 0.531326 
OWN -0.013269 0.3300 0.013455 
VOLUME -0.009003 0.6890 0.022331 
EVENTS -0.089879 0.3514 0.095319 
PANEL B: Private Placement (PP) 44 Firms 
MKTCAP 0.134534** 0.0469 0.065384   
S.D. -2.202023 0.4529 2.901915   
OFFSIZE 0.088278* 0.0010 0.024608   
CMAR_51 0.016504 0.9711 0.452988 0.349385 0.222876 
OWN 0.021660 0.4715 0.029767   
VOLUME 0.004008 0.3311 0.004069   
EVENTS 0.268845* 0.0907 0.154662   
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Explanatory 
Variables 
Statistic Values 
Coefficient p-values Std Error 2R  2R  
PANEL C: Stock Dividend (SD) 110 Firms 
MKTCAP 0.124420*** 0.0001 0.030554   
S.D. 0.298620 0.5079 0.449381 
0.545999 0.510038 
OFFSIZE 0.055141*** 0.0006 0.015594 
CMAR_51 -0.000982 0.9954 0.169984 
OWN -0.007987 0.5448 0.013145 
VOLUME -0.002345 0.5385 0.003799 
EVENTS -0.033301 0.6475 0.072603 
DUM_SD 0.874526*** 0.0000 0.065709 
 
* Significant at 10% level, ** Significant at 5% level, *** Significant at 1% level 
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Table 5.9: Results of robustness test with different calculations 
The table shows the results of the robustness estimation of the underpricing, calculating via “offer-to-
close” returns, as suggested in Kim and Hyun-Han (2004). The regression is controlled for 
heteroscedasticity by using White Heteroscedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors and Covariance, 
dropping some explanatory variables causing the form of near multicollinearity and including the 
dummy variables of issuing methods where applicable. Underpricing is defined as the ratio of closed 
issue price on the day of SEO to the issuing price minus one. MKTCAP is the logarithm of market 
capitalisation on the day prior to the offer day (day -1). S.D. is standard deviation captured by the S.D. 
of the daily return of each SEO firm for 30 days ending 11 days before the offer date. OFFSIZE is 
relative offer size, which equals the total number of shares offered divided by shares outstanding the 
day prior to the offer date (day -1). CMAR_51 refers to cumulative market-adjusted returns over five 
days before the offer date. The market-adjusted return is calculated as the firm‟s return minus market 
return from the SET index. EVENTS refer to a control variable in terms of the dummy variable equal to 
1 if the SEO firms have events other than SEOs during the event period of 115 days before and after 
the announcement date and equal to zero otherwise. OWN is insider ownership obtained from the 
average of the top five major shareholders of each company over one year before the offering year 
(Limpaphayom and Ngamwutikul, 2004). VOLUME represents the average daily trading volume 
calculated over the 250 trading days before the offer date. Panel A shows the outcomes from the total 
sample of 88 firms; Panel B  the findings from the 48 firms issuing with rights issuing (XR) and Panel 
C the results from the 41 companies issuing with private placement (PP). 
2R is implied as the adjusted
2R .   The regression is estimated as below where the dummy variables are applied when applicable:  
         
)(
)(51_..
7
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EVENTS
VOLUMEOWNCMAROFFSIZEDSMKTCAPngUnderpri ci
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


 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Statistic Values 
Coefficient p-values Std Error 2R  2R  
PANEL A: Total Sample 88 Firms 
MKTCAP 0.342626*** 0.0008 0.098560   
S.D. 10.96858** 0.0148 4.404904   
OFFSIZE 0.234717*** 0.0001 0.057047   
CMAR_51 1.369988 0.2638 1.217445 0.169494 0.096825 
OWN -0.061632 0.2847 0.057225   
VOLUME -0.028012 0.1157 0.017614   
EVENTS 0.232486 0.6541 0.516991   
PANEL B: Rights Issuing (XR) 48 Firms 
MKTCAP 0.470062*** 0.0026 0.146398   
S.D. 11.89588 0.1447 7.996304   
OFFSIZE 0.031145 0.7494 0.096847   
CMAR_51 0.848714 0.8023 3.366898 0.182179 0.039060 
OWN -0.096306 0.3830 0.109174   
VOLUME -0.101748 0.3129 0.099546   
EVENTS 0.461344 0.6707 1.076957   
PANEL C: Private Placement (PP) 41 Firms 
MKTCAP 0.138543** 0.0350 0.063014   
S.D. 1.099565 0.7292 3.149069 0.631862 0.553772 
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Explanatory 
Variables 
Statistic Values 
Coefficient p-values Std Error 2R  2R  
OFFSIZE 0.338879*** 0.0000 0.039260   
CMAR_51 0.985734 0.3434 1.025337   
OWN 0.011712 0.7289 0.033510 0.631862 0.553772 
VOLUME 0.008682* 0.0957 0.005063   
EVENTS 0.152780 0.5231 0.236681   
 
* Significant at 10% level, ** Significant at 5% level, *** Significant at 1% level 
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Table 5.10: Results of robustness tests with transformation variables 
The results of the robustness regression for the determinant of SEO underpricing for the companies in 
the total sample (Panel A), total sample with different issuing methods (Panel B) and individually 
different issuing methods: rights issuing (XR – Panel C), private placement (PP – Panel D) and stock 
dividend (SD – Panel E) are presented here. The regression is controlled for heteroscedasticity by 
using White‟s Heteroscedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors and Covariance, dropping some 
explanatory variables, causing the form of near multicollinearity and including the dummy variables of 
issuing methods, where applicable. Underpricing is defined as negative one times the return from the 
previous day‟s closing price to the offer price (Intintoli and Kahle, 2009). MKTCAP is the logarithm of 
market capitalisation on the day before the offer day (day -1). S.D. means the standard deviation 
captured by the S.D. of the daily return of each SEO firm for 30 days ending 11 days before the offer 
date. LOFFSIZE is the logarithm of the relative offer size, which equals  the total of shares offered 
divided by the shares outstanding the day before the offer date (day -1). CMAR_51 refers to 
cumulative market-adjusted returns over five days before the offer date. The market-adjusted return is 
calculated as the firm‟s return minus the market return from the SET index. EVENTS refers to a 
control variable in terms of the dummy variable, being equal to 1 if the SEO firms have events other 
than SEOs during the event period of 115 days before and after the announcement date and equal to 
zero otherwise. LOWN is the logarithm of insider ownership obtained from the average of the top five 
major shareholders of each company over one year before the offering year (Limpaphayom and 
Ngamwutikul, 2004). LVOLUME represents the logarithm of the average daily trading volume 
calculated over the 250 trading days before the offer date. The dummy variables of issuing methods 
are: right issuing (DUM_XR), equal to 1 if firms use rights issuing to issue new shares, zero otherwise; 
Private placement (DUM_PP), equal to 1 if firms use private placement to issue new shares, zero 
otherwise; Stock dividend (DUM_SD), equal to 1 if firms use stock dividend to issue new shares, zero 
otherwise and Public Offering (DUM_PO), equal to 1 if firms use public offering to issue new shares, 
zero otherwise. 
2R is implied to be the adjusted
2R .   The regression is estimated as below, where the 
dummy variables are applied when applicable:  
         
)_()_()_()_()(
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1 11 0987
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
 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Statistic Values 
Coefficient p-values Std Error 2R  2R  
PANEL A: Total Sample 110 Firms 
MKTCAP 0.141723*** 0.0004 0.038564   
S.D. 1.506105*** 0.0067 0.543982   
LOFFSIZE 0.043453 0.1989 0.033601   
CMAR_51 -0.127254 0.5346 0.204228 0.210063 0.155852 
LOWN 0.117646 0.4296 0.148358   
LVOLUME -0.033500** 0.0442 0.016441   
EVENTS 0.101843 0.2863 0.095006   
PANEL B: Total Sample 110 Firms with issuing methods 
MKTCAP 0.133565*** 0.0000 0.029767   
S.D. 0.209657 0.5876 0.385305   
LOFFSIZE 0.055905 0.0790 0.031499 0.603458 0.558948 
CMAR_51 0.029351 0.8360 0.141392   
LOWN -0.053861 0.6682 0.125289   
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Explanatory 
Variables 
Statistic Values 
Coefficient p-values Std Error 2R  2R  
LVOLUME -0.003725 0.8104 0.015482   
EVENTS -0.034217 0.6220 0.069184   
DUM_XR 0.381509*** 0.0010 0.112121   
DUM_PP 0.110417 0.1058 0.067642 0.603458 0.558948 
DUM_SD 1.120850*** 0.0000 0.117823   
DUM_PO 0.068702 0.5521 0.115128   
PANEL C: Rights Issuing (XR) 48 Firms 
MKTCAP 0.124157*** 0.0000 0.025613   
S.D. 1.478708** 0.0223 0.621916   
LOFFSIZE 0.023195 0.5405 0.037570   
CMAR_51 -1.048875* 0.0881 0.599930 0.410325 0.307131 
LOWN -0.135076 0.1549 0.093175   
LVOLUME -0.010051 0.6008 0.019058   
EVENTS -0.034048 0.7016 0.088235   
PANEL D: Private Placement (PP) 44 Firms 
MKTCAP 0.153317** 0.0397 0.071827   
S.D. -2.996883 0.4025 3.537366   
LOFFSIZE 0.128656** 0.0213 0.053449   
CMAR_51 0.250249 0.6210 0.501762 0.289936 0.151867 
LOWN 0.119019 0.6727 0.279443   
LVOLUME -0.008306 0.8016 0.032808   
EVENTS 0.108570 0.5057 0.161479   
PANEL E: Stock Dividend (SD) 110 Firms 
MKTCAP 0.136565*** 0.0000 0.032179   
S.D. 0.067926 0.8876 0.479206   
LOFFSIZE 0.071974*** 0.0085 0.026795   
CMAR_51 -0.044405 0.7973 0.172421 0.547552 0.511714 
LOWN -0.044292 0.7483 0.137640   
LVOLUME -0.015866 0.2378 0.013360   
EVENTS -0.043291 0.5365 0.069803   
DUM_SD 0.861985*** 0.0000 0.070566   
 
* Significant at 10% level, ** Significant at 5% level, *** Significant at 1% 
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CHAPTER 6 
THE POST-ISSUING PERFORMANCE OF SEOs 
 
Abstract 
 
This chapter focuses on an investigation into the performance of SEO firms during the 
post-issuing period. We examined 125 common stock offering companies from the 
Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET) between 1999 and 2006. The Buy-and-Hold 
Return (BHR) approach was chosen as the measurement of post-issuing performance 
in SEO companies. Individual estimations are also applied for the four different 
samples of issuing methods in order to discover how the firms perform in each 
sample. Our evidence reveals that firms underperform during the post-issuing period. 
These consequences are consistent with the existing studies, particularly in the Asia-
Pacific region. With the estimation of different benchmarks in the BHR approach, the 
results are unchanged, while a different approach (cumulative abnormal return, the 
CAR approach) provides slightly different outcomes. Firms who issue new shares via 
rights issuing and stock dividends do not underperform during the post-issuing period.   
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6.1 Introduction  
 
Eckbo et al. (2006, p.96) suggest that the explanation for the low long-term returns 
(subject to a holding period of 2-5 years) following equity offerings is under debate. 
Having considered the short-term performance of firms making a seasoned equity 
offering (hereafter, SEO) in the previous two chapters, we now turn to a post-issuing 
study (in terms of a long-term study) during the SEO period. Previous studies (e.g. 
Teoh et al., 1998b; Jegadeesh and Karceski, 2004; Lyandres et al., 2005) report that 
SEO companies underperform in the period after the issue of equity. We use this as 
our main objective in this chapter to examine the post-issuing performance in the 
context of different issuing methods.  To be more specific, we investigate the post-
issuing performance of SEO companies and consider how the companies perform in 
different samples of issuing methods. 
 
Our contributions to the existing studies on long-term performance (post-issuing 
performance) of SEOs are demonstrated in several ways. First, we provide an out-of-
sample examination by obtaining the data from an emerging market, Thailand. As a 
result, we will notice whether the evidence from Thailand carries over from the 
developed markets, on which most existing literature focuses. The findings would also 
assist the firms‟ managers and investors with their investment decisions concerning 
the performance of SEO firms during the post-issuing period. Second, our study is 
among the first to consider the post-issuing performance of SEOs in Thailand with 
recent data (obtained from the post-financial crisis of 1997 period). As a result, our 
evidence will present new outcomes in the area of SEOs in Thailand. Third, we 
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investigate the post-issuing performance of SEOs with different samples of issuing 
methods available during our study period. The outcomes could be different to the 
previous studies in developed and other emerging markets because SEOs in Thailand 
are concerned with issuing new shares to the existing shareholders instead of issuing 
to the public (as a public offering). Thus, we consider the methods such as rights 
issuing, private placement and stock dividend. Lastly, this study employs the sector 
index to confirm whether the results are robust with the benchmark that closely 
represents each firm. This could be better than using the market index because the 
sector index contains the firms which are doing similar business and may have some 
specific characteristics, e.g. higher market capital than the other sectors. The 
consequences of using the sector index will be new information on the post-issuing 
performance of SEO firms in the recent period (between 1999 and 2006), helping 
investors to invest more in the long run. 
 
As a whole estimation, we obtained data from the 125 companies issuing via common 
stock from the SET between 1999 and 2006. Applying the Buy-and-Hold Return 
(hereafter, BHR) approach, we investigated whether the SEO firms are 
underperforming in the post-issuing period. The outcomes show that there is 
underperformance, which appears to have occurred after the issuing of new shares of 
our SEO firms in Thailand. In addition, there was no difference in the results on 
underperforming in the post-issuing period when we focused on each issuing method 
separately. 
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This chapter is organised as follows: section 6.2 will briefly review some studies of 
the long-term performance of SEOs firms, including possible motivations and 
hypotheses. In section 6.3, we describe the data and methodology. Section 6.4 will 
reveal the empirical results and present a discussion of the findings. Section 6.5 will 
draw the final conclusions. 
 
 
6.2 Literature Review and Hypotheses  
 
Among the previous SEO studies, researchers have also examined how well SEO 
companies perform during the post-issuing period. This can be seen as studies of 
long-term performance over three to five years in general. In developed markets, there 
are several well-known papers, which range from works from the 1990s, such as 
Healy and Palepu (1990), Teoh et al. (1998b) and Soucik and Allen (1999a), to more 
recent research, e.g. Clarke et al. (2001), Hertzel et al. (2002), Krishnamurthy et al. 
(2005), Lyandres et al. (2005) and Eckbo et al. (2006). We find that these studies 
repeat the mixed results that firms underperform after issuing equity. For instance, 
while Soucik and Allen (1999a) find no underperformance of SEOs in the long-term 
in Australia, Lyandres et al. (2005) report that companies may exhibit 
underperformance in the post-issue period, having obtained data from companies in 
the U.S. However, Teoh et al. (1998b) respond to other previous studies, claiming that 
underperformance may occur in the pre-offering period but not post-offering. 
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Turning to the studies on our concerns in emerging markets, there has been some 
research concerning these particular areas of long-term performance in SEOs. They 
include the study determinants in the long-term instead of focusing only on how the 
SEO companies perform after issuing new equities. An example of this work is the 
study of Foerster and Korolyi (2000), who obtained a combination of samples from 
developed and emerging markets (including Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea, the 
Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand) from 1982 to 1996. Their results 
confirm the relationships between local market liquidity and depository receipts 
(DRs) in the performance of long-term returns. Some studies are based on data from 
emerging markets only (e.g. Claessen et al., 1995; Barry et al., 2002; Brown et al., 
2008) and are relatively little concerned with the long-term (post-issuing) 
performance of SEOs. 
 
Regarding the literature on countries within the Pacific Basin region, we also found a 
few studies relating to the long-term performance of SEOs. Some examples are listed 
as follows: Kang (1990) and Kim and Lee (1990) provide a similar study of the 
performance of SEOs in Korea in the short term, with a maximum of 6 months, rather 
than long-term. Their results show positive abnormal returns during the post-issuing 
months. With a longer study period of over 15 years, Dhatt et al. (1996) examine 791 
rights issue announcements in Korea. Their findings confirm the same outcomes of 
the above existing studies in Korea in the announcement month, while there is a 
negative in the abnormal returns after the announcement. Cai and Loungran (1998) 
examine the performance of Japanese SEOs between 1971 and 1992. They suggest 
that the age of firms influences the companies in such a way that they underperform 
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during the long-term horizon. In addition, their results reveal that the SEO sample has 
poor operating performance in the post-issuing period. Soucik and Allen (1999b) 
selected 94 Australian SEO firms for their investigation into the relationship between 
a company‟s betas and the extent of post-issue underperformance. Their consequences 
show that there is an underperformance in the SEO firms, compared with the non-
issuer firms (Soucik and Allen, 1999b, p.1839). 
 
Having obtained the equity offerings in three markets (Japan, Korea and Hong Kong), 
Matthew (2002) attempts to establish the relationship between the long-term 
performance of the SEOs and the relevant regulatory and organisational structure. 
Applying the matching portfolio technique, his findings indicate that the Korean 
companies, which have negative long-run abnormal returns, show the best increase in 
number of shares outstanding (at least 50% change in market capitalisation) (ibid, 
p.329). His results also show that the performance of SEO firms in Japan depends on 
the firms' age; the older ones appears to perform better, while the performance of SEO 
firms in Hong Kong relies on the asymmetric information on whether to issue new 
equities when their stock prices undervalue the market.  Brown et al. (2006, 2009) 
examine long-term underperformance and the relationship between corporate 
governance and firm performance over a 3-year post-issue window in Australia. They 
report that the private placement firms tend to have higher levels of market related to 
risk, are more highly leveraged and less profitable (Brown et al., 2006, p.206). From 
the sample of private placement, rights issuing and share purchase plans, their results 
indicate that the larger the companies, the more degree of long-term 
underperformance (Brown et al., 2009). With 93 samples of firms using employee 
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stock option (ESO) in Taiwan between 2001 and 2006, Lin and Tsai (2010) expect 
that offering ESO to the employees could improve the company‟s performance. Their 
evidence suggests, however, the opposite; that there is poorer long-term investment 
performance in the ESO issuing firms because of the asymmetric information.  
 
Besides the literature relating to SEO long-term performance, we can notice from the 
evidence of IPO long-term performance in emerging markets and Asia-Pacific regions 
that it is possible that underperformance is the case of the post-issuing period. 
Nevertheless, we find a conflict among the findings in the literature on IPO long-term 
performance in emerging markets. For instance, while Corhay et al. (2002) examine 
the four-year period of Malaysian IPOs and show that they perform better than the 
market in the long-term, Ahmad-Zaluki et al. (2007) report in their study regarding 
IPOs in Malaysia that there is underperformance of Malaysian IPOs, particularly 
when the number of IPO firms in the market is small. 
 
In Thailand, there are no particular studies regarding the long-term performance of 
SEO firms. The most closely related studies in this category are shown in the area of 
SEO operating performance, namely Ngamwutikul (2002) and Limpaphayom and 
Ngamwutikul (2004). These two studies provide similar examinations in Thailand 
between 1991 and 1994, with the exclusion of IPOs and financial firms
145
. While 
Ngamwutikul (2002) finds a poor operating performance after SEOs in her sample 
firms, Limpaphayom and Ngamwutikul (2004) show that more shares are offered by 
managers when the expectation of operating performance becomes worse. Their 
                                                 
145
 Ngamwutikul (2002) examines the pre- and post-offering period, while Limpaphayom and 
Ngamwutikul (2004) focus on the post-issuing period. 
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findings also suggest that the future prospects of issuing firms are signalled by using 
issue proceeds (Limpaphayom and Ngamwutikul, 2004).  
 
Another closely related research in Thailand has been applied with the IPO sample. 
Chorruk and Worthington (2009) report from their evidence that the IPO‟s post-listing 
performance indicates generally poor performance, measured by monthly cumulative 
abnormal returns (hereafter, CARs), BHR and Wealth Relative. Nonetheless, in terms 
of the post-listing performance, we assume from the literature that they should have 
considered the operating and financial long-term performance together, since the 
authors have mentioned nothing regarding the separation. In fact, there is a similar 
relationship between operating and financial long-term performance. Both of these 
could be explained and measured via the financial ratios. The operating is normally 
captured via return on asset (ROA), return on equity (ROE) and return on investment 
(ROI), while the measurements of financing are concerned with liquidity, the ability 
to return loans and growth rate. In practice, the financial performance in Thailand 
could proxy via the earning-per-share (EPS) as the main measurement. 
 
[Insert Table 6.1 here] 
 
With the above literature, we see that most studies restrict the investigation to 
developed markets, while the studies in emerging markets (including Thailand) are 
still scant, giving few details of the wider picture (see the summary of the existing 
literature in Table 6.1). Although there is some literature relating to the long-term 
performance of SEOs within the Pacific Basin region, some studies have obtained the 
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data from countries which are currently considered as developed markets, e.g. Japan, 
Hong Kong and Singapore. The characteristics of these markets are different from the 
general characteristics of emerging markets, including Thailand. The main reasons for 
this lack and the difference in characteristics remain the same, as stated in the 
previous two empirical chapters, because the Thai capital market is relatively small in 
comparison with other markets, illiquid and highly volatile
146
. Since SEOs have 
become more important following the policy of the Federation of Thai Capital Market 
Organisations (FETCO) in order to expand this type of financing source, there should 
have been an increase in the number of studies in this area. The reason is that we need 
some suitable research and empirical evidence in order to support the suggestions of 
investments from the security companies (the brokers). Having had more studies of 
SEO post-issuing performance, investors would have more information and 
knowledge in this particular area for comparison with the information received from 
those brokers for their final investment decisions. As a result, investors could invest 
based on the knowledge in an appropriate way, making the market less volatile. In 
addition, we could analyse our study of SEO post-issuing performance to establish 
whether the results in developed markets carry over to Thailand, as an emerging 
market.  
 
Within the study of SEO long-term performance in both developed and emerging 
markets (including Thailand and other Pacific Basin regions), the testable hypotheses 
are similar regarding whether there is over- or underperformance during the long-term 
period. Examples of these works are Healy and Palepu (1990), Cai and Loughran 
                                                 
146
 We provide the illustrations to support this with some figures later in section 6.3.1 – Data Sources 
and Definitions. 
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(1998), Soucik and Allen (1999a), Mathew (2002), Limpaphayom and Ngamwutikul 
(2004), Brown et al. (2009) and Lin and Tsai (2010). The outcomes from these studies 
guide us to know how the companies perform in the longer period; for instance, 
whether the firm underperforms or if the long-term abnormal returns are positive or 
negative. Since we have a limited amount of research into the long-term performance 
of SEOs in Thailand, we aim to develop our hypothesis in this chapter based on the 
existing literature mentioned above.  
 
Nonetheless, the existing SEO literature on the long-term in Thailand is not as 
particularly concerned with long-term performance as previous studies of developed 
markets (e.g. Healy and Palepu, 1990; Teoh et al., 1998b; Clarke et al., 2001). Instead, 
they cover different areas within the study period, which are the long-term, e.g. the 
long-term abnormal return (Lertsupongkit, 2002)
147
, the operating performance 
(Ngamwutikul, 2002; Limpaphayom and Ngamwutikul, 2004) and obtaining the IPO 
samples in the long-term performance (Chorruk and Worthington, 2009). As a result, 
our examination can be claimed to be the first study of the post-issuing performance 
(in terms of long-term performance) of SEOs in Thailand. In addition, our study 
provides more recent data, from areas such as the post-financial crisis period, which is 
the period during which the Thai economy was making a substantial recovery. To 
support this, we can see from Table 6.1 that the existing SEO literature in Thailand 
obtained the data either prior to or covering the period of the financial crisis between 
1997 and 1998. The percentage of sample coverage is 100%, compared with the 
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 Lertsupongkit (2002) mainly considers the abnormal returns during the post-issuing period, but the 
period of study appears to be more short-term than long-term (in particular, the 30-day period after 
SEOs). 
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previous studies into Thai SEOs. This implies that our study, with 125 firms in the 
sample during 1999 to 2006, provides more substantial sample coverage than the 
earlier Thai research. In other words, with more recent data, our sample size is larger 
than the existing works, which obtained data in the study period before and during the 
financial crisis in 1997. Although a few studies were made shortly after 1997 (e.g. 
Lertsupongkit, 2002; Prangthawat, 2002), most companies in Thailand remained in 
the process of rehabilitation and/or reorganisation (Vithessonthi, 2008, p.135). 
Therefore, our study focuses clearly on the period during which the country was 
showing signs of recovery in the economy, i.e. from 1999 onward. In addition, we 
employ a slightly different methodology for measuring post-issuing performance in 
order to obtain the closest possible reflection of the characteristics of the Thai capital 
market and the institutional background
148
.  
 
Furthermore, we will turn to examining how companies perform after issue equity 
when issuing with different methods, as presented by Hertzel et al. (2002) and 
Krishnamuthy et al. (2005). We found a few papers in the Pacific Basin region 
considering issuing methods similar to these two in the U.S. They are Tan et al. 
(2002), who focus on the private placement and rights issue in Singapore between the 
first quarter of 1998 and the second quarter of 1996, and Anderson and Rose (2006), 
who analyse the private seasoned equity issues in New Zealand from 1990 to 2002. 
Nevertheless, although these two studies in Asia-Pacific countries investigate the 
performance of SEO companies, they appear to have been more focused on the short-
term period than the longer term. However, Brown et al. (2009) are concerned with 
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 Further explanations of the methodology used in our study are given in section 6.3.2. 
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some individual issuing methods, e.g. private placement, rights offering and share 
purchase plans. Their examination relates to corporate governance, while our study 
focuses purely on how SEO firms perform during the post-issuing period. With the 
market differences (Thailand and Australia), the methodology of measuring post-
issuing (long-term) performance and the fact that Australia is seen to be a developed 
market, we can claim that our study will provide a clear close reflection to the 
characteristics of emerging markets (small in size, small in number of listed firms and 
highly volatile) regarding issuing methods with more recent data (between 1999 and 
2006).  
 
Consideration of each issuing method will lead to useful evidence for the firm‟s 
managers to know how their firms are performing in the period after their SEOs, when 
they issue via different methods. In Table 6.2, we summarise as illustrations the 
evidence from the previous studies. Our hypothesis to be tested can be set down as 
follows: 
:0H There is an underperformance among firms in the post-issue period of 
SEOs for common stock offering firms in the total sample and different 
issuing methods, where applicable. 
 
[Insert Table 6.2 here] 
 
However, there may be other events besides the equity offering during our holding 
period that can cause the post-issuing performance to be different to what it should be. 
These events include dividend announcements, earning announcements, stock splits 
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and the announcements of policies or regulations from the government or other 
related institutions (e.g. the Bank of Thailand, BOT). Nevertheless, according to our 
review, no previous studies have shown any specific concern regarding the other 
events. This is different from the section concerning stock price reaction, where a 
dummy variable can be brought into the estimation. As a consequence, we focus only 
on the event of SEOs during our study period, and assume that the other events are 
constant and have only minor impact on the post-issuing performance of SEO 
firms
149
. In other words, we take these events to be constant in terms of the control 
variable for our study. 
 
In the next section, we describe the data and methodology to be used in this chapter. 
 
 
6.3 Data and Methodology  
 
6.3.1 Data Sources and Definitions 
We obtained the data to estimate the post-issuing performance from two main 
sources: the SET‟s fact books and SETSMART (the SET database) during the period 
1999 to 2006. Initially, we had 1,910 SEOs among 251 non-financial companies. Due 
to the difference in asset structures and the method of analysis, we have excluded the 
financial firms from our sample. We excluded not only the financial institutions but 
                                                 
149
 We could refer to our previous evidence from the section on stock price reaction (Chapter 4), which 
shows that other events beside SEOs in Thailand have no relationship to SEO stock price reaction. This 
is perhaps supported by insignificant results in our events dummy variable in a previous chapter (see 
section 4.4.4 of Chapter 4). 
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also the firms with SP or sign of suspension and unavailable data of daily returns. We 
also obtained the first SEO of each company to avoid any overlapping in the sample. 
Having organised our initial sample following Seiler (2004), we have 126 companies 
issuing via common stock to be applied in our examination. 
 
We have excluded one firm (LL, see Appendix 3 for its name in full) because there 
are some SP signs during the post-issuing period (one year). This reduces our final 
sample to 125 companies. Among the 125 firms, we still have four different issuing 
methods as in our previous chapters; namely, rights issuing (XR) with 52 firms, 
private placement (PP) with 52 firms, stock dividend (SD) with 22 companies and 
public offering (PO) with 2 companies
150
. As in our earlier studies, our sample size 
here is different from the existing literature. It clearly shows that there are only two 
companies in our sample issuing new equities via PO, while the previous SEO works 
in both developed and emerging markets (e.g. Soucik and Allen, 1999a; Clarke et al., 
2001; Mathew, 2002; Lyandres et al., 2005; Brown et al., 2009; Lin and Tsai, 2010) 
tend to focus only on PO. In general, the companies issuing new shares with PO in 
Thailand are small in number. We confirm this from some of the SEO literature in 
Thailand. For instance, Prangthawat (2002) has only 11 firms in her study during the 
period of 1996 to 2000 in Thailand. Similarly, we found only three companies in our 
initial sample between 1999 and 2006 in Thailand. Therefore, these two firms in the 
sample size for PO could lead to a bias in the evidence of post-issuing performance, 
because the outcomes would be based only on them. As a result, our hypothesis when 
                                                 
150
 There are three firms (namely, ITD, KTP and SORKON – see Appendix 3 for their names in full) 
which use two different issuing methods at the same time. Therefore, the total sample when combined 
with the four subsamples does not correspond to the total of 125 firms. 
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considering the method of PO separately does not provide the best reflection of a PO 
case in practice.  
 
The explanation in this case is that issuing new shares with PO appears to entail a 
high cost of issuing and needs to be approved by the SEC (Securities Exchange 
Commission). The process of being approved could take longer than issuing to 
existing shareholders, XR for instance. This is because firms using XR to issue shares 
are allowed to issue new shares to the existing shareholders without any permission 
from the SEC, unless the company issues new shares in the same proportion to each 
existing shareholder who currently holds those shares in the firm (see section 3.2.4.1, 
regarding the notification KorChor.12/2543). Furthermore, although issuing with PP 
is also subject to gaining permission from the SEC, according to the 
KorChor.12/2543, it is related with the co-equal benefit between the issuing firms and 
the institutional investors. 
 
We defined our post-issuing performance period of one year, following the 
clarification of Kothari and Warner (2006) that the long-term prospect can be referred 
to as the event-window for one year onward. We find the reason for this to be that the 
Thai capital market has a low level of liquidity, and is highly volatile and sensitive to 
events. To illustrate this, we refer to the statistic of the SET that the market size in 
Thailand measured via market capitalisation is clearly smaller than our neighbouring 
markets, such as Singapore and Malaysia, as of December 2004
151
. Although the 
                                                 
151
 The information was obtained from the article by the SET (SET NOTE): “How market capitalisation 
and P/E ratio increase” (in Thai). The Stock Exchange of Thailand Issue 3/2006, available online at 
http://www.set.or.th/th/product_services/research/setnote_p1.html  [Accessed on 2 June 2010].  
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market itself seems to have a relatively high share turnover velocity (as a proxy for 
liquidity at around 84%, higher than Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia and the 
Philippines)
152
, the trend began to decline after 2003. This should have led to the 
market having less liquidity. The small amount of free-float in the market is another 
reason that causes the market to have less liquidity
153
. 
 
With the high number of individual investors, the volatility and sensitivity to events in 
the market are revealed to be at a high level. According to the statistic provided by the 
SET (as of 31 August 2009), around 64 per cent on average represents the number of 
individual investors in the past decade, while only 25 per cent on average represents 
the number of institutional investors. These individual investors usually follow 
rumours (trading without investment knowledge) and the economic factors: e.g. the 
GDP growth, the exchange rate, the oil prices and the current situations in the country, 
such as political uncertainty (Kasikorn Research Centre, 2006)
154
. Moreover, the 
trading in portfolios to make profits is another important reason that makes the Thai 
stock market highly volatile. The Kasikorn Research Centre (2006) indicates that 
these foreign investors have a huge amount of capital to invest in the market. When 
they invest in some blue-chip companies, it causes substantial changes in the market 
index. This is because since the Thai stock market is small, an increase in the share 
                                                 
152
 Source: World Federation of Exchange as of 31 July 2009. 
153
 Source: Kasikorn Research Centre (2006) The role of foreign investors in the Thai stock market 
(in Thai). Vol. 12, Issue 1890. Available via the CD-Rom of Kasikorn Research Centre or its summary 
via: http://www.kasikornresearch.com/TH/K-Econ [Accessed on 12 April 2011]. 
154
 Kasikorn Research Centre (2006) The Thai stock market in the remaining period of the year: 
waiting for the new foreign cash flow (in Thai). Vol. 12, Issue 1871. Available on the CD-Rom by 
Kasikorn Research Centre or its summary via: http://www.kasikornresearch.com/TH/K-Econ. 
[Accessed on 12 April 2011]. 
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prices of a few blue-chip companies causes an impact on the main composite index 
and other indices
155
.  
 
A longer period, if applied, should not reflect the actual evidence of the results of the 
SEO announcement
156
. In addition, the sample size turns out to be relatively small due 
to the availability of listed companies. Our sample size of 125 companies is clearly far 
behind the existing studies mentioned earlier in the area of long-term performance, 
such as Barber and Lyon (1997a) at 10,000, Teoh et al. (1998b) at 1,248, Spiess and 
Affleck-Graves (1999) at 2,229, Hertzel et al. (2002) at 619 and Lyandres et al. 
(2005) with 8,126 samples. Nonetheless, our sample size of 125 companies provides a 
slightly higher number of firms than the previous studies in Thailand and some Asia-
Pacific countries, e.g. the study by Limpaphayom and Ngamwutikul (2004), which 
had only 62 firms for their sample size, Anderson and Rose (2006) with 55 firms in 
New Zealand and Lin and Tsai (2010) with 93 firms in Taiwan. A summary of our 
sample is shown in Table 6.3. 
 
[Insert Table 6.3 here] 
 
We provide the estimation of the mean difference in size among each issuing method 
and total sample, as shown in Table 6.4 – panel A. This indicates clearly that there are 
                                                 
155
 This can be seen in the correlations of the changes in the industrial index and the new buy of foreign 
investors during the period of 2003 to 2006, that there are high correlations among the industries that 
have high market capitalisation. These industries are Resources, Financial groups, Property and 
Telecommunications. The figures of the correlations are between 0.31 and 0.41. The information is 
taken from Kasikorn Research Centre (2006) The role of foreign investors in the Thai stock market 
(in Thai). Vol. 12, Issue 1890. Available from the CD-Rom of the Kasikorn Research Centre or its 
summary via: http://www.kasikornresearch.com/TH/K-Econ [Accessed on 12 April 2011].  
156
 See further explanations mentioned in section 4.3.2.3 of Chapter 4. 
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no differences in the mean of the firm‟s size within our sample (insignificant results), 
except when the companies issue via SD (rejecting the null hypothesis). In other 
words, it is possible to explain that the firm sizes impact upon which issuing methods 
the companies will use to issue new shares. According to Tables 6.3 and 6.4 – panel 
A, it can be inferred from the average size that small firms in Thailand would prefer to 
issue via SD. This leads to the endogenetic problem. However, with close 
consideration to the real time trading in the SET and the behaviour of listed 
companies, this endogenetic problem should not be a case to which more attention 
needs to be paid.  
 
[Insert Table 6.4 – panel A here] 
 
The descriptive statistics in Table 6.3 clearly show that the maximum size of SD firms 
is the smallest within our sample, at THB 23,488.28 million. If the above assumption 
was true (small firms tend to issue new shares via SD), the minimum size of the whole 
sample would be shown at THB122.35 million for SORKON, instead of THB71.07 
million for NEW
157
. We interpret the reason as being that in Thailand SD will be used 
as the issuing method when the companies would prefer to maintain the level of cash 
flow. This is because they have either unstable cash flow or poor performance. They 
need to use the dividend announcement to signal to the market that they are in the 
position of paying dividends to their shareholders, but those dividends will be paid in 
terms of common stocks. This method will have no incoming cash flow, while there is 
an increase in the number of shares outstanding. The companies which have a limited 
                                                 
157
 See Appendix 3 for the names in full. 
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capital (normally referred to as small- and medium-size firms) would prefer this 
method because they can retain their capital (less cash flow from financing); 
meanwhile, they are at least the companies that pay dividend. In addition, the 
investors or the shareholders are able to sell the stocks (from dividends) to receive 
capital gain. According to Thai law, this capital gain is tax-free, as it is the income 
from dividends
158
. Therefore, the larger companies or the blue chip companies would 
rather use issuing methods other than SD, because issuing via SD offers less incentive 
to their shareholders. In other words, issuing new shares with SD appears to be 
regarded as the dividend reason rather than the priority of offering new equities 
(indirect issuing new equities). Nevertheless, SD remains one of the issuing methods, 
since the number of shares outstanding increases although there is no incoming cash 
flow, as mentioned earlier. 
 
As a result, we can claim from the above explanations that it is unnecessary for small 
firms to issue new equities via SD. In Thailand, it depends on how well the companies 
perform in the period they require equity financing rather than the size of the firms 
(based on our results in Table 6.4 – panel A). Consequently, the endogenetic problem 
in our case should not be the case. 
 
6.3.2 Methodology 
In parallel with the estimations of long-term performance in SEO firms, most authors 
have offered many suggestions for measuring performance in the long-term. These 
methodologies are, for instance, the BHR, the CAR approach, the calendar-time 
                                                 
158
 If a cash dividend is paid, however, investors are taxed on it; see section 3.2.2.3 in Chapter 3. 
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approach, the Fama-French 3-factor model, Fama-MacBeth regression, the matching 
firm technique, or even the simulation method (see Barber and Lyon, 1997a; Kothari 
and Warner, 1997, 2006; Jegadeesh and Karceshi, 2004; Fu, 2006). Furthermore, 
these methodologies are also suggested in the IPO literature concerning long-term 
performance. Some examples of these papers are Ali (1996), Teoh et al. (1998a), 
Eckbo and Norli (2005) and Hoechle and Schmid (2007).  
 
From the previous literature, we find that the BHR (or BHAR: Buy-and-Hold 
Abnormal Return) approach seems to be the method mostly used for examining the 
long-term performance of SEO firms. Several studies adopted this approach in their 
research, including Kothari and Warner (1997, 2006), Barber and Lyon (1997a), Lyon 
et al. (1999), Byun and Rozeff (2003) and Eckbo et al. (2006). Regardless of the 
drawbacks of the BHR approach indicated in previous research (e.g. Barber and Lyon, 
1997a; Kothari and Warner, 1997; Fama, 1998), the arguments from these studies 
support the BHR approach as being the appropriate estimator for measuring post-
issuing performance in the long term (see also Mitchell and Stafford, 2000). Since we 
intend to examine the one year post-issuing performance, the BHR approach is 
identified to be the suitable estimator. This is supported in the statement of Ritter 
(1991, cited by Barber and Lyon, 1997a, p.344) that mean annual abnormal returns 
would be estimated via the BHR approach rather than the CAR approach, which is 
concerned with the monthly basis calculation. In addition, the BHR approach is 
claimed to be better than the periodic (monthly) rebalancing entailed in other 
approaches in order to measure the risk-adjusted performance (Kothari and Warner, 
2006, p.27). Moreover, with the examination of IPO performance in Thailand, 
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Chorruk and Worthington (2009, p.10) demonstrate that the BHR approach provides 
the deduction of the return on a corresponding benchmark (market, industry and 
sector index)
159
. Consequently, the BHR approach should be the suitable method for 
our examination of SEO post-issuing performance. Since Chorruk and Worthington 
(2009) also apply the BHR approach in a similar period to ours, this approach could 
be the appropriate one for Thailand. 
 
Nonetheless, Barber et al. (1996) and Barber and Lyon (1997a) report that the BHR 
approach contains bias, namely measurement bias, new listing bias and rebalancing 
bias
160
. We suspect that, to some extent, this bias may remain the appropriate 
preliminary measurement of the post-issuing performance in our study. However, 
although there are biases in the BHR approach, we suggest one potential explanation 
in order to continue using this approach, that our holding period (the post-issued 
period) is shorter than in other research. Thus, according to Mitchell and Stafford 
(1997, cited by Fama, 1998, p.294), BHR (or BHAR) can grow with the return 
horizon after the first year has passed; our study may not be affected in this case since 
we are concerned within the first period (first year). In addition, since the BHR 
approach is commonly used among practitioners and academic researchers, it should 
be worth beginning our measurement of post-issuing performance with the BHR 
approach as the introductory methodology in this area in Thailand, where our study is 
believed to be the first one to be based on the recent data set. Consequently, with 
                                                 
159
 Although the study of Chorruk and Worthington (2009) concerns the IPO sample, we notice from 
several studies (e.g. Teoh et al., 1998a; Eckbo and Norli, 2005; Hoechle and Schmid, 2007) that the 
methodologies of examining the IPO post-issuing performance show no substantial differences to those 
mentioned in our SEO literature (see section 6.2). 
160
 The rebalancing bias may not be the case if the data from Thailand are applied. This is because it 
will occur when the BHR is computed via the equally weighted index, while in Thailand there is only 
the value-weighted index. 
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regard to the above reasons, we will follow this well-known method in our 
investigation. 
 
A typical buy-and-hold experiment is defined by Eckbo et al. (2006, p.99) as 
involving buying the issuing firm‟s stock in the month following the issue month and 
holding the stock for a period from 3- 5 years or until delisting, whichever comes first. 
Nevertheless, we select the holding period of one year, according to Kothari and 
Warner (2006). The reason is that we focus mainly on the performance of the firms 
after their announcements of SEOs. If considering a longer period, it could be difficult 
to control other events. The Kasikorn Research Centre (2005 and 2006)
161
 reports that 
these events are not only the other events, such as the dividend announcements, the 
stock splits and the announcements of operating performance, but also external 
factors, e.g. the economic factors, the political situations and the investments of 
foreign investors. Furthermore, these events would play an important role and could 
influence the firm performance (Kasikorn Research Centre, 2005). For instance, when 
the political chaos began, the exchange rate and the money flows could have had an 
effect in terms of the loss in confidence from investors, particularly foreign ones. This 
should influence the growth of the firms, leading to a poor performance. Thus, 
employing many years for the longer period of post-issuing could bring our 
examination right into the centre of the chaos, when confidence began to fall. 
Alternatively, we could interpret this in another way, that using a three- or five-year 
                                                 
161
 Sources: (1) Kasikorn Research Centre (2005) The narrow movement in the Thai stock market 
and the risk factors (in Thai). Vol.11 Issue 1731, available from the CD-Rom of the Kasikorn 
Research Centre or its summary via: http://www.kasikornresearch/TH/K-Econ [Accessed on 17 March 
2011]; (2) Kasikorn Research Centre (2006) The Thai stock market in the remaining period of the 
year: waiting for new foreign cash flow (in Thai). Vol.12 Issue 187, available from the CD-Rom of 
the Kasikorn Research Centre or its summary via: http://www.kasikornresearch/TH/K-Econ [Accessed 
on 12 April 2011].  
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holding period in Thailand, as was done in previous literature, would not closely 
reflect the real performance of firms. This is mainly because of the high volatility in 
the market. In addition, with a relatively high level of sensitivity in the Thai capital 
market, companies might suffer from poor performance following the policy 
announcements of the government and related institutions (shock events) or other 
events, i.e. the effect of the announcement from the Bank of Thailand on reserves in 
capital investment in 2006. 
 
Not only does the paper of Kothari and Warner (2006) select a 1 year period as its 
long-term horizon, but other studies, such as those of Byun and Rozeff (2003) and 
Jegadeesh and Karceshi (2004), also apply the period of 1 year for their measurement 
of long-term performance. As a result, we will utilise the holding period after the first 
SEO of each company (day 0) for a further 1 year (12 months)
 162
. We apply the same 
calculation and estimation of BHAR as those suggested in several studies (e.g. Barber 
and Lyon, 1997a; Kothari and Warner, 1997, 2006; Mitchell and Stafford, 2000; Byun 
and Rozeff, 2003). The equation of BHARs and the test statistics are defined 
following Barber and Lyon (1997a) and Kothari and Warner (1997, 2006) as: 
     


T
t
tB
T
t
tii RRTtBHAR
1
,
1
, 11,    (6.1) 
n
BHAR
BHARt
BHAR
_     (6.2) 
where  TtBHARi ,  = BHAR of firm i during period t to T 
                                                 
162
 This means that we apply the period of the event window for 1 year. Since the SET has generally 20 
trading days per month on average, according to our study period 1999 to 2006, this period can also be 
reckoned as 240 trading days. 
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tiR ,  = Return of firm i at time t 
 tBR , = Return on benchmark portfolio which refers to the SET index 
(the main composite index). 
 BHAR = Average value of BHAR 
 
BHAR  = Standard deviation of BHAR and 
 n  = Sample size of each issuing method and total sample. 
 
Although the BHAR approach is mostly calculated together with the “matching firm” 
technique (e.g. Mathew, 2002), it would not be a suitable method for our study with 
the samples from Thailand. This is because, according to Eckbo et al. (2000, p.272), 
the matching firm technique is likely to generate abnormal performance by itself. 
Since there is high volatility in the market, the firm performance and the movement of 
stock prices could easily respond to the other events beside the SEO announcements 
(see Kasikorn Research Centre, 2005)
163
. Having the possibility of abnormal 
performance being generated in the technique, the evidence we have would not 
provide a real reflection of the post-issuing performance among SEO firms in 
Thailand in practice. Even though some studies in Thailand (i.e. Jirasetthakulchai, 
2000) apply the matching firm technique in their examination, they focus on different 
study periods and examine them with regard to the dividend announcements. 
Furthermore, the matching firm technique could lead to an inability to identify the 
difference between the holding-period returns of the issuing firms, the non-issuing 
firms and the abnormal performance (Eckbo et al., 2000). Since we examine the post-
                                                 
163
 This reference refers to the same source as previously mentioned on p.333. 
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issuing performance of SEO firms, we should know the differences between the 
returns of SEO and non-SEO firms in order to clearly identify their performances.  
 
In addition, other approaches (e.g. the calendar-time portfolio approach) do not appear 
to be appropriate methods for measuring post-issuing performance. Mitchell and 
Stafford (2000, p.289) suggest that the calendar-time portfolio approach may fail to 
measure significant abnormal returns if abnormal performance primarily exists in 
months of heavy event activity. This may not be suitable to apply to the data from 
Thailand because the market is relatively sensitive to most events occurring at the 
time. The high number of individual investors also causes the market to have very 
high volatility. As a result, events could become the heavy event activity in any period 
of time because of the high level of sensitivity and volatility in the market. 
Consequently, although there are some biases in the BHR approach, it is the 
appropriate approach for our study since the other approaches provide less reflection 
on the real post-issuing performance in practice in Thailand. Concerning equations 6.1 
and 6.2, we choose the market index (the SET index) as our benchmark. We also 
consider a different benchmark for our robustness test, which we will discuss later in 
section 6.4.2. 
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6.4 Empirical Results  
 
We consider two kinds of empirical results. First, the main findings are concerned 
with the results of using the BHAR approach on SEO companies with different 
issuing methods, where applicable. Second, we explain some alternatives to 
robustness estimations, such as using a different technique or different benchmark for 
the measurement of post-issuing performance. 
 
6.4.1 The Main Findings 
Having estimated our sample of 125 companies, we reveal the outcomes statistically 
in Table 6.5. 
 
[Insert Table 6.5 here] 
 
Beginning with results from the total sample, the average of BHARs is clearly 
presented at a negative value at -0.27001. This refers to the fact that the return moves 
to the negative side after the announcement date and the companies have 
underperformed during the holding period. Moreover, with the t-statistic at -4.44606, 
this shows a highly significant result, meaning that we do not reject the null 
hypothesis of underperformance in SEO firms during the post-issue period (see Table 
6.5 – panel A). In other words, the total sample of companies offering common stock 
did not underperform after the SEO announcements. In comparison to a previous 
study in Thailand, that of Chorruk and Worthington (2009), we have an interesting 
 338 
 
result to illustrate, although the evidence shows that with the IPO sample Thai IPO 
firms revealed no underperformance in the first 12 months, which is the same period 
as our SEO case. One potential reason is that there are different issuing methods. IPO 
firms in Thailand first issue new equities via public offering (PO) (bringing the public 
in to be owners), but SEO firms prefer to issue to the existing shareholders in order to 
raise the responsibility of the owners to expand their businesses.   
 
Furthermore, our findings appear to be at least consistent with those of the existing 
literature on long-term performance in Thailand. For instance, in the study of 
Prangthawat (2002), she indicates that companies (which have earning management 
around their SEOs) underperform only during the first year after their SEOs, while the 
reverse is true in the following year. This can imply that even though we considered a 
more recent period (1999 – 2006) in our study, during which SEOs were more 
popular, and the sample size is larger (see Table 6.1 for the percentage of our sample 
coverage compared with these two studies), SEO firms still underperform after the 
SEO announcements. 
 
When issuing methods are individually considered, we find that there are 
underperformances among the firms issuing by rights issuing (XR), private placement 
(PP) and stock dividend (SD). These are confirmed by the significance of t-statistics 
at -1.68122 (XR), -3.32862 (PP) and -3.46503 (SD), see Table 6.5 – panels B, C and 
D. Consequently, our hypothesis of underperformance in the post-issuing period is 
true when different samples of issuing methods are estimated. As a result, it can be 
claimed that no matter which issuing methods are used, they will cause companies to 
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underperform during the post-issuing period. However, the XR firms show the 
significant result at 10 per cent, instead of 1 per cent, as in the total sample, PP and 
SD. This could be explained by the fact that issuing new shares via XR may help 
companies to underperform less because the average BHAR is higher than the other 
cases. 
 
An alternative explanation, particularly for the PP firms, is that PP firms have the 
highest standard deviation among other issuing methods and the total sample. This 
could bring high volatility into the firms issuing new shares with PP. The reason is 
likely to be the co-equal benefit between the issuing firms and institutional investors 
(who are in relationship with the political parties in the coalition government)
164
. In 
addition, our results from PP firms show partly inconsistent evidence with the existing 
literature in the US, e.g. Hertzel et al. (2002) and Krishnamurthy et al. (2005), which 
suggests that there is no evidence of underperformance among the firms offering by 
PP. Nevertheless, our results report negative post-issuing performance (indicated at    
-0.32048, see Table 6.5 – panel C), which is consistent with the existing literature 
(namely Hertzel et al., 2002; Krishnamurthy et al., 2005). Therefore, we can claim 
that the aspect of post-issuing performance for companies issuing via PP is partly 
carried over to an emerging market such as Thailand. In contrast, our evidence of XR, 
PP and SD, including the total sample, is consistent with that of some of the literature 
relating to the Asia-Pacific region, such as Cai and Loughran (1998), Mathew (2002 – 
in Japan and Hong Kong), Brown et al. (2006, 2009) and Lin and Tsai (2010). This is 
                                                 
164
 See also the similar explanations in the previous chapters, i.e. section 4.4.4.3 and section 5.4.3. 
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possibly because these countries are in the same region, where the characteristics of 
the investments and investors are to some extent the same. 
 
With only two companies issuing via PO, the results are totally different from those of 
other cases. Not only is there a positive on average of BHAR (at 0.07158), but the t-
statistic of BHAR is insignificant (shown at 0.45331, see Table 6.5 – panel E), which 
necessitates rejection of our hypothesis of underperformance in the post-issuing 
period. This means that firms do not underperform where the PO is applied as issuing 
methods during the post-issuing period. Nevertheless, there could be bias in the 
results from the PO case since the sample consists of only two firms. Moreover, our 
evidence from Table 6.4 – panel B shows that there are mostly no differences in the 
performance (measured by the average BHAR) between the total sample and the three 
subsamples of issuing methods
165
. Although there is significance in the statistical 
value between XR and SD, it should not mean that the worst post-issuing performance 
of firms implies the issuing of new shares via SD. This is because the minimum 
average BHAR is shown in PRANDA (see Appendix 3 for the name in full), which 
issues via PP. Alternatively, we could explain that the SD firms would have the worst 
post-issuing performance (indicated as the most negative value of average BHAR at   
-0.44261, see Table 6.5 – panel D) because issuing new shares via SD is mostly used 
by the firms which have not performed well and need to maintain their cash flow. 
Consequently, with the poor performance and the fact that companies underperform 
after the SEOs, the SD firms would use the issuing method that is the most effective 
in their post-issuing performance. 
                                                 
165
 The subsample of PO was excluded due to a small sample size (only two companies). 
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[Insert Table 6.4 – panel B here] 
 
Even though our sample size is small in comparison to earlier studies in developed 
markets, our results, by applying a similar methodology, remain mostly consistent 
with theirs, in that there are underperformances during the post-event period (e.g. 
Teoh et al., 1998b; Soucik and Allen, 1999b). This suggests that the out-of-sample 
estimations (e.g. Thailand) carry a similar aspect to the evidence in developed markets 
and are also consistent with the studies in the Asia-Pacific region (such as Japan and 
Hong Kong). However, we have some difficulties in comparing our evidence with 
other studies in Thailand, since few papers are available. We know from one study 
concerning SEO, Prangthawat (2002), that there is an underperformance of SEO firms 
during the first year after the issuing. This is consistent with our case, according to our 
statistical values, except for the firms which issued via PO. Since there are various 
methodologies for measuring post-issuing performance, we use these, i.e. applying 
different benchmarks or methodologies, as our robustness test in the following 
section. 
 
6.4.2 Robustness Tests 
As indicated in Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1999), obtaining a different benchmark is 
also possible as an alternative method for measuring post-issuing performance. We 
consider changing our benchmark to the sector index of the SET. The reason is that 
there are several companies in the SET and they are running different kinds of 
businesses. Focusing on each sector would lead us to particular concerns with the 
firms which are doing the same types of business. In other words, with the 
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consideration of the sector index, we would have a more specific reflection of the 
companies if they underperform after the issuing of new shares. This is because 
different sectors (businesses) may have different characteristics. For instance, 
according to the SET statistics, the firms in sectors ENERG, MINE, PROP, COMM 
and ICT are among those which have high market capitalisation (around 59 per cent 
of the total market capitalisation)
166
.  
 
Since we notice from our previous evidence that size is one of the factors which 
influences the SEO stock price reaction, a slight change in stock price due to the 
change in size could easily impact the stock market as a whole (Kasikorn Research 
Centre, 2006)
167
. Thus, if this is true, the substantial impact will be seen only in their 
sector and the entire market would not be fully affected by the change. We recall 
equations 6.1 and 6.2 with the use of sector as the benchmark, instead of the market 
index. The estimate sample size is reduced to 119 companies for the total sample: 51 
firms in XR, 50 firms in PP, 19 firms in SD and 2 firms in PO. This is because there 
are some companies which are in the SET sector called “Industrial Material and 
Machinery (IMM)”. This sector is a new one and first began trading in 2006168. 
 
                                                 
166
 The abbreviations of sectors refer to Table 3.1 in Chapter 3. The figure is roughly taken from the 
SETSMART as of 31 July 2008. The industry “RESOURC” contains the highest percentage, at 33 per 
cent of total market capitalisation. This is followed by FINANCIAL (at 18 per cent), PROPCON (at 13 
per cent) and SERVICE and TECH (at 11 per cent each). See the full names and lists of sectors in each 
industry in Table 3.1.  
167
 Kasikorn Research Centre (2006) The role of foreign investors in the Thai stock market (in 
Thai). Vol. 12 Issue 1890, available from the CD-Rom from the Kasikorn Research Centre or the 
summaries via: http://www.kasikornresearch/TH/K-Econ [Accessed 12 April 2011].  
168
 There are 25 sectors in 8 industries in the SET, as mentioned in Chapter 3 (see Table 3.1). This 
classification of sectors in the SET was mainly re-organised in January 2004 and we continue to re-
arrange the listed companies into those sectors where applicable. The IMM sector was first introduced 
in July 2006 (first trading on 3 July 2006), with all 23 companies falling into this sector (information 
has been updated to May 2009). 
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Hence, revised equation 6.1 will be as follows: 
     


T
t
tB
T
t
tii RRTtBHAR
1
,
1
, 11,
   (6.3) 
n
BHAR
BHARt
BHAR
_     (6.4) 
where  TtBHARi ,  = BHAR of firm i during period t to T 
 tiR ,  = Return of firm i at time t 
tBR , = Return on benchmark portfolio which refers to each of the 
sectors in the SET in which the SEO firms are located 
 BHAR  = Average value of BHAR 
 BHAR  = Standard deviation of BHAR and 
 n  = Sample size of each issuing method and total sample 
 
The results reveal that the SEO firms in the total sample, including when the firms 
issue via XR, PP and SD, underperform during the post-issuing period. We confirm 
the results by the significant t-statistics in all cases (except the PO) and the negative 
average BHAR (see Table 6.6 – panel A to D). These findings are consistent with our 
prior estimation with the use of market index as the benchmark and also the existing 
literature (e.g. Dhatt et al., 1996; Cai and Loughran, 1998; Mathew, 2002; Brown et 
al., 2009; Lin and Tsai, 2010). Nonetheless, our outcome in the PO firms remains 
unchanged, to reject the hypothesis of underperformance in the post-issuing period 
(see Table 6.6 – panel E). This finding appears to be biassed since the post-issuing 
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performances tend to be based only on two firms issuing via this method (PO). 
Furthermore, the results from the test of difference in the performance when the sector 
index is used report that there are no differences in the post-issuing performance 
between the total sample and the three subsamples (see Table 6.4 – panel C). Hence, 
different issuing methods do not cause the firms to underperform. One explanation is 
that it is because of the consideration of the sector index, where it groups the firms 
that have the same types of businesses together. When there are the changes of factors 
which particularly impact on this specific type of business, this impact would be in 
that sector and cause less interruption to the market as a whole. 
 
[Insert Table 6.4 – panel C and Table 6.6 here] 
 
In addition, not only is the sector index of the SET considered as a different 
benchmark, but we also consider changing our benchmark to the MSCI World 
Index
169
. We assume that if the Thai capital market is relevant, we should obtain a 
similar outcome when using MSCI as a benchmark. However, there are several 
indices in the MSCI World Index, of both developed and emerging markets. The 
MSCI, which is mostly related to Thailand, is “MSCI AC Far East Free ex Japan”170. 
                                                 
169
 The MSCI refers to The Morgan Stanley Capital Investment, also known as the World Index. It is a 
stock market index of 1,500 world stocks, maintained by MSCI Inc. This index is often used as a 
common benchmark for world or global stock funds. The World Index covers 23 countries: Australia, 
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Ireland, Italy, 
Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the 
United Kingdom and the United States [Accessed via: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MSCI_world, on 6 
February 2010]. 
170
 This index covers nine countries: China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand. The information about using MSCI AC Far East ex 
Japan as the most relevant index to Thailand is given by the Thanachart Fund of Thanachart Bank 
[Accessed via: http://www.thanachartfund.com/webboard/question.asp?QID=1569, Thai version, on 3 
December 2007, cited on 11 November 2009]. 
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Since we previously applied the SET index in our BHAR equation, we planned to 
examine the robustness via the index of MSCI AC Far East ex Japan. Unfortunately, 
there is no daily data available for the full study period of 1999 to 2006. In fact, the 
daily prices of the MSCI AC Far East ex Japan are available from June 2002. This 
would not entirely cover our study period. Therefore, with the use of daily stock 
prices (to calculate the daily returns) in our study, the MSCI AC Far East ex Japan 
would not be appropriate to apply in our robustness test
171
.  
 
Besides the use of different benchmarks as the robustness test, we also turn to other 
approaches. Barber and Lyon (1997a, p.358) measure and examine long-term 
performance with both the BHAR and CAR approaches. Ritter (1991, cited by Barber 
and Lyon, 1997a, p.344), suggests that it is reasonable to obtain CARs to measure 
long-term performance. His discussions reveal that CARs should be suitable for the 
test of the mean monthly ARs of a sample firm. This could be the case for our study, 
because our holding period is one year or 12 months, which could to some extent still 
relate to a monthly basis. In addition, applying the CAR approach, we would see the 
difference in the outcomes (according to Barber and Lyon, 1997a, p.345) if there is 
the effect of monthly compounding; CARs ignore compounding, while BHARs 
include its effect. Furthermore, although Chorruk and Worthington (2009) examine 
the IPO sample in Thailand, their results on long-term performance are estimated by 
using CAR, together with BHR and Wealth Relative. As a consequence, we follow 
these suggestions for estimating CARs in order to capture post-issuing performance as 
                                                 
171
 We have found that the similar indices in MSCI (e.g. the MSCI AC Pacific and MSCI Asia ex 
Japan) have the same availabilities of daily data. See the MSCI website for further information: 
http://www.msci.com/products/indices/performance.html [Accessed 30 April 2011]. 
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an alternative approach for our robustness check. The calculation of CARs remains 
that of applying the market model, as in our previous chapter on stock price reaction 
(see section 4.3.2 in Chapter 4). Therefore, CARs are estimated as follows: 
n
CAR
CARt
CA R
iT

_        (6.5)172 
where  
iTCAR  = Average value of CAR 
 CAR  = Standard deviation of CAR and 
 n  = Sample size of each issuing method and total sample. 
 
The results of CARs demonstrate in Table 6.7 that the firms are underperforming in 
the total sample and when they issue new shares via PP. This is shown by the 
significant t-statistics at -1.75811 for the total sample and -3.34812 for PP (see Table 
6.7 – panel A and C). Thus, these findings are consistent with our prior estimations 
when the BHAR approach is applied. In addition, the average CAR in the PP firms is 
the lowest in value at -0.24759 (see Table 6.7 – panel C). This could imply that 
considering the CAR approach, the firms would show the worst underperformance 
during the post-issuing period when issuing new shares via PP, while in the XR firms 
there would be no underperformance. To support this, we claim the significant result 
in the test of difference in performance between the total sample and the three 
subsamples (see Table 6.4 – panel D). In the XR and SD firms, we found a difference 
in the outcomes, that there is no underperformance among the firms when they issue 
new shares via these two methods. This could be the difference, according to Barber 
                                                 
172
 This equation is as mentioned in Barber and Lyon (1997a, p.358). 
 347 
 
and Lyon (1997a, p.345), regarding the monthly compounding, as mentioned earlier. 
However, the average CAR in the SD firms is negative in value (at -0.11750, see 
Table 6.7 – panel D). This could mean that the SD firms would slightly underperform 
during the post-issuing period, while the XR firms show no evidence of 
underperformance since there is a positive average CAR and insignificant t-statistics. 
 
[Insert Table 6.4 – panel D and Table 6.7 here] 
 
Moreover, a firm issuing via PO is another case to provide significant evidence. We 
claim that the companies could have underperformed when they issued new shares 
with PO. If this is the case, our findings might be consistent with the studies in 
Thailand, such as Prangthawat (2002) and Chorruk and Worthington (2009). 
Nevertheless, there would be again some bias due to the small sample size (only two 
companies). Therefore, our evidence under the CAR approach is partly robust with 
the evidence of the BHAR approach since we find the XR and SD firms have not 
underperformed during the post-issuing period. 
 
6.4.3 Summary of Empirical Results 
Our results indicate that there is underperformance of SEO firms during the post-
issuing period in Thailand. With different samples of issuing methods, the evidence is 
unchanged. This is consistent with the previous literature, particularly that examining 
the data in the Asia-Pacific region (e.g. Dhatt et al., 1996; Cai and Loughran, 1998; 
Brown et al., 2006; Lin and Tsai, 2010). When the sector index is applied as a 
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different benchmark for the robustness test, our results provide the same conclusions 
that SEO firms underperform during the post-issuing period. Nevertheless, when we 
estimate the post-issuing performance with a different approach (the CAR approach), 
we have slightly changed results. While the outcomes of the total sample and PP firms 
are consistent with the BHAR approach, the XR and SD firms reveal no 
underperformance during the post-issuing period. In addition, examining with the 
BHAR approach would contain some biases, e.g. new listing bias, measurement bias 
and other event bias (Barber and Lyon, 1997a). However, although the BHAR 
approach has the possibility of bias, this approach would be the appropriate method to 
be used since the alternative approaches (e.g. matching firm technique and calendar-
time portfolio approach) do not appear to be applicable to our study in Thailand due to 
their drawbacks. 
 
 
6.5 Conclusions  
 
Following the suggestions of several studies (e.g. Barber and Lyon, 1997a; Kothari 
and Warner, 1997, 2006), we use the BHAR (or BHR) approach in order to measure 
the post-issuing performance of firms. The evidence demonstrates that there is 
underperformance among Thai SEO firms, whatever their issuing methods. The same 
results remain when different samples of issuing methods are individually brought 
into consideration. These are consistent with the existing literature on emerging 
markets and the Asia-Pacific region. However, only companies issuing with “public 
offering” display the possibility of no underperformance during the post-issuing 
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period. The main explanation of the difference in these findings is the relatively small 
sample of public offering firms.  Moreover, our results are also unchanged when we 
examine the BHAR approach with a different benchmark, namely the sector index. 
This would make our findings more specific to the real post-issuing performance 
because the benchmark focuses on the firms which have similar businesses (each 
sector). Applying the CAR approach as another robustness test also reveals that we 
provide the same evidence as when using the BHAR approach only with the firms in 
the total sample and the firms issuing via private placement. When we examine the 
sample of rights issuing and stock dividend, the companies do not underperform 
during the post-issuing period. 
 
Although there are alternative approaches to measuring the post-issuing performance 
of SEO firms besides the BHAR approach, their drawbacks and their concerns do not 
appear to be appropriate to our study. These are, for instance, the failure to measure 
the significant abnormal return in the calendar-time portfolio approach and providing 
a slight reflection in practice in the matching firm technique. However, since we are 
the first study in Thailand in this area (post-issuing performance) with recent data, as 
far as we are concerned our study would carry over from the existing literature, which 
considers the data in developed markets. 
 
We close this chapter by pointing out some practical implications of the evidence for 
investors and firm managers in Thailand. First, the results of our study into post-
issuing performance could benefit investors in order to assist their investment 
decisions. They would prefer to know how the companies perform after the SEO 
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announcements and whether they are worth investing in. Furthermore, managers will 
be able to decide whether different issuing methods of SEOs can cause the companies 
to underperform during the post-issuing period. However, the decisions in this case 
may to some extent be in conflict with what the managers prefer to do during the 
issuing period. 
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Table 6.1: Summary of previous literature and the percentage of sample coverage compared with the existing Thai SEO studies 
The table presents the summaries of existing literature on long-term performance of SEOs and related matters in Thailand (Panel A), Asia-Pacific regions (Panel B) 
and other markets (Panel C). The sample coverage of our study in this chapter is calculated as a percentage of the relevant sample obtained in previous research in 
Thailand during the same study period of 1999 to 2006. 
 
AUTHORS MARKET PERIOD SAMPLE 
SAMPLE 
COVERAGE 
OBJECTIVE FINDINGS 
Panel A: Literature in Thailand 
Jirasetthakulchai (2000) Thailand 1977 – 1997 65 N/A To examine the effect of dividend 
announcements on public offering of 
equity. 
The larger the firm size, the more 
negative the ARs from equity 
offering. 
Prangthawat (2002) Thailand 1996 – 2000 115 Sample includes 60 firms 
from 1996-2000, coverage at 
52.17%. 
To investigate whether earning 
management and the timing of SEOs 
can explain subsequent poor 
performance 
Negative relationship between 
discretionary accruals and operating 
performance of firms after SEOs. 
Lertsupongkit (2002) Thailand 1994 – 2001 59 Sample includes 74 firms 
from 1994-2001, coverage at 
100.00%. 
To examine the stock price reaction to 
the announcement of SEOs. 
Negative stock price reaction after the 
SEO announcements. 
Ngamwutikul (2002) Thailand 1991 – 1994  62 N/A To examine operating performance in 
SEO firms during the pre- and post-
offering periods. 
Poor operating performance after the 
SEOs of sample firms, measured by 
three proxies: ROA, ROE and Tobin‟s 
q / The asymmetric information in 
Thailand remains the major impact on 
operating performance.  
Limpaphayom & 
Ngamwutikul (2004) 
Thailand 1991 – 1994  62 N/A To examine the post-issue operating 
performance. 
More shares are offered when the 
expectation of operating performance 
is worse. Future prospects of issuing 
firms are signalled by using issue 
proceeds. 
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AUTHORS MARKET PERIOD SAMPLE 
SAMPLE 
COVERAGE 
OBJECTIVE FINDINGS 
Vithessonthi (2008) Thailand 1997 – 2006  115 (only non-
financial firms) 
Sample includes 173 firms 
from 1997-2006, coverage at 
100.00%. 
To examine the changes in the 
authorised common stock (PIAC) and 
how it can affect stock prices. 
PIAC, on average, conveys 
information to the market / The larger 
the firm that announces a PIAC, the 
lower the CAR around the 
announcement. 
Panel B: Literature in Asia-Pacific Regions 
Dhatt et al. (1996) Korea 1977 – 1991  791 N/A To examine market reactions to a 
large sample of clean rights issues 
over a 15-year period. 
Negative ARs in the post-issuing 
months.  Market reaction to Korean 
rights issues is more positive for firms 
with greater fall in leverage. 
Cai & Loughran (1998) Japan 1971 – 1992  1,389 N/A To investigate the long-term stock and 
operating performance of SEO firms. 
SEO firms underperform in the long 
term. Younger firms seem more 
severe. Also, poor operating 
performance revealed in the sample. 
Soucik & Allen (1999a) Australia Jan. 1984 – Oct. 
1993 
137 N/A To examine the long-term 
performance of SEO firms. 
Significant positive initial returns in 
SEO firms, and a relationship 
between the extent of initial returns 
and subsequent underperformance. 
Soucik & Allen (1999b) Australia Jan. 1984 – Oct. 
1993  
94 N/A To investigate the relationship 
between a company‟s beta and the 
extent of post-issue 
underperformance, and to reassess 
factors affecting post-issue 
performance whilst controlling for 
risk. 
SEO firms underperform more than 
non-issuers over the extended long-
term period 
Foerster & Korolyi (2000) Hong Kong 
 Indonesia 
Korea 
The Philippines 
Singapore 
Taiwan 
Thailand 
1982 – 1996  333 N/A To provide an analysis of the 
investment performance of non-U.S. 
firms through GEO. 
Both DRs mkt liquidity and local mkt 
liquidity are significantly positively 
related to long-term return 
performance. 
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AUTHORS MARKET PERIOD SAMPLE 
SAMPLE 
COVERAGE 
OBJECTIVE FINDINGS 
Mathew (2002) Japan 
Korea 
Hong Kong 
1997 – 1992  
1979 – 1992  
1982 – 1992  
744 
415 
313 
N/A To examine and discuss the 
relationship between the long-term 
performance of the SEOs and the 
regulatory-organisational structure. 
Japan: older firms perform better 
than younger firms. Korea: negative 
long-term ARs are caused by the 
firms that generate the greatest 
increase in number of shares 
outstanding. H.K.: use of asymmetric 
information theory to issue equity 
when the share prices are 
undervalued. 
Brown et al. (2006) Australia 1993 – 2001 3,650 N/A To examine the relation between pre-
SEO announcement date 
misevaluation and long-term post-
SEO performance. 
Both mean and median long-term AR 
(BHAR) are negative and are 
magnified as the holding period 
lengthens. 
Brown et al. (2009) Australia 1992 – 2006  2,941 N/A To examine (1) relationship of 
corporate governance vs. firm 
performance and (2) whether good 
corporate governance mitigates post-
issue underperformance. 
The larger the company, the greater 
the long-term underperformance. 
Lin & Tsai (2010) Taiwan 2001 – 2006  93 N/A To analyse the long-term investment 
performance of employee stock 
options (ESO) issued for employee 
compensation programmes. 
Asymmetric information could cause 
the company with issuing ESO to 
have poor long-term investment. 
Panel C: Literature on other markets 
Healy & Palepu (1990) U.S. 1963 – 1981  128 N/A To examine the hypothesis of a 
decline of stock price at SEO 
announcements. 
When business risk of firms increases, 
a probability of financial distress 
seems to move together; then, 
financial leverage is reduced when 
firms issue common stock. 
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AUTHORS MARKET PERIOD SAMPLE 
SAMPLE 
COVERAGE 
OBJECTIVE FINDINGS 
Teoh et al. (1998b) U.S. Jan. 1970 – Sept. 
1989 
1,248 N/A To examine whether unusually 
aggressive management of earning 
through income-increasing accounting 
adjustments leads investors to be 
overly optimistic about the issuer‟s 
prospects. 
Poor post-issue performance is 
partially explained in the pre-issue 
earnings management of seasoned 
new issuers. 
Herizel et al. (2002) U.S. 1980 – 1996  619 N/A Investigating the stock price and 
operating performance of firms 
conducting private equity issues. 
Private placements of equity, like 
public equity issues, take place when 
investors appear willing to overpay 
for the firm‟s equity. 
Krishnamurthy et al. (2005) U.S. 1983 – 1992  2,351 
(397 PPs) 
N/A To examine the relation between stock 
price performance and the identity of 
the investor buying the shares in 
private placement of equity. 
Both firms placing their equity and 
those issuing equity publicly exhibit 
significant positive ARs in the year 
prior to the equity issue.  The firms 
engaging in PPs of unregistered 
shares are required to indicate 
explicitly the restricted nature of the 
shares at the time of the placement. 
Lyandres et al. (2005) U.S.  1970 – 2003  8,126 N/A To study long-term underperformance 
following SEOs. 
Equity issuers invest much more than 
matching non-issuers both before and 
after issuance. 
Eckbo et al. (2006) U.S. 1980 – 2004  83,282 N/A To review and extend evidence on the 
performance of issuing firms in the 5 
year post-issue period. 
The long term performance of issuer 
is biased downward owing to a high 
expected return in benchmark. 
This study  Thailand 1999 – 2006  125 N/A 
To examine the performance of 
SEO firms during the post-issuing 
period. 
Expecting to have 
underperformance of SEO firms 
during the post-issued. 
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Table 6.2: Previous evidence of long-term SEO performance in Thailand and Asia-Pacific countries 
The table shows the summary of the findings of the existing literature on long-term SEO performance in 
Thailand and Asia-Pacific countries, together with the expectation of our study in this chapter. (+) refers 
to over-performance, (-) refers to underperformance and (0) refers to no underperformance. 
 
Authors Country Firm Performance Notes 
Dhatt et al. (1996) Korea - 
Through rights issuing 
during post-offering 
period. 
Cai & Loughran (1998) Japan - 
To be considered with age 
of firms 
Soucik & Allen (1999a) Australia 0  
Soucik & Allen (1999b) Australia -  
Mathew (2002) 
Japan 
Korea 
Hong Kong 
- 
+ 
- 
Post-offering period 
Prangthawat (2002) Thailand -/+ 
- in first year, + in second 
year 
Limpaphayom & Ngamwutikul 
(2004) 
Thailand 0 
SEOs help operating 
performance to be 
improved 
Brown et al. (2009) Australia - 
Consider relation to 
corporate governance 
Lin & Tsai (2010) Taiwan - 
Employee Stock Option 
firms 
Our expectation Thailand - Post-issue period 
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Table 6.3: Table of sample size in the post-issuing estimation 
The table shows the summaries of sample size in our examinations of post-issuing performance after 
issuing new shares, together with different samples of issuing methods. The total sample refers to the 
sample size in total, regardless of the issuing methods. XR is defined as firms using rights issuing as their 
issuing method. PP is firms issuing newly shares via private placement. SD is defined as the firms issuing 
by stock dividend. PO refers to the firms using public offering as the issuing method. The average size is 
measured by average market capitalisation in million Thai Baht during the study period 1999 to 2006. 
The companies represented in each category are shown in parentheses and the full names of the 
companies are shown Appendix 3. The age of each firm was obtained from the number of months since 
the company first traded on the market. Average daily returns are the average of daily returns during the 
study period obtained from the SETSMART. Average Ownership is measured by the average of the top 
five major shareholders. Average turnover ratio is taken directly from the SETSMART: 
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. Industrial groups are the groups shown in the SET Index and 
contain (apart from the financial ones) the Agro and Food Industry (AGRO), Consumer Products 
(CONSUMP), Industrials (INDUS), Property and Construction (PROPCON), Resources (RESOURC), 
Services (SERVICE) and Technology (TECH). 
 
 
Sample Size Total Sample XR PP SD PO 
Average Size 8,399.61 7,751.50 10,627.94 2,227.51 32,880.78 
Maximum Size 
176,237.72 
(ADVANC) 
93,552.06  
(PTTCH) 
176,237.72  
(ADVANC) 
23,488.28  
(CPF) 
64,416.73  
(THAI) 
Minimum Size 
71.07  
(NEW) 
71.07  
(NEW) 
122.35  
(SORKON) 
122.35  
(SORKON) 
1,344.84  
(S&P) 
Average Age 
(months) 
99 100 94 108 145 
Average Daily 
Returns 
-0.00033 -0.00030 -0.00018 -0.00082 0.00033 
Average 
Ownership 
10.86635 10.69251 10.46116 12.42480 11.82200 
Average Turnover 
Ratio 
0.00570 0.00471 0.00742 0.00427 0.00080 
Number of Firms in each Industrial Group: 
AGRO 20 6 6 8 1 
CONSUMP 13 7 4 2 - 
INDUS 21 9 7 5 - 
PROPCON 24 11 14 1 - 
RESOURC 8 2 5 1 - 
SERVICE 24 11 8 4 1 
TECH 14 6 7 1 - 
TOTAL 125 52 52 22 2 
 
Note: Three firms (namely, ITD, KTP and SORKON) use two different issuing methods at the same time. ITD and KTP use XR and PP. SORKON applies PP and 
SD for its issuing methods. The full names of the companies are shown in Appendix 3. The market capitalisations were originally in the local currency (Thai baht: 
THB) and converted to US dollars at the rate (approximately) of THB 33.50 / USD 1.00. The total raw may not correspond to the summaries of each issuing 
method and each industry. The reason is that not only are there three firms issuing with two methodologies at the same time, the firm (USC – see full name in 
Appendix 3) is not categorised in any industries. In other words, there is no information on which industry and sector USC is located in.  
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Table 6.4: The two-sample t-test of sample size in the post-issuing estimation 
The tables show the two-sample t-test in the post-issuing estimation. Panel A presents the table of the 
results from the mean difference of size (measured by market capitalisation) estimation among the total 
sample and each issuing method. Panel B shows the two-sample t-test of average BHAR by market index 
between the total sample (125 firms) and three subsamples of issuing methods for SEO post-issuing 
performance. Panel C shows the two-sample t-test of average BHAR by sector index between the total 
sample (119 firms) and three subsamples of issuing methods for SEO post-issuing performance. Panel D 
shows the two-sample t-test of average CAR between the total sample (125 firms) and three subsamples 
of issuing methods as the robustness for SEO post-issuing performance.  XR stands for rights issuing. PP 
stands for private placement. SD stands for stock dividend. PO stands for public offering. The null 
hypothesis under this estimation indicates that there is no difference in the mean between the two 
samples. The degree of freedom is shown in parentheses and calculated by:
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PANEL A 
 
 Total XR PP SD PO 
Total 1.0000     
XR 
0.2812 
(117) 
1.0000    
PP 
-0.5124 
(77) 
-0.6817 
(84) 
1.0000   
SD 
2.6205*** 
(119) 
1.9074 
(497) 
2.0644** 
(55) 
1.0000  
PO 
-0.7515 
(1) 
-0.7788 
(1) 
-0.6776 
(1) 
-0.9454 
(1) 
1.0000 
 
* Significant at 10% level, ** Significant at 5% level, *** Significant at 1% level 
 
 
 
 
PANEL B 
 
 Total XR PP SD 
Total 1.0000    
XR 
1.0038 
(96) 
1.0000   
PP 
-0.4434 
(94) 
-1.2100 
(102) 
1.0000  
SD 
-1.2203 
(32) 
-1.7968* 
(45) 
-0.7635 
(46) 
1.0000 
 
* Significant at 10% level, ** Significant at 5% level, *** Significant at 1% level 
 
Note: We have excluded the firms issuing via PO from the two-sample t-test of average BHAR via market index, average BHAR 
via sector index and average CAR because they contain only two companies.  
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PANEL C 
 
 Total XR PP SD 
Total 1.0000    
XR 
0.5102 
(108) 
1.0000   
PP 
-0.3219 
(85) 
-0.6877 
(94) 
1.0000  
SD 
-0.3059 
(24) 
-0.5826 
(29) 
-0.0702 
(35) 
1.0000 
 
* Significant at 10% level, ** Significant at 5% level, *** Significant at 1% level 
 
Note: We have excluded the firms issuing via PO from the two-sample t-test of average BHAR via market index, average BHAR 
via sector index and average CAR because they contain only two companies.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PANEL D 
 
 Total XR PP SD 
Total 1.0000    
XR 
0.9726 
(84) 
1.0000   
PP 
-1.3696 
(128) 
-1.9096* 
(87) 
1.0000  
SD 
-0.0244 
(29) 
-0.6744 
(45) 
0.7350 
(31) 
1.0000 
 
* Significant at 10% level, ** Significant at 5% level, *** Significant at 1% level 
 
Note: We have excluded the firms issuing via PO from the two-sample t-test of average BHAR via market index, average BHAR 
via sector index and average CAR because they contain only two companies.  
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Table 6.5: The results of post-issuing performance by total sample and issuing methods 
The table shows the statistical values of the estimation in order to examine the post-issuing performance of common stock offering companies (total sample: panel A), 
together with issuing methods: rights issuing (XR: panel B), private placement (PP: panel C), stock dividend (SD: panel D) and public offering (PO: panel E).   
BHAR is calculated by:      


T
t
tB
T
t
tii RRTtBHAR
1
,
1
, 11,
, where  TtBHARi ,  = BHAR of firm i during period t to T, tiR ,  = Return of firm i at time t, tBR , = 
Return on benchmark portfolio which refers to the main composite index (SET index). t_BHAR is measured by: 
n
BHAR
BHARt
BHAR
_
,where BHAR = Average 
value of BHAR, 
BHAR  = Standard deviation of BHAR, and n  = Sample size of each issuing method and total sample. The companies are represented in parentheses 
with maximum value, minimum value and median of average BHAR (see Appendix 3 for full details) 
 
 
 PANEL A PANEL B PANEL C PANEL D PANEL E 
Statistic Values Total Sample XR PP SD PO 
Average BHAR -0.27001 -0.15779 -0.32048 -0.44261 0.07158 
Maximum 1.96817 (SHIN) 1.96817 (SHIN) 0.88492 (SAMTEL) 0.59988 (GFPT) 0.22950 (S&P) 
Minimum -3.29022 (PRANDA) -2.60920 (EASTW) -3.29022 (PRANDA) -2.34147 (CM) -0.08633 (THAI) 
Median -0.25828 -0.14608  -0.31635 -0.41019 0.07158 
Standard Deviation 0.67898 0.67681 0.69429 0.59913 0.22332 
t_BHAR -4.44606*** -1.68122* -3.32862*** -3.46503*** 0.45331 
Sample Size 125 52 52 22 2 
 
* Significant at 10% level, ** Significant at 5% level, *** Significant at 1% level 
Note: Three firms (namely, ITD, KTP and SORKON) use two different issuing methods at the same time. ITD and KTP use XR and PP. SORKON applies PP and SD for its issuing methods. The full names of 
the companies are shown in Appendix 3. The total raw may not correspond to the summaries of each issuing method and each industry. The reason is that not only are there three firms issuing with two 
methodologies at the same time, the firm (USC – see full name in Appendix 3) is not categorised in any industries. In other words, there is no information on which industry and sector USC is located in. 
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Table 6.6: The robustness results of post-issuing performance by total sample and issuing methods 
The table shows the statistical values of the estimation in order to examine the post-issuing performance of common stock offering companies (total sample: panel A), 
together with issuing methods: rights issuing (XR: panel B), private placement (PP: panel C), stock dividend (SD: panel D) and public offering (PO: panel E).   
BHAR is calculated by:      


T
t
tB
T
t
tii RRTtBHAR
1
,
1
, 11,
, where  TtBHARi ,  = BHAR of firm i during period t to T, tiR ,  = Return of firm i at time t, tBR , = 
Return on benchmark portfolio which refers to each sector in the Stock Exchange of Thailand that the SEO firms are in. t_BHAR is measured by: 
n
BHAR
BHARt
BHAR
_
,where BHAR = Average value of BHAR, 
BHAR  = Standard deviation of BHAR, and n  = Sample size of each issuing methods and total 
sample. The companies are represented in parentheses with maximum value; minimum value and median of average BHAR (see Appendix 3 for full details) 
 
 
 PANEL A PANEL B PANEL C PANEL D PANEL E 
Statistic Values Total Sample XR PP SD PO 
Average BHAR -0.28406 -0.23234 -0.32263 -0.33589 0.03899 
Maximum -0.28406 (GRAND) 1.40189 (GRAND) 1.12250 (SAMTEL) 0.69615 (CPI) 0.23372 (S&P) 
Minimum 1.40189 (PRANDA) -2.79076 (EASTW) -3.27634 (PRANDA) -2.41519 (CM) -0.15575 (THAI) 
Median -3.27634 -0.15548 -0.22584 -0.26989 0.03899 
Standard Deviation -0.19716 0.57932 0.73008 0.68935 0.27540 
t_BHAR -4.67091*** -2.86406*** -3.12477*** -2.12390** 0.20020 
Sample Size 119 51 50 19 2 
 
* Significant at 10% level, ** Significant at 5% level, *** Significant at 1% level 
Note: Three firms (namely, ITD, KTP and SORKON) use two different issuing methods at the same time. ITD and KTP use XR and PP. SORKON applies PP and SD for its issuing methods. The full names of 
the companies are shown in Appendix 3. The total raw may not correspond to the summaries of each issuing method and each industry. The reason is that not only are there three firms issuing with two 
methodologies at the same time, the firm (USC – see full name in Appendix 3) is not categorised in any industries. In other words, there is no information on which industry and sector USC is located in. 
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Table 6.7: The robustness results of post-issuing performance by total sample and issuing methods 
The table shows the statistical values of the estimation in order to examine the post-issuing performance of common stock offering companies (total sample: panel A), 
together with issuing methods: rights issuing (XR: panel B), private placement (PP: panel C), stock dividend (SD: panel D) and public offering (PO: panel E).   
Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) are calculated by the market model: )( mtitititit RRAR    , where mtR is market return on day t (in our case is defined 
as return on SET index which is the main composite index in the SET)
 i
= intercept and 
i  the OLS (Ordinary Least Square) estimators of the market model 
parameters, calculated in the estimation period.  



2
1
21 ),(
t
tt
ittti ARCAR
, where, 1t and 2t are the days between the event window. t_CAR is measured by 
n
CAR
CARt
CAR
iT

_
, where 
iTCAR
 = Average value of CAR, 
CAR  = Standard deviation of CAR, and n  = Sample size of each issuing methods and total sample. The companies are 
represented in parentheses with maximum value; minimum value and median of average CAR (see Appendix 3 for full details) 
 
 
 PANEL A PANEL B PANEL C PANEL D PANEL E 
Statistic Values Total Sample XR PP SD PO 
Average CAR -0.11327 0.01657 -0.24759 -0.11750 -0.00533 
Maximum 4.46919 (HMPRO) 4.46919 (HMPRO) 1.44387 (SAMTEL) 1.09219 (SSE) -0.00444 (S&P) 
Minimum -2.17770 (CM) -1.71422 (AH) -1.35256 (BLAND) -2.17770 (CM) -0.00622 (THAI) 
Median -0.06140 -0.03530 -0.25028 0.00268 -0.00533 
Standard Deviation 0.72031 0.84306 0.53326 0.75424 0.00125 
t_CAR -1.75811* 0.14171 -3.34812*** -0.73072 -6.00955** 
Sample Size 125 52 52 22 2 
 
* Significant at 10% level, ** Significant at 5% level, *** Significant at 1% level 
Note: Three firms (namely, ITD, KTP and SORKON) use two different issuing methods at the same time. ITD and KTP use XR and PP. SORKON applies PP and SD for its issuing methods. The full names of 
the companies are shown in Appendix 3. The total raw may not correspond to the summaries of each issuing method and each industry. The reason is that not only are there three firms issuing with two 
methodologies at the same time, the firm (USC – see full name in Appendix 3) is not categorised in any industries. In other words, there is no information on which industry and sector USC is located in. 
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
7.1 Introduction  
 
A paucity of SEO literature on emerging markets is the main gap in the existing 
literature, which focuses mainly on developed markets. This leads to the question of 
whether the SEO evidence carries over to emerging markets, whose characteristics are 
different from the developed markets (e.g. high volatility, small size, inefficiency and 
illiquidity – see Mody, 2004). Having chosen Thailand as the evidence of an 
emerging market, we examined three empirical SEO studies. The first relates to the 
SEO stock price reaction. We obtained more recent data, e.g. during the post-financial 
crisis period, and introduced the new issues in more detail. The second empirical 
study is concerned with SEO underpricing. We examined determinants of SEO 
underpricing with different issuing methods. Lastly, we performed an investigation 
into the post-issuing performance of SEO firms. With the investigations of different 
issuing methods and a different sample size from the previous literature (e.g. Denis, 
1994; Corwin, 2003; D‟Mello et al., 2003; Median, 2005; Walker and Yost, 2007), 
our study bring a wider overview of SEOs in Thailand. 
 
Consequently, this final chapter provides the summaries and the main findings of this 
study, together with the limitations and suggestions for future research. The remaining 
chapter is organised as follows: section 7.2 concludes the main findings of both the 
 363 
 
literature and the empirical studies; section 7.3 points out the limitations of the study 
and section 7.4 suggests further interesting areas for any future research.  
 
 
7.2 Main Findings  
 
7.2.1 Evidence from the SEO Literature 
We have surveyed the existing literature in the area of SEOs over recent decades. The 
previous studies show that they had mostly obtained the data from developed markets 
and provided comprehensive examinations, compared with those in emerging 
markets. The SEOs are largely influenced by typical capital structure theories, such as 
information asymmetry, agency theory and signalling theory. These theories helped us 
to develop the hypotheses for the empirical studies with out-of-sample data. 
Information asymmetry appears to be the main theory which plays an important part 
in SEOs, and is regularly discussed. For instance, the theory suggests that 
underpricing positively relates to information asymmetry (Yongtae and Myung Seok, 
2005). Empirical evidence from the previous research is still inconclusive in some 
areas, e.g. stock price reaction and determinants of SEO stock price reaction, as well 
as underpricing. Furthermore, the studies in long-term performance are concerned 
mostly with firm performance during the post-issuing period, while the results remain 
mixed, with either underperformance or nothing after the offerings. 
 
 364 
 
From our surveys, it is clear that the majority of both theoretical and empirical works 
in the area of SEO have been done by applying the data from the U.S. and other 
developed countries. The research in emerging markets is sparse, although these 
markets have become more interesting to investors in recent years. The main reason 
for the lack of literature is the difference in characteristics to the developed markets, 
such as illiquidity, high volatility and infrequent trading. We have found some 
interesting areas for expanding academic research into emerging markets. For 
instance, we obtain different data from an emerging market (Thailand in our case) and 
focus on whether the results carry over to our study. Repeating similar examinations 
and applying more recent data from Thailand are also interesting features for concern. 
In addition, providing the new investigation, such as issuing methods, is valuable for 
understanding SEOs in Thailand in more detail than is found in existing SEO research 
in Thailand (such as Jirasetthakulchai, 2000; Lertsupongkit, 2002; Prangthawat, 2002; 
Limpaphayom and Ngamwutikul, 2004). 
 
The differences between the studies in developed markets and emerging markets are 
generally noticed in many areas, such as the sample size, regulations and 
characteristics of the market. In our study of Thailand, we have a relatively small 
sample size in comparison with the studies of developed markets. For example, our 
study contains 126 companies issuing via common stocks, while there are 435 
samples in Denis (1994), 863 firms in D‟Mello et al. (2003), 6,768 samples in Median 
(2005) and 438 samples in Walker and Yost (2007). In addition, the regulation on 
commission fees in Thailand still imposes a fixed rate. This leads to the fact that the 
security companies would have less motivation to find alternative source of income, 
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instead of based only on the commission fees (FETCO, 2006)
173
. Moreover, some 
characteristics of the Thai market, such as the high number of individual investors, 
could separate the market in terms of the volatility level compared to the other 
markets (see Figure 3.1 for the real figures). Nonetheless, comparing our study with 
the existing literature in Thailand and other emerging markets could provide more 
similar evidence. The example is clearly shown in the sample size since we calculated 
the percentage of sample coverage through the previous SEO research in Thailand. 
The figures suggest that our study has covered more than previous Thai research, both 
in sample size and the study period (which is more recent). 
 
From the survey of the literature, we produced three empirical studies in each specific 
area of SEOs in Thailand. First, we chose one category of indirect flotation cost, 
namely SEO stock price reaction, for consideration with a variety of examinations, 
such as the announcement effect, dilution and determinants. Second, we completed 
another type of indirect flotation cost, namely underpricing, to identify the factor(s) 
impacting on SEO underpricing in Thailand. Having made two empirical studies 
during the issuing period, we then closed our empirical work by examining how the 
SEO companies perform during the post-issuing period. 
 
7.2.2 Evidence from the SEO Empirical Studies  
Our study aims to examine SEO companies in Thailand from 1999 to 2006. Although 
our final sample size is relatively small in comparison with those obtained in 
                                                 
173
 The FETCO refers to the Federation of Thai Capital Market Organisations, who provides the Master 
Plan of Developing the Thai Capital Market#2 (year: 2006-2010, Thai version). Available via: 
http://www.fetco.or.th [Accessed on 22 May 2009]. 
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developed markets, they are similar when compared with the studies in Thailand. 
Unlike the existing literature that relates to public offering, our SEO samples are 
based mostly on issuing new shares to the existing shareholders, e.g. rights issuing 
and private placement. With reference to the previous literature, flotation costs appear 
to be the most appropriate area to focus on. The announcement of SEOs in Thailand 
causes the stock prices to react negatively. This evidence of negative stock price 
reaction is shown in our total sample and when the three subsamples of issuing 
methods are separately considered. Nevertheless, we find that there is a leakage of 
information before the announcement date, particularly when we examined issuing 
methods individually. To illustrate, the shorter the period before the announcement, 
the less possibility that information is leaked. We apply the longer event window, ±30 
days, to confirm this. Our findings show that around 20 days prior to the 
announcement, the information is likely to leak. Moreover, our evidence reports no 
impact from the offering dilution (defined as discounting in prices in terms of market 
capitalisation). This is supported by the positive percentage of offering dilution, 
implying that the equity value in the announcement is less than the post-
announcement. 
 
In the determinant part, our examination is based on seven explanatory variables 
(suggested in the existing literature in emerging markets) and the two-day 
announcement abnormal return under the sample of 68 firms from the concept of 
balanced panel. We find that size, market-to-book and ownership are the three factors 
which affect the SEO stock price reaction since their statistical coefficients are 
significant. When we include the dummy variables of issuing methods in the 
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regression, rights issuing and stock dividend become the two issuing methods which 
influence the SEO stock price reaction. This is consistent with the previous literature 
on emerging markets (e.g. Demirgüc-Kunt, 1992; Alba et al., 1998; Barry et al., 
2002). In the robustness test, we notice that the close correlation between the leverage 
and the return on asset (ROA, in terms of the proxy for operating performance) has 
been eliminated when we change the proxy of operating performance to the EBITDA 
(earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation). This leads to the 
consequence that in the regression there is likely to be no misspecification due to 
multicollinearity. Nonetheless, transforming the explanatory variables into the 
logarithm function in order to improve the elasticity in the coefficients does not allow 
the regression to fit the data as well as using the original regression with EBITDA. 
This case of transformation shows lower and negative values of R-squares and 
adjusted R-squares, respectively. 
 
In long-term stock price reaction, we aim to examine: (1) whether the sales of equity 
are timed in the longer event window, particularly during the post-issuing period (see 
Asquith and Mullins, 1986) and (2) the relationship between short- and long-term 
stock price reaction in order to find the degree of mispricing that shows the correct 
stock price reaction in the long-term. Our evidence reveals that the stock prices 
respond negatively in the longer period after the SEO announcement. This implies 
that investors are likely to sell their equities in the long-term (post-issuing). 
Concerning the findings from the relationship between short- and long-term stock 
price reactions, we indicate no relationship in these two periods of reactions. This 
means that there is no large reaction (a shock reaction) in the short-term (referring to 
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the reaction of SEO announcement in our study), which will subsequently correct 
stock prices to the desired level. Consequently, the stock price reaction in the short-
term is a correct reaction (no mispricing) and the long-term reaction does not result 
from the correcting of misprice in the short-term (depending on the current situations 
at that time). This evidence appears to be consistent with the market characteristics 
that the stock price reaction also depends on external factors, such as GDP, exchange 
rate, inflation and other events (see for example, Kasikorn Research Centre, 2003 in 
section 5.2.2).  
 
In the determinants of SEO underpricing, we examine 12 explanatory variables 
(including the control variables and dummy variables) in our OLS regression. Since 
the existing literature in Thailand (e.g. Lertsupongkit, 2002; Vithessonthi, 2008) 
focuses on the stock price reaction and the determinants of market reaction, our study 
in this area claims to be the first in the area of SEO underpricing with the recent data 
set from the period of 1999 to 2006. Our results suggest that there is a positive impact 
between firm size (as a proxy of information asymmetry) and SEO underpricing in 
every case we estimate. This shows the inconsistency of the previous research (e.g. 
Corwin, 2003; Yongtae and Myung Seok, 2005), which reports a negative relationship 
between SEO underpricing and the information asymmetry. Furthermore, offer size 
relates to underpricing when estimating total sample and issuing methods 
individually, while volatility is shown to be related with underpricing when estimating 
only with the total sample (regardless of the issuing methods) and the rights issuing 
firms. This implies that our findings (particularly in volatility) reveal a contrasting 
reflection of the Thai market characteristics, since volatility is known to be the main 
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characteristic of the Thai market and it should affect SEO underpricing. However, 
when we estimate the regression with a different calculation of underpricing and 
transform the explanatory variables, our results change slightly in terms of significant 
variables. Thus, the Thai capital market appears to be sensitive to small changes. 
 
Applying the Buy-and-Hold Return (BHR) approach, we find that Thai SEO firms 
underperform during the one year post-issuing period. These consequences remain the 
same when we examine the matter individually with a different sample size of issuing 
methods. Although the findings in each issuing method are inconsistent with the 
previous literature (e.g. Hertzel et al., 2002; Krishnamurthy et al., 2005, for the 
private placement case), they are consistent with the existing research around the 
Asia-Pacific region, such as Dhatt et al. (1996), Cai and Loughran (1998), Soucik and 
Allen (1997b), Mathew (2002), Brown et al. (2009) and Lin and Tsai (2010). By 
estimating with the different benchmark (sector index), our results report the same: 
there are underperformances during the post-issuing period in every case (total sample 
and different samples of issuing methods). Nonetheless, there are slight differences in 
the outcomes when a different approach (namely the cumulative abnormal return, 
CAR, approach) is employed in the estimation. The firms issuing via rights issuing 
and stock dividend are those reporting without any underperformance after issuing 
new equities. Although the BHR approach may cause some biases to occur in the 
results (e.g. new listing bias and measurement bias; see Barber and Lyon, 1997a), it 
appears to be the appropriate approach to measure and estimate the post-issuing 
performance in Thai SEO firms. This is due to some drawbacks in other approaches 
(e.g. the matching firm technique and the calendar-time portfolio). 
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7.3 Limitations  
 
Having examined the SEOs in Thailand, we have some limitations in our study. These 
limitations could lead to the incompletion of some initial expectations in an area such 
as SEOs in Thailand. We can briefly describe these limitations as follows: 
 
7.3.1 Data Limitation  
The data are usually the main problem when they are obtained from emerging 
markets. In Thailand, it is difficult and limited to obtain and access long-term 
historical data (i.e. 20 years back) in person, unless having some connections with the 
people inside the stock exchange to obtain them. These data are, for instance, the 
historical daily prices, trading volumes, market capitalisation and the market index 
during the 1980s, while the prospectuses of issuing new shares in each firm are 
incomplete and missing. The latter is because the process of collecting the documents 
is inadequate. Although the listed companies are required to submit an electronic 
version of the prospectus and the financial statements to the SEC (The Securities 
Exchange Commission), the regulation was fully enforced in 2001
174
, causing 
inaccessibility in some companies. Moreover, as mentioned previously, we conducted 
a cross-check for data in different databases, e.g. Thomson One Banker: Deal Equity 
(TOBDE) and DataStream. There are no filing forms available for the companies in 
Thailand via the TOBDE, while the trading information (e.g. closed prices and the 
market capitalisation) in DataStream is not the same as the data we obtained from the 
                                                 
174
 For the case of prospectuses, the related SEC notification is KorChor.48/2543 (in Thai), available 
via: http://capital.sec.or.th/webapp/nrs/data/1035s.pdf [Accessed on 11 May 2011]. For the case of 
financial statements, the related SEC notification is KorChor.46/2543 (in Thai), available via: 
http://capital.sec.or.th/webapp/nrs/data/1033s.pdf [Accessed on 12 May 2011]. 
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SETSMART (the SET database). This information (i.e. the filing forms) should 
contain some interesting features, which are useful in order to expand our study into 
more particular areas. In addition, the unavailability of daily information from MSCI 
Barra remains a limitation to examining the robustness test in the estimation of post-
issuing performance. 
 
7.3.2 Limitation of Methodologies 
The methodologies to be applied in the examination of SEOs in Thailand could be 
claimed to be another limitation in our study. Some methodologies, such as the 
matching firm technique and the Fama-French three-factors, do not appear to be 
appropriate to the case of Thailand, due mainly to their drawbacks. Omitting these 
methodologies in the examination of SEOs could subsequently mean losing the 
differences in the investigation of different methodologies for the robustness test. For 
instance, as indicated earlier, the matching firm technique could not provide the 
evidence that closely reflects the real characteristics of the Thai stock market. This is 
because the abnormal performance can be generated within this technique and it 
might not be possible to identify the difference between the holding-period returns of 
the issuing firms, non-issuing firms and the abnormal performance (Eckbo et al., 
2000).  
 
Furthermore, although Homsud et al. (2009) suggest that the Fama-French model is 
appropriate to describe the SET better than CAPM (capital asset pricing model, in 
terms of the market model), we discuss their interpretations in order to apply their 
suggested model (namely, the Fama-French model) in our study. First, we find that 
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the suggestion of Jirasetthakulchai (2000) includes the supporting statement that using 
CAPM (which can also refer to the market model) is the appropriate approach for the 
SET. Alternatively, since the Fama-French model concerns only size and value effect 
(book-to-market ratio), the risk in the SET might have other variables that are 
appropriate or involve more than these two factors (Homsud et al., 2009, p.39). Thus, 
examining first with the CAPM should be the case in order to find whether there are 
any other factors which impact on SEO stock price reaction (e.g. leverage, operating 
performance and ownership). If there are only size and value effects that influence the 
SEO stock price reaction, we would apply the Fama-French model to confirm the 
outcomes. Nevertheless, instead of applying the Fama-French model in our robustness 
test, we are subsequently concerned with the correlation between leverage and 
operating performance (proxy via ROA), which could lead to misspecification due to 
multicollinearity. In addition, we use the transformation of the variables into the 
logarithm function in order to adjust the elasticity in the coefficients. This makes the 
regression fit the data better.  
 
 
7.4  Suggestions for Future Research  
 
With our limitations, we briefly make some suggestions for further research into 
SEOs in Thailand (or other emerging markets), as follows. 
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First, although we have controlled and eliminated the misspecifications in our 
regression (e.g. the corrections between the variables, which show no close 
correlations), the evidence in some cases (such as the chapter on SEO underpricing in 
the robustness section) may lead to the existence of multicollinearity. This is shown 
with a high standard error in the explanatory variables and the insignificant variables. 
Nonetheless, this possibility arises in the robustness examination. Thus, we could 
apply different models (approaches) for the robustness check in future research. Even 
though the other approaches (e.g. the Fama-French model, the matching firm 
technique and the bootstrap) would not be eligible for Thai data (see, for example, 
section 7.3.2), we would suggest obtaining the data from different emerging markets 
and comparing the evidence with our study. The outcomes could provide an 
additional comprehensive view regarding SEOs in emerging markets.  
 
Second, applying different benchmarks which are available in Thailand would be an 
excellent robustness examination in this area, particularly the SEO post-issuing 
performance. Those other benchmarks are namely the SET 100 and the FTSE SET. 
The MSCI World index could remain an interesting benchmark if we consider a 
different study period, in which the data is fully available in the MSCI.  
 
Third, we suggest obtaining a different sample size in order to provide wider evidence 
in the Thai capital market. For instance, since we examine the common stock offering 
firms, we could turn to investigate the warrant issuing firms (as suggested in section 
3.3.2). Issuing warrants in Thailand has further meaning than acting as as sweeteners 
and are attached to the common stocks, e.g. used as another technique for issuing new 
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equities (delay dilution) and issuing as the dividend. Therefore, considering the 
warrant issuing firms would to some extent fulfil the characteristics of SEOs in 
Thailand. Moreover, examining closely specific sectors or industries would give more 
particular evidence and close reflection on those particular businesses in those sectors 
or industries. In addition, since the capital market in Thailand has the MAI index 
(Market for Alternative Investment – see section 3.2.3.3), it would be interesting to 
examine the sample size from this index in order to cover the research in the middle-
size companies. Additionally, considering different types of ownership would be 
another issue to classify the difference in sample size (e.g. family, institutional or 
foreign ownership). 
 
Fourth, it is possible to suggest that in Thailand the SEO firms about to issue new 
equities via rights issuing change at the last minute to issuing via private placement 
when they realise that they may gain some benefit from those institutional investors. 
These investors could have some relationship with government departments, and 
would provide a convenient service when the companies require special needs, e.g. to 
speed up an administrative process. This is also known as co-equal benefit, which has 
been mentioned throughout our thesis. The feature of these institutional investors is 
therefore different from what we have learnt from the theoretical part and the general 
characteristics of private placement. We would suggest this point as a topic for future 
research in this particular area of private placement in Thailand. For instance, how 
and why do those reasons impact on the methodology of equity issuing in Thailand, or 
is there any particular reason for companies in Thailand to issue new shares via 
private placement? 
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Finally, having examined the SEOs in Thailand after the financial crisis of 1997, we 
would suggest considering SEOs in a different period of events. These events are, for 
instance, the credit crunch in 2008 and the deregulation of commission fees in 2012. 
The outcomes would provide some interesting features of whether these events 
influence the issuing of new equities in companies in Thailand, or whether these 
events impact on the performance of SEO companies in the country. In addition, 
consideration could be made of the firm performance in the sector (or industry) to 
which the state enterprises (e.g. the national rail service, the electricity service and the 
water service) go for listing on the stock exchange. Although these state enterprises 
have no exact period when they will be listed, we may consider (when they become 
listed in the future) how their IPOs influence the performance of the sector (or 
industry). This can focus on the pre- and post-listing of those state enterprises.  
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Appendix 1: Daily trading volume graph between 1995 and 2009 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: SETSMART up to July 2009. 
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Appendix 2: Types of institutional investor 
 
The 17 types of “Institutional Investors” defined by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) of Thailand (the notification KorChor.12/2543): 
1. Commercial banks 
2. Financial companies 
3. Security companies for private or personal funds 
4. Credit Foncier 
5. Insurance companies 
6. Juristic person set up by particular law 
7. Bank of Thailand 
8. International Financial Institutions 
9. Government and state enterprise 
10. Recovering and development of financial institutional system funds 
11. Pensions funds 
12. Provident funds  
13. Mutual funds 
14. Juristic person who has capital of more than 100 million baht 
15. Juristic person who is a shareholder in categories 1 to 14 above and holds 
more shares than 75% of the total shareholders 
16. International investors who meet categories 1 to 15 above and 
17. Investors who have a stock purchase value of more than THB 10 million 
(roughly, THB33.50: USD1.00). 
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Appendix 3: Full details of the final sample to be applied in this thesis 
The table shows the final sample of 173 SEO listed companies on the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET) during the period 1999 to 2006. The first SEO of each 
company is used, in order to avoid any overlapping. Local Code shows the abbreviations of each company used in the real trading on the Stock Exchange of Thailand. 
Types refer to the different issuing methods: rights issuing (XR), private placement (PP), stock dividend (SD), public offering (PO) and warrant issuing (W). Sector 
identifies  the sector in which the companies are traded on the SET shown in local code: Agribusiness (AGRI), Food and Beverage (FOOD), Fashion (FASHION), 
Home and Office Products (HOME), Personal Products and Pharmaceuticals (PERSON), Automotives (AUTO), Industrial Materials and Machinery (IMM), Paper and 
Printing Materials (PAPER), Petrochemicals and Chemicals (PETRO), Packaging (PKG), Construction Materials (CONMAT), Property Development (PROP), Energy 
and Utilities (ENERG), Mining (MINE), Commerce (COMM), Health Care Services (HEALTH), Media and Publishing (MEDIA), Professional Services (PROF), 
Tourism and Leisure (TOURISM), Transportation and Logistics (TRANS), Electronic Components (ETRON) and Information and Communication Technology (ICT). 
Average Mkt Cap is the average daily market capitalisation of each firm in million Thai baht (approximately THB33.50 / USD1.00) during the period 1999 to 2006. 
Average Daily Returns refers to the average daily returns during the period 1999 to 2006. Times of SEOs is number of times the companies issue SEOs during the 
period 1999 to 2006. 
 
 
Local Code Name of Companies Types Sector 
Average Mkt 
Cap. 
Average Daily 
Returns 
Times of 
SEOs 
AA Advanced Agro Public Company Limited PP PAPER    11,061.59  0.00031 1 
ADVANC Advanced Info Service Public Company Limited PP ICT  176,237.72  -0.00051 46 
AFC Asia Fiber Public Company Limited W FASHION        318.93  0.00043 3 
AH Aapico Hitech Public Company Limited XR AUTO      5,527.13  -0.00036 1 
AJ A.J. Plast Public Company Limited W PKG      1,012.31  0.00019 1 
ALUCON Alucon Public Company Limited SD PKG      1,763.89  0.00009 2 
AMC Asia Metal Public Company Limited XR IMM      1,621.21  0.00060 1 
AP Asian Property Development Public Company Limited XR PROP      5,830.76  0.00024 25 
APRINT Amarin Printing and Publishing Public Company Limited SD MEDIA      1,348.08  -0.00023 1 
APURE Agripure Holding Public Company Limited PP FOOD        547.90  -0.00004 6 
ASIAN Asian Seafoods Coldstorage Public Company Limited W AGRI        761.93  -0.00093 18 
ASIMAR Asian Marine Services Public Company Limited W TRANS        196.90  -0.00083 11 
ATC Arometric Public Company Limited PP ENERG    20,414.66  0.00105 14 
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Local Code Name of Companies Types Sector 
Average Mkt 
Cap. 
Average Daily 
Returns 
Times of 
SEOs 
BAFS Bangkok Aviation Fuel Services Public Company Limited SD ENERG      3,693.82  -0.00213 1 
BANPU Banpu Public Company Limited XR ENERG    19,172.55  0.00076 12 
BATA Bata Shoe of Thailand Public Company Limited XR FASHION        153.49  -0.00040 2 
BCP The Bangchak Petroleum Public Company Limited PP ENERG      5,970.88  0.00012 9 
BGH Bangkok Dusit Medical Services Public Company Limited XR HEALTH      9,111.13  0.00040 6 
BIGC Big C Supercenter Public Company Limited PP COMM    16,543.54  0.00095 18 
BLAND Bangkok Land Public Company Limited PP PROP      5,075.92  -0.00087 27 
CCET Cal-Comp Electronics (Thailand) Public Company Limited W ETRON    10,928.58  -0.00117 16 
CENTEL Central Plaza Hotel Public Company Limited XR TOURISM      2,854.27  -0.00002 1 
CFRESH Seafresh Industry Public Company Limited SD AGRI      1,638.97  -0.00193 1 
CIRKIT Circuit Electronic Industries Public Company Limited W ETRON        509.34  -0.00070 1 
CK CH. Karnchang Public Company Limited W PROP      6,859.72  -0.00100 11 
CM Chiangmai Frozen Foods Public Company Limited SD AGRI        791.20  -0.00106 1 
CPALL CP All Public Company Limited W COMM    26,409.80  0.00014 5 
CPF Charoen Pokphand Foods Public Company Limited SD FOOD    23,488.28  -0.00111 21 
CPI Chumporn Palm Oil Industry Public Company Limited SD AGRI        928.82  -0.00096 2 
CPL C.P.L. Group Public Company Limited SD FASHION        565.09  -0.00006 1 
CPN Central Pattana Public Company Limited XR PROP    14,076.30  0.00008 2 
CSC Crown Seal Public Company Limited XR PKG        635.17  0.00021 1 
CTW Charoong Thai Wire and Cable Public Company Limited W IMM      2,290.59  -0.00006 16 
CWT Chai Watana Tannery Group Public Company Limited W AUTO        327.95  0.00014 1 
DCC Dynasty Ceramic Public Company Limited XR CONMAT      3,881.97  0.00073 1 
DELTA Delta Electronics (Thailand) Public Company Limited XR ETRON    27,541.01  -0.00122 17 
D-MARK Thai-Denmark Swine Breeder Public Company Limited XR FOOD        125.26  -0.00148 2 
EASTW Eastern Water Resources Development and Management Public Company Limited XR ENERG      4,001.68  -0.00099 10 
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Local Code Name of Companies Types Sector 
Average Mkt 
Cap. 
Average Daily 
Returns 
Times of 
SEOs 
EGCO Electricity Generating Public Company Limited W ENERG    28,537.92  0.00021 6 
ERAWAN The Erawan Group Public Company Limited XR TOURISM      2,292.90  0.00006 15 
FANCY Fancy Wood Industries Public Company Limited SD HOME      2,093.60  -0.00137 2 
GENCO General Environmental Conservation Public Company Limited PP PROF        933.04  -0.00239 1 
GFPT GFPT Public Company Limited SD AGRI      1,719.10  0.00034 2 
GOLD Golden Land Property Development Public Company Limited PP PROP      4,886.81  -0.00016 8 
GRAND Grande Asset Hotels and Property Public Company Limited XR TOURISM      3,319.52  0.00021 3 
GSTEEL G Steel Public Company Limited PP IMM    11,618.47  -0.00158 1 
HANA Hana Microelectronics Public Company Limited W ETRON    15,544.94  -0.00056 145 
HEMRAJ Hemaraj Land and Development Public Company Limited W PROP      3,114.57  -0.00146 21 
HFT HWA Fong Rubber (Thailand) Public Company Limited XR AUTO        643.06  -0.00188 1 
HIPRO Hipro Electronics Public Company Limited W ETRON      1,782.03  0.00010 1 
HMPRO Home Product Center Public Company Limited XR COMM      4,024.89  0.00032 12 
IEC The International Engineering Public Company Limited PP ICT      1,198.80  -0.00072 30 
INET Internet Thailand Public Company Limited W ICT      1,229.82  -0.00077 1 
IRPC IRPC Public Company Limited PP ENERG    56,572.80  0.00001 2 
ITD Italian-Thai Development Public Company Limited XR/PP PROP    19,570.07  -0.00133 4 
ITV ITV Public Company Limited W MEDIA    11,975.98  -0.00142 13 
JAS Jasmine International Public Company Limited W ICT      4,444.16  -0.00154 28 
JUTHA Jutha Maritime Public Company Limited XR TRANS        351.23  0.00034 3 
KCE KCE Electronics Public Company Limited XR ETRON      2,100.26  -0.00157 12 
KDH Krungdhon Hospital Public Company Limited XR HEALTH        234.32  0.00105 1 
KTECH K-Tech Construction Public Company Limited XR PROP        929.18  -0.00300 1 
KTP Keppel Thai Properties Public Company Limited XR/PP PROP        853.70  0.00030 3 
KWH Wiik and Hoeglund Public Company Limited SD CONMAT        626.67  -0.00126 1 
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Local Code Name of Companies Types Sector 
Average Mkt 
Cap. 
Average Daily 
Returns 
Times of 
SEOs 
LEE Lee Feed Mill Public Company Limited SD AGRI      1,633.66  -0.00029 2 
LH Land and House Public Company Limited PP PROP    43,614.04  -0.00065 34 
LIVE Live Incorporation Public Company Limited PP MEDIA      1,050.80  -0.00054 12 
LL Living Land Capital Public Company Limited XR PROP        185.48  -0.00038 1 
LOXLEY Loxley Public Company Limited XR COMM      3,862.65  -0.00101 4 
LPN L.P.N. Development Public Company Limited XR PROP      2,458.65  0.00050 16 
LST Lam Soon (Thailand) Public Company Limited XR FOOD      1,438.96  -0.00122 2 
MAJOR Major Cineplex Group Public Company Limited W MEDIA      9,313.89  -0.00127 7 
MATCH Matching Studio Public Company Limited SD MEDIA        923.32  -0.00323 1 
MFEC MFEC Public Company Limited PP ICT      1,249.88  -0.00089 1 
MFG Minor Food Group Public Company Limited W FOOD      1,987.08  -0.00013 9 
MIDA Mida Assets Public Company Limited W COMM      6,044.12  -0.00304 5 
MINOR Minor Corporation Public Company Limited W COMM        916.22  -0.00013 47 
MINT Minor International Public Company Limited W FOOD      7,157.42  -0.00010 48 
MK M.K. Real Estate Development Public Company Limited W PROP      1,218.92  -0.00028 11 
MLINK M-Link Asia Corporation Public Company Limited XR ICT      1,630.71  -0.00238 1 
MME Mida-Medalist Entertainment Public Company Limited W TOURISM      2,827.62  -0.00365 1 
MODERN Modernform Group Public Company Limited PP HOME      1,880.06  0.00077 7 
MPT Magnecomp Precision Technology Public Company Limited PP ETRON      2,683.14  -0.00108 12 
MSC Metro Systems Corporation Public Company Limited XR ICT        561.43  -0.00004 12 
NC Newcity (Bangkok) Public Company Limited XR FASHION          80.62  -0.00025 1 
NCH N.C. Housing Public Company Limited XR PROP      2,267.26  -0.00299 2 
NEP NEP Realty and Industry Public Company Limited W PKG        558.70  0.00043 6 
NEW Wattana Karnpaet Public Company Limited XR HEALTH          71.07  -0.00048 1 
NFC NFC Fertilizer Public Company Limited XR PETRO      1,948.37  -0.00044 4 
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Local Code Name of Companies Types Sector 
Average Mkt 
Cap. 
Average Daily 
Returns 
Times of 
SEOs 
NMG Nation Multimedia Group Public Company Limited PP MEDIA      2,110.95  -0.00012 33 
NNCL Navanakorn Public Company Limited PP PROP      1,364.31  0.00124 1 
NOBLE Noble Development Public Company Limited PP PROP      2,101.34  0.00041 10 
OGC Ocean Glass Public Company Limited PP HOME        958.43  0.00087 1 
PA Pacific Assets Public Company Limited PP TOURISM      1,938.26  0.00015 4 
PAF Pan Asia Footwear Public Company Limited XR FASHION      1,546.13  -0.00051 4 
PAP Pacific Pipe Public Company Limited W CONMAT      1,513.85  -0.00308 2 
PATKL Patkol Public Company Limited SD IMM        420.34  -0.00007 2 
PB President Bakery Public Company Limited XR FOOD      1,670.68  0.00111 1 
PDI Padaeng Industry Public Company Limited PP MINE      3,196.91  0.00083 1 
PG People‟s Garment Public Company Limited XR FASHION        625.16  0.00026 1 
PLE Power Line Engineering Public Company Limited W PROP      3,339.01  -0.00142 13 
POMPUI Kuang Pei San Food Products Public Company Limited PP FOOD        136.22  -0.00370 2 
PRANDA Pranda Jewelry Public Company Limited PP FASHION      1,158.74  -0.00014 45 
PTT PTT Public Company Limited W ENERG  396,590.47  0.00143 2 
PTTCH PTT Chemical Public Company Limited XR PETRO    93,552.06  -0.00057 1 
PTTEP PTT Exploration and Production Public Company Limited W ENERG  149,671.14  -0.00050 10 
RCI The Royal Ceramic Industry Public Company Limited PP CONMAT        459.72  0.00003 1 
RCL Regional Container Lines Public Company Limited PP TRANS      8,052.68  0.00005 1 
ROJNA Rojna Industrial Park Public Company Limited W PROP      3,318.37  -0.00002 11 
RPC Rayong Purifier Public Company Limited W ENERG      2,878.96  -0.00319 3 
S & J S & J International Enterprises Public Company Limited XR PERSON        722.29  0.00011 7 
S&P S & P Syndicate Public Company Limited PO FOOD      1,344.84  0.00069 15 
SAM Samchai Steel Industries Public Company Limited PP CONMAT      2,046.78  0.00032 1 
SAMART Samart Corporation Public Company Limited W ICT      3,868.72  0.80470 13 
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Local Code Name of Companies Types Sector 
Average Mkt 
Cap. 
Average Daily 
Returns 
Times of 
SEOs 
SAMTEL Samart Telecoms Public Company Limited PP ICT      1,583.17  -0.00010 1 
SCCC Siam City Cement Public Company Limited XR CONMAT    47,822.07  0.00061 1 
SEAFCO SEAFCO Public Company Limited W PROP      1,020.99  0.00089 1 
SE-ED Se-Education Public Company Limited W MEDIA      1,195.63  -0.00012 28 
SF Siam Future Development Public Company Limited PP PROP      2,269.05  0.00067 12 
SH Sea Horse Public Company Limited PP AGRI        300.03  -0.00054 1 
SHIN Shin Corporation Public Company Limited XR ICT    72,289.45  -0.00078 39 
SIAM Siam Steel International Public Company Limited PP HOME        723.96  0.00038 4 
SIS SIS Distribution (Thailand) Public Company Limited W ICT        552.13  -0.00130 3 
SKR Sikarin Public Company Limited PP HEALTH        571.73  0.00064 1 
SNC SNC Former Public Company Limited PP IMM        970.67  0.00153 1 
SORKON S. Khonkaen Food Industry Public Company Limited PP/SD FOOD        122.35  -0.00059 1 
SPALI Supalai Public Company Limited W PROP      1,951.31  -0.00012 21 
SPORT Siam Sport Syndicate Public Company Limited W MEDIA        437.29  -0.00102 15 
SSC Serm Suk Public Company Limited W FOOD      4,899.20  -0.00116 13 
SSE Sunshine Corporation Public Company Limited SD COMM        705.96  -0.00306 1 
SSF Suraon Foods Public Company Limited SD AGRI        598.68  -0.00131 1 
SSI Sahaviriya Steel Industries Public Company Limited W IMM    13,437.04  -0.00046 5 
SSSC Siam Steel Service Center Public Company Limited SD IMM        645.68  0.00117 1 
STA Sri Trang Agro-Industry Public Company Limited XR AGRI      1,792.16  -0.00055 5 
STHAI Shun Thai Rubber Gloves Industry Public Company Limited XR PERSON      1,496.70  0.00008 3 
SUN Sun Wood Industries Public Company Limited W HOME        182.88  -0.00038 4 
SUSCO Siam United Services Public Company Limited PP ENERG        756.15  -0.00082 3 
SVH Samitivej Public Company Limited XR HEALTH      1,438.08  0.00132 1 
TASCO Tipco Asphalt Public Company Limited XR CONMAT      3,164.27  -0.00039 7 
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Local Code Name of Companies Types Sector 
Average Mkt 
Cap. 
Average Daily 
Returns 
Times of 
SEOs 
TCCC Thai Central Chemical Public Company Limited XR PETRO      2,855.61  0.00023 3 
TCMC Thailand Carpet Manufacturing Public Company Limited PP CONMAT        264.39  0.00024 1 
TCP Thai Cane Paper Public Company Limited XR PAPER      2,685.49  0.00030 7 
TEAM Team Precision Public Company Limited SD ETRON        638.81  0.00070 4 
TF Thai President Foods Public Company Limited XR FOOD      4,397.85  0.00069 2 
TFD Thai Factory Development Public Company Limited XR PROP        407.80  -0.00105 3 
TFI Thai Film Industries Public Company Limited PP PKG      2,272.56  -0.00016 5 
TGCI Thai-German Ceramic Industry Public Company Limited PP CONMAT      2,141.81  -0.00093 1 
THAI Thai Airways International Public Company Limited PO TRANS    64,416.73  -0.00003 8 
THCOM Thaicom Public Company Limited XR ICT    11,919.11  -0.00050 14 
TICON Ticon Industrial Connection Public Company Limited W PROP      4,462.92  -0.00023 18 
TIPCO Tipco Foods (Thailand) Public Company Limited W FOOD      1,284.99  -0.00001 12 
TKS T.K.S. Technologies Public Company Limited W ICT        945.67  -0.00125 3 
TKT T. Krungthai Industries Public Company Limited W AUTO        438.07  -0.00206 1 
TLUXE Thailuxe Enterprises Public Company Limited XR AGRI        367.82  -0.00053 3 
TOC Thai Olefins Public Company Limited PP PETRO    50,911.19  0.00050 1 
TPP Thai Packaging and Printing Public Company Limited PP PKG        198.58  0.00087 1 
TRU Thai Rung Union Car Public Company Limited SD AUTO      3,578.77  -0.00103 5 
TRUBB Thai Rubber Latex Corporation (Thailand) Public Company Limited PP AGRI        358.13  0.00042 2 
TRUE True Corporation Public Company Limited PP ICT    38,642.58  -0.00046 28 
TSTE Thai Sugar Terminal Public Company Limited SD TRANS        525.93  -0.00091 2 
TT&T TT&T Public Company Limited PP ICT      9,429.33  -0.00084 31 
TTA Thoresen Thai Agencies Public Company Limited PP TRANS      8,751.40  0.00085 15 
TTI Thai Textile Industry Public Company Limited XR FASHION      1,140.82  0.00026 1 
TUF Thai Union Frozen Products Public Company Limited PP FOOD    16,336.31  -0.00090 5 
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Local Code Name of Companies Types Sector 
Average Mkt 
Cap. 
Average Daily 
Returns 
Times of 
SEOs 
TVO Thai Vegetable Oil Public Company Limited W FOOD      3,597.12  -0.00059 11 
UCOM United Communication Industry Public Company Limited W ICT    14,604.76  0.00025 1 
UMI The Union Mosaic Industry Public Company Limited W CONMAT        875.24  -0.00040 2 
USC Universal Starch Public Company Limited PP N/A        276.62  -0.00052 2 
UV Univentures Public Company Limited PP PROP        868.81  -0.00061 12 
VARO Varopakorn Public Company Limited SD IMM        554.21  0.00025 3 
VNG Vanachai Group Public Company Limited PP CONMAT      5,874.33  0.00031 16 
VNT Vinythai Public Company Limited XR PETRO      8,309.00  0.00043 4 
WIN Wyncoast Industrial Park Public Company Limited XR TRANS      1,704.81  -0.00076 6 
YNP Yarnapund Public Company Limited PP AUTO      3,541.65  -0.00200 1 
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Appendix 4: The definitions of offering techniques from Thomson One Banker 
 
 
The following definitions are additional clarifications to the other issuing methods 
mentioned in the contents of section 3.3.3 in Chapter 3. All the definitions are taken 
from the Thomson One Banker, available via: http://mergers.thomsonib.com. 
ezproxyd.bham.ac.uk/DealsWeb/help/nidef.htm#OFFERING_TECH [Accessed on 29 
September 2009]. 
 
Third Party Allotment: The allotments of new shares to the third party of the 
issuing firms. 
Auction: System by which securities are bought and sold through brokers on the 
securities exchanges, as distinguished from the over the counter market, where trades 
are negotiated.  Price is established by competitive bidding between brokers acting as 
agents for buyers and sellers.   
Block Trade: An underwriting structure in which the investment bankers 
purchase the shares from the issuer at a discount to the market price and re-offer the 
shares to investors.  In this structure, the pricing of the transaction takes place within 
one business day. 
Negotiated Sale: Underwriting of new securities issue in which the spread 
between the purchase price paid to the issuer and the public offering price is negotiated 
rather than having competitive bidding by multiple potential underwriters. 
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Offer for Sale: The practice of issuing a security by public subscription. The 
offer is advertised widely, stipulating the terms of the issue and closing of the offer at a 
future date. 
Open Offer: An invitation to existing holders of securities to purchase or 
subscribe for securities in proportion to their existing holdings. This subscription is not 
made by means of a renounceable letter. 
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